Successful Communication

As has been previously proposed, 'Philosophy of Language', can be defined as 'the study of successful Communication', a reflection of Leibniz' original inspiration for his Logicism, sight of which has seemingly gotten lost in the past century.  So, based on what has been examined here thus far, a provisional definition of 'successful Communication' can be: 'a correspondence, on the occasion of an Utterance, between the Intention of its speaker, and the Enactment of the addressee'.  Now, because of the radical alterity between speaker and addressee, that 'correspondence' cannot be reduced to Identity, a lack of specificity that is a virtue, not a vice, since it accurately represents the conditions under consideration.  Furthermore, the correspondence cannot be immediately and directly verified, but can only be inferred from a combination of the speaker's satisfaction, and the addressee's subsequent demonstrations of competence in later performances.  Now, because of its irreducible contingency and uncertainty, this model of 'Language' might not appeal to someone who demands simplicity and necessity in their formulations, but they, nevertheless, might recognize its applicability to a familiar scenario--in a classroom, in their own attempts to confirm that they have successfully communicated their version of 'Philosophy of Language' to a student, e. g. via a test.

Meaning and Enactment

As has been previously discussed, in at least some circumstances, the Meaning of an Utterance is the enactment of it by its addressee.  Now, that concept of Meaning is not Reference, since unlike a Referent, an Enactment does not exist at the moment of Utterance.  Nor is it a Sense, since unlike the latter, it is specific to the addressee and to the occasion, not general.  Furthermore, it is neither a Purpose, nor a Consequence, since, each of those entails a mechanical causal relation between Utterance and Action.  Finally, it is not the object of an Expression of a speaker's Intention, since, the latter can never be more than an external perspective on the addressee's private experience.  Thus, Enactment is a species of Meaning that is distinct from the varieties prominent in mainstream Philosophy of Language, unfamiliar there due at least in part to a less than thorough examination of actual Communication.

Meaning and Time

One abstraction that Levinas' model of face-to-face experience shares with Russell's Proposition, Wittgenstein's Language-Game, and Searle's Speech Act, is from Temporality.  That is, not only is how an addressee understands a speaker's utterance specific to their relation, it is specific to the occasion, as well.  Or, from another perspective, one's knowing how to enact a verbal formulation is a function of one's past attempts at it, and hence, their understanding of it varies accordingly.  Thus, insofar as the Meaning of an Utterance is, as has been previously proposed, its enactment, it is specific not only to the addressee, but to that moment, as well.  For example, if Neil Armstrong heard "Proceed" at 2:56 on 7/21/69, its Meaning is absolutely singular.

Meaning and Preception

Regardless of how anybody else understands it, a certain patch of green is a mere phenomenon unless one interprets it as a signal for them to move their car forward.  Furthermore, that interpretation is personal, i. e. it incorporates the know-how of the driver, which is, at least in part, constituted by the driver's memories of past experiences.  Hence, such interpretation is Meaning-conferring, and is absolutely unique, i. e. the resulting Meaning is incommensurate with that conferred on the signal by any other driver, by the installers of the light, the jurisprudential system, etc.  Likewise, the Meaning of any verbal signal, e. g. a recipe, travel directions, etc., is peculiar to the one following it.  Now, the term 'Preception' has been introduced here to characterize the awareness of a verbal sequence as a formulation for one to enact, and, furthermore, it has been previously argued here that every Utterance is fundamentally a Signal.  Thus, the primary Meaning of an Utterance is its enactment, with the Preception of it the source of that Meaning.  In their examinations of rule-following, Wittgenstein and Searle each encounter Preception, without appreciating its function in Semantics.

Understanding and Meaning

In #2 of the Investigations, the assistant's adequate understanding of the utterances of the builder consist in his knowing what to do upon hearing them.  Now, such knowledge incorporates at least some proprioceptive components, e. g. memories of his having fetched a block.  But, those components are opaque to the builder.  So, insofar as the 'meaning' of a builder's utterance is what the assistant understands by the words, it is not a pre-existing object of such understanding, but is first created in the latter process.  Likewise, more generally, Meaning is not conveyed, by an Utterance, from a speaker, as across a bridge, to an addressee, but originates in the latter.

Philosophy of Language and History

While Etymology strongly influences Nietzsche, it is no factor in mainstream Philosophy of Language, the typical object of which, for all approaches, is a-historical.  Now, the potential significance of the history of a word lies not merely in its origin, but in the demonstration of the mutability of the Meaning of the word.  That is, Etymology is a reminder that the Present may be no longer like the Past, and, thus, that hitherto shared meanings are always subject to dissociation.  So, in a Philosophy of Language that accommodates diachronic factors, it can be easily recognized that one source of Commonality is shared history, and that an irreducible uncertainty in Communication is the relation of the Present to the Past, e. g.  the assistant in #2 of the Investigations can at any moment decide that he no longer shares a purpose with the builder.  The neglect of such factors is another indication of the relative superficiality of recent a posteriori Philosophy of Language.

Philosophy of Language and Interest

With the Philosophy of Language defined as 'the study of effective Communication', and the radical alterity of interpersonal relations accepted as a fundamental premise, the primary problem of the enterprise is to determine Commonality in Communication.  Three prominent solutions to that problem have been: 1. The metaphysical world (Leibniz); 2. The natural world (Russell), and 3. Cognitive structures (early Wittgenstein).  Accordingly, the later Wittgenstein can be understood as rejecting the shared assumption of all three, i. e. that Commonality is Monistic.  But, in the process of demonstrating the Pluralism of Language-Games, he, perhaps unwittingly, implies the possibility of a Monistic #4--Interest.  For, the source of Commonality in a Language-Game is the Purpose that unites it and its participants.  So, if there is a universal Interest, e. g. world peace, then it is a potential single ground of effective Communication.

Ordinary Language and Contingency

Modern Philosophy of Language begins with Leibniz' vision of universal Communication, the medium of which, he posits, must be free of contingency, and, so, must be derived from Logic and/or Mathematics.  So, the substantive alternative approach to that ideal is a posteriori, i. e. is based on the examination of specific actual instances of successful Communication.  But, one shortcoming of Ordinary Language Semantics in that regard has been that its analysts have typically settled for merely exposing the limitations of Russellian a priori Logicism, via reliance on contrivances such as Language-Games and Speech Acts, rather than more rigorously seeking evidence of the rudiments of effective Communication in specific face-to-face experience.  So what they have missed in the latter context, as has been previously discussed, is the potentially significant radical alterity of speaker and addressee, which suffices to indicate the contingency of any verbal intermediary, and, perhaps, to suggest as a basis of an alternative to Logicism, a definition of 'communication' as a coordination of agents, not as a conveyance of content. Accordingly, Communication is revealed therein as essentially a Practical problem, not a puzzle in Logic or Epistemology, and, as such, in the purview of Morality, as Levinas proposes, or, perhaps, as an Art.  

Face-to-Face Communication

Wittgenstein seems correct, in #27 of the Investigations, to describe as "singular", the case of using someone's name to call them, but not merely in the sense that he means it, i. e. 'distinctive'.  Rather, as Buber, and Levinas show, to which Wittgenstein and his peers seem oblivious, the I-Thou, Face-to-Face experience is opaque and irreducible to any Third-Person scenario.  Accordingly, in particular, mainstream Philosophy of Language misses the singular use of Language that is plainly evident in person-to-person Communication, e. g. the Vocative character of Names and of Utterances, as has been previously discussed.  So, if the priority of First- and Second-Person to Third- is any indication, each of the prominent mainstream atomic concepts--Proposition, Language-Game, Speech Act, etc.--is not only inadequate to what is among the commonest, empirically verifiable, Language-events, i. e. face-to-face Communication, but a groundless contrivance that abstracts from it.

Names and Vocatives

The exemplary element of standard Philosophy of Language is the Name, primarily because its referential relation to its object so closely approximates an ideal Language-World correspondence that some characterize that relation as governed by Necessity.  So, Wittgenstein's observation, in #27 of the Investigations, "how singular is the use of a person's name to call him", is itself singular in the literature.  However, that use is hardly rare in ordinary practice, suggesting that the pervasive neglect of it is because it eludes reduction to Referring.  Instead, in those actual situations, a Name can be termed a 'Vocative', a grammatical category that is well-established despite being of little interest in the standard theories.  Nevertheless, in an alternative Philosophy of Language, the Second-Person use of the Name is still exemplary.  For, in Communication, all Utterances are fundamentally Vocative, i. e. they all have addressees, in an interpersonal relation from which the standard approaches, whether Logistic, or otherwise, tend to abstract.

Banter and Philosophy of Language

Banter is not a prominent topic in contemporary Philosophy of Language, possibly because its content is light.  But, for precisely that reason, it can be distinctively instructive--in it, the Form of Language is therefore highlighted.  For, the ultimate purpose of Banter is interpersonal socializing, i. e. it is conversation for the sake of conversation.  Accordingly, each Utterance involved is, at bottom, a Signal seeking another Utterance as its Response, thereby expressing a respect for the Form of the activity that Kant might admire.  Hence, in general, the function of Language as coordinating social interplay is laid  bare in Banter.  Now, Banter is no mere eccentric Language-Game; rather, it is the fundamental stratum of all other Language-Games, in the way that the physiological processes that are exercised in a gym work-out underlie purposeful exertions.  Accordingly, far from being Philosophically insignificant, Banter can redirect the attention of the Philosophy of Language from its usual object, the Language-World relation, to the interpersonal Communication that is the context of that relation.  Indeed, the examination of Banter by Philosophy of Language might be like holding up a mirror, since the latter often seems to be no more than a species of the former.    

Communication and Play

The profound flaw in the image of Communication as a 'bridge', which appears in Speech Acts, is the premise that an Utterance is common to both sides.  However, as has been previously discussed, an abyss separates the perspectives of a speaker and an addressee, so, the interaction is always constituted by what can never be more than two half-bridges.   Accordingly, a more accurate characterization of Communication, evident in common banter, is that it functions dynamically as interpersonal coordination.  Now, because such coordination is essentially both uncertain and independent of ulterior purpose, Communication can be classified as 'Play', a term conspicuously absent from Wittgenstein's study of Games, and, hence, as fundamentally not rule-governed, contrary to how Searle and Wittgenstein interpret it.  They, as much as Russell, abstract Language from its native element--empirically verifiable social interaction.

Signal, Response, Meaning

What, in Signal-Response Communication, a speaker 'means' by an utterance is an image of the addressee performing an action.  In contrast, what the addressee understands by the utterance is a proprioceptive image of their attempt to perform the action.  So, to a speaker, the Meaning of an Utterance does not coincide with that to an addressee, i. e. they are expressions of two irreducibly distinct perspectives on one and the same process, though, on occasion, there is appreciation from one or the other of the everse perspectives.  Plainly, each of the various established concepts of Meaning--Sense, Reference, Use, Consequence, etc.--abstracts from this fundamental discrepancy.

Meaning, Intention, Communication

If, following the utterance 'Leave!', its addressee remains immobile, either they did not understand it , or they did, but could not or did not want to execute it.  Thus, there is a distinction between a successful communication and a satisfied intention or purpose, i. e. an utterance might be understood when an intention or purpose remains unfilled.  So, insofar as the object of understanding is the meaning of an utterance, the distinction between Meaning and Intention is not, as Searle asserts, that the former is greater than the latter, but that it is less.  Accordingly, Wittgenstein's concept of Meaning as Use, and Peirce's as Consequences, are likewise inadequate.

Meaning, Intention, Uncertainty

In #2.6 of Speech Acts, Searle challenges the concept of Meaning as Intention: "Meaning is more than intention, it is also at least sometimes a matter of convention", for, otherwise, "any sentence can be uttered with any meaning whatsoever".  However, as is evident in even the simplest case of 'convention'--two people with a long history of verbal exchanges--misunderstanding is always possible, which demonstrates that what is additional to Intention in any Communication is a combination of uncertainty and trust, not some mysterious property of the language itself.  In other words, that extra dimension is Moral, not Semantic, as Searle himself exploits in his study of False Promising in chapter 8.

Meaning and Pragmatism

Peirce and his successors associate Meaning with Consequences, which are determinable by some controlled procedure, e. g. 'solid' = 'cannot be penetrated'.  So, because an operation is essential to their concept of Meaning, it is classified as 'Pragmatist'.  However, a Consequence is a cognized Effect, i. e. an object of scientific knowledge, so, in that regard, it remains a component of Theory.  In contrast, the concept of Meaning as Purpose or as Intention is fully incorporated into Action, and is, thus, completely Pragmatist.  If Wittgenstein had addressed those forerunners, he might have acknowledged their legacy, and its shortcomings that he corrects.

Meaning, Purpose, Intention

The Use-Purpose relation is essentially one of Mechanical Causality, i. e. to use U in order to bring about P presupposes that U causes P.  Thus, if, as Wittgenstein posits, Meaning is identical to Purpose, the Signal-Response relation is a mechanical one.  But, as has been previously argued here, a response to an utterance is fundamentally voluntary, and, hence, does not reduce to a mechanical effect of it.  Instead, a Pragmatist concept of Meaning that is more accurate than Purpose is Intention, the fulfillment of which cannot be taken for granted, and which conforms to how it is conceived in ordinary conversation, e. g. 'What do you mean by that?' is commonly regarded as synonymous with 'What do you intend by that?.

Purpose and Meaning

Wittgenstein's repudiation of Logicism is not based on the detection of some hitherto overlooked subtle detail, but on a profound shift of orientation in his concept of Semantics--from that of a Theoretical discipline to that of a Practical one.  That is, Meaning is now no longer a property of Language, but one of the act that produces Language.  In other words, he re-casts Meaning as Purpose, and, hence, as Pragmatist beyond even Dewey's concept of it as Consequence.  However, he stops short of explicitly recognizing that Semantics, accordingly, becomes a branch of Psychology and/or Morality, preferring to attend to painstakingly disconnecting it from its subsumption under Logic, perhaps because he prefers to think of his procedure as discovery and observation, rather than as positing and constructing.  As a result, the Investigations less shows the fly the way out of the bottle, than tries to convince it that it is inside a bottle, by repeatedly leading it to bump up against the insides of the bottle.

The Analytic Fly-Bottle

To assert, as Wittgenstein does, that the 'meaning' of a word' is its 'use', is to equate Meaning and Purpose.  Now, with a shift in method, from micro-analysis to macro-interpretation, it can be argued that the ultimate purpose of Language is Communication, and, furthermore, that the ultimate purpose of human communication is to promote the growth of the species.  On that basis, it follows that the meaning of every specific utterance is, at bottom, the growth of the species, a perhaps relatively uninteresting result that, nevertheless, reveals the contemporary Anglo-American fascination with Philosophy of Language to be due more to methodology than to substance.  So, Wittgenstein's concept of Meaning shows a way out of the Analytic Fly-Bottle, though he himself seems to prefer to remain inside it with Russell, as his comments at the end of #51 of the Investigations suggest.

Language and Content

According to one common concept of it, Language has 'content', i. e. its Meaning.  So, Wittgenstein not only de-mystifies that concept, he everts it.  For, in his Language-Game model, what any conversation is 'about' is the participants, things, actions, etc., in which it is imbedded.  Thus, in other words, the Meaning of Language is not contained in it; rather--Language is contained in its Meaning, according to Wittgenstein.

Using and Playing

Consistent with the image of Language-Game, Wittgenstein, in #108 of the Investigations, suggests that a word is "analogous to" a chess-piece.  However, the analogy founders on his concept of 'using a word', i. e. a bishop is something that is part of playing chess, not something brought along to a match, and inserted for use when relevant.  Furthermore, his argument, in #65-71, that the meaning of 'game' is context-bound, implies that so, too, is that of 'playing'.  In contrast, he generally treats 'using' as univocal', suggesting a privileged, primitive status for it, indicative of a "foundation', even though, in #124, he prohibits the latter from Philosophical discourse.  So, rather than reinforcing his Language-Game image, the analogy in #108 only exposes Wittgenstein's uncertainty involving a distinction that some, e. g. Kant, regard as Philosophically vital--between Communication fundamentally as purposeful, or as purposeless. 

Reading and Representation

In #156 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein initiates an examination of "reading" by defining it as "the activity of rendering out loud what is written or printed".  Two results of what ensues are that 'reading' has multiple uses, and that in each of those instances, a mysterious influence is exerted on a 'reader'.  Now, conspicuously absent in the definition is any consideration of what is arguably the essence of the process--that its object is taken to be a representation of some sort.  Furthermore, to take an object as a representation of any kind involves being directed by it to whatever it represents, i. e. it functions as a signal to make an association, which  easily explains the felt influence that intrigues Wittgenstein.  So, in that significant absence, his conclusions, as is, seem to have little value.

Reading and Communication

In #156-71 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein examines the process of Reading, with special attention to the seemingly mysterious influence that its object exerts on it.  A little later, in #180, he briefly entertains a potential explanation of that influence, but without fully exploring it.  There, he considers that that object might be a "signal", but without pursuing the implication that it is produced by a 'signaler'.  That bypassing is part of his general relative neglect of the process that is complementary to Reading, i. e. Writing.  Now, if he had devoted equal attention to the latter, he might have recognized that the two originate as phases of Communication, with Reading, therefore, as essentially a response to its object, and, thus, as inherently influenced by it.

Philosophy as Therapy

The concept of Philosophy as 'therapy', suggested by Wittgenstein in #133 of the Investigations, has had appeal to opponents of Logicism, in which Philosophy is conceived as regulating, if not constituting, the ordinary use of Language.  However, the image is only superficially helpful to his agenda.  For, 'therapy' is commonly associated with Psychoanalysis and related practices, the rise to prominence of which originates with Nietzsche's novel insights, at the center of which is his discovery of the Will to Power, and his efforts to supplant the Will to Live as the fundamental conatus of human conduct, the far-reaching implications of which are only slowly being explored.  So, to reduce such potentially epochal Philosophical activity to one of its consequences only illuminates how constricted Wittgenstein's range is, regardless of how effective he is against Logicism.

Contemplation, Empowerment, Language

A certain experience of exaltation has prevalently been characterized by Philosophers as a moment of Contemplation, and, hence, as private, with respect to which any subsequent description of it is extrinsic.  In contrast, in recent centuries, there has been slowly emerging, e. g. in the works of Spinoza, Kant, and Nietzsche, an alternative interpretation of the experience--that it is a moment of Empowerment, an excitation the continuation of which is an attempt to communicate it, and, hence, that it is a phase of a fundamentally social experience, in the second phase of which the initial datum may be transformed, e. g. by a process of articulation.  So, despite Wittgenstein's perhaps unprecedented attention to Language, in #133 of the Investigations, when he alludes to "stopping doing philosophy" while not ceasing to discuss the stoppage, he reveals his concept of Philosophy to be in the Contemplationist tradition.  In that regard, his invocation of silence at the end of his philosophizing in the Tractatus is more conscientious.

Writing, Cogito, Certainty

As has been previously discussed here, the scenario that Descartes describes in the Meditations is not quite as he presents it, i. e. he is plainly at a desk writing, not conducting a thought-experiment while sitting in front of a fire.  Still, it might be argued that the discrepancy is extrinsic to the described procedure and its results.  However, on the other hand, the non-coincidence is perhaps fatal to the entire project.  For, the pivotal proposition in the exercise is 'I cannot doubt that I am doubting', on the grounds that 'One cannot simultaneously doubt and not doubt'.  So, the presumption of that simultaneity is essential to procedure.  But, that Descartes is merely reporting it only amplifies what critics since Kant have argued--that doubting that one doubts consists in two, successive, acts.  In other words, in the writing of the Meditations, Descartes cannot attribute Certainty to any Cogito that he is reporting, unless he somehow identifies it with that process of describing.

Using Language

That a dog can respond to the sound "ball" by fetching a ball is no indication that it can use the English language, nor that the issuer can, either, i. e. any other oral signal might have been equally effective.  Thus, Wittgenstein's call-and-response scenario, in #2 of the Investigations, does not necessarily involve the use of the German or English Language, and, hence, is not necessarily a Language-Game involving either of them.  Furthermore, that "block" from the assistant might be nothing more than mechanical mimicry of an issuance from the builder, suggests that it might not be an instance of Naming, and, hence, does not suffice, contrary to what Wittgenstein proposes in #7, to distinguish the scenario as a Language-Game.  In contrast, the assistant's "yes, sir" in response to "block", would be a better indication that he has learned to use the same Language of which "block" is a part.  Thus, more generally, the 'use of Language' begins only with an independent speech-act, and, likewise, a Language-Game involves at least two players, i. e. at least two participants who have learned to use the relevant Language.

Philosophy, Cartography, Language

In cartographic terms, the Meditations can be conceived as describing the drawing of a map from point A, siting in front of a fire, to B, the Cogito, and, thereafter, to the existence of God, Mathematics, etc.  Now, the primary dispute with this map in Modern Philosophy has been regarding point B, e. g. for some B is, instead, a sense-datum.  In contrast, it has been suggested here that A is, more properly, writing at a desk, a suggestion based on a shift of perspective--to the description itself as a map, i. e. in which B is the determination of a starting-point, C is a demonstration that other points can be reached from B, etc.  In other words, from that perspective, the book is fundamentally a primer in what might be called 'theory-construction', and it is in that respect that it has been most influential.  So, as Empiricism, Phenomenalism, etc. evince, the greater historical significance of the Meditations is its use of Language, not its attempted allusion to some non-verbal state.