Names and Vocatives

The exemplary element of standard Philosophy of Language is the Name, primarily because its referential relation to its object so closely approximates an ideal Language-World correspondence that some characterize that relation as governed by Necessity.  So, Wittgenstein's observation, in #27 of the Investigations, "how singular is the use of a person's name to call him", is itself singular in the literature.  However, that use is hardly rare in ordinary practice, suggesting that the pervasive neglect of it is because it eludes reduction to Referring.  Instead, in those actual situations, a Name can be termed a 'Vocative', a grammatical category that is well-established despite being of little interest in the standard theories.  Nevertheless, in an alternative Philosophy of Language, the Second-Person use of the Name is still exemplary.  For, in Communication, all Utterances are fundamentally Vocative, i. e. they all have addressees, in an interpersonal relation from which the standard approaches, whether Logistic, or otherwise, tend to abstract.