Communication and Play

The profound flaw in the image of Communication as a 'bridge', which appears in Speech Acts, is the premise that an Utterance is common to both sides.  However, as has been previously discussed, an abyss separates the perspectives of a speaker and an addressee, so, the interaction is always constituted by what can never be more than two half-bridges.   Accordingly, a more accurate characterization of Communication, evident in common banter, is that it functions dynamically as interpersonal coordination.  Now, because such coordination is essentially both uncertain and independent of ulterior purpose, Communication can be classified as 'Play', a term conspicuously absent from Wittgenstein's study of Games, and, hence, as fundamentally not rule-governed, contrary to how Searle and Wittgenstein interpret it.  They, as much as Russell, abstract Language from its native element--empirically verifiable social interaction.