Ordinary Language and Contingency

Modern Philosophy of Language begins with Leibniz' vision of universal Communication, the medium of which, he posits, must be free of contingency, and, so, must be derived from Logic and/or Mathematics.  So, the substantive alternative approach to that ideal is a posteriori, i. e. is based on the examination of specific actual instances of successful Communication.  But, one shortcoming of Ordinary Language Semantics in that regard has been that its analysts have typically settled for merely exposing the limitations of Russellian a priori Logicism, via reliance on contrivances such as Language-Games and Speech Acts, rather than more rigorously seeking evidence of the rudiments of effective Communication in specific face-to-face experience.  So what they have missed in the latter context, as has been previously discussed, is the potentially significant radical alterity of speaker and addressee, which suffices to indicate the contingency of any verbal intermediary, and, perhaps, to suggest as a basis of an alternative to Logicism, a definition of 'communication' as a coordination of agents, not as a conveyance of content. Accordingly, Communication is revealed therein as essentially a Practical problem, not a puzzle in Logic or Epistemology, and, as such, in the purview of Morality, as Levinas proposes, or, perhaps, as an Art.