Anarchism and Federalism

Proudhon espouses Federalism, which seems to conflict with his Anarchism, because the former connotes a centralized government, while the latter connotes individual liberty.  However, Federalism unifies not individual citizens, but smaller political units, of which a citizen is more immediately a member.  So, he conceives a Federation as functioning as protection of the citizen from more localized tyranny.  A more recent example that seems to exemplify his analysis is the protection, by the U. S. Federal Government, of voting rights in a state like Mississippi.  Likewise, some of the apparent Anti-Federalism of sone American Libertarians is actually a defense of State authority, and, hence, potentially antagonistic to individual citizens that are subject to that authority.

Anarchism and Mutualism

As has been previously discussed, the Modern concept of Citizen-Sovereign Contract is grounded in the mutual consent of citizens.  Now, the concept of mutuality is of especial significance to Proudhon, because he conceives the Economic system that is suitable to his variety of Anarchism to be what he calls Mutualism. The fundamental element of Mutualism is freely-engaged equitable exchange, thereby, according to some analysts, combining free-market Capitalism with exploitation-free Socialism.  It also implicitly repudiates the profit-seeking Ethical Egoism that is the psychological basis of Smith's system.

Contract, Sovereign, Anarchism

As has been previously discussed, the Citizen-Sovereign contract of the main Contractarian models, is derived from Citizen-Citizen consent.  The analysis thus exposes the actual function of the Sovereign in these models--to enforce and adjudicate the latter stratum.  However, Proudhon's excising of the Sovereign in his Anarchistic variation of Contractarianism does not follow necessarily.  For, whether or not an independent party is required to perform those functions depends on whether or not the parties to a contract are themselves capable of effectively self-policing, which is no simple problem.  And, if they are not, then his Anarchistic model requires some accommodation of enforcement and adjudication, in which parties concede sovereignty to what that might entail.  So, the appeal of Proudhon's vision may be no more than superficial.

Contract, Citizen, Sovereign

The Contract in the main Modern Contractarian models, e. g. both Hobbes' and Rousseau's, is between each Citizen and the Sovereign, however the latter might be embodied.  Now, the establishment of the Contract in these cases tends to conflate three distinct stages: 1. Association of individuals on some basis; 2. Representation of the association; 3. Establishment of an agreement between the representation and each individual.  However, implicit in #1 is a more fundamental agreement, namely, one constituted by the terms of the association, e. g. a cessation of hostilities, which develops through the other two stages, i. e. implicit in one's contractual arrangement with the Sovereign is that each other is doing likewise.  So, the ground of legitimacy of the Citizen-Sovereign Contract is the consent between each Citizen with every other, a ground which tends to be obscured in the tradition.

Monarchism, Contractarianism, Anarchism

While Rule of Law might be the predominant feature of the Modern Polity, its foundation is the Contract.  The historical significance of the Contract is that it supplants Hereditary Monarchism, usually theologically underwritten, as the source of political legitimacy.  However, as Proudhon perhaps is the first to note, there is a profound conflation in the prominent theories of the era--whether the parties to the Contract are Individuals, or are an Individual and the Sovereign, i. e. the expositions tend to groundlessly shift from one to the other, and any concept of a Sovereign is vestigial Monarchism.  So, Prodhoun's Anarchism can be conceived as Contractarianism that eliminates the Individual-Sovereign Contract.  Conversely, because an inter-individual contract establishes order between them, such Contractarianism is not anarchic qua chaotic.

Law and Privacy

As has been previously discussed, Rule of Law is formally antithetical to Individualism, though the content of a law can defend and promote it.  It is also often regarded as hostile to Privacy, which only sometimes reduces to Individualism.  For, in many cases, such opacity entails a multiplicity, agreement amongst which first produces it, e. g. sexual relations.  The claim to the privileged status of agreement is one of fundamental grounds for Economic de-regulation, based on the analysis that a Free-Market system is constituted by a network of private arrangements.  However, granting such an opacity, it is not extended to activity that exceeds the agreement, e. g. when a third-party is affected by such activity.  But, perhaps the biggest challenge to such a claim is that agreement entails voluntariness, and it is often difficult to determine if consent is truly voluntary, e. g. someone under duress.  That difficulty is a central factor in American life, even if business-as-usual tends to obscure it.  In the absence of attention to that indeterminacy, Law remains widely conceived as a threat to Privacy.

Law, Individual, Universal

The example of the United States seems to refute the previously asserted proposition that Law is antithetical to Individualism.  For, the U. S., as is often stated, is a "nation of laws", beginning with the Constitution, and the centerpiece of that document is the Bill of Rights, which protects the Individual in a variety of ways.  However, the content of a law is distinguishable from its form, and regardless of the former, the latter is Universal.  In other words, that a law protects each individual is a contingent feature of it.  Likewise, there is a distinction of contingent and necessary in the contrast between the claim of a right as an individual, and universal requirement to respect the right of others.  Arguably, the privileging of the former is one of the fundamental sources of discontent in current American society.

Anarchism, Capitalism, Rule of Law

One feature of the typical contemporary polity that is antithetical to Individualism is the Rule of Law.  For, Law in these cases tends to be Universal, thereby abstracting from any individual distinctiveness.  Thus, the Archy opposed by varieties of Anarchism that are modes of Individualism is Law, e. g. government regulations of Capitalist activity. However, such cases do not enjoy Wolff's Kantian defense of Anarchism, since it applies only to autonomous conduct, which Capitalist Egoism is not.  Proof of the latter is as follows: autonomous conduct is conduct determined by Pure Practical Reason; conduct determined by Pure Practical Reason is that the maxim of which can be a universal law; the maxim of Capitalist Egoism is 'optimize profit'; but, that maxim will self-destruct as a universal law, since every profit entails some loss; therefore, Capitalist Egoism is heteronomous behavior.  Or, more plainly, such Egoism is instinctive, with respect to which Reason is only instrumental.

Pure Practical Reason and Law

Kant's Pure Practical Reason can also be characterized as Legislative Reason or Legislative Will.  For, according to him, it is the faculty that creates Laws--not merely edicts, but formulations that qualify as Laws by entailing Universality, the fundamental characteristic of a Law.  Now, in his system, Pure Practical Reason functions primarily as the basis of Morality, as a vehicle of an Individual's transcendence of external influences.  But, it is also potentially relevant to Political Philosophy.  For, its concept of Universalizability offers a criterion for weeding out any partisanship from presumably egalitarian legislative processes.

Anarchism, Individual, State

The Anarchist concept of an antagonistic relation between Individual and State/Government is concrete in one context--criminal jurisprudential proceedings.  For, in those, it is the State or Government vs. some particular citizen.  But, whether or not the action is justified, it is implicitly a deviation from some non-antagonistic relation.  So, even if that antagonism has become normalized in a given polis, it does not follow that it is inherent in political organization.  Likewise, that some organism is chronically ill does not imply that Life is essentially a diseased condition.  So, Anarchism has no more than contingent value--as a corrective to a Rule in which the Ruled are alienated from the Ruling.

Anarchism and Anti-Statism

By implication, what Anarchists oppose can be called 'Archism', and since they tend to advocate self-determinism, Archism can be broadly defined as 'Rule in which Ruler and Ruled are not identical'.  But, in the salient moments of their history, the kind of Rule that they specifically oppose is that in which the Ruler is anonymous and centralized, usually termed the 'State' or the 'Government'.  In other words, their target might be more the Soviet bureaucracy than Stalin.  No doubt they also oppose tyrants, but they are peripheral factors in the doctrine.  So, more accurate than 'Anarchism' is 'Anti-Statism'.

Capitalism and Anarchy

The implied positive concepts of which anarchy and Anarchism are the negations are archy and Archism, respectively, hitherto non-addressed.  So, corresponding to the distinction, previously discussed, between the negatives, 'archy' is a social condition in which some rule obtains, while 'Archism' is the doctrine that asserts that some rule is better than no rule.  Now, a 'rule' is a human institution, as opposed to either a natural or a superhuman law.  But, Capitalism is conceived as fundamentally governed by either a natural law, i. e. the Law of Supply and Demand, or a superhuman law, i. e. the dictate of the Invisible Hand.  Thus, Capitalism is not archic, and any insistence that market activity not be interfered with is not Archistic.  In other words, Capitalism is anarchic, and the defense of it is often Anarchistic.

History and Events

History is usually conceived as events organized in some manner, with chronological order the most basic pattern.  But, that concept misleadingly suggests that there is nothing occurring in between those events, whereas, as is the case in everyday experience, History is constituted as a flux, in which an 'event' is actually more like a salient node than a discrete atom.  Furthermore, an event is internally temporal, i. e. its constituents are themselves organized in some manner.  So, a concept of History must be both inter- and intra-event, and, if there is a distinction between those two, they must be systematically related.  Thus, for example, a Dialectical concept of History, of any variety, by sharply distinguishing its moments, i. e. Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis, abstracts from actual flux, and, so, as a representation of it, is inadequate to its concreteness.

Anarchy, Anarchism, Self-Determination

Literally, 'anarchy' means 'rulelessness'.  Thus, the common use, signifying 'chaos', is etymologically accurate.  In contrast, the doctrine 'Anarchism' is not.  It is so superficially, insofar as it connotes the rejection, in either practice or principle, of a 'State'.  But, that rejection is, more precisely, that of Heteronomy, i. e. of external rule, so it does not preclude Autonomy, i. e. self-determination, which, upon closer examination, is often endorsed by Anarchists.  Thus, for example, Wolff, in his "defense of Anarchism", recognizes the systematic relation between that doctrine and Kantian Autonomy.  Accordingly, any social organization that is fundamentally produced and maintained by voluntary arrangements can be classified as 'Anarchistic' in this sense, though not as literally 'anarchic'.

Anarchy and Anarchism

'Anarchy', in common parlance, is synonymous with 'chaos'.  In contrast, 'Anarchism' is a doctrine the cardinal element of which is the thesis that self-determination is the best principle of social organization, with variations of the concept of 'best' the grounds of varieties of the doctrine.  In other words, anarchy is antithetical to Political Philosophy, while Anarchism, as the suffix suggests, is a special case of it.

Political Philosophy and State of Nature

One of the fundamental debates of Modern Political Philosophy is: Humankind is by nature in a condition of universal war, e. g. Hobbes, vs. Humankind is by nature in a condition of universal peace, e. g. Rousseau.  Correspondingly, therefore, is a debate over the basic function of Political Philosophy--to neutralize universal war vs. to undo the artificial impediments to universal peace.  Now, one criticism of the terms of the debate is that there is no such 'state of nature', from which it follows that Political Philosophy is a groundless enterprise.  Still, by re-conceiving the 'state of nature' as heuristic, the enterprise can recover at least some justification.  However, even granted that modification, the two positions share an arbitrary presupposition--both a state of war and a state of peace are structures.  In contrast to both is the premise, whether constitutive or heuristic, that Humankind is formless, from which it follows that the basic function of Political Philosophy is to introduce organization into it, with the debate over the best type of organization independent of any supposition of a 'state of nature'.

Dialectical Materialism and Technocracy

According to Dialectical Materialism, Techne consists in a modification of Matter.  However, Technology involves more than such a transformation.  It also consists in the harnessing of laws of Nature, e. g. the harnessing of laws governing fire, to warm a room.  Thus, insofar as Dialectical Materialism is, as Marxists posit, a law of Nature, it, too, is subject to being harnessed, e. g. inducing a Revolution.  But, Dialectical Materialism cannot account for the harnessing of a law like itself.  In other words, Marxist Technocracy, i. e. Socialism that is deliberately developed out of Capitalism, cannot be derived from Dialectical Materialism.

History and Political Philosophy

For Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke, History is irrelevant to their model societies. Instead, Marx vacillates between conceiving it as a force that necessarily transforms Capitalism into Socialism, and as itself part of a world that must be changed.  For Nietzsche, it is a source of examples.  In contrast, it can be conceived as the precondition of what is now to be done, most generally, either a continuation of a status quo, or a variation of it, depending on how satisfactory it is.  So, Shakespeare might have the more accurate concept of History than any in this group--it is a prologue to subsequent action, though without the formal sharp distinction between the two that is a characteristic of Plays.  Rather, the transition is a constantly mobile one.  Accordingly, a Political Philosophy reflects its preconditions, as their extension, to a greater or lesser degree of similitude.

Scientific Socialism and Technological Socialism

It is unclear if the term "scientific socialism", formulated by Engels, accurately applies to Marxism.  For, the 'science' to which he refers is Dialectical Materialism, the Marxist concept of History.  But History always ends at the present moment, so any concept of it is an interpretation of the world.  In contrast, to change the world in accordance with the principles of an interpretation of the world entails the application of them to action, or, in other words, Techne.  So, more accurate than "scientific socialism" in the case of Marxism is 'technological socialism'.

Technocracy and Revolution

Techne consists in applied Theory. In the case of the main works of Modern Political Philosophy, the Theory involved is Psychological Egoism, which is itself an application of Atomist Mechanics to human behavior.  So, to that extent, the doctrines that result are Technocracies.  In the case of Marx, the Theory involved is Dialectical Materialsm, or, eqiuvalently, Class Conflict.  Now, applied Dialectical Materialism is Revolution, spanning the transition from Capitalism to Socialism, and, so, Marxism is Technocratic in that respect.  However, it is less obvious how Socialism, once established, is applied Dialectical Materialism, and, so, if it is Technocratic, the informing Theory is likewise less obvious. Thus, the concept of Marxism, qua, as held by some, "permanent revolution", is better evidence of Marxist Technocracy than its Socialism.

History and the Understanding of History

The standard Archimedean moment of Modern Political Philosophy is purportedly a Nowhen, or in Spinoza's case, Eternity.  But, these works are products of abstractions from a transition from the Medieval Era that precedes the writing of them, a period dominated by Theocracy.  In contrast, for Marx, the best polis occurs at a not only specific, but a unique, When, the transition to which is an instance of a general principle of History, i. e. Dialectical Materialism.  Still, what he does not quite explain is the nature of the moment of his coming to understand the essence of that transition, and whether or not the process of coming to that understanding is itself an instance of that general principle, i. e. whether or not it is via Dialectical Materialism that he arrives at that awareness.  This is less of a problem for Hegelian Dialectical Idealism, because the terminal moment of the process is an Idea.

Archimedean Where? and Archimedean When?

While Archimedes presents a transcendent point of leverage as heuristic, some Philosophers have conceived it as real in some respect, though without adequately explaining where the point is located, e. g. Nagel's facetious "Nowhere".  Now, the difficulties that they thereby tend to evade are more clearly articulated in a temporal analog to Archimedes' spatial image, a corresponding transcendent moment that emerges in any Philosophical concept of History.  For, that process of emergence is itself also part of History, which means that it has to be accommodated within the concept that emerges from it.  In other words, the problem of an Archimedean When? cannot be as easily finessed as that of an Archimedean Where? has been.

Archimedes and Technocracy

The fundamental principle of Technocracy is Archimedes' statement, "Give me a place to stand on, and I will move the world." Modern Philosophy is Technocratic in that respect, e. g. the Cogito, and a Sense-Datum, for Rationalists and Empiricists, respectively,  are such 'places', though the abstraction from the Practical character of the enterprise typically gets it hypostasized as Theoretical 'Foundationalism'.   Likewise, Modern Political Philosophy has its Archimedean places, e. g. the Individual, Natural Right, Self-Interest, etc.  These are all devices for moving, if not the world, human society, but, because the search for and securing of the point is, like Wittgenstein's Ladder, dispensed with, their Practical and Historical character, and, hence, their Technocratic function, is suppressed within the content of the works.

Practice, Change, History

The content of Political Philosophy is Practical rather than Theoretical, since it concerns Action, not an object of Cognition.  However, it not so obviously concerns changing the world, as opposed to interpreting it, as Marx posits the contrast.  For, while a Modern work typically constructs a model of a preferred society, and gets published with the implication that it be actualized, there is never the exhortation, as there is in the Communist Manifesto, to prepare for such a construction by destroying its preconditions, e. g. even Rousseau only advises change, without systematically incorporating it into his model, as Marx-Engels do.  In order to so incorporate it, the preconditions, too, must be systematically related to what is to supplant them, which requires a concept of History that embraces both and the transition from one to the other.  So, while the main works of Modern Political Philosophy concern Practice, as a-historical, they do not constitute efforts to change the world, even if they do not interpret it, either.

The Prince and Technocracy

Though it is typically cited as the first work of Modern Political Philosophy, The Prince seems to have very little in common with the rest of that era.  For, while those works posit competing models of the best social organization, Machiavelli abstracts almost completely from any such content, instead offering advice to a ruler regarding the maintaining of power.  So, The Prince superficially seems to be a different genre of Political writing than Leviathan, etc.  Still, the contrast is instructive, since it is a reminder that implicit in the latter group is that they, too, are pieces of advice on how to rule, i. e. they are programs to be executed by a ruler, not mere fodder for theoretical debate.  In other words, they, too, are Technocratic.

Technocracy and Social Engineering

Like that of Technology, some of the hostility to Technocracy is rooted in an antagonism to Techne that is expressed in fundamental cultural myths, e. g. that of Prometheus, and that of Adam and Eve.  Typical of those myths is that Techne constitutes a straying of humans from some higher order, e. g. some deity, or divinized 'Nature'.  So, entailed in those expressions of antagonism is the existence of a higher order, or, conversely, absent that premise, any implication that Techne, and its modes, is inherently malign is groundless.  Consequently, if there is any ill in Technocracy, it is only contingent and particular, not necessary and general.  Thus, for example, if busing is ineffective as a remedy for racial bigotry, it is not because it is "social engineering" that is a violation of some higher order segregation, as some seem to conceive it.

Technocracy and Capitalism

The most prominent examples of Technocracy the past several centuries have been Economic ones, often as a response to perceived shortcomings of Capitalism.  The primary target of those responses is the presumed existence of the Invisible Hand of the Market, the purported source of Justice in the system.  Accordingly, Socialism, and, less radically, Keynesianism, consist in Techne, i. e. the deliberate control over, or at least intervention in, the distribution of goods.  But, also, any centralized banking system, which controls the quantity and rate of availability of money, is Technocratic.  Thus, the most fervent opponents of Technocracy have been Capitalists, though the soundness of their arguments tends to not match that fervor.  For, their fundamental premise, the existence of the Invisible Hand, is typically presented dogmatically, an inadequacy that therefore trickles down to any claim of a 'right' against interference in the receipt of assets in the open Market, e. g. taxation of income.  Nevertheless, in some places, notably the U. S., that premise continues to be deeply entrenched.

Technocracy and Tools

Tools originate for humans as compensation for natural deficiencies, e. g. forks for claws, but often far exceed their basic function.  Now, Political Philosophy can be conceived as a tool in that respect--compensating for a deficiency of instinct in social organization, but thereby gaining much greater versatility.  So, just as Techne is the skilled use of a tool, Technocracy is skill in social organization.  Thus, 'Technocracy' is uninformative in the way that 'Aristocracy', in its literal meaning--rule of the Best--is, i. e. neither term in itself contributes content to the concept of Skill, or of Best.  Still, that Technocracy is the best form of social organization does informatively entail that Political Philosophy is at the service of human affairs, and is neither an alien structure superimposed on humans, nor a necessary evil.

Technocracy and Empowerment

Techne means Know-How and Skill, and, therefore, Ability.  Thus, it is also equivalent to Power.  Accordingly, a fully developed Technocracy is a society in which each can exercise their abilities, and, hence, are thereby empowered.  Marx expresses a Technocratic ideal in his "From each according to their abilities" formulation, though Dialectic Materialism, as 'scientific' Socialism, is Theory, not Practice, and, hence, is not a dimension of a Technocracy.  Plato's Republic is a Technocracy insofar as Ability is determined by Nature.  In contrast, the concept of Freedom that is a cardinal element in Modern Individualism does not necessarily entail Techne, and, so, is not necessarily an empowered condition.  And, Technocracy in this sense has little to do with the common use of the term as part of derogatory rhetoric that typically targets institutional efforts to correct racial segregation.

Anthropocene and Ecosystem

The current debate among geologists--whether or not the Earth has entered an Anthropocene Epoch, and, if so, since when, is methodologically unsound in at least two respects, even granted that there are precise criteria for determining that Humankind has 'significantly' affected the terrestrial ecosystem.  First, whether the proximate cause is the 18th Century Industrial Revolution, with its increase of carbon dioxide, or the Agricultural Revolution of circa 10,000 BC, with its deforestation, or even more primitive hunting, any accurate gauge of impact on the ecosystem requires a base case of zero impact, which, since it entails both the presence of a human measurer, and the non-presence of humans, is impossible.  Furthermore, all the accepted indicators of influence are destructive, which arbitrarily preempts the possibility that Humankind has functioned constructively in some respect within the ecosystem.  Obviously, the debate is specifically occasioned by Climate Change, but it also presupposes the theological premise that Humankind is an alien intruder into the ecosystem, and, therefore, a malevolent one.  Surely, ecologically damaging Human activity requires correction.  But an inadequately grounded declaration about geological epochs is not an effective means to that end.