Soul and Reproduction

One of Schopenhauer's fundamental theses is that sexual pleasure is Nature's means to stimulate Reproduction.  On that basis, the long and continuing tradition of treating sexual desire as a merely personal phenomenon is erroneous; rather, it a manifestation, in a Person, of a Species drive.  But, despite being the prototype of a critic of Empiricism, Plato takes sexual desire at face value, classifying it as one of the drives of the Appetitive portion of the Person-Soul.  He thereby misses an opportunity to systematically link the Person-Soul to a Polis-Soul, a World-Soul, or to any other trans-personal Soul, from which different concepts of Happiness and Justice might be developed.

Soul, Justice, Happiness

One of the fundamental questions of the Republic is whether or not the Just person is Happy.  Consequently, while the explicit topic of the dialogue is Justice, the implicit and perhaps more fundamental one is Happiness, with Socrates arguing that the various concepts of it held by the interlocutors, and relecting common opinion, are faulty.  Instead, anticipating Aristotle, Plato defines Happiness as the condition of a well-functioning Soul, constituted by each part, under the guidance of Reason, performing its proper function.  Now, writ large, i. e. applied to the Polis-Soul, such well-functioning entails that each Citizen performs their proper function, and, presumably, are Happy doing so.  However, writ small, i. e. applied to the Person-Soul, no such concept of personal Happiness is entailed, since there is no part of Plato's concept of the Person-Soul the function of which is Political.  Likewise, Aristotle's concept of Friendship as a Virtue is systematically anomalous, since it transcends his concept of the Person-Soul, and, hence, that of personal Happiness.  So, in sum, the concept of Happiness in the Republic that is the basis of Plato's demonstration that a Just person, and only a Just person, is Happy, is not quite adequate to the purpose, primarily because his concept of the Person-Soul lacks any inherent connection to the Polis-Soul.

Person-Soul and Polis-Soul

Even though Plato likens the structure of the personal Soul to that of the Polis, he does not attribute a Soul to the latter.  Now, in the Timaeus, he attributes a Soul to the World, so he is not commited to restricting a Soul to a person.  Accordingly, that a Polis, too, has a Soul is implicit.  But, if so, then a Person-Soul can only be part of the Polis-Soul, which, at minimum, complicates the exposition of the Republic.  For, the Part-Whole relation undermines the Writ Small-Writ Large analogy, and there must be some component of the Person-Soul that evinces a fundamental connection to the Polis-Soul.  Accordingly, the concepts of Happy Person and Just Person, i. e. that are the central issues of the dialogue, need to be revised, even if the essence of the rebuttals to Glaucon and Thrasymachus remain intact.

Soul, Polis, Philosopher-King

Like any analogy, Plato's concept of the relation between personal Soul and Polis as writ small-writ large suggests a parallel, and, hence, an inherent non-coincidence of the two terms.  As such, the essential segregation of Soul and Polis seems at home in a Theology of the Salvation of the Individual Soul, expostulated in a work entitled City of God.  However, in the Republic, Plato proceeds to violate the parallel. For, rather, Soul and Polis converge--in the person of the Philosopher-King, a Just person under whose Rational rulership the Polis becomes Just.  Likewise, Aristotle's concept of the Just person is part of the education of Political leadership.  The lacuna in Plato's concept of a Just Polis is that it does not explain how the Souls of the ruled become Just, since they, unlike that of the Philosopher-King, are inherently Unjust, i. e. not ruled by Reason.  Regardless, the Republic is a City of Man, not a City of God, as its corporeal necessities indicate.

Contributive Justice and Volition

Doing one's share can be either voluntary or involuntary, or, equivalently, for its own sake or as a means to another end, e. g. avoiding punishment.  Now, among those who regard the distinction as essential are Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, who attribute personal Justness to the Soul, Character, and Intention, respectively.  On the other hand, Mill is among those for whom Volition is not distinct from Action.  Thus, likewise on Consequentialist grounds, he rejects the segregation of Voluntary and Involuntary on the basis that the former is in the realm of 'Ethics' while the latter is not.  But, regardless, any such segregation is irrelevant in at least one case--Economic Contributive Justice, which consists completely in overt actions, e. g. paying dues, performing a chore, etc.  In such situations, motive might be relevant to some considerations, but not to whether or not one has done one's share.  So, Volition is not an essential factor of Contributive Justice, or, hence, of Justice in general.

Contributive Justice and Communism

Probably the only two prominent examples of Contributive Justice being entailed in a Political Philosophy are from Plato and Marx.  In both cases it is the concept of each member of a society doing what they do well, the difference being that the former, but not the latter, distinguishes those abilities by natural classes.  Regardless, they share a communist vision of the best society.  Under such conditions, doing one's fair share is not regarded as an imposition, but as a pleasure, just as it is in any collective enterprise.  Conversely, therefore, the rarity of Contributive Justice as a principle in the history of Political Philosophy is a reflection of the predominance of Atomism, even in the case of Aristotle, whose pronounced Holism is inconsistent, as has been previously discussed.

Varieties of Justice

A simple model illustrates how Economic Justice combines Contributive, Reciprocatory, and Distributive Justices.  If 5 investors each purchase a share for $100, and the return is $1000, each receives $200 back.  So, $100 is Contributive, 5-way split is Distributive, and $200 is Reciprocatory.  Likewise, if one of the 5 purchases 4 shares, and the yield is $1600, that one receives $800, and the others $200.  So, in this case, Contributive Justice remains $100 per share, Distributive Justice consists in a 4-1-1-1-1 pattern, and Reciprocatory Justice involves 4 $200 and 1 $800 returns.

Contributive Justice and Democracy

Contributive Justice is an uncommon term for a not uncommon practice that has rarely received systematic attention.  It connotes 'doing one's share', exemplified by dues-paying and mandatory military service, but alluded to in the context of a general social doctrine by probably only Marx' ' From each according to one's ability' formulation.  The concept is certainly germane to that of a Participatory Democracy.  So, that even mandatory voting is regarded as an imposition is a symptom of a deficiency in a presumed 'Democracy'.

Justice and Requital

Since terms like Retributive Justice and Rectificatory Justice typically connote punishment, theories of Justice tend to ignore Just positive requital, e. g. a reward.  So, what can be called Reciprocatory Justice is the more general category of Just requital.  Now, in many cases, positive Reciprocity is, like punishment, e. g. an eye for an eye, based on a one-to-one formula, e. g. a bonus.  But in other cases, e. g. profit-sharing, a determining factor in the formula is a scheme of Distribution.  Thus, most generally, Reciprocatory Justice is coordinated with Distributive Justice, with simple one-to-one requital a special case, i. e. when return is not delimited.

Hylomorphism and Economic Justice

Despite classifying Justice as a personal attribute, Aristotle proceeds to examine varieties of Distributive and Reciprocatory Justice, all of which are transpersonal.  Absent from his usual thoroughness, is any attention to what might be called Contributive Justice, the best-known formulation of which is Marx' 'From each according to his ability'.  So, from the three combined is a Hylomorphic concept of Economic Justice--a distribution of goods in accordance with a reciprocation commensurate with contribution.  Accordingly, since Private Property, as well as its abolition, is each a scheme of the distribution of some goods, Aristotle's advocacy of the former, in opposition to Plato's of the latter, as the Hylomorphic concept illustrates, expresses a disagreement over in the category of Political Justice, whether or not he recognizes such.

Just Person and Just Polis

Plato's concept of the relation between a Just Person and a Just Polis as a Writ Small-Writ Large analogy, entails that the two conditions are mutually independent.  It therefore further entails the possibility of a Just Person inhabiting an Unjust Polis.  However, the concept of Justice as an internal condition avoids the complication that a Person has external relations within a Polis, to which that concept seems inadequate.  Thus, for example, that someone does an honest day's work on an assembly line in the manufacture of gas chambers in Germany in 1942 seems, at minimum, to complicate Plato's concept of a Just Person.  Perhaps a better indication of the inadequacy is an example of what might be required to eliminate the complication.  Whether or not Plato would subscribe to it, Leibniz offers such an elimination via his two theses--external relations between Monads are illusory, as is any apparent disharmony between them.  Absent such difficult to confirm theses, Plato's concept of Justice is problematic.

Polis, Justice, Hylomorphism

In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle classifies Justice as personal Virtue, and asserts that "all men mean by justice that kind of state of character . . .".  But, this is plainly untrue in the case of Plato.  For, in the Republic, he presents two concepts of Justice: one, indeed, of a person, but the other, of a Polis.  More precisely, the latter, which as Writ Large is the more clearly discernible of the two, is a Hylomorphic concept, consisting in a correlation between the Form of a Polis, i. e. its division of labor, and its Matter, i. e. the natural abilities of its citizenry.  Now, in the Politics, Aristotle argues, against Plato, that the elimination of private property can stifle the individual Citizen.  Yet, he does not recognize that he is disputing, on Hylomorphic grounds, one of Plato's instances of Political Justice.  Perhaps via a methodology consistent with his professed Holism, in which he treats Justice as a property of the Whole, he would have arrived at that recognition.

Hylomorphism and Justice

While Hylomorphism is usually presented as a Theoretical principle, corresponding to it is the Moral principle: The Highest Good of any entity is a balance between its Form and its Matter.  In an Artistic entity, that condition can be called Harmony, in a Biological entity, Health, and in a Political context, Justice.  Thus, an example of a Just society is one in which each citizen is Healthy, since its Matter is not suppressed by its Form. Accordingly, Plato's concept of a Just Polis has a shortcoming.  For, that concept entails two concepts of a Just Citizen of a Polis, and they do not coincide.  One is that of a part of the Matter of the Form of the Polis, i. e. of fulfilling a natural role in the division of labor of the Polis.  The other is that of a similar though "writ small" Form of the internal Matter of the Citizen, i. e. a Soul governed by Reason.  But, the two coincide only in the case of the Philosopher-King--any other role is natural for only an irrational Citizen, i. e. a Citizen who is Just according to one concept, and Unjust according to the other.  Moral Hylomorphism exposes the source of the discrepancy--Plato does not consider that a Form can also be part of the Matter of another Form, in the absence of which he can relate the two Forms only by analogy, e. g. his Writ Small-Writ Large relation.

Hylomorphism and Logic

The Hylomorphic principle--Every entity is the Form of some Matter--i. e. is the Unity of a Multiplicity, entails the possibility that a Form can itself be part of the Matter of another Form, and that any Matter can be the Form of some other Matter.  However, the principle is indeterminate as to whether or not there is either an ultimate Form or ultimate Matter.  So, from the evidence of the naked eye, Aristotle might be justified in positing the existence of limits in both cases, whereas a modern Cosmologist, with the benefit of the telescope and the microscope, might be justified in positing infinitude in both directions.  In any case, the fundamental axioms of Hylomorphic Logic are: 1. some A are B; some B are C; therefore, some A are C and 2. all C are B; all B are A; therefore, all C are A, with B part of the Matter of A, and C part of the Matter of B.  Seemingly isomorphic, the inverse directions of the two axioms suffice to preclude the reduction of one to the other, which would implicitly privilege either Form or Matter, i. e. one of the starting points, contrary to the equiprimordiality of the Hylomorphic principle.

Aristotelianism and Hylomorphism

Aristotelianism might be Hylomorphic insofar as it proposes that an actual entity is constituted by both Form and Matter.  However, it does not itself well exemplify the concept.  For, if it were Hylomorphic, it would evince equal attention to detail and coherence.  But, while his production of differentiations is meticulous, the general organization of them is only occasionally comprehensively coherent.  For example, though On the Soul, the Nichomachean Ethics, and the Politics are inter-connected, the latter is Holist while the Prior Analytics is Atomist, as has been previously discussed.  Also, while he recognizes an extended hierarchy of Universals, e. g. Species and Genus, he does not relate them to the status of a Nation as a Whole, and, in the other direction, the subdivision of Matter does not extend beyond the immediately perceivable, even as he characterizes Matter as composite.  So, Aristotelianism is structurally more Hylo- than Morphic, regardless of its contents.

Hylomorphism, Holism, Atomism

'Hylomorphism' is a term that has been used to characterize Aristotle's thesis that every actual entity is constituted by both Form and Matter.  Accordingly, Form and Matter are equiprimordial, i. e. neither is prior to the other.  Thus, Hylomorphic Logic is distinct from both Holist Logic, in which the Whole is prior to the Part, and Atomist Logic, of which an Individual entity is the irreducible foundation.  So, since, as has been previously discussed, he advocates each of those two in different places, 'Aristotelian' Logic can mean any of three things.

Individual, Holism, Atomism

The Part of Holist Logic and the Particular of Aristotelian Logic are often equivalent, each expressed by the quantifier Some.  However, they diverge in the status of Individuality.  For, in Aristotelian Logic, an Individual is a Particular that can never be a Predicate, and, hence, can never be a Universal.  In contrast, in Holist Logic, an Individual can be both a Part and a Whole, e. g. Socrates is a part of Athens, and a Whole the parts of which are legs, a face, etc.  That Aristotelian Logic does not recognize such analysis of Individual entities exposes it as essentially Atomist, in contradistinction to his Political Holism.

Whole and Universal

As has been previously discussed, Aristotle's Logic inverts his Political Holism.  But, the inversion more than merely exchanges the terms involved.  For, in the transformation of Whole-Part to Particular-Universal, while Part and Particular might be exchangeable, Whole and Universal are not.  For example, in Kant's appropriation of the Aristotelian Practical Syllogism, the Universal, the Kingdom of Ends, cannot be a Whole, since the Whole could be the Human Species, while the Universal cannot be, since it includes a non-Human--his deity, as well as any other non-human Rational entity.  More generally, Universal connotes all of a set of Particulars, which, unlike the Parts of a Whole, are otherwise inherently ununified.  Indeed, for Kant, constructing such unification is the fundamental problem of Morality, the effort of which is the foundation of his Theology. In contrast, any such Holistic project consists in making explicit the implicit collective unity, and/or further developing it, with therefore no place for a transcendent deity, and no need for an associated Theology.  So, Kant's doctrine bears out the full implications of Aristotle's inversion.

Syllogism, Whole, Part

In the Politics, Aristotle asserts that the Whole is prior to the Part.  Accordingly, an example of a Syllogism that expresses such priority is: some Americans are Texans; some Texans are Houstonians;  therefore, some Americans are Houstonians.  However, no such pattern is considered in the Prior Analytics.  Instead, a pattern that he does recognize, and that is apparently equivalent, is, for example: all Houstonians are Texans; all Texans are Americans; therefore, all Houstonians are Americans.  But, in this pattern, the Part is prior to the Whole, in which case, the two patterns are not equivalent, and, of greater significance, his Logic contradicts his Political Philosophy.

Manumorphism and Logic

As has been previously discussed, the concept of a substantive originates in the object of manual grasp.  Now, from such immediate knowledge, other knowledge can be inferred.  For example, from the holding of a peapod, it can be inferred that some peas are also being held.  In other words, Manumorphism is also the original locus of Logic, the fundamental pattern of which is: If A contains B, and B contains C, then A contains C.  Likewise, for example: some Americans are Texans, some Texans are Houstonians, therefore, some Americans are Houstonians--a pattern that is clearly and unambiguously represented by Venn diagrams, and is faithful to Aristotle's interest in hierarchical classification.  However, Aristotle inverts the pattern, which converts each quantifier from Particular to Universal, and renders the relation of containment as the equivocal copula, resulting in the Barbara scheme.  He thereby abstracts both the pattern and the relation from their manumorphic origin, presenting them instead as "prior" to concrete experience.  Accordingly, Logic gets transformed from a tool to a supernatural force.

Manumorphism and Sculpture

Not all objects of Manumorphism are potential or actual tools; in some cases, they are ends in themselves.  Those are generally called Sculptures, some of which are representational, others of which are not.  So, it is the latter cases that are the most primitive examples of Formal Causality.  But, while the Matter of Sculpture is usually recognized to include bronze, stone, etc., it can also be colors, sounds, words, or physiological movement.  As such, Sculpture is the fundamental Art, or, conversely, all Art is a mode of Sculpture.

Manumorphism and Evolution

As has been previously discussed, the prototype of the bearer of attributes--the discrete solid thing--is an object enclosed in a grasping hand, and, thus, originates as neither a sense datum, a manifold of sense data, nor a thought.  Now, insofar as Knowledge is conceived as an essentially incorporeal process, that physical activity is Epistemologically irrelevant.  However, insofar as Knowledge is conceived as constituted by some Mind-Body correlation, e. g. Spinoza's concept, the significance of Manumorphism is profound.  For, if, as Darwin holds, the distinctive feature of the Human species is the versatility of the thumb, and, hence, of manual grasp, then, given a Mind-Body correlation, the increased complexity of the Human Mind is an Evolutionary development corresponding to that physiological emergence.

Anthropomorphism, Mentomorphism, Manumorphism

Kant's Anthropomorphism is, more precisely, what can be called Mentomorphism, since it is to the Forms of the human Mind that it is adapted, i. e. Knowledge is his Anthropomorphization.  Now, an important element of his concept of Mind is what he sometimes calls the Transcendental Object, without which there can be no unified things in Empirical Knowledge, which is essentially perspectival and superficial.  However, he does not consider that an object can be wholly and immediately given in manually grasping it, an process that neither reduces to a mere manifold sense-data, nor requires the positing of a Transcendental Object as a substratum of such a manifold.  Instead, it can be classified as a Technical Object, since, as has been previously discussed, grasping an object is the beginning of knowing how to use it.  Hence, the Transcendental Object is abstracted from the Technical Object. Likewise, his Mentomorphism is, more fundamentally, what can be called Manumorphism, i. e. the most basic human shaping of the world is by the grasping hand, from which the Mental shaping of it, in Theoretical Knowledge, is derived.

Geocentrism, Anthropocentrism, Anthropomorphism

While Kant conceives his Copernican Revolution as an instructive analogy, it actually involves a more fundamental discovery.  The analogy is between the Sun-Earth relation and the Mind-Object relation, concerning an inversion in each relation of which term is oriented to the other.  But, as the Medieval appropriation of the Ptolemaic system reveals, Geocentrism is really Anthropocentrism.  So, what Kant's Epistemological inversion shows is that that Anthropocentrism is actually Anthropomorphism, i. e. that For-Us is an Epistemological, not an Ontological, relation.  In other words, in Kant's Copernican Revolution, an apparent analogy between two pairs of terms is actually a replacement of one by the other.

Hand, Tool, Form

To modify Aristotle's analogy, the hand is not only the "tool of tools", it is the "Form of Forms", as well.  For, the most primitive occurrence of Formal Causality is the shaping of some material so that it can be grasped by the hand, i. e. the hand is the original Shape, prior to geometrical figures.  Thus, the aptly named handle, adapted to the contours of the hand in order for a tool to be usable, is the link between the two characterizations of the hand.  Now, Comprehension is distinguishable from other seemingly synonymous Mental operations, e. g. Understanding, as etymologically related to the functioning of the hand.  Thus, Comprehension, in its proper meaning, connotes a concept of Mind as fundamentally Practical, e. g. the Comprehension of the Idea of the Good is equivalent to knowing how to use it, rather than to merely looking at it.  Similarly, Spinoza's Adequate Idea, which entails Causal knowledge, is a product of Comprehension.

Form and Grasp

For most Philosophers, starting wth Plato and Aristotle, 'Form' may have a variety of meanings, but the fundamental one is Shape.  Now, Aristotle classifies Shape as a Common Sensible, i. e. it can be an object of any of the Senses.  However, he does not explain how any of them can be the source of the circumambience required to cognize, either via direct surface contact or via a synthesis of direct surface contacts, a solid object.  Instead, that source can only be Grasp, i. e. the enfolding hand.  Accordingly, if analogy is involved in the Knowledge of any Form, it can be only with the hand, not the eye.  Thus, Aristotle's likening of Mind as the Form of Forms, to the hand as the tool of tools, is more literal than he appreciates.

Idea of Good, Acting Wisely, Contemplation

In book VII of the Republic, Plato's metaphorical Sun, the Idea of Good, is presented as a necessary condition if one is to "act wisely".  The analogy thus suggests two ways that it might function as such.  One is that is guides one to an appropriate action, just as the Sun makes some object visible.  The other is that it empowers one to such action, just as the Sun, via photosynthesis and carbohydrates, energizes one.  But, neither of these is how he conceives the requisite interaction with the Sun.  Rather, the attitude that he exalts is Contemplation, for which there is no clear justification.  For, since Contemplation is distinct from the Idea of Good, there is nothing inherently Good about it.  Furthermore, in the absence of a systematic account of the relation between the Contemplation of the Idea of Good and acting wisely, the former can be an impediment to the latter, as Schopenhauer brings out in his concept of Platonic Contemplation as quelling any Action.  So, the traditional Philosophical privileging of Theory over Practice begins in a lacuna at the heart of Plato's solar metaphor.

Weakness, Individuality, Strength in Numbers

The Christian promotions of Pity and Meekness are antithetical to the promotion of Strength by the Will to Power.  Furthermore, the Christian promotion of individual Salvation is antithetical to the collectivity of the Dionysian festivals, described at the beginning of Birth of Tragedy.  So, Nietzsche's opposition to Christian values targets both Weakness and Individuation, each an antithesis to the principle of strength in numbers.

Sun, Enlightenment, Empowerment

The solar metaphors of Plato, Plotinus, imply that it is as enabling visibility that the Sun is most important to humans.  Those Ancients must be aware of it as also a source of warmth, but they apparently find nothing philosophically significant about that function.  But, it is less likely that they are aware of the Modern discovery of the contribution of solar energy, via photosynthesis, to human nutrition, e. g. carbohydrates.  On that basis, perhaps more philosophically significant than as a source of Enlightenment, is a metaphorical Sun as a source of Empowerment, which even Nietzsche misses with his Sun-deity Apollo.

Dionysian, Will to Power, Political Philosophy

Nietzsche remains a Dionysian throughout his oeuvre, from which it can be inferred that the collective experience that he describes at the beginning of Birth of Tragedy is what, in traditional terms, he conceives to be the Highest Good for a person.  Thus, according to his doctrine of Will to Power, the experience is one of maximum Empowerment.  Accordingly, though it is rarely explicitly stated in his works, implicit in all of them is the concept of strength in numbers, i. e. numbers of a coherent collectivity, not in a dissolute rabble.  Conversely, a society is only as strong as its weakest member, from which it follows that a fundamental responsibility of a Ruler is the maximum empowerment of the Ruled.

Henosis, Dionysian, Communitarian

Nietzsche's version of Henosis, likely based on personal experience, described in the opening sections of Birth of Tragedy under the rubric Dionysian, is non-Cognitive and collective, with all social divisions dissolved.  The experience thus seems more conducive to grounding a Holistic or a Classless Political Philosophy, e. g. that of Aristotle, Rousseau, or Marx, than the Oligarchical or Individualist one often associated with his own later writings.  However, in #45 of Human, All Too Human, he makes it clear that it is the capacity for community that is a characteristic of superior types, while petty self-interest is characteristic of the fragmentary rabble.  So, contrary to the standard interpretation, he is both a Dionysian and a Communitarian, though not necessarily Egalitarian.