Eugenics, Techne, Self-Overcoming

Two main stages of Techne are: 1. Learn a causal pattern, and 2. Actuate it.  Techne this involves a mastery of the discovered pattern.  Now, Eugenics, e. g. crop rotation, is an example of Techne.  Thus, so, too, is Human Eugenics, e. g. miscegenation.  But, because the mastery involved is of Humans, by Humans, Human Eugenics exemplifies Self-Mastery, or what Nietzsche calls Self-Overcoming.  As a response to the procreative impulse, this exercise of Techne is an alternative to succumbing to it, to detachment from it, and to sublimate it to a different creative activity.

Instinct, Techne, Eugenics

Corresponding to the Nature vs. Artifaction contrast is that of Instinct vs. Techne.  Accordingly, whether or not Technology is conceived as inherently corrupt depends on whether or not Nature connotes 'divinely created'.  For example, according to one myth, the Promethean, Techne is stolen from the gods, but enhances human life.  However, according to another, the acquisition of Techne by Adam and Eve is an act of disobeying a deity, as a result of which, reliance on Technology is the defining characteristic of a 'fallen' condition.  Now, while in the former myth, the primary content of Techne is fire, in the latter it is the reproduction of life.  Thus, whether or not Artifactual Human Eugenics is 'evil' depends on the concept of Nature that is presupposed.

Will to Power and Artifactual Human Eugenics

In the Prologue of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche alludes to the overcoming of Man by the Superman, a process that he later terms Self-Overcoming, which is a mode of the Will to Power. Now, 'man' is ambiguous--it can connote either the species or an individual member, but because of the common association of Nietzsche with Individualism, his Superman in this passage is usually interpreted to be an individual entity.  However, in #960 of the Will to Power collection, as Kaufmann insists, what Nietzsche posits as superior to humans is a "race", to be produced by miscegenation, not by purification, as has been held by Nazis and others.  So, in at least that passage, Artifactual Human Eugenics exemplifies the Will to Power.

Natural, Artificial, Artifactual

The Natural-Artificial antithesis of common parlance is derived from that of divine creation vs. human manufacture, which is why 'artificial' is often a derogatory term.  But, the Theological prejudice latent in that usage is exposed by contrast with Spinoza's system, according to which human making is an extension of God's creativity within Nature.  So, to avoid confusion, 'Artificial' can be replaced by 'Artifactual', which does not entail 'non-Natural'.  Thus, for example, the expression 'artificial selection', of various branches of Biology, can be rendered as 'artifactual selection'.  Likewise, Artifactual Human Eugenics, e. g. the purchase from a sperm bank based on the characteristics of the donor, is no crime against Nature, but, rather, is an extension of a eugenic instinct that is inherent in the species' drive to propagate itself.

Natural Eugenics and Artificial Eugenics

According to Darwin and a few others, Sexual Selection is a variety of Natural Selection, in which the seeking of optimal characteristics is the motivation for the choice of a partner in the reproductive process.  Hence, Natural Selection can also be termed Natural Eugenics.  Now, this drive is a Species drive, even if it is superficially interpreted as a sexual 'like' of an individual member of the Species.  Thus, it has more in common with the Unconscious of Schopenhauer than with that of Freud.  Now, the term Artificial Selection is sometimes used as a contrast to Natural Selection, so, likewise, it can also be called Artificial Eugenics, a contemporary example of which is the purchase by a woman from a sperm bank based on some of the characteristics of its donor.  However, the Natural-Artificial distinction is not clear.  For, the capacity to revert to 'artificial' means can itself be the expression of a Species drive, in which case Artificial Eugenics is only a special case of Natural Eugenics.

Eugenics and Superhumanism

Only barely inferrable from the texts is the influence of the concept of Human Eugenics on the arc of Nietzsche's oeuvre.  It is clearly relevant to his projection of a transition from Human to Superhuman, and it explains the supplanting of the Will to Live by the Will to Power as his elucidation of the Dionysian principle.  Indeed, he is aware that the mastery of the former by Eugenic techniques might constitute not a transcendence of a Species drive to propagate itself, but, to the contrary, evidence that Will to Power, not Will to Live, has been the true character of that drive all along.  Eugenics thus distinguishes Nietzschean from Darwinian Superhumanism.

Atomism and Nationalism

According to Atomism, Relations are External, i. e. an Atom exists independently of any Relation with other Atoms into which it might enter.  So, any Polity that needs trade with another is not an Atom.  Now, whether or not there is or has been a Polity that is self-sufficient is uncertain, or, conversely, one is not to be found among the known Polities of past and present.  Nevertheless, the Nation has always been treated as an Atom, not only in the major works of Modern Political Philosophy, but, in common practice, as well, as routine and pervasive Patriotism in everyday affairs regularly expresses.  In either case, the implicit Atomism is inadequate, and is a fiction that is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.

Superhumanism and Social Darwinism

It is said that cockroaches could survive a nuclear war that would destroy the human race.  On the other hand, there is no question that Humans are more complex organisms than are cockroaches. Thus, there is no correspondence between Evolution and Survival, i. e. between increasing in complexity, and staying alive, an equivocation that is at the heart of Darwinism.  Likewise, there is no correspondence between so-called Social Darwinism, based on the 'survival of the fittest' principle, and Superhumanism.  Indeed, there is no correspondence between Humanism and Social Darwinism, since the latter does not recognize any essential difference between humans and cockroaches.

Will to Power and Origin of a Superhuman Species

The outcome of a Self-Overcoming of the Human species qua Species, implicit in the Will to Power, but unexplored by him, is currently virtually unimaginable.  Perhaps it might originate a Superhuman species that has added a capacity for extraterrestrial survival.  But, if so, the impetus is not the latter, but the principle of Self-Overcoming, with Survival in such a new habitat a pre-condition of further developments. In other words, even if the Will to Power coincides with Darwinian Evolution in some respects, they differ in one crucial one--while Darwinism vacillates between Evolution and Survival as its primary principle, for Nietzsche, the Will to Power is unequivocally prior to any Will to Live.

Will to Power and Species

Whether or not he intends it as such, Nietzsche is claimed as an influence by several subsequent political movements: Naziism, Straussism, and Randism, for example.  In each case, to varying degrees of radicality, the theme is an Inegalitarianism derived from cherry-picked passages espousing the Will to Power.  Now, as has been previously discussed, that interpretation of the Will to Power, which Nietzsche unarguably encourages, is at odds with a more rigorously developed version of the concept, in which the species, not any of its individual members, is the subject of the volition.  Thus, undeveloped by Nietzsche himself, though casually considered by Heidegger, among a few others, is the concept of Technological progress as the goal of a Species Will to Power.  On the other hand, not at all considered has been the possibility of the Will to Power qua Self-Overcoming as applied to the Species.  In either case, this alternative version of the Will to Power entails none of the Inegalitarianism that characterizes its counterpart.

Will to Power and Superhuman

The attribution, by both Nietzsche and commentators, of Will to Power to an individual organism, is not merely arbitrary, but is inconsistent with the derivation of it.  It is arbitrary because he offers no grounds for ascribing volition to precisely and only that combination of cells.  But more problematic is that Will to Power is his replacement for Schopenhauer's Will to Live, which is a principle with respect to which the 'Individual' is an irreal Appearance.  Rigorously derived, therefore, Will to Power likewise transcends the 'individual' Human.  But, if so, then the Super-man that is the product of the Will to Power qua Self-Ovecoming can only be an origination of a surpassing of 'Man' qua species, not qua individual member of the Human species.  Most commentators follow Nietzsche in ignoring the former meaning of Superhuman and its implications.

Superhuman and 'Superman'

The most common contemporary use of the term 'Superman' has little to do with Nietzsche's.  While the former refers to physical characteristics, the latter signifies a psychological self-overcoming: of Ressentiment, via the affirmation of Eternal Recurrence.  Nor does it have any relation to a Darwinian Superhuman being.  For, even though the latter does connote a projected possible physiological condition, it is one that is the product of a mutation of Human characteristics.  In sharp contrast, in the fiction, there is no biological connection between the inhabitants of Krypton and the Human species.  In other words, he might be a male, but there is no 'man' in Clark Kent's alter ego.  So, the common use of the term 'Superman' is far removed from the concept of the surpassing of the Human species that either is explicitly proposed by Nietzsche, or is implicit in Darwinism.

Superhumanism, Will to Power, Species

Superhumanism does not merely speculate about some possible future turn of events.  Rather, as only Nietzsche has begun to consider, it entails radical departures from conventional theses entailed in Humanism.  In Biology, it posits Growth, rather than Life, as the fundamental principle; in Psychology, Will to Power vs. Will to Live; in Darwinism, Evolution vs. Survival; in History, Progress vs. Peace.  So, Superhumanism is potentially applicable to current Political Philosophy.  For example, in an application of Will to Power that is rarely considered--to the Species, political organization is governed by a general Growth that is a prelude to the emergence of a superior species.  On that basis, a program of strengthening each individual Human, in contrast with both Humanism that promotes Equality amongst members, and sub-Humanism, e. g. Social Darwinism, that promotes the strengthening of only some members, is prescribed.  The type of organization that is optimal for actualizing that program can then be determined.

Superhumanism and Political Philosophy

Since Superhumanism connotes a post-Human historical period, any corresponding Political Philosophy can only be speculated about. Indeed, in such a society, e. g. extraterrestrial, currently unimaginable entities, etc., such a thing as political organization might even be a thing of the past. Still, one feature that is entailed in the concept is the prior achievement of a Humanist society.  Now, as has been previously discussed, that achievement consists in some version of Cosmopolitanism, i. e. of a Planetary society.  Accordingly, two presumed interpretations of the concept of Political Superhumanism are quite inadequate to it.  One, Naziism, is a regression to Tribalism, the other, Social Darwinism, the basic principle of which, Egoism, hardly transcends Human principles.  To the contrary, each of these exemplifies a dehumanization that Humanism has sought to overcome.

Humanism and Superhumanism

A criticism of Humanism that is perhaps more formidable than the familiar ones proposed by Supernaturalism, e. g. that it is 'Relativistic', is ironically implicit in the source of the most completely defined concept of Human.  That source, as has been previously discussed, is Darwin, who improves upon all prior concepts, by offering a genesis of the species that is independent of Supernatural premises. However, at the same time, he opens up the possibility of a Naturalist transcendence of Humankind, though he never develops it.  Instead, it is, of course, Nietzsche, with his concept of Ubermensch, that pursues the theme, in expositions usually misunderstood as 'Inegalitarian'.  Rather, his doctrine is more accurately characterized as Superhumanism, which contrasts with Humanism just as Supererogatory compares to Deontic.  The Superhuman is thus a Naturalist revision of the Supernatural as the self-overcoming of the Human, e. g. Jesus as more highly evolved, rather than an incorporeal perfection, a transcending that Humanism suppresses.

Humanism and Relativism

The charge that Humanism "deifies" Humankind is a moment in a special case of the Absolutism vs. Relativism debate that is a perennial Philosophical topic.  To Absolutists, Relativism is a threat because, among other features, it lacks intellectual and behavioral standards, the consequences of which are dire.  Now, usually ignored in the debate is the ambiguity of 'Relativism', which can mean either 'Subjectivism', or 'Perspectivism'.  Indeed, the former, according to which judgment is private, does elude evaluation, but that is not the case with the latter.  For, a Perspective can be more or less comprehensive, and, hence, can be subject to evaluation as, correspondingly, better or worse.  Scientific theories are judged on those terms, and Utilitarianism offers a formula for evaluating conduct as more or less comprehensively beneficial.  So, the criticism that Humanism lacks Intellectual or Moral standards is groundless.

Humanism and the Deification of Humankind

One prominent criticism of Humanism is that it "deifies" Humankind.  The source of the criticism is typically a proponent of some variety of Supernaturalism.  Now, one unclarity in the charge is the meaning of the term 'deify'.  If it means 'posits to be the creator of the universe', it would be difficult to find a Humanist who believes that.  Likewise for the interpretation 'posits to be omnipotent'.  More likely is that Humanists are being accused of presuming that Humans are the ultimate judges of their conduct.  Implicit in the accusation is that there is a higher authority that can be cited, and that higher authority is usually the author of the Ten Commandments.  However, the problem with that premise is that it is question-begging: it groundlessly asserts that that author is a deity, and not Moses, a human.  So, this criticism of Humanism is less than objectively compelling.

Humanism and Nationalism

Humanism implies a concept of Human that is liberated from Supernatural premises, though, as has been previously discussed, that ambition has not always been successful.  It also implies a concept of Human that is distinct from a concept of semi-Human.  Now, one case of the latter is a concept of some subset of the species, e. g. a Nation.  Thus, Nationalism is not a Humanist concept.  In other words, none of the major works of Modern Political Philosophy, i. e. that of Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Rousseau, or Smith, can be classified as fully Humanist.  It is only when the entire world is the locus of a political model, e. g. in Kant's or Marx's model, that all of Humankind is being taken into consideration.

Humanism, Biology, Evolutionism

As has been previously discussed, Marx proposes that it is the manufacturing and use of tools that is the defining characteristic of the Human species.  But, that capacity is impossible without unique Biological traits such as flexible opposable thumbs that can grip and manipulate tools. Still, since it is not inconsistent with Genesis 1, Comparative Biology does not decisively ground Humanism.  Rather, that is accomplished by Evolutionism, which proposes an origin of the species to counter the familiar account of Supernaturalism. Thus, Humanism does not complete the liberation from Medieval Theocratism until the arrival of Darwinism.

Humanism and Economics

As has been previously discussed, Nietzsche can be interpreted as proposing that Psychology, especially with its Will to Power principle, is the distinctively Humanist field of study.  However, his Naturalization of the Soul, like Spinoza's, fails to adequately distinguish Humans from other Natural entities.  In contrast, Smith and Marx each presents a differentiating characteristic: the former, barter, the latter, the manufacturing of tools.  In other words, they agree that the specifically Human activity is Economics.  Accordingly, the familiar characterization of the latter as 'dismal' might reflect a Theocratic judgment of the post-Eden Human condition in general.

Humanism, Psychology, Will to Power

The introduction of Psychology as a Philosophical method in a work entitled Human, All Too Human entails a concept of Soul that is not Supernatural.  Thus, insofar as the Supernatural realm is conceived as consisting in Eternal Life, the positing of a Will to Life as the fundamental Psychological principle fails to decisively humanize the concept, a problem which unnecessarily complicates Spinoza's exposition in Part V of the Ethics. Instead, it is Nietzsche's later proposal, that the Will to Power is the fundamental Psychological principle, that is appropriately Humanist, since it entails change, which Eternity precludes.

Pantheism and Humanism

One Modern system that decisively breaks from Medieval Supernaturalism is Spinoza's Naturalist Pantheism.  The constituents of this system are Modes, three main characteristics of each of which are: 1. A conatus by which it persists in its being; 2. The maintaining of spatial contiguity and coherence as it changes location; and 3. Can be either simple or compound.  Thus, contrary to some interpretations, a Human is not the only kind of Mode, and, indeed, Spinoza offers no criterion for distinguishing Human Modes from others, i. e.: "I am not able here to explain" (Ethics II, xiii, note) the distinction.  So, even though his Pantheism can be classified as Secular, it is not specifically Humanist.

Humanism, Theocratism, Rationality

The liberation of Humanism from Theocratism has not been as decisive as its equivalence to Secularism seems to suggest.  For, one of its defining characteristics of Humankind is Rationality, but, as is evinced by the various arguments known as 'proofs of the existence of God', which continue to have their advocates centuries after the Medieval era, Rationality and Supernaturalism are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  So, in at least some varieties of Humanism, it is not Theocratism per se that is eliminated, but, rather dogmatic Theocratism.

Humanism and Method

Modern Philosophy might be taken to be Humanist because of a foundation in human experience--'I Think', or a Sense-Datum.  However, Humanism excludes supernatural premises, and each of those, upon further scrutiny, is revealed as an element of a supernatural system: the Cartesian I is an incorporeal Soul the existence of which presupposes that of a Deity, while, as Berkeley shows, a Sense-Datum is actually an incorporeal Phenomenon that is a sign the source of which is a Deity.  More important, neither of those two is the foundation of their respective systems.  For, each is preceded by a Method--a Rationalist or an Empiricist establishment of Certainty, and it is Method per se which is irreducibly Human.

Species and Humanism

The term 'Humanism' has had a variety of meanings, perhaps the most general of which is 'Secularism'.  Accordingly, Modern Political Philosophy can be conceived as a Humanist response to Medieval Theocratism.  Now, in the vast literature on the topic, there seems to be little consideration of the implication of Evolutionism, and, in particular, of the concept of Species, for that of Humanism.  Thus lacking has been the circumscription of the scope of the latter as Planetary, rather than as, as is usually the case, indefinitely localized.  One exception has been Modern Political Philosophy, which implicitly treats Humanism as a Nationalist phenomenon.  So, Nationalism is no longer adequate to what might be called Evolutionist Humanism.

Socialism, Theory, Practice

In general, Modern Political Philosophy is a type of Theory, i. e. its various propositions are assertoric, with the ambition of being apodeictic.  Now, even though Marx exorts Philosophers to privilege Practice over Theory, several of the cardinal features of Marxism are Theoretical, notably the concepts of Dialectical Materialism and Socialism, to the latter of which he cannot avoid attributing a permanent Goodness, which, as has been previously discussed, entails a contradiction of the principle that Humankind has no fixed nature. The shortcoming in this procedure is not exposed until the Pragmatists re-conceive standard components of Theory, e. g. Ideas and Concepts, as fundamentally Practical, i. e. as plans of action, rather than as substantives or predicates of assertions.  Accordingly, for example, Socialism is not a condition to be arrived at once certain pre-conditions are met, but a blueprint for organizing society.  As such, it is a Good, but only provisionally so, only so long as the construction is underway, just like any productive process.  In these terms, the Marxist does not have to contend with the aforementioned contradiction.

Marxism and Human Nature

Marx anticipates Existentialism by proposing that humankind has no fixed Essence, i. e. has a mutable nature. Correspondingly, he argues that Socialism is only an historically contingent optimal mode of organization, since it is possible only subsequent to the attainment of a certain level of Industrial Capitalism.  However, he also conceives Socialism as, once estabilished, to be thereafter permanently optimal, which would seem to imply, correspondingly, that humankind has then, if not acquired an Essence, at least arrived at a thereafter immutale nature.  Now, in a likely effort to correct that apparent inconsistency, some Marxists have argued that perpetual Revolution is the ultimate goal.  However, they do not conceive that as entailing an eventual surpassing of Socialism, rather, that such persistence is required to preserve Socialism from unremitting threats, both external and external.  So, whether or not, according to Marxism, Humankind has a potential fixed nature, corresponding to which is a permanent optimal Polity, is uncertain.

Evolution, Survival, Political Philosophy

A significant unclarity in Evolutionism is whether the drive to generate more complex entities is a means to Survival, or is for its own sake.  The distinction bears upon Political Philosophy.  For, if Evolution is a means to Survival, then social progress aims at some permanent optimal condition, e. g. Kant's Cosmopolity, Socialism, etc.  But, if Human History is a prelude to the arrival of some new, more advanced Species, then it might aim at a social order that is the breeding ground of the relevant mutation, and what such a Polity might consist in seems to be anybody's guess.  So, Evolutionism reduces Political Philosophy to a contingent, temporary project.

Political Philosophy, Evolution, Extraterrestriality

That a Polity consists in a structured multiplicity transcends circumstances, since it follows from the concept of a Society as an Organism.  But what that structure might be is a function of Historical and Geographical conditions.  Now, on the premise that the Telos of the Human Species is permanent harmonious integration into the ecosystem of the Earth, the political system that that would entail would be definable by a Political Philosophy as an Ideal that is also concrete.  However, that premise is dubitable for a least two reasons.  First, as is implicit in Darwinism, and is explicitly proposed by Nietzsche, the Telos of Humankind might be an entity or species that surpasses it in some respect.  Second, an extraterrestrial continuation of Humankind is no longer implausible.  So, in each of these cases, political organization is a means to a subsequent development, and not an Ideal, which entails stable finality.

Political Philosophy, Economics, Ecology

Insofar as a Political Philosophy abstracts from spatio-temporal conditions, it abstracts from Economics, a system in which a society is rooted in a habitat that is the source of its resources.  So, Marx's Materialism does not merely restore Economics to Political Philosophy, it derives the latter from the former, because Economic activity is the foundation of all social relations.  However, Marxism conceives an environment as completely at the disposal of human Techne, thereby abstracting from the need to, conversely, adapt to a habitat, as well.  Thus, the Marxist concept of Economics is itself abstracted from Ecology, which studies the human species in all its interactions with its environment.

Evolutionism, Political Philosophy, Geography

As has been previously discussed, the abstraction of Political Philosophy from historical circumstances can obscure the contingency of some of the features of a proposed model, e. g. the Nationalism typical of the Modern era.  Similarly prone is abstraction from geographical circumstances.  For, entailed in such abstraction is a neglect of environmental factors in the determination of the optimum social organization.  For example, in a more edenic climate, rigid collective labor organization might be less required than in a less naturally hospitable habitat, with the implication that the former might be more politically Individualistic than the latter.  So, a Political Philosophy derived from Evolutionism might be more mindful of such environmental nuances.

Socialism and Evolutionism

There have been two main groundings of Socialism--that it is the inevitable outcome of Dialectical Materialism, and that it corrects the de-humanization of Capitalism.  The first is of dubious value, since Marx-Engels frequently represent Socialism as voluntaristic, and, hence, as transcending a Necessity such as that process.  The limitation of the second is that it pertains to the Good of the Members of a Society, without addressing that of the whole of a Society.  In contrast, a derivation of Socialism from Evolutionism is as follows: The Good of an Organism is Health.  The Health of an Organism entails the Health of each of its Parts.  A Species is an Organism, the Members of which are its Parts.  The Health of an Organism is dependent on the beneficial factors in its environment.  Thus, the Health of an Organism entails that each of its Parts benefits from such environmental factors.  Likewise, the Health of a Species entails that each of its Members benefits from environmental goods.  But, only Socialism guarantees such universal benefiting.  Therefore, Socialism is the best Economic system from an Evolutionist perspective.

Evolutionism, Monotheism, History

The best evidence suggests that there have been two main periods in human history.  First, given that the species is generally believed to have originated at a single location, and later achieved a worldwide presence, a diaspora constitutes an initial era.  Second, there has been a planetary solidification of those scattered humans, as tribes, as basic units of organization, have become cities, provinces, nations, continents, and, currently in progress, a cosmopolity.  Now, a significant factor in this second main period has been the emergence of Monotheism, which, because of the focus on what it entails regarding the nature of Deity, is sometimes under-appreciated as also entailing and effecting a unification of the race.  So, beyond the not insignificant question of the origin of the human species, Evolutionism and Monotheism are not in much disagreement about the general patterns of subsequent History.

Evolutionism, Marxism, Anthropocentrism

Necessity entails omnipotence, i. e. the absence of resistance.  Thus, the thesis that Dialectical Materialism determines Human History by Necessity entails the omnipotence of the process. However, according to Evolutionism, the History of a Species is at least partly determined by the resistance of an environment.  Thus, Evolutionism exposes the unexamined Anthropocentrism of Marxism.

Evolutionism, Organism, Political Philosophy

The subject of the evolutionary process, according to the theory, is a Species, which, as is, is open to either a Platonist or a Nominalist interpretation, i. e. a unit or a multiplicity.  However, the apparent antithesis is simply, and appropriately, resolved, by conceiving a Species as an Organism, i. e. as a structured multiplicity.  Now, the structure of the members of most species is often plainly evident, e. g. the formation of birds in flight, and is easily attributable to an instinct.  In contrast, as is the case with many Human features, that instinct is somewhat deficient, forcing the race to construct its own structure, the process of which is commonly known as 'Political Philosophy'.  So, in other words, from the perspective of Evolutionism, any Political Philosophy the foundational unit of which is an individual person is fundamentally mis-conceived.

Political Philosophy and Evolutionism

Though some version of Evolutionary Theory is now widely accepted, its implications for Political Philosophy have rarely been considered.  To begin with, if the thesis is that Human History is an episode in Natural History, then any pattern of events in the former must be derived from the principles that govern the latter, e. g. Survival, Adaptation, Variation, Mutation, etc.  Accordingly, the goal of the formation of a Polity must be derived from some such principle.  Furthermore, the fundamental subject of the episode is the Species, so any positing of its individual members as foundations of a Polity, including attributes such as 'freedom', 'right', etc., is, as is, ungrounded.  In other words, Evolutionism invalidates Modern Political Philosophy, as well as its Contemporary successors, to the extent that they accept the undermined premises of their predecessors.

History, Happiness, Power

According to the standard model in the Modern Era, the function of the formation of a Polity is to maximize the pursuit of Happiness of the Individual.  But, historicizing this process re-conceives the latter as having being liberated from preceding Oligarchical conditions, in the context of which entering into collaborative construction with others can, thus, be interpreted as in itself a process of Empowerment.  Now, Kantian Autonomy reflects a recognition of that historical development.  However, he is unable to completely jettison the pursuit of Happiness as a fundamental motivation, leaving him needing to combine the two goals as the telos of History, i. e. a Happiness that humans make for themselves, not one that is merely fortuitous.  Marx, too, rejects fortuitous Happiness as a complement to human Labor in the achievement of his concept of a goal of History, but replaces it with Necessary Happiness, i. e. Dialectical resolution.  In contrast with both, Nietzsche eliminates the complementary factor, with the result that Empowerment is the sole principle of these Historical developments, with Happiness nothing distinct from that principle, i. e. he conceives it as a concomitant of Power.

History and Species

Kant and Marx agree that History is converging on a solidification of the human species. According to the former, the motor of that History is Nature, while according to the latter, it is Dialectical Materialiism.  Thus, neither considers that it is the Species itself.  The likely reason for that neglect is that each accepts the traditional premise that the individual member of the species is given as such.  But, that premise is preempted by that of the concept of the Individual as a part of the Species, which entails the re-conceiving of the Individual as the product of a process of Diversification, thereby transforming the concept of History

Nationalism, Planetarism, World Wide Web

The recent U. S. election and Brexit seem to be indicative of a Nationalist resistance to Trans-Nationalism.  However, the Trans-Nationalism of these is primarily Capitalist Globalism.  Instead, a more pervasive Planetary phenomenon is the World Wide Web, which constitutes a de facto cosmo-community.  Accordingly, a better indication of the current Nationalism-Planetarism antagonism is the increasingly familiar sight of people walking around absorbed in mobile telecommunication devices, oblivious to immediate spatio-temporal events.  It will be in the resolution of this conflict that the concrete transition to a Cosmopolity, likely to take centuries, will consist in, of which traditional 'political' phenomena will be derivative manifestations, e. g. the arrival at a settled universal Economic system.

Nature and the End of History

As has been previously discussed, a Kantian Cosmopolity may be 'peaceful' only because 'war' is defined as a conflict between independent Nations, and such independence has been absorbed into the pervasive body.  Furthermore, such Peace does not entail a cessation of hostilities that are unbeknownst to Kant--worldwide Class-Conflict, a condition that is not only a fundamental feature of Marxism, but is exemplified in the current process of Globalization.  However, Marxism, too, cannot presume that its Socialist Cosmopolity is conflict-free.  For, according to its own principle of Dialectical Materialism, new antagonisms will be generated from within that condition, as at least some Marxists acknowledge.  Indeed, as only Nietzsche seems to fully recognize, the premise of an insuperable end of History is groundless, and is perhaps wishful thinking in the face of the possibility that Nature is a tenporally indefinite principle.  Even Darwin shrinks from countenancing that, when he subordinates Evolution to Survival.

Cosmopolity, Peace, Conflict

Kant's concept of Perpetual Peace is potentially misleading, if not empty.  For, by Peace, he means the absence of War, and by War, he means a conflict between independent Nations.  But, if Perpetual Peace is a condition of a Cosmopolity, then there are no independent Nations.  So, there can still be conflict at the end of History, except that it is internal to the Cosmopolity, though under the auspices of its jurisprudential system, either Civil or Criminal.  So, the "antagonisms" by means of which, according to Kant, Nature pushes the human race through History to a Cosmopolity, are not thereby, as his term 'Perpetual Peace' seems to connote, permanently eliminated.

Nature and History

According to Kant, the motor of human history is "Nature", which pushes the species to its goal.  However, just as, as has been previously discussed, his concept of that goal is ambiguous, so, too, correspondingly, is that of Nature.  In both cases, Nature creates "antagonisms", one response to which is a condition of harmony, thereby anticipating the concept of it as Dialectical Materialism.  In contrast, the other response is that humans become proactive in dealing with the situation, i. e. that continued passivity, even on the occasion of happenstance harmonization, is inadequate.  In other words, the second concept of Nature anticipates Darwinian Evolution, and,in particular, Adaptation as the response to an untenable environment.  So, for example, what is 'Natural', in the first sense, about Hobbes' Leviathan is that it replaces War with Peace, but, in the second sense, that humans voluntarily construct the Leviathan, even if they concede their power to it.

History, Peace, Power

In some passages, it is Peace that Kant posits as the goal of History.  But in others, the goal is to be "worthy" of that Peace, by being its creator.  Now, this priority of Deservedness over Happiness is developed in the 2nd Critique, in passages that are arguably groundlessly designed to make room in his system for the existence of a deity, i. e. as a rewarder of Happiness for having been Virtuous.  So, paring his concept of History of its problematic theological commitment, what remains of the goal of Deservedness is that of Creativity, or, in other words, of the empowerment of humans to determine their own society.  Also, unlike Deservedness, which is the Good of individual Rational beings, universal Empowerment can be conceived as beneficial to the Species qua concrete existent, with respect to which Peace can be an enervating condition.  Analogously, in Marxism, the peace of Socialism can be conceived as de-vitalizing permanent Revolution.

Human Race, History, Rationality

As has been previously discussed, in Kant's system, Rationality and Peace are co-extensive, i. e. universal Rationality and universal Peace are in an Inner-Outer relation.  Likewise, the Cosmopolity that is the telos of History is the appearance of the Kingdom of Ends.  However, there is one discrepancy between the two concepts.  The "cosmopolitan point of view" is also the "standpoint of the human race", entailing the existence of the human race as a concrete unity.  But, there is no corresponding concrete unity in the Kingdom of Ends, which is constituted by only distinct Rational beings.  So, though he briefly envisions a unification of the human race, it is one that transcends the resources of his system, the attainment of which should transform the Atomist presuppositions of the latter.

Planetary, International, Global, Cosmos

'Planetary' is being used here, rather than apparent synonyms, 'International', or 'Global', because the latter two are inadequate for the purpose.  'International' presupposes 'National', thereby preempting the possibility that the latter is derived from the former.  'Global' avoids that possibility, but its current exclusive association with Capitalism--ironic, given that Smith's doctrine is fundamently Nationalistic, while Marxism transcends such limitations--can easily confuse.  'Cosmopolity' also has some contemporary connative baggage, e. g. a magazine, that only mildly distorts Kant's use of 'Cosmopolitan'.  It is also only slightly misleading, because 'cosmos' means 'world' in a logical, not in a geographical or astronomical, sense.  Still, Cosmopolity is unencumbered enough to adequately signify a potential future Planet-encompassing political unity, into which the United Nations might develop.

Reproduction, Division of Labor, Dialectical Materialism

According to Marx-Engels, the husband-wife relation is the foundation of Private Property, or, equivalently, Division of Labor, and, hence, Contradiction.  Thus, the foundational Negation of the Negation is the abolition of Private Property, and, equivalently, of Division of Labor.  However, while the result of the former is clear, i. e. the Collectivization of Property, that of the latter is less so.  For, it is unclear what the Negation of the reproductive process might consist in, i. e. unlike Private Property, Reproduction involving two sexes must surely continue.  One possibility is that what is negated is the antagonistic relation between the parties to the reproductive process, leaving a healthier diversification of that labor, e. g. that they are conceived as playing complementary, rather than antagonistic, roles.  On that basis, Dialectical Materialism, in general, can be re-conceived as constituted by complementary moments.  In other words, Marx-Engels do not seem to consider that Dialectic Materialism itself is an underdeveloped version of a process that, upon the achievement of Socialism, reaches full maturity.

Capitalism, Socialism, Glass Ceiling

Two main manifestations of contemporary 'Sexism'--the treatment of a woman as a sex object, and the 'glass ceiling'--originate in the treatment of women as private property for reproductive purposes.  Now, according to Marx-Engels, that ownership is the foundation of all private property.  Thus, in Socialism, which entails the abolition of private property, there is no such Sexism.  Or, put otherwise, the glass ceiling is peculiar to Capitalism, and the preservation of the latter has priority over the smashing of the former.

Market, Cosmo-Revolution, Planetarism

For Smith, the Market is a national institution.  But, if each Nation has its own Market, and there exists between them at least some interaction, there also exists a World Market.  Now, for Marx-Engels the fundamental Market is a World one.  Thus, only a Cosmo-Revolution, one that spans the entire Market, can give rise to Socialism, which can obtain in only a Cosmopolity.  So, Marxism continues Kant's transition to a Contemporary Planetary Political Philosophy.

Individual, Nation, Reason

The standard model of Modern Political Philosophy, reflecting its Hobbesian origin, is fundamentally Empiricist--a finite aggregate, i. e. a Nation, of elements unified by associations, e. g. contracts.  However, one systematic problem with the model is that its basic element--the Individual--does not per se exist in that Empiricism, e. g. Hume's bundle of perceptions.  Addressing and solving that problem waits for Kant, for whom the unity of the Individual originates in Pure Practical Reason, i. e. the Rational Agent, as defined by the Fundamental Priciple of Pure Practical Reason.  But, such an Individual is a member of an infinite Universe of such Agents, linked by mutual respect, not mere association. It is thus a member of a society that transcends a finite one like a Nation.  In other words, Kant's critique of the Modern Nationalist Individual initiates a transition to a new concept of the Individual, one which can be characterized as Contemporay and Planetary, spanning an era that is still in progress.

Political Freedom and Psychological Freedom

Perhaps Kant's most important contribution to Modern Political Philosophy is rarely recognized as such--an implicit critique of the prevailing concept of 'freedom'.  According to that concept, one is 'free' when one's conduct is not subject to the will of another.  In contrast, according to Kant, Freedom is, most fundamentally, a psychological condition that entails mastery of one's impulses.  Thus, mere political 'freedom' is neither a necessary or a sufficient condition of psychological Freedom.  In other words, for example, the 'pursuit of happiness', a treasured 'freedom' in the U. S., can consist in conditioned, i. e. unfree, behavior.

Individual and Nation

Over the centuries, the basic political unit has expanded from City, to Province or County, to Nation, and currently, to Planet.  At each transition, there is a dissolution of the smaller unit, followed by an integration of an aggregate of the constituents of the recently dissolved units.  So, for example, Modern Political Philosophy, spanning Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, and Rousseau, most notably, is fundamentally Nationalistic.  In other words, their models represent not the Individual per se, but the Individual qua product of Medieval Provincial polities, transitioning to Modern National ones.  Likewise, Kant and Marx signal the transition to what can be termed Contemporary Planetary models.

Illusion and Supply-Side

In the passage in the Republic commonly known as 'The Parable of the Cave', Plato distinguishes fettering desire from the liberating knowledge of the Good.  In contrast, Marx-Engels oppose the "real" interests of an individual to "illusory" ones, thereby inverting Plato's subordination of Materialism to Idealism.  Now, in contemporary America, the illusion has become so codified in Supply-Side Economics, in which desire, i. e. Demand, is created, that Politics itself is Supply-Side, as is expressed in the wide-spread disjunction of the offerings of major party candidates from the real needs of much of the electorate.  Still, even if Marxist Materialism better explains the contents of the illusion, i. e. irreal desires, Plato's image of how it the illusion is inculcated, i. e. a play of puppet-shadows, remains unsurpassed in its relevance, e. g. the refined calibration of a candidate's media image, which, borrowing current jargon, can be called an 'avatar'.

Individual, Universal, Pluralization, Unification

The positing of Individual Freedom, as prevails in Modern Political Philosophy, entails that the independent existence of a concrete Universal is indifferent, if not antithetical, to that principle.  So the absence, in the era, of unifying purpose as a fundamental element in a polity, at least in part reflects the Logic underlying its construction.  In contrast, if Individual Freedom is historicized, it can be re-interpreted as the culmination of a process of Pluralization.  But, if so, then unifying purpose, likewise historicized, can be re-interpreted as a process of Unification, which, rather than antithetical to Pluralization, can function as its complement.  So, a shift in Logic can transform what have been the standard parameters of Modern Political Philosophy.

Political Philosophy and Goals

Arguably, Nietzsche does not only call for Philosophers "of the future", to set concrete goals, he himself exemplifies the paradigm, as not only a teacher of the uberhuman, but as an advocate of a means to it, i. e. a program of eugenics.  In either case, this concept of what amounts to Political Philosophy stands in sharp contrast with most of the preceding tradition.  For example, Plato speaks of "the Good", but without offering any elaboration, leading some to interpret it as esoteric, e. g. Strauss, and others, as indefinable, e. g. Moore, when, it is possible that Plato simply has no such elaboration to offer.  Regardless, the concept of a concrete goal disappears in Modern Political Philosophy, except for the Wealth of Smith, and the Socialism of Socialists.  Still, in even these cases, the goals are no more than mediate, albeit timely, in contrast with one that perhaps constitutes a post-human evolutionary step.

History and Purpose

Kant's Teleological concept of Rationality, previously discussed, is shared by Aristotle, with the addition of a concept of conflict-fueled History as the path to that end.  So, regardless of the influence of Hegel on Marx, a precursor of the latter's concept of a Dialectical Materialist History can be found in Kant's system, with the significant variation of the collectivization of property as the binding factor of Society.  Still, as ordinary experience regularly evinces, e. g. a work-crew, the most effective ground of social unification is commonality of purpose in action, the most familiar example of which is war.  Now, the limitation of the latter is at the planetary level, when universal human peace has been achieved, assuming no extraterrestrial beings have been discovered.  Two examples of an extension of purpose past that achievement have been Nietzsche's somewhat veiled promotion of the production of an Uberhuman via eugenics, and, more recently, the development of actual extraterrestrial projects.  In the meantime, the concrete transition from Nationalism to Planetization would be, and perhaps should be, the unifying universal political goal at this stage of human history, of which the collectivization of property is a side-effect.

Reason and Peace

In Kant's system there are two teloses for the human race--universal peace and rationality.  These are not two distinctly existing goals, but two perspectives of one and the same condition.  A peaceful society is a rational society, and a rational society is a peaceful society.  Furthermore, according to Kant, the relation between the two is not merely a happenstance equivalence, but a logical bi-conditional--Peace only if Reason, and Reason only if Peace.  In other words, Universal Peace and Kingdom of Ends are related as outer and inner.

Unity of Labor and Collectivization of Property

According to Marx-Engels, social Atomization is the result of Division of Labor.  However, as has been previously discussed, Division of Labor entails Unity of Labor, and, hence, is, more accurately, Organization of Labor.  In contrast, as is expressed in Smith's Egoism, Atomization can be instilled independently of the context of Labor.  Thus, to the contrary of their thesis, Unity of Labor, e. g. a work crew, can contrast sharply with prevailing Atomism, and, indeed, that contrast is often the signal distinction between the Working and the Ownership classes.  Accordingly, it is that solidarity, expressed as collective ownership, that can be conceived as defining the Revolutionary class, in its ascension to power, rather than its class-lessness, as Marx-Engels propose.

Division of Labor and Unity of Labor

The process of dividing presupposes that given is some entity that is unified in some respect.  Likewise, therefore, Division of Labor presupposes a Unity of Labor.  Now, Unity of Labor derives from the unity of the product of labor, e. g. a car.  But, at the same, the division of the  product, e. g. the parts of a car, determines the division of the productive process.  Thus, the concept of Division of Labor abstracts from the combination of the concept of it and the concept of Unity of Labor, or, in other words, from what can be called the concept of Organization of Labor.  Furthermore, prior to involvement in the Labor process, the parties to it are a formless manifold.  Thus, the Marxist analysis, according to which Division of Labor suffices to effect social fragmentation, abstracts from and simplifies a more complicated development.

Division of Labor and Class

Two cardinal concepts in Marxism are Division of Labor and Class.  Now, as has been previously discussed, the former is usually taken to be closer to Atomization than to Diversification.  But, if so, the relation between it and the concept of Class needs to be explained, for otherwise, the connection Division of Labor and Class-Conflict remains unestablished.  In particular, even granted the emergence of solidarity among the Working Class, the consciousness that that involves, i. e. the awareness of common victimization, does not explain any formation of solidarity among exploiters, each of whom is motivated only by self-interest.  Accordingly, the Marxist diagnosis of the ills of Capitalism conflates particular Employer-Employee exploitation, and Class-Conflict.

Division of Labor, Specialization, Exclusivity

Unlike Smith, Marx does not seem to recognize the distinction between division and fragmentation, i. e. the latter as a degenerate mode of the former.  However, Marx does address a complementary problem--Division of Labor from the perspective of the individual participant, who is therein constricted to an exclusive sphere of activity, prompting from Nietzsche the image "inverse cripple".  Still, Marx himself elsewhere implicitly acknowledges a distinction between Specialization and Exclusivity, in his "From each according to his abilities" formulation, that corresponds to that between Division and Fragmentation.  There, he reflects the recognition that individual Specialization and psychological well-roundedness are not mutually exclusive, just as a Diversification of Labor can constitute collective health.

Organism, Society, Diversity of Labor

Any organism is constituted by a division of labor.  In such an entity, 'division' means 'diversification', not 'contradiction'.  Furthermore, as the human thumb exemplifies, the greater the diversity of labor, the greater the capacity to function to the benefit of an organism, e. g. the capacity of humans to grip useful implements. So, the Marxist aim of the abolition of Division of Labor is antithetical to a concept of society as a healthy organism.

Contradiction and Exploitation

In Dialectical Materialism, Contradiction is Conflict.  Now, Confict is a situation in which there is at least one less good than there are parties that desire it.  In nature, Conflict is usually constituted by Scarcity, and resolved by either the elimination of the excess claimants, or by a distribution of the good among all the claimants.  Artifactual Conflict, e. g. sports competition, is usually resolved in the former manner.  Now, the fundamental target of Marxism, Exploitation, consisting in the enjoyment, by the owner of the means of production, of the product of someone else's labor, can be conceived as a case of Conflict--between those two parties, over the product, resolvable by either exclusive possession or sharing.  However, neither solution in itself addresses the essence of Exploitation--that it is stealing, resolvable, according to Marxism, only by the elimination of private ownership of the means of production.  So, Dialectical Materialism is irrelevant to both the ill that Marxism diagnoses of Capitalism, and its proposed cure.

Division of Labor and Dialectical Materialism

Contradiction is a special case of Differentiation, e. g. red and blue are different, but they are not in conflict with each other.  However, in any Dialectical system, all Differentiation is Contradiction.  Now, Division of Labor entails Differentiation, but not necessarily Contradiction.  Thus, insofar as Marx-Engels adhere to Dialectical Materialism, they cannot adequately represent Division of Labor.

Labor, Theory, Oracle

Marx-Engel's concept of "pure" theory, e. g. "theology, philosophy, ethics", as embodying non-material mental labor, abstracts from one dimension of the production of them--they are communicated, which requires physical exertion of some sort.  Thus, the producers of them have less in common with the priest who performs rituals in order to harness higher powers that can benefit a tribe, e. g. bring rain, than with the oracle, who is a medium of communication between the former and the latter.  But, such communication is still a material act that serves a social function, even if it is merely to prepare for the inevitable.  So, if the purpose of the exposition in these passages in the German Ideology is to correlate fundamental Division of Labor and Mind-Matter Dualism in some way, the presentation is less than convincing.

Division of Labor, Mental, Material

As is the case in several sections of the German Ideology, Marx-Engel's attempt to derive a separation of mental labor from physical labor is methodologically sloppy.  For, it presupposes a distinction of "material" and "mental", that, especially in the context of an apparent subscription to a Materialist concept of Mind, itself requires further elucidation.  Now, one approach to such a derivation that is seemingly consistent with some of the principles of Marxism, is to begin with the concept of Labor, and analyze it as "intelligent motion".  Accordingly, the separation, and its hypostasization, of the latter two terms produces a 'mental-'material' duality, plus, it is also produces a division of Labor.  However, as rigorous and potentially fruitful for Marxism as such a derivation might be, that it is adequate without the concept of Dialectical Materialism likely disqualifies it from serious consideration among Marxists.

Division of Labor and Opposable Thumb

Marx-Engels recognize the sexual act as constituting both the original Division of Labor, and the nucleus of exploitative relations.  Now, regardless of whether or not each of those attributions is accurate, another equally primitive Division of Labor can be found in the human hand, specifically in the distinction between the thumb and the fingers.  More precisely, that distinction is generally characterized as opposition, i. e. the thumb is generally classified as 'opposable'.  But, unlike other oppositions in Marxist Dialectics, this one is not at all antagonistic, nor is it exploitative.  Rather, it is the source of the capacity that makes most of human labor even possible--the grip, without which most tools would not even exist.  So, the exploitative antagonism that they try to attribute to Division of Labor, is not, as they try to establish, inherent in it.

Labor and Contemplation

Marx-Engel's division of material labor from mental labor entails that an activity such as the contemplation of an Idea is a variety of Labor.  However, that classification conflicts with a definition of Labor that seems to govern most Marxist works--'a modification of some matter'.  Furthermore, it prevents Marx-Engels from conceiving a corresponding Class distinction the way Dewey does--that between the Working Class and the Leisure Class.  So, their thesis that the separation of mental labor from material labor is the origin of Division of Labor is not only, as has been previously discussed, poorly grounded, it is systematically incoherent, and undermines some fruitful further development.

Division of Labor, Geometry, Architecture

One of the earliest recorded examples of a separation of what Marx-Engels call, in the German Ideology, "mental" from "material", is Pythagoras' conversion of applied Geometry, e. g. land measurement, to pure Geometry.  But Pythagoras does not maintain that duality.  Rather, he further proposes that 'matter' is nothing but 'mental' entities, i. e. combinations of pure Geometrical figures, a thesis that continues to have influence, from Plato, to Leibniz, and lately among Fractal Geometers.  Now, one prominent recent Pythagorean is Buckminster Fuller, who not only conceives 'matter' to be constituted by triangles, but extends that vision into his own artifacts, i. e. geodesic domes, structures that are actualized by builders. So, Marx-Engels' claim that Division of Labor begins with the separation of mental labor from material labor is far-fetched in several respects.  First, it is sheerly speculative, whereas according to a better-evidenced account, pure mental activity is first separated from applied mental activity, not from merely material activity.  Second, it is not the case that perhaps the most influential Mental ontology in history is part of a Dualism--it is Monistic. And, third, the Architect-Builder division of labor, in which the former is inspired by a purely Mental ontology, is one that is complementary, not antagonistic.  In other words, its history of Division of Labor is another less than compelling theoretical feature of Marxism.

Division of Labor and Geometry

In the German Ideology, Marx-Engels assert that "Division of Labor only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labor appears. From this moment onwards, consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of an existing practice, that it really represents something without representing something real."  However, a significant gap in this account, which is sheerly speculative, is suggested by the word 'geometry'.  For, the term analyzes as 'the measurement of the earth', thereby suggesting that prior to becoming a purely mental object, Geometry is a practical enterprise, e. g. involving the measurement of land for agrarian purposes, in which case it is both mental and material.  Accordingly, Marx-Engels skip a stage in the purported genesis of Division of Labor--that constituted by a distinction between the organization of material Labor, and its execution.

Drudgery, Exploitation, Socialism

'Drudgery' encompasses a variety of tasks--sanitation, waste disposal, any toil in unpleasant circumstances, mechanical physical motions, etc.  Now, these are tasks that no one voluntarily performs.  But they are needed.  Thus, any Drudgery-class is one that is exploited, though, since Drudgery is non-productive, its Labor-value is zero, and, hence, can not be something the value of which is alienated from its source.  In other words, such exploitation is not adequately remedied by the collectivization of property.  Thus, if Socialism aims to rid society of class-exploitation more completely, the performance of Drudgery must be universally shared.

Polity and Orchestra

There are three main contributors to the production of a typical piece of what is usually termed 'Classical Music'--the composer, the conductor, and the orchestra.  There are others--the instrument-makers, the managers of the venue, etc.--but those three are the central ones.  Correspondingly, there are three main contributors to a polity--a theorist, e. g. a policy-formulator, a ruler, and the citizenry.  Now, the dysfunctions of each of those three are familiar factors in the development of a Political Philosophy--too abstract theorizing, self-serving ruler, oppressed citizenry, etc.  However, analogous problems seem peculiar, at best, in the context of the production of a piece of music, e. g. that the orchestra is oppressed because they are being told what to do, and even how to do it.  So, the dysfunctions that usually constitute the primary instigation to the development of a Political Philosophy are contingent ones, as are, therefore, their solutions.

Legitimacy, Inegalitarianism, Egalitarianism

One of the distinctive features of Political Philosophy, that distinguishes it from Political Theory, is the attempt to legitimize a proposed model.  Thus, in Ancient Political Philosophy, the source of legitimacy is Nature, while in the Medieval era, it is a Deity.  Now, in the Modern Era, there is a return to Nature as the foundation, but with a significant difference.  Among the Ancients, the specific Natural characteristic is some ability that is posited as not necessarily shared by all, e. g. Reason, whereas for the Moderns, it is universally attributed Freedom.  Accordingly, debates between advocates of Ancient doctrines vs. those of Modern ones tend to reduce to an Inegalitarianism vs. Egalitarianism dispute.  But, tending to corrupt that antithesis is the insinuation into it of extrinsic normative considerations.  As a result, a contrast of 'better suited to rule or to choose a ruler' vs. 'less well-suited to rule or to choose a ruler', morphs into a 'superior human being' vs. 'inferior human being' one, thereby corrupting a perhaps modest and inoffensive Inegalitarian proposition.  Furthermore, the corrupt version has become the widely accepted one, which makes it difficult to criticize, even where presumed Democratic processes are a shadow puppet show.

Political Philosophy and Drudgery

In his positing of Class Conflict as the motor of History, Marx never quite explains why one class exploits another.  He implicitly seems to believe that such exploitation is a necessary means to the acquisition of wealth, though Nietzsche argues that it is motivated by a Will to Power that is more fundamental then profit-seeking.  However, another explanation is one that is seemingly never addressed in the major works of Political Philosophy, though it is implicit in Marx's hope that technological advances can eliminate the need to exploit Labor.  Conspicuously absent in Plato's cataloguing of what is 'necessary' in a polity is a familiar dimension of every society hitherto known--drudgery, which is not to be confused with the skilled Labor that is the foundation of Marxism.  Accordingly, what Marx and Nietzsche, along with Plato, miss is that power relations are required to ensure that necessary drudgery, e. g. waste disposal, is carried out, since no one voluntarily does so, i. e. requiring if not slavery, at least a class that has no alternative to being consigned to it.  Indeed, the accumulation of wealth can be understood as not for its own sake, but in order to distance oneself from menial work.  Thus, one method of Political Philosophy is to return to Plato's, which has been abandoned by his successors, both Ancient and Modern, and Polbegin with the fundamental premise that the performance of drudgery is necessary, and develop a model on that basis.

Happiness: Ancient and Modern

Aristotle conceives Happiness as activity in accordance with Virtue.  In other words, it consists in the exercise of one's talents.  In sharp contrast, the standard Modern concept is that Happiness is constituted by the satisfaction of all one's desires, i. e. something that is pursued, which is not the case with Aristotle's version.  Modern thinkers thus have difficulty appreciating that citizens of Plato's Republic are happy, not because they are ignorantly inured to its inegalitarianism, but because they are each functioning in accordance with the best of their abilities.  Thus, both Ancient and Modern polities are conceived as achieving general Happiness, the difference being how Happiness is conceived in each case.  So, one anomaly is Marx, who is closer to Plato and Aristotle than to Hobbes, Locke, etc. in that regard.

Justice: Ancient and Modern

In the Republic, Justice consists fundamentally in the fulfillment of a natural ability, whether a part of the Soul or a member of a Polity.  Similarly, Justice in Modern Political Philosophy can be conceived as the fulfillment of a person's natural desire to be happy.  Now, that fulfillment is more commonly known in that era as Natural Right, though the latter is usually misattributed to the subject of Happiness, rather than to the experience of fulfillment.  Thus, the main distinction between the two concepts is that Plato's concept of natural potential is more determinate than its Modern correlate, i. e. implicit in the former is that happiness consists in the exercise of some natural characteristic, while no such specification limits the Modern concept of Happiness.  So, Strauss's formulation of the Ancient-Modern contrast--The Good vs. Right--is superficial, at best.

Right and Retributive Justice

A Right is generally conceived to be a simple property of its bearer.  However, what that property consists in is difficult to explain.  Instead, a Pragmatist analysis might be the essential one--a Right is a threat of punishment for interference with its bearer in some respect.  Accordingly, a Right is equivalent to a special case of Retributive Justice--the bearer existing in some way, in return for which they are not to be interfered with in some way.  For example, the standard concept of Natural Right is equivalent to the bearer existing as a human being, in return for which they are not to be interfered with in their pursuit of happiness.

Justice, Retribution, Distribution

The concept of Retributive Justice is that of proportionality between what one gives and what one receives.  It, thus, involves two parties, each of which is both a giver and a receiver.  Now, in many cases, the two parties are each an individual person, but, in some, one party is an individual person, while the other is a totality, such as the World, e. g. when someone is deemed to 'deserve' what happens to them.  And, in some such cases, the totality is society, e. g. Marx's "From each . . . to each . . ." formulation.  However, the latter case is distinguishable from others, for, as Marx overlooks, what society gives one is not independent of what it gives anyone else.  For, what it gives out to one is contingent on the total of what is available to all.  In other words, Justice in a political context combines Distributive and Retributive calculations.  The example also suggests that in the cases in which Retribution seems to suffice, it is abstracted from Distributive considerations, often because the total quantity of what is given is presupposed to be infinite, e. g. when a deity is posited as rewarding behavior.

Society and Organism

Proudhon shares with other Modern Political Philosophers, including Marx, the premise that the Individual human is the fundamental unit of society.  He, thus, shares with them a limitation of that premise--its inadequacy to the concept of Organism, in which an  Individual is re-conceived as a Part.  That inadequacy is a reflection, at least in part, of the ignorance of Biology in an era generally dominated by inanimate Physics, an era that begins to get transcended by the writings of von Humboldt, for example.  So, to apply the thesis of the latter--that the Earth is an Organism--to Political Philosophy, society is a whole of which its members are parts, thereby undermining one of the fundamental premises of the preceding era.  In other words, the application to Political Philosophy of the principles of the Ecologism that has been emerging over the past century or so potentially overrides all the main doctrines of the 17th-, 18th-, and 19th-centuries, and perhaps renders them obsolete.

Mutualism and Justice

Proudhon's concept of Mutuality is that of Retributive Justice, a term which, regardless of its common usage, can apply to any reciprocity, positive or negative.  Now, Retributive Justice entails two, and only two parties.  In contrast, Distributive Justice can apply to any situation involving two or more parties.  So, in the case of any division of labor among three or more parties, only Distributive Justice is adequate.  Now, Proudhon plainly recognizes the need for collective production involving more than two workers.  So, his Mutualism is inadequate to his own ambition of a just society.

Organization and Association

Organization is no mere Association.  It is determinate in at least some respect, whereas the latter is not necesssrily so.  Now, Division of Labor is Organization, and, yet, Proudhon equates it with Association.  He, thus, avoids having to consider that a Socialist collective consists in a structure that, like the performance of a musical composition, entails a distinction between conductor and players, or, in other words, a ruler-ruled differentiation.

Anarchism and Orchestra

An orchestra is an example of a multiplicity that functions effectively, not only collectively, but individually, as well, under the direction of a unitary leader.  Thus, there is no a priori reason why, as Proudhon implicitly believes, a hierarchy necessarily adversely constrains an individual member of a society.  So, the value of Anarchism is contingent on circumstances, e. g. it might vitalize a hitherto sclerotic hierarchical society, but it might accelerate the de-vitalization of one that is already decaying.  That there are music collectives, e. g.  jazz combos, that perform effectively  without a conductor, and, hence, exemplify Anarchism, does not contradict the possibility of a healthy society in which ruler and ruled are distinguished, i. e. as a conductor and player are.

Anarchism, History, Diversification

Regardless of the validity of Dialectical Materialism, Marxism surpasses most, if not all, of rival Modern social models by locating its version in an historical context.  Thus, while Proudhon's Direct Democracy might, in itself, constitute an extreme variety of a horizontal society, e. g. Egalitarianism, that interpretation potentially undergoes modification when, following Marxism, it is historicized, i. e. placed in the context of being preceded by the prevailing vertical models of the Medieval Era.  Now, one characterization of that modified interpretation is suggested by a main Anarchist criticism of Marxism--that it is too centralized.  So, if Proudhon values decentralization with respect to Marxism, then he must do so also with respect to any Theocracy, Monarchism, and Oligarchism, that precedes his model.  Thus, the latter can be more adequately conceived as reflecting an espousal of a diversification of power, and not merely one of Egalitarianism, which is only the product of an hypostasization of and abstraction from that dynamic historical pattern.

Anarchism and Direct Democracy

Proudhon's rejection of any society in which there is a distinction between Ruler and Ruled encompasses Representative Democracy, even though in it, representatives are, in principle, ruled by their constituents.  Instead, he conceives his Anarchism, not be confused with anarchy, requires only Direct Democracy.  Now, as is widely recognized, one of the potential weaknesses of Direct Democracy is what is sometimes characterized as the 'tyranny of the majority', i. e. in which Ruler and Ruled are sundered.  So, the presumed unique suitability of Direct Democracy to Anarchism is unclear.

Sovereign and Representative

One well-recognized distinction between Hobbes' and Locke's Political Philosophies is that the former, but not the latter, conceives the State of Nature as a condition of universal conflict.  Another distinction, less well-recognized, but perhaps as significant, is that between Sovereign and Representative.  While Hobbes' Sovereign-Citizen power relation is downward, that of Locke's Citizen-Representative is the inverse, so Locke diverges further from Medieval hierarchy than does Hobbes.  Now, a parallel between that concept of Locke's with his Epistemological theory can be noted, but with one difference.  Representation is derivative in both cases, though, while the Epistemological one is a mere abstraction from the multiplicity of its represented, the Political representative, is, like those represented, a concrete individual entity.

Anarchism, Socialism, Marxism

Proudhon's Anarchism is a variety of Socialism that diverges from Marxism in two respects.  First, it entails no Dialecticism, and, second, it rejects the centralization of Marxism.  Now, the failure of Marxists to establish an essential connection between Socialism and Dialectics leaves Proudhon's variety of the former deficient in no obvious respect with the absence of the latter.  However, the other divergence is not as clear-cut as it sometimes seems to be taken.  For, his Federalism entails at least some unity of the multiplicity of citizens, so its distinction from Marxist centralization is only one of degree, not kind.

Mutualism and Property

Proudhon's Mutualist theory of Property has two main principles: 1. The product of one's own labor is inalienably one's own, and 2. The means of production is collectively owned.  Now, while such an arrangement eliminates much exploitation, it is not completely coherent.  For, it leaves undeterminable the status both of the production of means of production, such as tools, and of the collective production of goods.  Common to the two problems is the absence of a formulation of the relation between My and Our, an absence that originates in that between I and We.

Mutualism and Solidarity

Proudhon conceives his Mutalist Anarchism to be Socialist, i. e. an associative solidarity.  However, one problem with his concept is that there is no systematic relation between Mutuality and Solidarity.  For, the former is constituted by a multiplicity of Is, while the latter consists in a We.  Similarly, Kant's Kingdom of Ends is an aggregate of Rational agents that is outside the scope of Synthesis--Quantity in his system is applicable to only Phenomenal entities, not to Noumenal ones like Rational agents, and, hence the aggregate cannot be unified while retaining internal distinctions.  In other words, a Mutualist collective can never be more than a concatenation of Individuals, i. e. can never solidify as a We.

Mutualist Anarchism and Rationality

The derivability of Mutualist Anarchism from Kantian Morality, previously discussed, thus marks it as a model of a Rational social system.  However, it diverges from Kant's Kingdom of Ends in two respects--it is not necessarily constituted by laws, and it includes no King.  The very brief and oblique allusion to a King in the Groundwork seems to imply that the monarch in question is Kant's deity, the positing of the existence of which is justified only elsewhere, in the 2nd Critique, by a dubious proof, as has been discussed here a while ago.  And, Kant never shows that the process of Universalization entailed in the functioning of Pure Practical Reason is ever more than a mental operation.  So, Mutualist Anarchism can be conceived as a critique of Kantian Rationalism, separating its essential features--Autonomy and End-in-Itself--from its inessential legalist Monarchism.

Mutualism, Form, Content

As has been previously discussed, Mutualism can be conceived as an instance of Kantian Morality, i. e. voluntary fairness combines the concepts of Autonomy and End-in-Itself.  Conversely, as an instance of Kantian Morality, Mutualism exposes an inadequacy of one of the prominent criticisms of that doctrine.  The criticism is that it is merely abstract, deficient for guiding concrete behavior.  However, Mutualism shows why such under-determination can be regarded as a virtue.  For, beyond the formal requirement that an exchange be fair, its details are contingent, determinable by the parties involved, not a priori.  In other words, the formal requirement is not, as is charged in the criticism, abstract, but, rather, concrete, awaiting content that complements it.  So, Mutualism illustrates that the Abstract-Concrete contrast that is the basis of the criticism is actually one of Form-Content, each of which is concrete.

Anarchism, Mutualism, Kantianism

Mutualism can be conceived as an instance of Kantian Morality--of the feature characterized as the End-in-Itself Duty.  For, treating another as an End in that system entails both elements of a Mutualist exchange--voluntary participation, i. e. Autonomy, and fairness, i. e. respect for the interest of another.  Now, one of the looser transitions in Kant's system is that from the Fundamental Principle of Pure Practical Reason to this Duty, i. e. the latter admirably enriches the former, but is not rigorously derived from it.  Similarly, Mutualism enhances Proudhon's Anarchism, but it is not logically entailed by it.  That looseness can explain why Wolff's Kantian defense of Anarchism, based on the concept of Autonomy, bypasses the parallel Kantianism of Proudhon's Mutualism.

Mutualism and Egoism

Mutualism entails the voluntary participation in equitable exchange, and, hence, that fairness is freely pursued.  However, Prouhon does not supply a principle that would ground such behavior, so it can only be an object of speculation.  Now, there can be little doubt that the principle is neither Psychological nor Ethical Egoism, each of which excludes Fairness as an immediate conative aim.  An alternative possibilty, one consistent with optimistic concepts of Human Nature, is the thesis of an instinct for Justice, though proof of the existence of such an instinct would seem difficult to establish, since that would require study of behavior under conditions that are completely abstracted from historical vicissitudes.  Instead, a more accessible possibility is Dewey's thesis that human behavior is essentually plastic, from which it follows that Mutualist conduct is the product of education.  In any case, at minimum, Mutualism is antithetical to any of the prominent traditional varieties of Egoism.

Democracy, Capitalism, Mutualism

Democracy combines Equality and Freedom, the actualization of which is more Art than either Science or Dialectical Necessity.  Now, Capitalism entails Freedom, but not Equality.  In contrast, the fundamental element of Proudhon's Mutualism, the voluntary and equitable Exchange, entails both Freedom and Equality.  Thus, despite the deeply ingrained, especially in the U. S., synonymity of Democracy and Capitalism, it is Mutualism, not the latter, that is the Economic system that is more appropriate to the former.

Anarchism and Federalism

Proudhon espouses Federalism, which seems to conflict with his Anarchism, because the former connotes a centralized government, while the latter connotes individual liberty.  However, Federalism unifies not individual citizens, but smaller political units, of which a citizen is more immediately a member.  So, he conceives a Federation as functioning as protection of the citizen from more localized tyranny.  A more recent example that seems to exemplify his analysis is the protection, by the U. S. Federal Government, of voting rights in a state like Mississippi.  Likewise, some of the apparent Anti-Federalism of sone American Libertarians is actually a defense of State authority, and, hence, potentially antagonistic to individual citizens that are subject to that authority.

Anarchism and Mutualism

As has been previously discussed, the Modern concept of Citizen-Sovereign Contract is grounded in the mutual consent of citizens.  Now, the concept of mutuality is of especial significance to Proudhon, because he conceives the Economic system that is suitable to his variety of Anarchism to be what he calls Mutualism. The fundamental element of Mutualism is freely-engaged equitable exchange, thereby, according to some analysts, combining free-market Capitalism with exploitation-free Socialism.  It also implicitly repudiates the profit-seeking Ethical Egoism that is the psychological basis of Smith's system.

Contract, Sovereign, Anarchism

As has been previously discussed, the Citizen-Sovereign contract of the main Contractarian models, is derived from Citizen-Citizen consent.  The analysis thus exposes the actual function of the Sovereign in these models--to enforce and adjudicate the latter stratum.  However, Proudhon's excising of the Sovereign in his Anarchistic variation of Contractarianism does not follow necessarily.  For, whether or not an independent party is required to perform those functions depends on whether or not the parties to a contract are themselves capable of effectively self-policing, which is no simple problem.  And, if they are not, then his Anarchistic model requires some accommodation of enforcement and adjudication, in which parties concede sovereignty to what that might entail.  So, the appeal of Proudhon's vision may be no more than superficial.

Contract, Citizen, Sovereign

The Contract in the main Modern Contractarian models, e. g. both Hobbes' and Rousseau's, is between each Citizen and the Sovereign, however the latter might be embodied.  Now, the establishment of the Contract in these cases tends to conflate three distinct stages: 1. Association of individuals on some basis; 2. Representation of the association; 3. Establishment of an agreement between the representation and each individual.  However, implicit in #1 is a more fundamental agreement, namely, one constituted by the terms of the association, e. g. a cessation of hostilities, which develops through the other two stages, i. e. implicit in one's contractual arrangement with the Sovereign is that each other is doing likewise.  So, the ground of legitimacy of the Citizen-Sovereign Contract is the consent between each Citizen with every other, a ground which tends to be obscured in the tradition.

Monarchism, Contractarianism, Anarchism

While Rule of Law might be the predominant feature of the Modern Polity, its foundation is the Contract.  The historical significance of the Contract is that it supplants Hereditary Monarchism, usually theologically underwritten, as the source of political legitimacy.  However, as Proudhon perhaps is the first to note, there is a profound conflation in the prominent theories of the era--whether the parties to the Contract are Individuals, or are an Individual and the Sovereign, i. e. the expositions tend to groundlessly shift from one to the other, and any concept of a Sovereign is vestigial Monarchism.  So, Prodhoun's Anarchism can be conceived as Contractarianism that eliminates the Individual-Sovereign Contract.  Conversely, because an inter-individual contract establishes order between them, such Contractarianism is not anarchic qua chaotic.

Law and Privacy

As has been previously discussed, Rule of Law is formally antithetical to Individualism, though the content of a law can defend and promote it.  It is also often regarded as hostile to Privacy, which only sometimes reduces to Individualism.  For, in many cases, such opacity entails a multiplicity, agreement amongst which first produces it, e. g. sexual relations.  The claim to the privileged status of agreement is one of fundamental grounds for Economic de-regulation, based on the analysis that a Free-Market system is constituted by a network of private arrangements.  However, granting such an opacity, it is not extended to activity that exceeds the agreement, e. g. when a third-party is affected by such activity.  But, perhaps the biggest challenge to such a claim is that agreement entails voluntariness, and it is often difficult to determine if consent is truly voluntary, e. g. someone under duress.  That difficulty is a central factor in American life, even if business-as-usual tends to obscure it.  In the absence of attention to that indeterminacy, Law remains widely conceived as a threat to Privacy.

Law, Individual, Universal

The example of the United States seems to refute the previously asserted proposition that Law is antithetical to Individualism.  For, the U. S., as is often stated, is a "nation of laws", beginning with the Constitution, and the centerpiece of that document is the Bill of Rights, which protects the Individual in a variety of ways.  However, the content of a law is distinguishable from its form, and regardless of the former, the latter is Universal.  In other words, that a law protects each individual is a contingent feature of it.  Likewise, there is a distinction of contingent and necessary in the contrast between the claim of a right as an individual, and universal requirement to respect the right of others.  Arguably, the privileging of the former is one of the fundamental sources of discontent in current American society.

Anarchism, Capitalism, Rule of Law

One feature of the typical contemporary polity that is antithetical to Individualism is the Rule of Law.  For, Law in these cases tends to be Universal, thereby abstracting from any individual distinctiveness.  Thus, the Archy opposed by varieties of Anarchism that are modes of Individualism is Law, e. g. government regulations of Capitalist activity. However, such cases do not enjoy Wolff's Kantian defense of Anarchism, since it applies only to autonomous conduct, which Capitalist Egoism is not.  Proof of the latter is as follows: autonomous conduct is conduct determined by Pure Practical Reason; conduct determined by Pure Practical Reason is that the maxim of which can be a universal law; the maxim of Capitalist Egoism is 'optimize profit'; but, that maxim will self-destruct as a universal law, since every profit entails some loss; therefore, Capitalist Egoism is heteronomous behavior.  Or, more plainly, such Egoism is instinctive, with respect to which Reason is only instrumental.

Pure Practical Reason and Law

Kant's Pure Practical Reason can also be characterized as Legislative Reason or Legislative Will.  For, according to him, it is the faculty that creates Laws--not merely edicts, but formulations that qualify as Laws by entailing Universality, the fundamental characteristic of a Law.  Now, in his system, Pure Practical Reason functions primarily as the basis of Morality, as a vehicle of an Individual's transcendence of external influences.  But, it is also potentially relevant to Political Philosophy.  For, its concept of Universalizability offers a criterion for weeding out any partisanship from presumably egalitarian legislative processes.

Anarchism, Individual, State

The Anarchist concept of an antagonistic relation between Individual and State/Government is concrete in one context--criminal jurisprudential proceedings.  For, in those, it is the State or Government vs. some particular citizen.  But, whether or not the action is justified, it is implicitly a deviation from some non-antagonistic relation.  So, even if that antagonism has become normalized in a given polis, it does not follow that it is inherent in political organization.  Likewise, that some organism is chronically ill does not imply that Life is essentially a diseased condition.  So, Anarchism has no more than contingent value--as a corrective to a Rule in which the Ruled are alienated from the Ruling.

Anarchism and Anti-Statism

By implication, what Anarchists oppose can be called 'Archism', and since they tend to advocate self-determinism, Archism can be broadly defined as 'Rule in which Ruler and Ruled are not identical'.  But, in the salient moments of their history, the kind of Rule that they specifically oppose is that in which the Ruler is anonymous and centralized, usually termed the 'State' or the 'Government'.  In other words, their target might be more the Soviet bureaucracy than Stalin.  No doubt they also oppose tyrants, but they are peripheral factors in the doctrine.  So, more accurate than 'Anarchism' is 'Anti-Statism'.

Capitalism and Anarchy

The implied positive concepts of which anarchy and Anarchism are the negations are archy and Archism, respectively, hitherto non-addressed.  So, corresponding to the distinction, previously discussed, between the negatives, 'archy' is a social condition in which some rule obtains, while 'Archism' is the doctrine that asserts that some rule is better than no rule.  Now, a 'rule' is a human institution, as opposed to either a natural or a superhuman law.  But, Capitalism is conceived as fundamentally governed by either a natural law, i. e. the Law of Supply and Demand, or a superhuman law, i. e. the dictate of the Invisible Hand.  Thus, Capitalism is not archic, and any insistence that market activity not be interfered with is not Archistic.  In other words, Capitalism is anarchic, and the defense of it is often Anarchistic.

History and Events

History is usually conceived as events organized in some manner, with chronological order the most basic pattern.  But, that concept misleadingly suggests that there is nothing occurring in between those events, whereas, as is the case in everyday experience, History is constituted as a flux, in which an 'event' is actually more like a salient node than a discrete atom.  Furthermore, an event is internally temporal, i. e. its constituents are themselves organized in some manner.  So, a concept of History must be both inter- and intra-event, and, if there is a distinction between those two, they must be systematically related.  Thus, for example, a Dialectical concept of History, of any variety, by sharply distinguishing its moments, i. e. Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis, abstracts from actual flux, and, so, as a representation of it, is inadequate to its concreteness.

Anarchy, Anarchism, Self-Determination

Literally, 'anarchy' means 'rulelessness'.  Thus, the common use, signifying 'chaos', is etymologically accurate.  In contrast, the doctrine 'Anarchism' is not.  It is so superficially, insofar as it connotes the rejection, in either practice or principle, of a 'State'.  But, that rejection is, more precisely, that of Heteronomy, i. e. of external rule, so it does not preclude Autonomy, i. e. self-determination, which, upon closer examination, is often endorsed by Anarchists.  Thus, for example, Wolff, in his "defense of Anarchism", recognizes the systematic relation between that doctrine and Kantian Autonomy.  Accordingly, any social organization that is fundamentally produced and maintained by voluntary arrangements can be classified as 'Anarchistic' in this sense, though not as literally 'anarchic'.

Anarchy and Anarchism

'Anarchy', in common parlance, is synonymous with 'chaos'.  In contrast, 'Anarchism' is a doctrine the cardinal element of which is the thesis that self-determination is the best principle of social organization, with variations of the concept of 'best' the grounds of varieties of the doctrine.  In other words, anarchy is antithetical to Political Philosophy, while Anarchism, as the suffix suggests, is a special case of it.

Political Philosophy and State of Nature

One of the fundamental debates of Modern Political Philosophy is: Humankind is by nature in a condition of universal war, e. g. Hobbes, vs. Humankind is by nature in a condition of universal peace, e. g. Rousseau.  Correspondingly, therefore, is a debate over the basic function of Political Philosophy--to neutralize universal war vs. to undo the artificial impediments to universal peace.  Now, one criticism of the terms of the debate is that there is no such 'state of nature', from which it follows that Political Philosophy is a groundless enterprise.  Still, by re-conceiving the 'state of nature' as heuristic, the enterprise can recover at least some justification.  However, even granted that modification, the two positions share an arbitrary presupposition--both a state of war and a state of peace are structures.  In contrast to both is the premise, whether constitutive or heuristic, that Humankind is formless, from which it follows that the basic function of Political Philosophy is to introduce organization into it, with the debate over the best type of organization independent of any supposition of a 'state of nature'.

Dialectical Materialism and Technocracy

According to Dialectical Materialism, Techne consists in a modification of Matter.  However, Technology involves more than such a transformation.  It also consists in the harnessing of laws of Nature, e. g. the harnessing of laws governing fire, to warm a room.  Thus, insofar as Dialectical Materialism is, as Marxists posit, a law of Nature, it, too, is subject to being harnessed, e. g. inducing a Revolution.  But, Dialectical Materialism cannot account for the harnessing of a law like itself.  In other words, Marxist Technocracy, i. e. Socialism that is deliberately developed out of Capitalism, cannot be derived from Dialectical Materialism.

History and Political Philosophy

For Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke, History is irrelevant to their model societies. Instead, Marx vacillates between conceiving it as a force that necessarily transforms Capitalism into Socialism, and as itself part of a world that must be changed.  For Nietzsche, it is a source of examples.  In contrast, it can be conceived as the precondition of what is now to be done, most generally, either a continuation of a status quo, or a variation of it, depending on how satisfactory it is.  So, Shakespeare might have the more accurate concept of History than any in this group--it is a prologue to subsequent action, though without the formal sharp distinction between the two that is a characteristic of Plays.  Rather, the transition is a constantly mobile one.  Accordingly, a Political Philosophy reflects its preconditions, as their extension, to a greater or lesser degree of similitude.

Scientific Socialism and Technological Socialism

It is unclear if the term "scientific socialism", formulated by Engels, accurately applies to Marxism.  For, the 'science' to which he refers is Dialectical Materialism, the Marxist concept of History.  But History always ends at the present moment, so any concept of it is an interpretation of the world.  In contrast, to change the world in accordance with the principles of an interpretation of the world entails the application of them to action, or, in other words, Techne.  So, more accurate than "scientific socialism" in the case of Marxism is 'technological socialism'.

Technocracy and Revolution

Techne consists in applied Theory. In the case of the main works of Modern Political Philosophy, the Theory involved is Psychological Egoism, which is itself an application of Atomist Mechanics to human behavior.  So, to that extent, the doctrines that result are Technocracies.  In the case of Marx, the Theory involved is Dialectical Materialsm, or, eqiuvalently, Class Conflict.  Now, applied Dialectical Materialism is Revolution, spanning the transition from Capitalism to Socialism, and, so, Marxism is Technocratic in that respect.  However, it is less obvious how Socialism, once established, is applied Dialectical Materialism, and, so, if it is Technocratic, the informing Theory is likewise less obvious. Thus, the concept of Marxism, qua, as held by some, "permanent revolution", is better evidence of Marxist Technocracy than its Socialism.

History and the Understanding of History

The standard Archimedean moment of Modern Political Philosophy is purportedly a Nowhen, or in Spinoza's case, Eternity.  But, these works are products of abstractions from a transition from the Medieval Era that precedes the writing of them, a period dominated by Theocracy.  In contrast, for Marx, the best polis occurs at a not only specific, but a unique, When, the transition to which is an instance of a general principle of History, i. e. Dialectical Materialism.  Still, what he does not quite explain is the nature of the moment of his coming to understand the essence of that transition, and whether or not the process of coming to that understanding is itself an instance of that general principle, i. e. whether or not it is via Dialectical Materialism that he arrives at that awareness.  This is less of a problem for Hegelian Dialectical Idealism, because the terminal moment of the process is an Idea.

Archimedean Where? and Archimedean When?

While Archimedes presents a transcendent point of leverage as heuristic, some Philosophers have conceived it as real in some respect, though without adequately explaining where the point is located, e. g. Nagel's facetious "Nowhere".  Now, the difficulties that they thereby tend to evade are more clearly articulated in a temporal analog to Archimedes' spatial image, a corresponding transcendent moment that emerges in any Philosophical concept of History.  For, that process of emergence is itself also part of History, which means that it has to be accommodated within the concept that emerges from it.  In other words, the problem of an Archimedean When? cannot be as easily finessed as that of an Archimedean Where? has been.

Archimedes and Technocracy

The fundamental principle of Technocracy is Archimedes' statement, "Give me a place to stand on, and I will move the world." Modern Philosophy is Technocratic in that respect, e. g. the Cogito, and a Sense-Datum, for Rationalists and Empiricists, respectively,  are such 'places', though the abstraction from the Practical character of the enterprise typically gets it hypostasized as Theoretical 'Foundationalism'.   Likewise, Modern Political Philosophy has its Archimedean places, e. g. the Individual, Natural Right, Self-Interest, etc.  These are all devices for moving, if not the world, human society, but, because the search for and securing of the point is, like Wittgenstein's Ladder, dispensed with, their Practical and Historical character, and, hence, their Technocratic function, is suppressed within the content of the works.

Practice, Change, History

The content of Political Philosophy is Practical rather than Theoretical, since it concerns Action, not an object of Cognition.  However, it not so obviously concerns changing the world, as opposed to interpreting it, as Marx posits the contrast.  For, while a Modern work typically constructs a model of a preferred society, and gets published with the implication that it be actualized, there is never the exhortation, as there is in the Communist Manifesto, to prepare for such a construction by destroying its preconditions, e. g. even Rousseau only advises change, without systematically incorporating it into his model, as Marx-Engels do.  In order to so incorporate it, the preconditions, too, must be systematically related to what is to supplant them, which requires a concept of History that embraces both and the transition from one to the other.  So, while the main works of Modern Political Philosophy concern Practice, as a-historical, they do not constitute efforts to change the world, even if they do not interpret it, either.

The Prince and Technocracy

Though it is typically cited as the first work of Modern Political Philosophy, The Prince seems to have very little in common with the rest of that era.  For, while those works posit competing models of the best social organization, Machiavelli abstracts almost completely from any such content, instead offering advice to a ruler regarding the maintaining of power.  So, The Prince superficially seems to be a different genre of Political writing than Leviathan, etc.  Still, the contrast is instructive, since it is a reminder that implicit in the latter group is that they, too, are pieces of advice on how to rule, i. e. they are programs to be executed by a ruler, not mere fodder for theoretical debate.  In other words, they, too, are Technocratic.

Technocracy and Social Engineering

Like that of Technology, some of the hostility to Technocracy is rooted in an antagonism to Techne that is expressed in fundamental cultural myths, e. g. that of Prometheus, and that of Adam and Eve.  Typical of those myths is that Techne constitutes a straying of humans from some higher order, e. g. some deity, or divinized 'Nature'.  So, entailed in those expressions of antagonism is the existence of a higher order, or, conversely, absent that premise, any implication that Techne, and its modes, is inherently malign is groundless.  Consequently, if there is any ill in Technocracy, it is only contingent and particular, not necessary and general.  Thus, for example, if busing is ineffective as a remedy for racial bigotry, it is not because it is "social engineering" that is a violation of some higher order segregation, as some seem to conceive it.