Mind, Automaton, Mechanism, Autonomy

In Improvement of the Understanding, Spinoza briefly uses the term "automaton" to characterize Mind.  The term has thus suggested to a least one recent scholar that his concept of Mind is mechanistic, which, because Mind, according to Spinoza, is part of Nature, seems to conform to the Cartesian/Newtonian concept of Nature.  However, according to Deleuze, 'automaton' connotes something different than its standard contemporary English meaning.  He, instead, interprets it as 'autonomous being', which is certainly well-grounded etymologically.  But stronger support for that interpretation can be found elsewhere in Improvement, in a passage in which Spinoza characterizes Mind as creating its own "tools", i. e. operations that facilitate its work.  He gives no instances, but the formation of algorithms seems exemplary.  Indeed, he even uses the term "mechanisms" to characterize its simpler operations.  So, to that extent, "automaton" does connote 'mechanical'.  But, the capacity of Mind to far transcend such mechanisms with more complex inventions, tends to confirm the interpretation of "automaton" as 'autonomous being'.

Nature: Inanimate, Animate, Dynamic

As has been previously discussed, the Cartesian-Newtonian concept of Nature is as inanimate.  The emergence in recent times of the general acceptance of many parts of Nature as animate thus reflects the incapacity of that concept to ground a concept of animate Nature.  But Spinoza seems to have the converse problem--to derive a concept of inanimate Nature from one of animate Nature, e. g. how a stone can be conceived as endeavoring to persist in its being.  Now, he does not address the problem, but a potential solution comes, ironically, from Newton.  For, his First Law, according to which an object remains in motion unless acted upon from without, seems reducible to Spinoza's concept of persisting in being.  On the other hand, the concept of an endeavor seems difficult to ascribe to a stone.  However, there are passages in which Spinoza seems to equate persistence in being to the maintenance of the integrity of the parts of the body.  Now, that characteristic does seem easier to ascribe to an endeavor, especially in light of the more recent Physics, according to which the integrity of an object is achieved by internal cohesion produced by electro-magnetic forces.  On that basis, the characterization 'inanimate' can be replaced by 'dynamic', in which case the distinction between inanimate Nature and animate Nature can be revised as a distinction of degree between two parts of dynamic Nature.  Whether or not Spinoza would assent to such a projection of his doctrine can only be a matter of speculation, but the possibility does illustrate the greater versatility of his concept of Nature in comparison with that of the Cartesian/Newtonian concept.

Nature, Thought, Soul

Spinoza's attribution of Thought and Extension to one and the same substance, God/Nature, is a direct response to Descartes' attribution of them to two distinct substances, Mind and Body, with Nature restricted to the latter.  Descartes, reflecting his Theological orientation, also diverges significantly from Plato and Aristotle by identifying Mind and Soul, thereby eliminating the animal and vegetative divisions of the Soul.  The result is a concept of Nature and its parts as inanimate machines, a thesis that soon gains great influence via Newton's adoption of it.  In sharp contrast, Spinoza attributes both Mind and Body to all parts of Nature, distinguished by degree of complexity, and, thus, by implication, animation to all those parts, thereby repudiating the Cartesian/Newtonian concept of Nature and its parts as mere machines.  Now, Spinoza's attribution of Thought to Nature has hardly gained wide currency over the centuries.  But that e. g. dogs and trees are now generally accepted to be intelligent living beings is an example of the general assimilation of at least some of his doctrine.

Nature and Proof of the Existence of God

The Argument From Design is one of four prominent 'proofs of the existence of God'.  The Cosmological Proof tries to prove that God exists as a necessary First Cause; the Teleological Proof tries to prove that God exists as a necessary Final Cause; and the Ontological Proof tries to prove that the existence of God is entailed in its essence.  Now, Kant is widely recognized as presenting the most formidable refutations of them.  However, Spinoza's counter to the other three is just as decisive as that to the Argument From Design, as has been previously discussed--even if they do soundly prove the existence of a deity, they fail to prove that that deity transcends Nature, i. e. is incorporeal.  Similarly failing is Kant's Practical Proof that he proposes as the replacement for the four that he has repudiated--that Pure Practical Reason requires the existence of God as a rewarder of Virtue.  For, the concept of Karma is an example of a principle of just deserts that can be conceived as immanent in Nature.  So, even granting the necessity of the existence of a rewarding deity, that it transcends Nature remains unestablished.  Thus, Spinoza's doctrine undermines all the proofs simply and decisively--by denying from the outset any Super-Natural existence.  At the same time, it exposes the limits of the scope of their relevance--dualistic Theology--whether in the Medieval Era, or in the so-called Enlightenment.

Transcendent Designer and Immanent Designer

As has been previously discussed, implicit in Spinoza's attribution of Thought to Nature is an exposure of the fallacy of the various versions of the standard Theological Argument From Design.  According to that argument: 1. Nature evinces Design; 2. Evidence of Design indicates the existence of a Designer; 3. Therefore, a Designer exists; 4. Therefore, the transcendent Abrahamic deity exists.  Usually, counter-arguments have targeted 1 or 2, e. g. Hume and Kant, respectively.  But, the counter that is possible only on the basis of an intelligent Monist Naturalism targets 4, by implicitly exposing the inference to a Designer that transcends Nature--an inference that is the essence of the argument--as begging the question.  Furthermore, Spinoza's doctrine does not merely neutralize the argument by presenting an alternative inference at 4--its alternative is better grounded.  For, there is ample evidence of Designing that is immanent in Nature--that of humans, who routinely make plans and execute them, with e. g. products of their manufacturing as evidence of Design, which advocates of Theological argument freely acknowledge.  So, there is unarguable evidence of the existence of immanent Self-Designing in Nature.  In contrast, there is no such evidence of the existence of a transcendent Designer that is independent of the argument devised to prove that existence.  Nevertheless, Spinoza's doctrine has remained an untapped resource as the Argument From Design persists in its recent Creationist guise, e. g. Darwinists who seem satisfied with the thesis that Evolution is a random process.

Intelligent Design and Intelligent Self-Designer

These days, the phrase 'intelligent design' is best-known as a Creationist counter-argument to Darwinism, the fundamental premise of which is that the patterns evinced by Nature are better ascribed to a deity than to a random process.  The argument is also similarly applicable to Big-Bang Theory, though it seems to appear less in that context.  But while it is now associated with Creationism, a version of it has a long history, preceding its emergence in Medieval Theology as one of the 'proofs of the existence of God', advanced by Aquinas, in particular.  Newton, too, subscribes to the argument, but because his Physics overshadows his Theological writings, his continuation of that tradition has been relatively less recognized.  Now, Kant's critique would seem conclusive.  Nevertheless, the argument has survived its apparently more formidable peers that are included in Kant's critique--the Ontological Argument and the Cosmological Argument.  In any case, Spinoza's doctrine implicitly refutes its Medieval version and its descendants.  As has been previously discussed, his attribution of Thought to Nature is equivalent to the attribution to Nature of Intelligent Design.  But implicit in his doctrine is that the inference from Intelligent Design to transcendent Intelligent Designer is fallacious, i. e. begs the question.  For, an inference to immanent Intelligent Designer is also possible.  In other words, his affirmation of the principle that Nature is an Intelligent Self-Designer is another example of his Pantheism/Monist Naturalism undercutting the Dualism that continues to prevail in both Theology and Philosophy.

Nature, Thought, Intelligent Design

Spinoza's concept of Nature is of a dynamic, creative Substance.  Hence, more accurate than 'Thought' and 'Extension' as terms for its attributes, likely references to Descartes' static substances, are 'Thinking' and 'Extending'.  Now, one way to understand what he means by the attribution of Thinking to Nature is to examine an exemplification, i. e. the Thinking of a Mode as it creates.  So, his description of the guiding of the drawing of a circle by following the definition of a Circle is one such example.  On that basis, more generally, any production, guided by a model, whether of a sequence of behavior, or of the manufacture of some thing, exemplifies the Thinking of Nature.  Accordingly, his attribution of Thought to Nature is equivalent to the attribution of what might be called  'intelligent design' to Nature, though, quite contrary to the usual use of that phrase, the design is a product of immanent designing, i. e. is the self-designing of Nature.

Naturalism and Human Artifice

Whether or not Spinoza conceives Thought to be inherently Mathematical, his attribution of it to Nature is a direct contrast with Descartes' concept of Thought as Super-Natural.  More generally, the attribution is a cardinal premise of the aspect of his doctrine that has been overshadowed by his Pantheism--what can be classified as Monistic Naturalism.  The under-emphasis of the latter is due to Spinoza's own focus on the God aspect of his principle, to the relative neglect of its Nature and Substance aspects, which together constitute Monistic Naturalism.  Now, as his counter to Descartes signifies, the immediate aim of Monistic Naturalism is the denial of any Super-Nature.  But, over the subsequent centuries, perhaps unanticipated by Spinoza, a second non-Natural realm has emerged--the world of Human artifice and its products, often characterized as 'unnatural', or 'artificial'.  Such characterizations perhaps reflect a Theological legacy--a distinction between God-made Nature and the disobedient Human appropriation of it.  Nevertheless, in a Monistic Naturalism, regardless of their value, all such activity and its products is Natural.  So, one way to forfend such developments from within Spinoza's doctrine is to emphasize that Modes are intra-Natural, as is all their creative activity.

Nature, Thought, Mathematics

Both Empiricists and Kant argue that Mathematical relations are part of the perception of Nature, not in Nature itself.  Thus, if Spinoza's attribution of Thought to Nature is based on the thesis, perhaps derived from Descartes, as has been previously discussed, that it has an inherent Mathematical structure, then it is vulnerable to formidable challenge.  However, the stronger textual evidence suggests that for Spinoza, it is the "order" of events in Nature that evinces the inherence of Thought.  Indeed, Hume might be skeptical about the positing of a law that connects the striking of a ball by a stick with the subsequent movement of the ball.  But he does not deny that in the concrete case, one precedes the other.  So, it is most likely that Spinoza's attribution of Thought to Nature is based on the Ordinality of events, which obtains even in the case of a mechanistic sequence, i. e. the order of events in Newton's clockwork Nature expresses the Thought its divine clockmaker.  Furthermore, if Mathematics is defined in terms of terms of Ordinal Numbers, rather than Cardinal Numbers, the inherent Ordinality of events entails the possibility of an inherent Mathematical structure.  So, the Empiricist potential  criticism of the the attribution of Thought to Nature is, at best, only conditionally sound.

Nature and Thought

The complement in Spinoza's doctrine of his attribution of Extension to God is that of Thought to Nature.  This is two decades prior to the appearance of Newton's concept of Nature as mechanical, and, hence, as lacking Thought, so perhaps Spinoza recognizes no urgency in explaining the role of Thought in mechanical relations.  Still, he is familiar with the discoveries of Galileo, so he is aware of such relations constituting gravitational events. He is also, of course, familiar with the work of Descartes, and, hence, of the latter's innovations in and applications of Analytic Geometry.  Furthermore, he is aware of the status of Mathematical relations as objects of Thought, according to Descartes, and, hence, as products of Thought in his doctrine. Thus, if Spinoza's concept of Nature is influenced by Descartes, then insofar as the laws of Nature are fundamentally Mathematical, Thought is an attribute of Nature.  Accordingly, a potential response by Spinoza to Newton is that qua mechanical, Nature might lack Thought, but qua Mathematical, it is constituted by Thought.

Intuition and Creativity

In the context of the Ethics, the Intuition of God might seem to be a rarified mystical experience.  But in a different context, the general significance of the moment may be easier to recognize.  From the beginning of recorded history, creativity has been an attribute of humans.  But in almost the same span, human creativity has been interpreted as an object of divine wrath, with epochal consequences. Less dramatically, but similarly, the source of that creativity, Techne, is relegated by Aristotle to inferior, non-divine status.  Thus, when Spinoza's Intuition of God is combined with familiar creative experience, it not only enriches the experience, and even explains Kant's concept of Genius, but repudiates any cultural tradition in which human creativity is conceived as disobedience, e. g. the entire drama of Fall and Salvation that has had a powerful influence on some societies for centuries.  Likewise, the relegation of Techne, common to Philosophy since Aristotle, is nullified.

Creativity and Creator

As has been previously discussed, the object of Spinoza's Intuition poses an unchallenged counter-example to the standard concept of an incorporeal, transcendent deity.  Now, Spinoza seems to imply that that concept is an Inadequate Idea, but he does not present a detailed derivation of it from his concept of an immanent deity.  One possible approach to such a derivation begins with a distinction that Spinoza only briefly entertains--between Naturing Nature and Natured Nature--which, as has been previously proposed, can conceived as Creating vs. Created.  On that basis, the concept of a Creator that transcends its Creations is an expression of a Created-perspective that is alienated from its Creating correlate.  Now, the recovery of an ever-present but latent perspective is one of the most venerable of Philosophical projects, e. g. from the 'forgetting' of Plato, to the 'forgetting' of Heidegger.  But in all these cases, what has been lost is an Epistemological, perhaps inert, standpoint, whereas in the case of Spinoza, it is a source of Creativity.  Consequently, while the goal of those projects is Enlightenment, that of Spinoza's doctrine is Empowerment.  Thus, the 'forgetting' that has given rise to the standard concept of a transcendent deity is actually a weakening that is expressed by the powerlessness of its corresponding creations in the standard associated Theology.

God and Fact

The peak moment of Spinoza's doctrine is an Intuition of God/Nature/Substance, constituted by an immediate awareness of oneself as as an active part of the creative force of reality.  Now, it can only be speculated about, but it seems likely that this a first-hand description of an experience, and not a projection of an abstract possibility.  If so, then Spinoza is reporting, as a fact, that God and Nature are one and the same, and, hence, that God has a corporeal aspect, and that it is immanent in all its Modes.  As such, it refutes all alternative concepts of deity, not as a counter-argument, but as a factual counter-example.  Nevertheless, this momentous discovery has generally been ignored by those to whom it is relevant.  For example, while Dualists Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel each offer a criticism of Spinoza, in each case the topic is a peripheral matter which is taken as sufficing to therefore dismiss Spinoza.  Later, a purported follower of Spinoza, Alexander, reduces Spinoza's doctrine to an Empiricist system culminating in a concept of deity in which all vitality is drained.  In contrast, Spinoza's insight likely inspires the two most influential Philosophers of the 19th-century, Marx and Nietzsche, though only implicitly, but because those two have generally been marginalized by subsequent academic Philosophy, the significance of Spinoza's discovery has remained generally ignored.  This neglect shows that not only has the alleged Love of Wisdom become nominal in Philosophers, they can no longer even be considered champions of intellectual integrity.

Wisdom and Ecologism

As has been previously discussed, insofar as Spinoza's Wisdom includes the Intuition of one as a Mode of a dynamic immanent deity, it surpasses that of King Solomon, and Biblical Wisdom, in general, according to which the deity is transcendent.  But this new Wisdom is more than merely post-Theological, in the traditional sense of that term.  God in Spinoza's doctrine is also Nature, so Wisdom is, equivalently, that one is also an integral part of Nature, not a visitor to it, as is entailed in traditional Super-Naturalist Theology.  In other words, Spinoza's new Wisdom is incipient Ecologism, the fuller development of which is centuries away.  Ecologism is another implication of the Copernican destruction of Heaven-Earth dualism, and Spinoza's nascent awareness of it is another indication that he is the most radical of the early waves of post-Copernican Lovers of Wisdom.

Wisdom and Intuition of God

In common parlance, usually entailed by the Wisdom vs. Foolishness contrast is a Knowledge vs. Ignorance contrast, often expressed in terms of age and experience vs. youth and inexperience.  So, in one of the two predominant modern Moral doctrines, Kantianism, Wisdom is no factor, i. e. the Kantian principle is independent of any such conditions.  In the other, Utilitarianism, such conditions are irrelevant to the calculation, which it merely describes, regardless of how wise or foolish the choices involved, even though Mill sometimes struggles to refrain from normative judgment, e. g. his 'higher' vs. 'lower' distinction.  In contrast, degree of Knowledge is a factor in Spinoza's doctrine, in which Knowledge is more rigorous defined than it is in common parlance.  So, that doctrine can be conceived as promoting Wisdom, and, if so, as surpassing that of even King Solomon.  For, according to the doctrine, maximum Wisdom is achieved in the Intuition of oneself as a Mode of an immanent God.  But Solomon's Wisdom must fall short of that degree--for his God is transcendent, and, so, his Wisdom could never include such knowledge, regardless of how much else of his God that he knows.

Wise vs. Foolish: Beyond Good and Evil

The concept of Good and Evil as ontological, i. e. as ingredient in objective reality, is often characterized as 'Manichean' or 'Zoroastrian'.  Thus, Spinoza's repudiation of that concept likely inspires Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil' theme.  But Nietzsche goes further in his development of the theme, notably showing how value terms have been used as weapons.  However, perhaps because of the premature end of his career, Nietzsche never fully develops that 'Beyond', going only so far as to imply that Evaluation be comparative, i. e. presented as an "order of rank", but offering no replacement for the terms 'Good' and 'Evil', other then an inverse 'Good' and 'Bad'.  In contrast, a more substantive alternative for Philosophical Ethics has been proposed here--'Wise' vs. 'Foolish', one which might revive the literal meaning of 'Philosophy'.

Wisdom and Strength

Spinoza defines Good and Evil as Healthful and Unhealthful, respectively.  Accordingly, the characterization of a person in those terms can be, as is the case in Utilitarianism, Consequentialist, i. e. how they effect others.  Thus, the terms are unavailable to him as an evaluation of a person as signifiers of their own internal condition.  So, it is as a possible alternative that he uses the Aristotelian term 'Virtue' as such in some contexts, i. e. as connoting the possession of Power.  However, unlike Aristotle, he does not go further to develop the use of the term systematically, and offers no indication of how he might use, correspondingly, 'Vice'.  Furthermore, in the time since Aristotle, those terms have acquired semantic baggage well in excess of their original precise definitions.  So, one suitable alternative available to Spinoza, and to Philosophical Ethics, in general, is, as has been previously discussed, 'Wise' vs. 'Foolish', defined in terms of maximizing the exercise of strength.  In that context, in which the exercise of strength can be to a greater or lesser degree, evaluation is correspondingly comparative, so the fundamental evaluative terms are, more precisely, 'Wiser' and 'Foolisher'.  Those terms are well-suited to his doctrine because, as is the case in their common usages, degree of knowledge of circumstances is a factor in degree of strength.  So, though Spinoza himself does not develop it as such, his doctrine does lack a replacement for traditional 'Good' vs. 'Evil' Axiology, and one based on the concept of Wisdom is both available and suitable.  The concept also has potential value to him in his attempts at a Philosophical critique of Biblical scriptures.

Wisdom, Prophecy, Prescription

King Solomon is well-known as a source of Wisdom.  But insofar as Philosophy is methodical or systematic, he is thus not also a Philosopher.  Regardless, he is also classified as a Prophet, a characterization that seemingly is not applicable to Philosophers.  However, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche each project the future, so, in that respect, each is indeed a Prophet. Furthermore, like the Biblical Prophets, Marx and Nietzsche warn about the urgency of behavior-change.  Now, Prediction is not the only discourse about the future; Prescription is, too.  And, indeed, both the advice that Solomon offers in the Psalms, etc., and dire warnings about the need to change, are modes of Prescriptive expression.  So, Prescription is both wise and prophetic, and, further, is Philosophical insofar as it is methodically or systematically developed.  Conversely, it is because of the preponderance these days of Philosophers who insistently restrict themselves to Analysis that Philosophy has become commonly conceived as not concerned with Wisdom, i. e. is a misnomer.

Wisdom and Foolishness

'Philosophy' means 'love of wisdom', but Wisdom seems a rare topic among 'Philosophers'.  Indeed, the closest to a popular image of a 'Philosopher' is not Plato, Kant, etc., but King Solomon, and very little of the output of these Philosophers has seemed classifiable as 'Wisdom'.  Instead, the primary interest of most Modern Philosophy has been Knowledge, the main objects of which have been Truth and Goodness, the studies of which are typically segregated on the basis of the traditional Theory-Practice duality.  In contrast, Wisdom combines both, and its privative correlate is neither Falsity nor Evil, but Foolishness.  A little more precisely, Wisdom consists in doing what is best on the basis of the most comprehensive grasp of circumstances as is possible.  Likewise, Foolishness is informed by a minimal grasp of circumstances, so, the Wisdom-Foolishness contrast is one of degree, not of kind.  Now, Spinoza does not characterize his doctrine in those terms.  But his Inadequate-Adequate contrast is one of degree, and maximum Adequacy is constituted by the 'Intuition of God', which, in his doctrine is equivalent to a comprehension of the Whole.  Thus, behavior on that basis can be classified as 'Wise', the progressive privation of which approaches 'Foolish'.  Now, one general distinction between Spinoza and Solomon as sources of Wisdom is that the former is systematic while the latter is not, a distinction which, by itself, might distinguish the 'Philosopher' from the 'Wise Person', e. g. Psalms seems to have no unifying theme.  But one implicit specific point of contrast is that Spinoza does not regard Monarchy as the wisest Political structure.

Techne and Reason

Traditionally, 'Techne' connotes artistic skill, and, hence, entails no obvious involvement with Reason.  But, Spinoza, not necessarily intentionally, reveals that involvement in the course of explaining his concept of Definition.  His specific example in that explanation is Circle, his definition of which is an instruction for the production of a Circle, i. e. how to draw one.  So, the execution of the definition consists in the instantiation of a general formulation, which is a traditional concept of Reason.  Such instantiation is not specific to verbal formulation--it obtains in the case of an artisan attempting, even instinctually, to actualize some idea.  But its involvement in the application of mathematically formulated knowledge, instructions for the use of implements, and of prescriptions for recommended behavior, is an essential factor in human development, especially in the accelerated development of the past several centuries. Now, such Reason coordinates Mind and Body, without subordinating one to the other.  So, Spinoza's doctrine is one of the few in which Technical Reason can be grounded, and recognized for the role that it plays in human development.

Homo Techne and Dualism

The developments of the past 500 years, culminating in the most extraordinary event in not only Human history, but in terrestrial history, strongly suggest that Homo Sapiens has become Homo Techne.  Nevertheless, many prominent Philosophers of the era adhere to the former concept.  Now, there is at least one pervasively held systematic reason for maintaining that concept of Human.  For, Technical Reason involves a coordination of Mind and Body, and, hence, their parity as factors in it.  But, for the most part, beginning with Parmenides, Philosophers have subscribed to a variety of pseudo-Dualism, in which Mind and Body are severed, with Mind conceived as superior to Body in some respect.  As a result, Homo Sapiens has been the predominant concept of Human, with Homo Techne, a derivative, inferior mode of being.   One notable exception to this tradition is Spinoza, according to whom Mind and Body are equally vital coordinated aspects of human behavior, and, hence, are hospitable to Technical Reason. Of course, Spinoza does not anticipate the rapid technical developments, culminating in extraterrestrial exploration, of the next several centuries.  But, his doctrine, perhaps uniquely, provides a ground for them.

Proactive, Reactive, Passive, Autonomous

• As has been previously discussed, Spinoza's fundamental behavioral principle can be characterized as Proactive.  Now, insofar as it applies to a Mode, which is a finite being affected by other finite beings, the principle determines a response to an external influence, in which case its Proactive function is specifically Reactive.  Thus, Proactive is not antithetical to Reactive, while Reactive is distinct from Passive, which signifies a modification the cause of which is external, e. g. an Emotion.   In other words, a Reaction is a Proactive response to a Passive condition.  On that basis, Hume conflates Reactivity and Passivity when he ascribes motive power to a Passion.  Furthermore, Kant's concept of Autonomy entails independence from external influence, but, as is expressed in the formulation of his Rational principle, it is occasioned by the formulation of a Maxim, and, hence, by some Passion.  Hence, it is not equivalent to Proactivity, though a concept of Autonomy other than Kant's might be.  So both sides of the prominent debate between Hume and Kant fail to consider a factor that underlies each.

Active and Proactive

In contemporary common parlance, 'active' usually connotes the opposite of 'inactive' or 'inert'.  Hence, it inadequately represents what Spinoza means by it--the opposite of 'passive' or 'reactive'.  Instead, a contemporary term that is closer to what Spinoza means by 'active' is 'proactive', signifying not only 'active', but also 'self-activating'.   Now, 'proactive' is instructive in distinguishing between Spinoza's concept of "persisting in being", and a prominent apparent synonym, 'self-preservation'.  For, as is exemplified by Hobbes' influential use of it, the latter typically connotes a reaction to a threat, whereas Spinoza conceives the endeavor to persist in one's being as proactive, i. e. as operative independent of external circumstances, hostile or otherwise.  Now, the previously discussed proposed revision of Spinoza's principle as the endeavor to maximize the exercise of strength introduces a further point of distinction between it and the concept of Self-Preservation.  For, to 'preserve' means to 'maintain', whereas to 'increase' means to not merely 'maintain', but to 'extend', as well.  Thus, the revision entails a proactive endeavor to increase strength even in the circumstance of no threat of a decrease.

Persisting in Being and Exercising Strength

A significant lacuna in Spinoza's doctrine seems to be between the endeavor to persist in one's being, and the differentiation in one's being in terms of varying degrees of strength, which can become a factor in determining the endeavor, e. g. choosing the greater of two goods. One solution is to follow Nietzsche, and to redefine the object of the endeavor as the maximization of the exercise of strength.  The alternative is not a change of principle, merely an explication of a version of the vital principle that is standard prior to the 19th-century.  It seems consistent with his analyses of various structures, and it captures the connotation of the original as an active principle, i. e. being active consists in the exercise of strength.  It is also potentially grounded in his concept of God/Nature/Substance, insofar as that concept has the structure of Emanation.  For, Emanation connotes increase, and a Mode is an instance of that deity, so, increase, and not merely maintaining, is inherently part of the object of one's endeavor.  Thus, it is unclear why Spinoza might reject the explication.

Reason and Power

Spinoza does not formally define Reason, but in one of its functions, it is the source of Ideas of objective Causal connections.  Such a function is valuable to finite being, for whom experiential connections are immediately random and merely subjectively concatenated, and, hence, are not necessarily effective in promoting strength and neutralizing weakness.  The power of Reason in this capacity seems merely Instrumental, as Hume insists.  However, Reason has another function: introducing objective Causal connectivity into the endeavor to persist in one's being.  In this function, it is the source of not Knowing-That, but of Knowing-How, i. e. Reason is Technical therein.  Furthermore, though such Causal connectivity is objective, it is not independent of the endeavor.  For, in many such cases, the connections are created, not discovered, as much of human society illustrates.  Likewise, the value of such Reason is more than Instrumental, i. e. more than the value of the products of Know-How.  For, in the exercise of Know-How itself, one's power, i. e. over oneself, and over external materials, is increased, and, hence, is of value in itself in the endeavor to persist in one's being.  Thus, Reason is Power not merely qua Instrumental, but, more so, qua Technical.

Passion and Motivation

According to Spinoza, the active principle that determines all behavior is the endeavor to persist in one's being.  Entailed in the principle is the endeavor to maintain or increase one's strength, and to correct any decrease in strength.  Now, whether an Emotion consists in an increase in strength, a decrease in strength, or a maintaining of strength, it is a passive condition.  Hence, the motive power to modify an Emotion can not come from an Emotion, but from only the active principle.  On that basis, Hume's error is to attribute motive power to a Passion, despite the plain connotation of passivity in the term itself.  The root of his error is to reduce a complex, derivative, passive experience to a simple, irreducible, dynamic experiential datum.  Or, in other words, his concept of Passion is inadequate, one significant implication of which is that his concept of Reason as the slave of the Passions is likewise inadequate, which, regardless, does not help Kant's rejoinder, which accepts the same concept of the Passions.

Emotion and Emotivism

According to Spinoza, an Emotion is an Idea of a change in the degree of strength of a Mode, the Object of which is the posited cause of the change.  Now, as one of staple topics of Psychoanalysis demonstrates--that Hate can be misdirected--an Emotion can be an inadequate Idea, the supplanting of which by an adequate Idea usually being the aim of therapy.  Likewise, any Emotion can be an inadequate Idea.  Now, according to Emotivism, Moral Judgment is not open to dispute, because the basis of Judgment, e. g. an Emotion such as Like or Dislike, is a simple, private, experiential datum.  But, just as Hate can be misdirected, so, too, can be a Moral Judgment based upon it.  Thus, a Moral Judgment can be an inadequate Idea, and, so, disputable, contrary to premises of Emotivism.  Spinoza's doctrine thus exposes the source of the error of Emotivism--the thesis that an Emotion is a simple, private, experiential datum.  Or, equivalently, that Emotivism is based on an inadequate Idea of Emotion.

Experience and Emotion

According to Spinoza, human experience consists in the endeavor to persist in one's being.  So, Knowledge is part of that endeavor, determining what promotes it and what hinders it, in order to harness the former and to eliminate the latter.  Thus, Sense-Experience, the focus of prominent Philosophers of the era and beyond, is of only derivate interest to Spinoza.  More relevant to his project are the increases and the decreases of one's strength in the endeavor, which, on the basis of his Parallelism, have Mental and Bodily aspects.  Thus, unlike most Dualist Philosophers, he can conceive Pleasure and Pain as Ideas of Bodily conditions, i. e. of increases in strength and decreases of strength, respectively.  Furthermore, because he defines Emotions as derived from Pleasure and Pain, he can conceive them as not irreducible experiential data, as is common to most systems of Psychology and Morality, but as fluctuations in strength, to be either reinforced or resisted, via Knowledge of their causes.  Two notable applications of this concept of Emotion are to Sympathy and to Hope, each of which, containing a Pain component, can be weakening experiences.  The concept thus entails significant objections to the advocacy of one or the other Emotion, e. g. by Hume and Kant, respectively, which, even if recognized, are difficult to counter on the basis of a concept of Emotion as an irreducible experiential component.

Sense-Experience and Sense-Organ Experience

It is not an explicit theme for Spinoza, but implicit in his doctrine is a repudiation of most standard concepts of Sense-Experience.  To begin with, Mind is the Idea of the Body, and of its parts, so Sense-Experience is, more properly, Sense-Organ Experience.  Thus, for example, the awareness of a color is, more properly, the awareness of an optical process. Second, Experience, in general, is the endeavor to persist in being, so the fundamental context of Sense-Organ Experience is this endeavor, in which the Sense-Organs are coordinated with other parts of the Body.  Thus, for example, the standard Empiricist account of visual experience has no way of explaining hand-eye coordination. Finally, the data of the Sense-Organ Experience are modifications of the Sense-Organs.  Thus, contrary to most concepts of Sense-Experience, Sense-Data are not discrete atoms, but are constituted in part by the previous condition that has been modified.  In other words, most of these concepts of Sense-Experience repeat Locke's profound error--generalizing what might be an initial Tabula Rasa to all subsequent experience.  The general unfamiliarity of this repudiation of most concepts of Sense-Experience is an indication of the marginalization of Spinoza in subsequent Philosophy.

Volition, Consciousness, Reflection

Spinoza attributes Consciousness to the exercise of Volition, without at the same time seeming to consider the converse--whether or not Consciousness is inherently Volitional.  But based on his justification of the former attribution, a denial of the converse seems to follow.  For, the justification seems based on a standard thesis that awareness of X is, at the same time, awareness of that awareness of X, i. e. Mind naturally doubles itself.  But, if so, Volition seems to not be involved.  However, that standard thesis seems antithetical to the concept of Mind that Spinoza otherwise develops, from Mind as actively producing Ideas, to the concept of Will and Understanding as coextensive, based on the concept of Mind as actively positing or affirming its Ideas, as has been previously discussed.  On that basis, an act of Reflection consists in Mind positing a previous act of Mind as its object, i. e. two volitional processes.  Thus, rigorously developed from the elements of his doctrine, Reflection is Volitional, and Volition is Reflection, whereas the concept of Consciousness that he introduces into the analysis is not well-grounded in them, a lapse of rigor in his development of the doctrine.

Will, Consciousness, Modification

Spinoza attributes Consciousness to Will on the basis of the premise that the attribution to Mind of a capacity to double itself, i. e. Reflection, is self-explanatory.  A more elaborate explanation of the first attribution begins with a concept of Causality as a Modification, i. e. in which the act of Causality spans a transition from a previous condition to a subsequent condition.  Now, there can be a Consciousness of that Causality by virtue of Mind monitoring the entire process.  But that Causality is Will.  Hence, according to the more elaborate explanation, the Consciousness attributed to an act of Will is Mind taking as its object the process that the act spans, i. e. is not an act of Reflection qua a simple doubling of itself.  On that basis, the latter, a common Philosophical concept, is inadequate.

Will and Consciousness

In Spinoza's doctrine the Vital principle is the 'endeavor of something to persist in its being', with Will the Mental aspect of the endeavor.  Now, a significant feature of the endeavor is that it is "conscious". Thus, this Psychological dimension of his doctrine is apparently at odds with the long tradition, beginning with Leibniz, culminating with Freud, and thereafter popularized, according to which behavior is at least in part determined by subconscious or unconscious forces.  However, Spinoza would likely respond that such forces all have external sources, and, hence, are not ingredient in the Vital principle per se of the entity.  Likewise, an Emotion, contrary to some theories that glorify emotions, is not an expression of innermost character, but an effect of some external influence. Instead, it is only when behaving consciously, or, equivalently, when exercising Volition, or, equivalently, that one is self-activating, that, according to his doctrine, one is truly oneself.

Truth, Correspondence, Holist

Descartes' thesis that Will and Understanding are distinct is based on a traditional Correspondence concept of Truth.  For, the divergence of the two is exemplified for him by False Belief, in which Affirmation, a product of Will, does not correspond to its object, and, hence, is lacking Understanding.  In contrast, Spinoza's thesis that Will and Understanding are coextensive is based on a different concept of Truth, which can be called Holist.  According to that concept, a False Belief is, more precisely, one that is only partly True, but, in itself, is a product of an affirmation that combines both Will and Understanding.  For example, according to Descartes, a dream is False because it does not correspond to fact.  But, according to Spinoza, it is True as a datum, but False only insofar as it is a partly True representation of fact, potential complemented by another True datum, e. g. that one earlier fell asleep. The Holist concept is thus applicable to Berkeleyan Phenomenalism, which denies correspondence to any fact, and, so, serves Spinoza as the basis of a criticism of Empiricism. So, his Holist concept of Truth is another example of Spinoza's divergence from both main schools of Modern Philosophy.

Centripetal, Centrifugal, Mind

As has been previously discussed, the repudiation of Geocentrism and Anthopocentrism, entailed by the Copernican discoveries, is preparatory to a replacement of Centripetal Geocentrism and Centripetal Anthropocentrism, by Centrifugal Geocentrism and Centrifugal Anthropocentrism.  In other words, the concept of humans as protagonists on a cosmic stage in a drama determined by impregnable Heavens, is replaced by that of humans as centers of action, with the Heavens an accessible destination, as history has proven.  Now, one set of inhabitants of the Ancient Heavens is Platonic Ideas, which are thus passively experienced, e. g. contemplated.  But Spinoza inverts that relation, with a concept of Mind that anticipates Brentano's Intentionality.  According to this concept, Mind experiences an Idea only insofar as it posits it, i. e. affirms it, which Spinoza ascribes to Volition, rather than to Brentano's Intention.  On this basis, Volition and Understanding are one and the same, in opposition to Descartes' contrary concept of their relation. Kant later briefly similarly posits the unity of Will and Reason, but squanders the opportunity to further develop the insight, and to perhaps extend his rubric 'Copernican Revolution' to that unity.

Centrism, Centripetal, Centrifugal

It seems unarguable that one always finds oneself physically at the center of a world.  Hence, Physical Egocentrism seems to be an undeniable fact that is the basis of Epistemological Egocentrism, as well as of Psychological Egocentrism, and of Moral Egocentrism.  However, proponents of these rarely seem to consider that they all have a further foundation.  To begin with, none of them seems to recognize the ambiguity of any Centrism--Centripetal vs. Centrifugal--and the concepts are each varieties of the former.  So, typically ignored is Centrifugal Egocentrism, i. e. that one is a center of Action in one's world, and, hence, rarely considered is that this is the foundation of the Centripetal Egocentrisms, e. g. that Perception is a function of Action. Indeed, Modern Philosophy is primarily the product of the falsification of Centrifugal Egocentrism as Centripetal Egocentrism, e. g. Descartes, who is self-evidently at a desk writing the Meditations, presenting himself instead as gazing at a fire, and likewise for all the major works of the era.  But one possible exception is the Ethics--in which a Mode is an instance of a divine Emanation, i. e. a center of Action--an exception that is typically obscured by the inclusion of Spinoza as part of a sequence of Rationalists, in opposition to a sequence of Empiricists.  Nevertheless, Spinoza is distinctive among them as acknowledging and exploring the epochal change in human history that is a consequence of the Copernican discovery--a transition from Centripetal Geocentrism, i. e. in which the Earth is the arena of a cosmic drama of which humans are the protagonists, to Centrifugal Geocentrism, in which the Earth is the starting point of the human exploration of a previously impregnable cosmos.

Reason, Compassion, Happiness

In Kant's system, Happiness, defined as a totality of satisfactions, is an Empirical concept.  Hence, his inclusion of Happiness in the Highest Good of Pure Practical Reason, even conditionally, is problematic, at best.  Likewise, the ascription to Pure Practical Reason of the Duty to promote the Happiness of others is groundless, i. e. promoting their Rationality would be consistent with the principle.  Similarly, it would seem to follow on the basis of a principle of Self-Denial that one should promote the Self-Denial of others.  But, instead, Schopenhauer advocates Compassion, the exercise of which consists in the alleviation of the specific causes of the suffering of others, which as such, only reinforces their Selfishness.  In contrast, Spinoza has no such difficulty.  For, in his doctrine, Happiness is Health, Health consists in the active exercise of one's powers, and the active exercise of one's powers is grounded in Knowledge, either Reason or Intuition.  Thus, the promotion of the Happiness, no matter whose, is entailed in the Rationality of Spinoza's doctrine.  He does not share the problem with his peers because while their, and most other, concepts of Happiness is that of a passive condition, his is active.

Geocentrism, Perception, Action

As has been previously discussed, the repudiation of Geocentrism entails that of Anthropocentrism, and, hence, that of the Moral Absolutism that has been grounded by the latter.  And, while Berkeley and Kant, notably, endeavor to salvage the concept of the world as the arena of a Theological drama of which humans are the protagonists, Spinoza explores the consequences of the repudiation.  There is a further consequence, which he perhaps only implicitly recognizes, and that Kant verges upon, but because of his Theological commitments, cannot quite appreciate it for what it is.  The concept of Centrism is potentially ambiguous--it can signify motion towards the center, or motion away from the center, e. g. centripetal force, or centrifugal force.  Plainly, traditional Geocentrism and Anthropocentrism are of the former variety, i. e. the universe is conceived as oriented towards human existence.  But the repudiation of that Centrism does not entail that of the inverse Centrism, and, to the contrary, can liberate it.  Indeed, as subsequent history has proven, the Copernican discovery enables the recognition that humans are now centers of action, with the previously impregnable Heavens now an accessible destination.  Implicit in that recognition is the more radical revolution than the one that Kant acknowledges, the one that he verges upon, only to shy away from--the concept of humans as centers of Action, rather than of Perception.  In contrast, Spinoza does conceive Modes as essentially agents, not subjects, and as modifications of a divine emanation, perhaps as agents of a new Geocentrism.

Relativism and Subjectivism

The common association of 'relativism' with 'permissiveness' usually confuses Relativism and Subjectivism.  For unlike the latter, the former is not based on whim, e. g. a food being healthful on bio-chemical grounds, rather than attracting on the basis of aroma.  A similar, though more subtle, confusion underlies most complaints against 'cultural relativism'.  In some cases, the complaints are merely expressions of bigotry, e. g. Eurocentric, but, in others, e. g. ascriptions of objectivity to assertions of the superiority of Beethoven or Shakespeare, there is some basis.  However, as is well covered by Kant, at issue is a dialectic of Taste, namely, how Aesthetic evaluation is even possible, but, again, the conflict is between Objectivity and Subjectivity, not between Objectivity and Relativity.  Instead, the Moral Relativism of Spinoza is based on the factual repudiation of the basis of Moral Absolutism, sometimes aka Manicheanism--the discovery that the human species is not at the center of the universe, and, hence, that what is Good or Evil for it is not as such in itself.  Accordingly, what is beneficial or harmful to humans is still objectively so, but, outside of the Theology that refuses to accept the repudiation of the thesis that the Universe is the setting of a drama of which humans are the protagonists, such Goodness or Evil is not a characteristic that is independent of its effects on humans.

Geocentrism and Moral Relativism

• The repudiation of Geocentrism entails the repudiation of Anthropocentrism, and, while Kant tries to salvage the latter via his Reflective Judgment faculty, Spinoza considers the implication of the repudiation for Moral Values.  The result is a replacement of Absolutism with a variety of Relativism--'Good' and 'Evil' are no longer ingredient in the cosmos, but signify 'Healthful' and 'Unhealthful', respectively, relative to some subject.  Who the subject is varies--an individual person, a group of people with common characteristics, perhaps even the entire species.  Now, contrary to some common confusions, 'relative' in this case connotes Objectivity, not Subjectivity, i. e. whether or not some food is Healthful depends on e.g. its nutritional value.  In contrast, Utilitarianism is Subjectivist, i. e. with a private datum, Pleasure or Pain, the determining factor of the value of something.  So, in Spinoza's doctrine, Knowledge is an important factor in establishing whether or not something is Good, with Pleasure and Pain inadequate as sources of Knowledge. One seemingly unusual implication of this Axiology of the Ethics is that Virtue and Goodness are not necessarily related.  For, Virtue is an intra-personal characteristic, i. e. consisting in the achievement of Self-Control, whereas Goodness, as a characteristic of a person, is inter-personal, i. e. one is 'Good' insofar as one benefits another.  The two may coincide, e. g. when under the guidance of Reason, one helps another, but either can obtain in the absence of the other.  So, Spinoza's development of Moral Relativism is another feature of his drawing out the consequences of the repudiation of Geocentrism, again further than most of his peers of the era.

Geocentrism and Parallelism

The repudiation of Geocentrism destroys two hierarchical relations--that of ruler to ruled in Theocratic Monarchism, i. e. insofar as the relation represents the Heaven-Earth difference of kind, and that of Mind and Body, which is based on the Spirit-Matter distinction that separates Heaven from Earth.  Spinoza's response to the former has already been discussed--the replacement of a transcendent deity with an immanent one, corresponding to which is the replacement of Theocratic Monarchism with Technocratic Democracy.  Of course, the promotion of Democracy in the era is hardly unique.  However, his second response has had few peers--the attribution of Corporeality to his deity, resulting in Mind-Body Parallelism.  Indeed, the depreciation of Corporeality remains a common theme among Modern Secularists, e. g. the Empiricist disembodiment of Sense-Experience, Mill's 'higher vs. lower' distinction, etc.  So, Spinoza's doctrine expresses the most comprehensive appreciation in the era of the repudiation of Geocentrism.

Theocratic Monarchy andTechnocratic Democracy

In the Ethics, Spinoza presents no explicit Political doctrine, but the rudiments of one are implicit in it.  To begin with, the premises of Theocratic Monarchy are repudiated from the outset, by a concept of an immanent deity who is thus not in a transcendent hierarchical relation to human society.  Second, his concept of Reason as the adequate means to the solution of problems--as opposed to Theocratic ones such as prayer and ritual--is a basis for a Technocracy.  And third, his concept of a Rational society, as embodied by the Rule of Law as best promoting the common Good, amounts to an advocacy of Democracy.  So, in other words, the Ethics implies a repudiation of Theocratic Monarchism, in favor of Technocratic Democracy.  Thus, his introduction of an immanent deity collapses the distinction between the City of God and the City of Man, resulting in a post-Medieval Polis, for which the Ethics presents some of the main principles.  In contrast, Kant's Law-governing Kingdom of Ends includes a "head" that is "subject to the will of no other", and, hence, implicitly constitutes a Theocratic Monarchist reaction to Spinoza's Polis.  As is the case with his explicit criticism of Spinoza, he makes no attempt to either acknowledge or defend the underlying Theological point of dispute.

Suicide and Right

As has been previously discussed, Spinoza's doctrine entails that any self-destructive tendency must be an expression of only diminished capacity in some respect, a condition of 'emotional bondage'.  Hence, it seems to follow that he would dispute the contention of someone who believes that one has a right to commit suicide.  But, in fact, according to his concept of Natural Right, as developed in his Political writings, not in the Ethics, he does implicitly recognize such a Right.  For, in those passages, Natural Right is presented as transcending emotional incapacity, or, equivalently, intellectual capacity.  However, there is a discrepancy between those passages and the exposition in the Ethics, specifically regarding the concept of Power.  In the political writings, Natural Right and Natural Power are correlated, whereas in the Ethics, Power is correlated with Knowledge, and, hence, inversely with degree of bondage to Emotions.  Hence, from the latter, it would seem to follow that someone who is controlled by Emotion is someone whose Natural Right is correspondingly diminished.  Accordingly, there is no Right to commit suicide, at least on the basis of the Ethics.  It is unclear how Spinoza might reconcile the two apparently contradictory positions.

Will, Weakness, Suicide

Nietzsche's criticism of Schopenhauer's Asceticism is based on the innovative thesis that the true character of Volition is Will to Power, not the traditional Will to Live.  As such, its range of expression can vary in degree of Power, stronger or weaker.  Accordingly, the weakest expression of Will to Power is a Will to Nothingness, i. e. Asceticism.  Thus, Schopenhauer's promotion of Self-Denial, and, more generally, the concept of Will as essentially suffering, is a doctrine of a weak Will, and, hence, not universally valid, just as the ambitions of a sick person, e. g. the minimization of pain, are not those of a healthy person, who can, e. g. take the same pain in stride.  Now, an alternative criticism of Asceticism is implied in Spinoza's doctrine, according to which Self-Denial as a principle, rather than a temporary exercise of self-control, is impossible, since the fundamental principle of Self is persistence in its being.  On that basis, Self-Denial is, as Nietzsche diagnoses, a symptom of weakness, but not a weakness of a Will in itself.  Rather, it is a weakness with respect to stronger external forces, including those which are inimical to it, e. g. a parasite seeking to appropriate the blood of its host.  In those conditions, an apparent expression of Self-Denial is, in fact, an internalization of the stronger external inimical force, and an expression of weakness in that respect.  The more general significance of these rival criticisms of Asceticism is to the extreme case--Suicide--and, despite their differences, are similar as alternatives to the common contemporary approach that, influenced by Freud, respects suicidal tendencies as a psychologically sound expression of a Thanatos-like principle.

Will and Suffering

Schopenhauer's aim is the elimination of suffering.  The source of suffering, according to his diagnosis, is Individual Will, but because that concept is unsettled in his doctrine, he offers three different correctives.  First, he conceives suffering as inherent in Universal Will, of which Individual Will is an instance, so, Will per se is the problem, the corrective of which is the denial of Will, expressed in Ascetic behavior.  Second, he conceives suffering to arise specifically from the personal dissatisfactions of Individual Will, the corrective of which is, therefore, denial of Self, expressed in Compassionate behavior.  Third, he conceives suffering to arise in the combination of Will and Self, the corrective of which is Will-less, Self-less Subjectivity, expressed in the contemplation of Platonist Forms as presented in Art, especially in Music.  Now, he plainly seems most enthusiastic about the latter solution to suffering, but he recognizes that such experiences are short-lived, so he vacillates between promoting Asceticism and promoting Compassion, which are not necessarily consistent.  For, insofar as Compassion for the suffering of another entails Self-Denial in the alleviation of the suffering of another, it implicitly affirms the source of that suffering, i. e. some selfish desire of the other, and, hence, reinforces non-Ascetic behavior.  In any case, in his promotion of Asceticism, he is well aware that a Will to deny Will is a problematic concept, which is why ultimately the Contemplation of Will is the only sound basis for Asceticism.  Still, he does not seem aware that only Will can be at the source of the judgment that suffering per se is a problem that requires correction, rather than is simply an objective fact, i. e. a failure, requiring no further action.  So, Schopenhauer's own acts of writing and publishing doctrines that offer correctives to suffering seem themselves to not quite exemplify their contents.

Will and Individual

Individual is properly a quantifier that is pervasively, often misleadingly, used as a substantive.  For example, Schopenhauer does occasionally use it to quantify Will.  But for the most part, he treats it as a characterless entity, one of an indefinite number of such entities.  However, it may be that what is a logical error is not extrinsic to some of the content of his Moral doctrine.  For, the aim of the doctrine is to escape suffering, to which a diagnosis of and a specific corrective of are the means.  Now, he offers two diagnoses of suffering: caused by Will, or caused by Individuation, i. e. Selfhood.  Accordingly, a two-fold corrective for suffering consists in a denial of Will and a denial of Self.  That double denial is expressed in his abstraction of 'Individual' from 'Individual Will', i. e. in his abstraction of a characterless entity from a quantity, which, in the context, illustrates the Will-less, Self-less product of taking that corrective--a virtual nonentity, i. e. an anonymous subject of perception, a mere function, like Kant's 'I think'.  There are, thus, two logical errors that Schopenhauer commits--that a Will-less entity is alive, and that a Self-less being can still function as a subject.

Will, Representation, Individuation

According to Schopenhauer, Representation is the Principle of Individuation, i. e. by objectifying Will, it also fragments it, and then reconstructs the fragments in accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, e. g. as Cause and Effect.  Now, one unclarity in the process is the status of the subject of Representation--itself an object of Representation, or Will?  One problem with latter is that it leaves unexplained the Individuality of an act of Representation, i. e. that it occurs in an Individual subject, at an Individual location.  But, the more general problem is that of the subject of the Principle of Individuation.  For, as a principle of a system, it has Universal scope, and the Universal principle in Schopenhauer's system is Will.  Accordingly, in his system,  Individuation can only be the Self-Individuation of Will, just as Representation can only be the Self-Representation of Will, which aligns him with Intuition as the ecstatic Self-Intuition of Substance in Spinoza's doctrine.  But, Schopenhauer cannot make that alignment because, while Volition and Cognition are systematically related in Spinoza's doctrine, they remain sundered in the theory that directly influences his own concepts of the two--Kant's.  They remain sundered in Kant's system because he neglects the exposition that would connect them--a theory of Action derived from his concept of a Rational Will, which would show how Cognition functions in a Volitional context.  But absent that exposition, Cognition has no systematic relation to Volition, which Schopenhauer inherits as an alienation of his Individual from its Universal, a source of misery that only Music can temporarily relieve.

Appearance, Phenomenon, Representation

Spinoza's Creating vs. Created contrast could correspond to Kant's In-Itself vs. Appearance contrast.  However, because Creating is a dynamic process, it is not a Thing-In-Itself, insofar as by 'Thing', Kant means a static entity.  Now, Kant further complicates the contrast with his Noumenon-Phenomenon distinction, which recasts the Thing-In-Itself as a product of thought, and, hence, as not in an inner-outer relation with Appearances.  By implication, therefore, the existence of an independent divine Creating is also denied, though Kant does not take the trouble to explicitly challenge Spinoza's claim to Intuit it.  Now, further complicating Kant's complication is Schopenhauer's Will vs. Representation contrast, which he attributes to Kant.  For, while his concept of Will is as an In-Itself that is not Noumenal, i. e. it exists independent of thought, Representation, unlike either Appearance or Phenomenon, is a product of thought, and, hence, strictly speaking, is Noumenal.  So, even if Will does correspond to Spinoza's Creating, Representation does not correspond to Spinoza's Created.  Accordingly, unlike Spinoza, he derives joy neither his version of the latter, nor from Will, which he thus experiences as a hostile affliction.  So, these variations of Spinoza's original contrast have significant implications for the doctrines that are developed from them.

Creating-Created and Will-Representation

Spinoza's Naturing Nature and Natured Nature can be conceived as a contrast of Creating and Created.  Creating and Created has more in common with Schopenhauer's Will-Representation duality than with Whitehead's Process-Reality.  For, like the former, but not the latter, the two terms are simultaneous, rather than consecutive, i. e. two aspects of one and the same development.  Now, Spinoza's Intuition of Creating is comparable to Schopenhauer's cognition of Will as expressed in Music--each achieves a liberation from suffering from the Emotions.  However, one significant distinction between the two ecstatic moments is that in Spinoza's, Individuation is revealed as itself a creative development, whereas for Schopenhauer, for whom Individuation is groundless, it remains the source of suffering.  Accordingly, Spinoza's doctrine affirms Creating, while Schopenhauer's seeks the denial of the Will.  Nietzsche can be conceived as abandoning the latter for the former as his career develops.  Meanwhile, Kant is not part of this tradition, even though Schopenhauer's Will-Representation contrast is derived from his Noumenon-Phenomenon one.  For, he is insistent that his Noumenal realm is Supernatural, thereby clearly distancing his system from any Naturalism, of which each of these other three pairs is a variety.

Intuition, Insight, Nature

Spinoza characterizes Intuition as the 'third kind' of Knowledge, but it is possible that there is a fourth, that can be called Insight.  The object of Insight is a briefly considered element of his doctrine, Naturing Nature, i. e. Nature as dynamic and creative.  Thus, the object of Insight is all Nature, both in oneself and everywhere else.  In other words, Insight is a rare, elevated experience.  Now, it is possible that by Intuition, Spinoza means Insight, for, Nature is God in his doctrine.  But too much of his exposition of Intuition seems devoted to matters not relevant to Insight, e. g. whether or not the Mind can survive the death of the Body, and too little to an exposition of Naturing Nature, e. g. the experiencing of oneself as a Mode of Natural creativity. Trying to make the doctrine as palatable as possible to hostile Christian and Judaic forces, i. e. by emphasizing elements that seem amenable to orthodox reading, might, under those hostile conditions, be justifiably prudent.  But three centuries later, the visionary aspects of the doctrine, that have more in common with 19th-century Vitalism than with the neo-Medieval Rationalism of Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant, need to be better developed.  Distinguishing Insight from his Intuition is a step in that direction.

Health and Morality

In Spinoza's doctrine, the highest value is Health, the interplay of the Parts of a dynamic active Whole. Thus, Health is implicitly Good-in-itself, while 'Good' and 'Evil' signify what is conducive or not, respectively, to Health. What is Healthful is relative to the specific constitution of a Mode, from which generalization, e. g. to all members of a species, is derivative.  Hence, in at least some cases, what is Healthful is relative to an individual Mode, as Aristotle recognizes, but, in others, it is common.  However, and it is unclear if Spinoza recognizes this, insofar as a collective constitutes a Mode, e. g. a species, then inter-Modal relations are themselves subject to Holist evaluation.  And, indeed, insofar as a Mode is a part of Nature, then Nature is the Whole, and Health is ultimately Ecological, i. e. a condition of the Ecosystem, of which an individual human is a part.  Regardless of these indeterminacies of his doctrine, his Philosophical insight is that the deliberate pursuit of Health is itself an activity, and, hence, is itself Healthful, from which it follows that the determination and application of Knowledge of what is Healthful, e. g. Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, etc., is itself Healthful.  Indeed, Philosophy itself can be Healthful, in two respects.  So, Spinoza's doctrine is well beyond the range of each of the two dominant Moral doctrines of the era--Kantianism, with its Supernatural concept of Good, and Utilitarianism, which privileges passive, phenomena.

Parallelism and the Limits of Knowledge

The awakening of him by Hume from "dogmatic slumber" begins with Kant's acceptance of having a sensory basis as a necessary condition of Knowledge.  It continues with his additional necessary condition of having an organization the only source of which is the mental structures that process sensory input.  Now, it is unclear if Spinoza is among those to whom "dogmatic" is a reference.  But if so, it would be an erroneous charge.  For, according to Spinoza, Mind and Body are correlating Parallels.  Hence, Knowledge is not only constrained by the limits of the senses, but of the sense-organs.  Furthermore, the correlation pertains to not only Knowledge, but to Action.  Hence, the functioning of the sense-organs is constrained by their role in organic action, e. g. eye-hand coordination, as is, therefore, sense-information, and, accordingly, Knowledge.  So, his criteria for Knowledge are perhaps even better grounded and more rigorous than those of Kant or Hume, neither of whom is therefore qualified to classify him as 'dogmatic', especially someone whose system depends on the existence of a supernatural realm.

Rationalism and Reason For Its Own Sake

The foundation of any Rationalist Psychology or Rationalist Ethics is the possibility of Reason for its own sake as a motive of behavior.  For, otherwise, Reason can be only Instrumental, and, hence, only at the service of non-Rational principles, e. g. the Passions.  So, the primary task of a Rationalist is to ground that possibility.  One prominent example of that effort is Aristotle, who ascribes to humans a natural Teleology, which motivates them to fulfill their Rational potential.  Another is Spinoza, according to whom Reason is an immanent force that is obscured by external forces.  Now, Kant, influenced by Leibniz, proposes a variation on these two--that the fundamental principle of Reason is a principle of Practical Sufficient Reason, which governs any use of Reason.  One expression of the principle is the requirement that use of Reason in Maxim-formation is subject to the criterion of Universality.  However, the concrete experience of the Rational principle is the moment when one chooses Reason for its own sake, when one chooses for its own sake to follow the prescribed use of Reason for Maxim-formation.  Accordingly, Sufficiency is the fundamental value of Reason.  However, as has been previously discussed, Kant's primary ambition for a Rationalist doctrine is its adaptability to Theologically-based Deontic Morality.  Entailed in that adaptability is a shift of emphasis to Totality as the fundamental value of Reason, e. g. when he attributes to Reason, on the basis of Totality, the thesis that Virtue is incomplete without Happiness, the completion of which requires a rewarding deity.  The historical consequences of this shift of emphasis have been plain--the ascendance in the Rationalist tradition of Totalitarian Reason, e. g. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and the marginalization of Sufficient Reason, e. g. the Pragmatists.  And, in the process, the motive of Reason for its own sake gets replaced by that of obedience to Duty for Duty's sake.

Reason and Freedom of Choice

Despite all the Deontic elements, the source of concrete motivation in Kant's system is what he calls Willkur, i. e. Freedom of Choice.  Now, he acknowledges that disobeying his Categorical Imperative is possible, which seems to entail that Reason and Freedom are not co-extensive.  On the other hand,  Choice requires an object, and, so, is in fact subject to further influence, and, hence, is as such not Free.  But, it can choose Reason, for its own sake, and Reason is independent of external influences.  Hence, concrete Freedom consists in action that is motivated by Reason for its own sake, and it is only by virtue of the absolute privacy of the choosing that it might be classified as a Noumenal Cause. But, Aristotle and Spinoza are among those who define Reason differently than Kant.  So, many of the features of his Moral doctrine are inessential to the concept of Rational Ethics--notably the content of his Categorical Imperative, the Deontic Quantity of his Categorical Imperative, and the Noumenon vs. Phenomenon qua Freedom vs. Nature duality. Instead, a Rational Ethics that is independent of such trappings can thus be developed on the basis of Freedom of Choice, a concept of Reason, and choosing Reason for its own sake, with the latter the focal point.

Noumenon and Reason

Probably the most important structural distinction in Kant's system is that of Noumenon vs. Phenomenon, which grounds the possibility of Freedom, i. e. of non-Empirical Causality.  However, the concept of Noumenon remains crucially underdeveloped in several respects.  For example, since he establishes that Quantity applies to only Phenomena, any quantification of Noumena is groundless.  Therefore the concept of Universal that he ascribes to the presumably Noumenal Pure Practical Reason is likewise groundless, i. e. if it were descriptive of the conduct of a Rational Automaton, it would entail no Quantification.  He also neglects to consider the significance of the equivalence of the concept of the totality of Phenomena and Spinoza's concept of Natured Nature.  He accordingly neglects to consider the potentially analogous relation between his Noumenal realm and Spinoza's Naturing Nature.  The potential relevance to Kant's doctrine of that relation is if it is similarly one of equivalence, then Pure Practical Reason is nothing but an expression of Spinoza's immanent deity, and, hence, the Noumenal realm is Natural, not Supernatural. Kant's negligence of the Noumenal characteristics of the Principle is graphically illustrated by the ratio of the amount of text in the trilogy and the Groundwork devoted to an exposition of it, versus the amount devoted to matters that are derivative or extrinsic.

Nature, Noumenon, Phenomenon

A cardinal feature of the conventional Morality and Theology that Kant attempts to protect from Spinoza's doctrine is its Super-Natural vs. Natural dualism.  A significant example of his commitment to the conventional doctrine is his adoption of that dualism to characterize one of the cardinal features of his Rational system--Noumenon vs. Phenomenon.  Stripped of that commitment, the similarities between the Noumenon-Phenomenon contrast and Spinoza's Naturing Nature-Natured Nature emerge.  For example, on that basis, it is easier to recognize Pure Practical Reason as an immanent, rather than transcendent, force.  Likewise, the force is thus not experienced in Deontic terms, i. e. as a command of Duty that must be obeyed.  Instead, the content of the Principle of Pure Practical Reason gives expression to the conflict between the internal force and outer influences, and, hence, functions as an instructive development of Spinoza's doctrine.  But he squanders the opportunity for a fuller exposition, instead adapting the analysis to a conventional drama of divine reward for obedience to duty, and, instead of acknowledging Spinoza's influence, turns on him.

Amor Fati and Faith

References to 'love of god' in his  exposition of the concept of Intuition suggest that Spinoza prescribes a doctrine of Amor Fati for averse circumstances in life.  If that is specifically what Kant is addressing by proposing Faith as an alternative, then the issue is rarefied Philosophy, transcending mere systematics.  Now, one of Spinoza's few peers on the topic would be Nietzsche, in his affirmation of Eternal Recurrence.  If so, then as the latter shows, the attitude is not one of permanent resignation.  Rather, as Nietzsche dramatizes, affirmation of what has come to pass is a precondition at any moment for subsequent creativity, which is why it is an empowering moment for both him and Spinoza.  In other words, Amor Fati is indeed a concrete systematically-developed concept.  In contrast, Kant cannot even prescribe to a virtuous person that they keep Faith, since Duty is their only motivation in his doctrine.  So, while Amor Fati has clear systematic practical value, Faith, on Kant's own account, has none, a plain deficiency in a presumed doctrine of Pure Practical Reason. Regardless, his response to Spinoza, on any grounds, is misguided from the outset.  For, a defense of a concept of Faith must begin at the source--a concept of deity.  Accordingly, the only possible rigorous argument against Spinoza's Amor Fati, in the name of Faith, is a Theological one, i. e. demonstrating the impossibility of a concept of an immanent, bi-attribute deity, which Kant seems unwilling, if not unable, to present.  Absent such an argument, not only is his criticism of Spinoza groundless, the whole premise of the second half of his Critical trilogy collapses--that Faith in the possible existence of a rewarding deity is necessitated by Rational principles--simply on the basis of the possibility of an alternative Rational concept of deity.

Virtue, Power, Faith

From the earliest times, religious ritual has been an attempt by humans to extend control over conditions, e. g. by appeasing a deity, perhaps via sacrifice.  In other words, such rituals have been attempts to extend the exercise of power over conditions.  Now, unacknowledged by Kant in Spinoza's doctrine is the identity of Virtue and Power.  Likewise, implicit in his charge that Spinoza's concept of Virtue is insufficient is that the criterion of measurement is Power.  For, his proposed correction can be conceived as a variety of extending Power over conditions, via religious ritual, perhaps via sacrifice.  In Kant's version of such ritual, sacrifice consists in the constraint of self-interest, that justifies faith in a deity delivering favorable conditions.  That the sequence is merely hoped-for does not alter its essential structure--a faith-based extension of Power beyond Virtue, even if justified as 'Rational completeness'.  But this 'Rational Faith' is merely a rationalization of the Faith component of conventional Deontic Morality, and its vicarious Power is not likely to impress Spinoza.

General Will, Practical Reason, Invisible Hand

Because of Kant's explicit attention to Hume, a contrast with a colleague of the latter has gone generally unnoticed, despite having become more significant over the centuries.  Kant's Moral principle can be summarized as--Act dutifully, and leave it to a supernatural deity to reward you with personal happiness.  In complete opposition--Act selfishly, and leave it to an invisible force to arrange for general happiness--is the principle of Hume's colleague, Smith.  The structural similarity is no accident--both Kant and Smith are influenced by Rousseau, with Pure Practical Reason and the Invisible Hand, respectively, varieties of his General Will.  However, each deviates significantly from the latter.  Though Rousseau does not develop the concept of General Will systematically, indications are that he conceives it as natural collective volition, anticipating the species instinct of Darwin, constituted by active and deliberate individual civic participation.  So, Smith most sharply diverges from the latter characteristic, i. e. in promoting laissez-faire selfishness.  On the other hand, Kant does adopt Rousseau's concept of active individual participation in general volition, but only heuristically, the result of which is an abstract generality the individual parts of which remain atomized, i. e. his Kingdom of Ends.  So, Kant and Smith could be conceived as initially neo-Rousseaian rivals, the antagonism between which has grown significantly since.  For, Kant's Moral doctrine can easily be conceived as condemning at least one of Smith's fundamental principles--the deliberate neglect of the well-being of others, regardless of the exploitation that later emerges as implicitly permitted in it.  But, as is commonly the case in the standard academic segregation of Philosophy, Political Science, and Economics, the interrelation of the concepts of General Will, Practical Reason, and Invisible Hand remains typically unconsidered, so, neo-Kantian criticism of Capitalism, e. g. Rawls', is typically unfocused, and the concept of a General Will remains obscure.

Reason and Hope

The specific point of Kant's dispute with Spinoza is the thesis of the latter that Virtue is its own reward.  Now, even though his counter-argument is on Utilitarian grounds, he justifies resort to those grounds with the thesis that it is according to Reason that a virtuous person be happy, with which Spinoza would likely not argue.  However, Spinoza would not accept a concept of Happiness that is subsequent to Virtue.  Now, the ground in Kant's system of that diachronic relation of Virtue and Happiness is his question "If I do what I ought to do, what may I then hope for?", which he attributes to Pure Reason.  So, implicit in this grounding is the thesis that Hope is Rational.  But, in passages of which Kant is well aware, Spinoza disputes that thesis, on the grounds that one of the constituents of Hope is Pain, and Reason does not promote Pain.  Nevertheless, Kant does not address this specific point that is perhaps the decisive one in the issue, which effectively undermines any ambition that his challenge to Spinoza is on Rationalist grounds.  This carelessness in responding to Spinoza contrasts sharply with the meticulousness of his response to Hume.  The potential casualty of this carelessness is a significant portion of his entire Critical system, from the second half of the 2nd Critique on, including the entire 3rd Critique.  For, without Hope, there is no ground in his Rational system for the concept of a Reward, and, thus, for the concept of a divine Rewarder, so, there is no necessity for a faculty such as Reflective Judgment to ground the concept of divine Empirical Rewarding.

Epistemology and Theology

In Spinoza's doctrine, the source of the Parts of experience is the Senses, and the source of the Whole of experience is Reason.  A third faculty is Intuition, the object of which is "God".  Now, in his doctrine, God and Nature are one and the same.  Furthermore, there are two aspects of Nature--'nature naturing', i. e. creating, and 'nature natured, i. e. created.  So, the Whole that is the object of Reason is Nature qua created, while Nature qua creating is the object of Intuition.  But, this divine force is immanent, not transcendent, so the Intuition of it by a Mode can only be the Mode's awareness of its own divine creating, or, equivalently, the self-awareness of Nature/God.  In the 19th-century, variations of this awareness begin to emerge in Philosophical systems, e. g. Schopenhauer's Will, Bergson's Elan Vital, etc.  But prior to that, such an Intuition of God has no analogue in the Epistemological theories of the era, primarily because in the dualistic Theology that predominates, the deity is transcendent, and, hence, is knowable, if at all, by inference.  In other words, Epistemology is not an autonomous field of study, but is determined by Theology, i. e. whether or not there is such a faculty as Spinoza's Intuition, is a function of whether or not there is such a thing as an immanent divine creative process.

Autonomy, Knowledge, Power

Kant well recognizes that outer experience being multifarious, it is essentially unorganized.  Accordingly, it is only via the Forms of Intuition that it first becomes successive, and then only via the Categories of the Understanding that Successiveness becomes further structured.  However, he does not seem to recognize the implications of the analysis for behavior--that any organization of external influences must be Autonomous.  In contrast, Spinoza does recognize that Adequate Knowledge and Autonomy are one and the same.  More specifically, Knowledge for him is not Knowing-That, but Knowing-How.  Thus Adequate Knowledge entails control of some event, either by entailing a means of neutralizing it, or by entailing a means of reproducing it.  In other words, according to Spinoza, Knowledge and Power are one and the same.  Thus, another example of the superficiality of the standard Rationalism vs. Empiricism classifications is that two founding proponents of the Knowledge = Power thesis are an 'Empiricist', Bacon, and a 'Rationalist', Spinoza.

Holism, Atomism, Morality

The Subject-Object relation is fundamentally Epistemological, and Epistemology is fundamentally a Subjective process.  So, to classify Spinoza as an Objectivist is still Subjectivist.  Thus, more accurate, is that he is a Holist, whereas the systems of most of his peers in the era is Atomist.  His Substance-Mode relation is that of Whole-Part, so accordingly, his 'Intuition of God' is the awareness of a Mode that it is a part of the whole.  Knowledge is Holistic, so that the shortcoming, which he calls 'inadequacy' of most perceptions, including sensations, is that they present only parts of a whole, and that error consists in taking a Part as a Whole.  Similarly, the shortcoming of Pleasures is that they are only parts of a whole Good, and behavior or Moral error consists in treating as if they were sufficient as motivation.  Thus, the 'Intuition of God' in his doctrine is liberating because the awareness of the Whole frees behavior from an erroneous perceptions of external influences, facilitating control over how to proceed.  So, his Ethics is opposed to both the predominant Rationalist and Empiricist varieties of Atomist Morality.  For example, Kant's Atomist Rationalism consists in an individual person conceiving themselves as an Instance of a Universal, not as a Part of a Whole.  Thus, the irony of his charge that Spinoza's virtuous Part is deficient in Happiness is that, to the contrast, it is his virtuous Atom who is so deficient, i. e. because it can never experience the exhilaration of discovering that it is part of Whole, the alienation from which is only inadequately compensated for by a divine reward. Likewise, the Utilitarian Good is constituted by the aggregate of individual Pleasures, not their harmony as a Whole, i. e. as Health.  Plus, Mill's elusive distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' Pleasure is easy to explain as that between a Holist Pleasure vs. a localized Pleasure.  But, as is typical of most of its peers, Rationalist and Empiricist, Utilitarianism, as Atomist, cannot accommodate Holist elements, even those that afford simple solutions to vexing problems.

Rationalism vs. Empiricism and Objectivism vs. Subjectivism

The standard grouping together of Descartes and Spinoza as 'Rationalist' obscures how they are radically opposed in another respect.  While Descartes derives God and World from private sensory experience, Spinoza derives private sensory experience from God and World.  In other words, Descartes is a Subjectivist, and Spinoza is an Objectivist.  Leibniz, too, is an Objectivist, i. e. the concept of a Windowless Monad could not be derived from private experience.  Locke, Berkeley, and Hume are all Subjectivists, though, unlike the latter two, Locke does not deny any Objective existence.  Now, Kant's credit to Hume of wakening him from "dogmatic slumber" seems to imply that Objectivism is dogmatic.  However, he misses how Hume's Subjectivism is also dogmatic--the acceptance of the irreducibility of Sense-Data suppresses the sequence of abstractions that isolate them from ordinary immediate experience.  Now, Kant does eventually posit himself in an Objectivist vs. Subjectivist opposition to Hume, but on the basis of redefining it in terms of Form vs. Matter within the Subjectivist context. So, he never comes to consider that his waking from a dogmatic slumber might be a dream within another dogmatic slumber.  Regardless, the usual classification of the era in terms of Rationalist vs. Empiricist obscures the dynamic of the Objectivist vs. Subjectivist opposition.

Pleasure, Pain, Subjectivist Morality, Objectivist Morality

Spinoza defines Pleasure and Pain as an increase and a decrease, respectively, in strength.  In other words, Pleasure signifies a condition of vitalization, and Pain signifies a condition of de-vitalization.  Thus, according to his doctrine, Pleasure and Pain are not irreducible data, and, hence are not two foundational Psychological principles, but are modifications of a single fundamental Physiological principle.  Now, the implications of these definitions extend to Morality.  For according to Sentimentalism, e. g. Hedonism, Utilitarianism, Emotivism, etc., Moral valuation is rooted in the Pleasure vs. Pain contrast, i. e. most generally as Approval vs. Disapproval, and including Good vs. Evil, Right vs. Wrong, etc.  The general classification of such doctrines is thus Subjectivism, the pervasive acceptance of the Psychological foundations of which is expressed in the recourse to a Deontic principle in the attempt to establish an Objectivist doctrine that overrides it, Kantianism, most notably.  In contrast, Spinoza grounds an Objectivist doctrine by undercutting Subjectivism directly, at its root--by analyzing Pleasure and Pain as derivative data, an argument not likely at the disposal of anyone who does not accept Mind-Body Parallelism.

Homo Faber and Exhilaration

The originality of Spinoza's vision is not that of a new way of looking at the same thing, e. g. a Pantheistic vision of the world.  It is a vision of the beginning of a new era in human history, characterized by a transition from Homo Sapiens to Homo Faber, and correspondingly, by the supplanting of Theoretical Reason by Technical Reason.  In the Pantheistic context, Homo Faber is transformed from an original sinner to a Mode of a creative deity, i. e. of the deity of Genesis 1, as opposed to the deity of Genesis 3.  The ascendance of Technical Reason also applies to Instrumental Reason--Reason does not merely function as a slave of the passions by calculating Means to its Ends, it becomes creative, the autonomy of which becomes salient when construction is for its own sake--in Art.  Because Kant ignores the role of Technical Reason even in a purposive context, e. g. a labor-saving invention, he cannot recognize the Pleasure of it--Exhilaration--that is communicated in Genius Art.  But he is far from alone; centuries later, the subject of most Philosophy is still Homo Sapiens.

Stimulation and Exhilaration

As has been previously discussed, Spinoza's concept of physical Pleasure differs from the conventional one.  For, while the latter signifies sensory Satiation, his, which he calls Stimulation, signifies an increase in volitional power.  However, the feeling itself is a passive condition, which seems antithetical to the Pleasure involved in the harnessing of divine creativity that constitutes the peak moment of his doctrine.  So, active Pleasure, i. e. the enjoyment of one's own creativity, might be better termed Exhilaration.  Thus, Exhilaration entails a Dualism other than that which, as has been previously discussed, Serenity entails: Active-Passive vs. Incorporeal-Corporeal.  Both signify liberation from Pain, but the latter Dualists have usually blamed Corporeality in general for suffering, while in the Corporeal dimension of Spinoza's God/Nature/Substance, suffering is rooted specifically in passivity, which is a consequence of finitude.  So, his doctrine aims at the maximization of Creativity, and, hence, the enlarging of finitude, while traditional Dualist doctrines aim at the transcendence of Corporeality, while maintaining degree of finitude, e. g. from individual Body to individual Soul.  In other words, while in the latter, the highest Pleasure is Serenity, in the former, it is Exhilaration.  Spinoza thus presents a radically heterodox vision, that has been shared in varying respects by Kant, Pragmatists, Marx, and Nietzsche, but remains of marginal interest in contemporary Anglo-Saxon academic Philosophy.

Serenity and Dualism

Because it is easy to interpret an organism as naturally seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, Pleasure and Pain are often posited as the fundamental Psychological principles.  Accordingly, intelligence is often conceived as functioning primarily in the service of maximizing Pleasure and minimizing Pain.  However, as human invention demonstrates, the capacity to cause suffering increases in proportion to the capacity to end suffering and to produce pleasure.  So, a higher wisdom often begins with the insight that Pleasure and Pain are inextricably entwined in Nature, so freedom from Pain requires a purified Pleasure that transcends Nature, i. e. Serenity.  Popular versions of that super-natural realm are Heaven and Eden, and the prototypical Philosophical version is The One of Parmenides.  Now, Serenity entails transcendence of natural Pleasure and Pain, so these various hypostatizations of it entail a systematic Dualism, the second term of which for Parmenides is Motion/Multiplicity.  A more general characterization of the Duality is Incorporeality vs. Corporeality, one to which most successors of Parmenides have adopted.  So, these traditional Ontological or Epistemological Dualisms are usually Psychological in origin, and their ultimate aim, implicit or explicit, is to ground the cultivation of Serenity.

Pleasure, Satiation, Stimulation, Serenity

Not often clearly distinguished by Philosophers or others is three kinds of Pleasure--Satiation, Stimulation, and Serenity.  Satiation is sensory, and ephemeral. Stimulation is volitional, and transitional.  Serenity is mental, and continuous. The distinction between Satiation and Serenity is one of the bases of many Philosophical projects, the prototype of which is Stoicism.  Stoicism seeks detachment from both Pain and Pleasure, a detachment that consists not in Apathy, but in Serenity.  Likewise, the standard Philosophical subordination of Corporeality to Incorporeality is rooted in the Pain vs. Serenity contrast, i. e. what is usually presented as Ontological, Epistemological, or Theological Dualism, is an expression of Psychological Dualism.  So, the concept of Pleasure in Spinoza's doctrine, in which its immanent, creative, deity has parallel corporeal and incorporeal attributes, is that of Stimulation, even when instantiated in a Mode. In contrast, in Kant's system, there seems to be no concept of Stimulation, while Aesthetic Pleasure is Serenity, and incorporeal Reason requires the thesis that an incorporeal deity recompense Satiation that has been foresworn in the restraint from seeking it at the expense of the Satiation of others. Accordingly, his charge that Spinoza's concept of Pleasure is deficient in a Satiation that only an incorporeal deity can deliver is uncharacteristically misguided in several respects.

Pleasure, Beauty, Super-Beauty

To attack Spinoza's concept of Rationalist Ethics, that has no need for the existence of his own deity, Kant resorts to a Utilitarian argument.  Compounding the inadequacy of such an argument is Kant's inattention to the fact that Spinoza does not share his concept of Pleasure.  For, while he conceives Pleasure as causing a maintaining of the experience of its source, Spinoza conceives it as an increase in Power, equivalent to Stimulation.  Now, the distinction bears upon Kant's concept of Beauty that is a symbol of his concept of the Good.  For, the basis of the former is Pleasure in the Beautiful object, a feeling that thus causes maintaining the experience of it, a traditional example of which is the Contemplation of the object.  In contrast, as has been previously discussed, the Pleasure involved in the experience of Super-Beauty is Stimulation, and, hence, in Empowerment, thereby functioning as a prelude to some further action.  Spinoza has no Aesthetic Theory, but if he had one, Super-Beauty might be its highest value, and be systematically related to his own concept of the Good, just as Aesthetic and Moral values correspond in Kant's doctrine.  The contrast further emphasizes that Spinoza's doctrine is an incommensurable rival to his own, not an internally flawed version of it, not accessible via a Utilitarian argument based on an equivocal use of 'Pleasure'.

Beauty, Sublimity, Super-Beauty

As original and exemplary, a work of artistic Genius can stimulate new ways of experiencing the world.  Such a work is not what Kant classifies as 'Beauty', since it does not harmonize with the cognitive faculties, but challenges them to develop in new ways.  Nor is it classifiable as his 'Sublime', since that characterization does not apply to Artworks, and the aim is not refuge in a super-natural realm, but a natural overcoming of human experience as is.  Accordingly, the term 'Super-Beauty' has been introduced here to classify such works, though without the established connotations, 'sublime' would be instructive.  So, the experience of Super-Beauty is stimulating, and whether or not that sensation is universally communicable, as Kant requires of the pleasure in the experience of Beauty, is irrelevant.  Instead, what is relevant is that unconventional modes of behavior be stimulated, perhaps even Supererogatory action.  So, Super-Beauty is beyond the scope of Kant's Aesthetic Theory, and, correspondingly, beyond the scope of his Moral doctrine.

Genius, Super-Beauty, Supererogation

One of the shortcomings of Deontic Morality is an incapacity to accommodate Supererogatory action.  Correspondingly, a shortcoming of a concept of Beauty as a symbol of Deontic Morality is an incapacity to deal with what can be called Super-Beauty, the source of which is an elevated creative process called Genius.  Now, just as Supererogatory action is personal, and non-universalizable, the enjoyment of Super-Beauty, too, is personal, and non-universalizable.  Indeed, Kant does detect the personal component of Aesthetic experience--the recognition, in reflection, that a work is 'for-me'.  However, he attempts to universalize this component, i. e. as the "universally communicable" component of Taste.  Now, there may be cases in which it is universalizable; but there are others in which it it is strictly personal.  He, thus, cannot recognize the concatenation Genius to Super-Beauty to Supererogation.

Beauty, Reflection, Pleasure

According to Alexander, Beauty is a Tertiary Quality--neither a property of an object, nor a feeling of a subject, but a characteristic of the experience of an object.  In other words, 'X is beautiful' means 'The experience of X is beautiful'.  Now, Kant seems to agree with Alexander's classification, adding the analysis that it is upon reflection that a beautiful relation is first revealed.  But he also discovers in the reflection the emergence of a further pleasure--the pleasure that he characterizes as "universally communicable", i. e. Taste is a Reflective Judgement.  But that reflective pleasure is distinct from the unreflected-upon direct pleasure of an object, e. g. enjoyed dancing to music.  Likewise, the beautiful relation itself is independent of the reflection upon it, and of the pleasure that emerges in the latter.  So, Beauty as a Tertiary Quality may become an object of Reflection, but the pleasure that Kant attributes to the Reflection is extrinsic to Beauty.  In other words, Aesthetic Experience may be enriched by Aesthetic Judgement, but it is independent of it.

Aesthetic Pleasure, Communication, Morality

In Kant's system, Taste is the appreciation of Beauty, constituted by universalizable Aesthetic pleasure.  The locus of the pleasure is the interplay of universal cognitive structures, so his concept of Beauty is Formalist, and he often characterizes Taste as consisting in "universally communicable" pleasure.  But this attribution is perhaps a misnomer--what is universally communicable in his analysis is not the pleasure per se, but one's judgement that a work is pleasurable, i. e. his topic is not the Art of Criticism, but the Criticism of Art.  Regardless, conspicuously absent in his introduction of the concept of Communicability into Aesthetic Theory is an explicit recognition of where Communication does occur--in the presentation of a work to an audience, prior to any inter-audience interaction. Communication is implicit in the artist-audience relation, and, indeed, universal Communicability is entailed in his criterion that a work of Genius be "exemplary".  By failing to consider the initial act of Communication, Kant misses the complete phenomenon, and, so, fails to trace the Communicable pleasure to its source--the work of Genius.  He, thus, does not consider that what is communicated might be other than pleasure, i. e. a creative impulse, which is pleasurable, one discharge of which is the excited recommendation of the work to another.  Accordingly, he suppresses the characteristic of Beauty that indicates that it is an impulse to Creativity, by representing the hortatory 'Act in an exemplary manner' as the categorically imperative 'Act only on that Maxim that you can at the same time will to be a Universalization Law'.  He thus misses that the latter is a special case of Examplification--i. e. in which the example is codified.  So, in addition to the two derivations of Moral principle of which Kant is aware--from the concept of Duty, and from the concept of Reason--there is a third of which he is unaware--from the concept of Genius, via the concept of Communication.