Will, Representation, Individuation

According to Schopenhauer, Representation is the Principle of Individuation, i. e. by objectifying Will, it also fragments it, and then reconstructs the fragments in accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, e. g. as Cause and Effect.  Now, one unclarity in the process is the status of the subject of Representation--itself an object of Representation, or Will?  One problem with latter is that it leaves unexplained the Individuality of an act of Representation, i. e. that it occurs in an Individual subject, at an Individual location.  But, the more general problem is that of the subject of the Principle of Individuation.  For, as a principle of a system, it has Universal scope, and the Universal principle in Schopenhauer's system is Will.  Accordingly, in his system,  Individuation can only be the Self-Individuation of Will, just as Representation can only be the Self-Representation of Will, which aligns him with Intuition as the ecstatic Self-Intuition of Substance in Spinoza's doctrine.  But, Schopenhauer cannot make that alignment because, while Volition and Cognition are systematically related in Spinoza's doctrine, they remain sundered in the theory that directly influences his own concepts of the two--Kant's.  They remain sundered in Kant's system because he neglects the exposition that would connect them--a theory of Action derived from his concept of a Rational Will, which would show how Cognition functions in a Volitional context.  But absent that exposition, Cognition has no systematic relation to Volition, which Schopenhauer inherits as an alienation of his Individual from its Universal, a source of misery that only Music can temporarily relieve.