Amor Fati and Faith

References to 'love of god' in his  exposition of the concept of Intuition suggest that Spinoza prescribes a doctrine of Amor Fati for averse circumstances in life.  If that is specifically what Kant is addressing by proposing Faith as an alternative, then the issue is rarefied Philosophy, transcending mere systematics.  Now, one of Spinoza's few peers on the topic would be Nietzsche, in his affirmation of Eternal Recurrence.  If so, then as the latter shows, the attitude is not one of permanent resignation.  Rather, as Nietzsche dramatizes, affirmation of what has come to pass is a precondition at any moment for subsequent creativity, which is why it is an empowering moment for both him and Spinoza.  In other words, Amor Fati is indeed a concrete systematically-developed concept.  In contrast, Kant cannot even prescribe to a virtuous person that they keep Faith, since Duty is their only motivation in his doctrine.  So, while Amor Fati has clear systematic practical value, Faith, on Kant's own account, has none, a plain deficiency in a presumed doctrine of Pure Practical Reason. Regardless, his response to Spinoza, on any grounds, is misguided from the outset.  For, a defense of a concept of Faith must begin at the source--a concept of deity.  Accordingly, the only possible rigorous argument against Spinoza's Amor Fati, in the name of Faith, is a Theological one, i. e. demonstrating the impossibility of a concept of an immanent, bi-attribute deity, which Kant seems unwilling, if not unable, to present.  Absent such an argument, not only is his criticism of Spinoza groundless, the whole premise of the second half of his Critical trilogy collapses--that Faith in the possible existence of a rewarding deity is necessitated by Rational principles--simply on the basis of the possibility of an alternative Rational concept of deity.