Suicide and Right

As has been previously discussed, Spinoza's doctrine entails that any self-destructive tendency must be an expression of only diminished capacity in some respect, a condition of 'emotional bondage'.  Hence, it seems to follow that he would dispute the contention of someone who believes that one has a right to commit suicide.  But, in fact, according to his concept of Natural Right, as developed in his Political writings, not in the Ethics, he does implicitly recognize such a Right.  For, in those passages, Natural Right is presented as transcending emotional incapacity, or, equivalently, intellectual capacity.  However, there is a discrepancy between those passages and the exposition in the Ethics, specifically regarding the concept of Power.  In the political writings, Natural Right and Natural Power are correlated, whereas in the Ethics, Power is correlated with Knowledge, and, hence, inversely with degree of bondage to Emotions.  Hence, from the latter, it would seem to follow that someone who is controlled by Emotion is someone whose Natural Right is correspondingly diminished.  Accordingly, there is no Right to commit suicide, at least on the basis of the Ethics.  It is unclear how Spinoza might reconcile the two apparently contradictory positions.