Reason and Hope

The specific point of Kant's dispute with Spinoza is the thesis of the latter that Virtue is its own reward.  Now, even though his counter-argument is on Utilitarian grounds, he justifies resort to those grounds with the thesis that it is according to Reason that a virtuous person be happy, with which Spinoza would likely not argue.  However, Spinoza would not accept a concept of Happiness that is subsequent to Virtue.  Now, the ground in Kant's system of that diachronic relation of Virtue and Happiness is his question "If I do what I ought to do, what may I then hope for?", which he attributes to Pure Reason.  So, implicit in this grounding is the thesis that Hope is Rational.  But, in passages of which Kant is well aware, Spinoza disputes that thesis, on the grounds that one of the constituents of Hope is Pain, and Reason does not promote Pain.  Nevertheless, Kant does not address this specific point that is perhaps the decisive one in the issue, which effectively undermines any ambition that his challenge to Spinoza is on Rationalist grounds.  This carelessness in responding to Spinoza contrasts sharply with the meticulousness of his response to Hume.  The potential casualty of this carelessness is a significant portion of his entire Critical system, from the second half of the 2nd Critique on, including the entire 3rd Critique.  For, without Hope, there is no ground in his Rational system for the concept of a Reward, and, thus, for the concept of a divine Rewarder, so, there is no necessity for a faculty such as Reflective Judgment to ground the concept of divine Empirical Rewarding.