Appearance, Phenomenon, Representation

Spinoza's Creating vs. Created contrast could correspond to Kant's In-Itself vs. Appearance contrast.  However, because Creating is a dynamic process, it is not a Thing-In-Itself, insofar as by 'Thing', Kant means a static entity.  Now, Kant further complicates the contrast with his Noumenon-Phenomenon distinction, which recasts the Thing-In-Itself as a product of thought, and, hence, as not in an inner-outer relation with Appearances.  By implication, therefore, the existence of an independent divine Creating is also denied, though Kant does not take the trouble to explicitly challenge Spinoza's claim to Intuit it.  Now, further complicating Kant's complication is Schopenhauer's Will vs. Representation contrast, which he attributes to Kant.  For, while his concept of Will is as an In-Itself that is not Noumenal, i. e. it exists independent of thought, Representation, unlike either Appearance or Phenomenon, is a product of thought, and, hence, strictly speaking, is Noumenal.  So, even if Will does correspond to Spinoza's Creating, Representation does not correspond to Spinoza's Created.  Accordingly, unlike Spinoza, he derives joy neither his version of the latter, nor from Will, which he thus experiences as a hostile affliction.  So, these variations of Spinoza's original contrast have significant implications for the doctrines that are developed from them.