Aristotle, Kant, and Logic

Aristotle's treatment of 'Logic', in his case, 'Syllogistic', appears in a work called Organon. In contrast, Kant explicitly characterizes his concept of Logic as a 'canon'--while an 'organon' describes the basic patterns of knowledge-presenting procedures, a 'canon' distinguishes between proper and improper patterns of those processes. Hence, Kantian Logic is part of his more general Critique of Pure Reason. But, contrary to the common use of the term 'critique', an expression of denigration, for him it refers to a process of distinguishing proper from improper. Or, in other words, the activity of Critique is nothing but a process of Definition, and what Kant's Critical project ultimately aims at is an answer to the question 'What is Man?' The answer that he arrives at includes the thesis that Human Pure Reason is properly Practical, which facilitates a definition of Humans as autonomous beings. Now, as has been previously discussed, Human Autonomy is an Evolvement beyond mere Particularity. Hence, Kantian Logic is an Evolvement from Aristotelian Logic.

Aristotle and Number Theory

The standard gloss, 'Ancient Philosophy' tends to obscure that, in some respects, the definitive criticism of Platonism comes from Plato's most famous student himself, Aristotle. For sure, some aspects of Aristotelianism are Platonistic, especially its honoring of Contemplation as the highest state, and, more generally, the priority it accords Theory over Practice. But, Aristotle's contention that Unity is a Predicate cuts right to the heart of Platonistic Mathematics, by challenging the premise that Mathematical entities subsist in an eternal realm beyond the physical, i. e. it implies that e. g. ' a triangle' is a reification of 'is triangular'. Furthermore, since Mathematical entities are the archetypes of all Platonic Forms, the debunking applies to them as well--they are all reified Predicates. Hence, according to Aristotle, the entire realm of Platonic Forms is fictititous. But, this is no Nominalistic rejection of Platonism. For, Aristotle's own concept of One, "to be the first measure of a kind . . . the starting-point of number qua number", anticipates the Constructionism of Kant, or the Intuitionism of Brouwer, more than the Nominalistic Cardinalism of Russell. It also anticipates the Formaterial concept of One--that it is both an end and a beginning--that is the basis of the Evolvemental concept of Individual, more than it does the exclusively terminal concept of One implied by Aristotle's own Teleology.

Modern Math Logic and Kantianism

Platonism holds that Numbers are self-subsistent entities that inhabit the realm of Forms. Its historically primary opponent, Nominalism, denies the existence of any such realm, and, instead, treats Numbers as abstractions from empirical experience. In contrast with both, for Kant, possibly echoing Spinoza's notion of Definition, Numbers are rules of construction. The extent to which modern Mathematical Logic, originated by Frege, is a reaction to Kant, can be gleaned from the fact that its most eminent expression, Principia Mathematica, is a collaboration of a Platonist, Whitehead, and a Nominalist, Russell. Likewise, contemporary Analytic Logic, inspired by these attempts to reduce an active process such as counting to intellectual abstraction, is generally oblivious to some of its Philosophical pre-suppositions, e. g. the priority of Theory over Practice, that are common to Platonism and Nominalism. As such, they remain under-Evolved doctrines.

Math Logic and Political Philosophy

Any notion of 'Individuality' entails some concept of 'One'. For example, its prevalent connotations, Self-Sufficiency, Independence, etc. imply Cardinal Oneness, namely, self-subsistence and an absolute separation from other Numbers. In contrast, Ordinal Oneness, i. e. Firstness, entails a continuation beyond 'One', and, hence, is intrinsically other-directed. Hence, Individuality that entails Firstness entails the intrinsic Self-Insufficiency and Interdependence of paticular persons. And, just as, as has been previously argued, Cardinality abstracts from Ordinality, the prevalent American notion of Individuality, e. g. 'the Rugged Individual', is a partial, because under-Evolved, type of Individual, and the society that presents that notion as paradigmatic of membership in it, is an under-Evolved version of Democracy. More generally, Mathematical Logic and Political Philosophy are Systematically related, contrary to what is implied by the usual arrangement of Academic departments.

Platonism and Oneness

Plato seems on occasion to regard the Form of the Good as the most important Form. Even if so, the essential Form is, plainly, the Form of Oneness, since the essence of Form is Unity. Further, since the Forms are self-subsistent entities, so too is The One. Thus, for Platonism, since the One is also a Cardinal Number, all Cardinal Numbers are self-subsistent entities, and Mathematics is a purely analytical science. But, in Formaterialism, the One is a derivative notion, an abstraction from both the Formal Principle, Many-becoming-One, and the Material Principle, One-becoming-Many. Counting entails both, so, likewise, do the Ordinal Numbers. For one neo-Platonist, Plotinus, The One is explicitly the master Form, and, furthermore, is the source of an Emanation that generates all Reality. In Formaterial terms, Emanation is, hence, actually a Material Principle, and if other Platonists had considered the Mathematical implications of Plotinus' Theory of The One, Platonism might have arrived, at minimum, at the position that Ordinal Numbers are not inessential derivatives of the Cardinals.

Cardinal and Ordinal Numbers

Since the meaning of a number like '2', and the truth of an expression like '2+2=4', seem completely independent of personal or empirical experience, Mathematics has long been considered to exist in an abstract realm. Accordingly, any debate over the Ontological status of Mathematical entities has concerned just whether that abstract realm is the infrastructure of reality itself, as per, e. g., Pythagoras, or is in the Intellect, as per, e. g., Russell. In either case counting and measuring are considered applied modes of Mathematics, and, likewise, Ordinal Numbers are construed as derived from Cardinals. But, 2+2=4 is easily refuted by 2 apples + 2 oranges=? In other words, presumably 'pure' Mathematical formulas implicitly quantify homogenous items, e. g. '2+2=4' is actually '(x)(2x+2x=4x)'. So, Numbers cannot escape being quantities, which means that they originate in Counting. Likewise, Ordinal Numbers are original, and Cardinals derivative, which is reinforced by the consideration that the latter lack an ordering principle, i. e. a principle that places e. g. the distinct entity 1 before, not after, the distinct entity 2. In other words, Counting is not '1, 2, 3, . . .' but 'first, second, third, . . .,' from which the former are abstracted. Russell's mistake is to believe that his 'Successor Function' generates the Cardinals, whereas it is the Ordinals that are successive. That the Successor Function is recursive, i. e. is applied, in turn, to each new successor that is generated, shows that Counting is cumulative, and, hence, is an Evolvemental process. Or, to put it more familiarly, Counting involves the introduction of a new item, and its subsequent integration into the given group, which is the Evolvemental process of Diversification without loss of Unity.

Theories

In some contemporary circles, 'Logic' is the 'Theory of Theories'. For example, 'Mathematical Logic' organizes Mathematics structurally in a manner reminiscent of Euclid's systematizing of Geometry. The structure involved is nowadays formally characterized as a 'Theory'. A 'Theory', in general, is any set of statements pertaining to some associated phenomena. Typically, those statements are either Axioms or Theorems, Axioms being statements that are self-evidentally True, and Theorems being statements that are derived from Axioms by an inference rule or rules. The two criteria for the evaluation of a Theory is Consistency and Completeness. Consistency is presumably guaranteed by strict adherence to inferential procedure, i. e. any properly derived Theorem cannot contradict any other statement in the Theory. Completeness can also be guaranteed if a Theory concerns a finite range of phenomena, such as in Mathematics, when 'Infinity' is treated as a Cardinal Number. Usually, though, the range is indefinite, and ever-increasing, so there is no guarantee that the description of some previously undiscovered phenomenon will not emerge as inconsistent with the established statements of a Theory. Such an inconsistency, at minimum, challenge the Theory, and if it is compelling enough, can force the formulation of a new Theory. So, while Completeness for at least empirical Theories cannot be guaranteed, a Theory can be more or less Comprehensive, and evaluated on the basis of explanatory power, e. g. Einsteinian Physics explains better high-velocity phenomena than does Newtonian. In Formaterial terms, Comprehensiveness is Complexity, so Theories can be evaluated as more or less Evolved.

The Honesty Policy

There is less than meets the eye to the popular Principle 'Honesty is the best policy', for 'honesty' means merely 'honorable conduct', which is hardly illuminating in the context. What it more obviously means is 'truthfulness', but the latter is still ambiguous. For some, 'being truthful' means to 'forthrightly express one's feelings'. But this entails the expression of hate and bigotry, which, undeniably, have been honored in American society in recent decades, and, so, may qualify as a 'best policy' only if one's aim is to breed antagonism. Given that many of today's hate-mongers seem taken aback when not welcomed in societal spheres outside their own, breeding antagonism cannot be their aim. The most common use of the Principle, rather, is in the context of Self-Interested activities, in which profitable lying is an option, to advise that Truthfulness is always the best means to gain. Given the ample empirical evidence to the contrary, the basis of that advice is unclear, and its advocates are often reduced to invoking some vague formula of Cosmological Justice to validate it, e. g. 'Karma', 'The Invisible Hand of the Market', etc. That the profitability of Truthfulness is not self-evident is an indication that Truth exceeds the sphere of personal interests. A policy of Truthfulness, in a broader sense, would advise the pursuit of Truth itself, i. e. would be a Principle of continual learning. In other words, to be Truthful is to Evolve, a sense in which Honesty is indeed the best Policy.

The Marketplace of Ideas

Even though it is considered to be an ancient notion, the phrase 'marketplace of ideas' was actually coined in 1967, as part of a U. S. Supreme Court decision. The venerablility of the phrase attaches to its connotation, the 'free exchange of ideas', which is plainly Evolvemental both for Individuals and for society as a whole. However, in the context of contemporary American Economics, the phrase easily takes on a malign connotation, as well. For, the American 'marketplace' is an arena in which products have a monetary value, which implies that a 'good' idea is one that sells, and the 'best' idea is the one that is the most expensive to purchase. Perhaps nothing demonstrates the equivocality of 'marketplace' than that in current American debates such as Health Care and Climate Change, Scientific Truth is having to negotiate with Corporate Profitability. In Evolvementalism, as well as other doctrines, a more comprehensive idea has more Value than a less comprehensive one, even if the latter fetches a higher price than it does.

Zero-Sum

In Game Theory, a 'zero-sum' Game is an activity in which total gains and total losses are equal, whereas a 'non-zero-sum' Game is one in which they are unequal. As Smith conceives it, Capitalism is a non-zero-sum Game, because it entails the possibility of each participant profiting. In contrast, Marx's critique of Capitalism begins with the premise that profit is not spontaneously generated, but is derived from someplace, which he traces to the difference between wages paid to labor, and the added value to a product that is the precise equivalent of the labor-energy expended on its refinement and manufacture. Hence, for Marx, Economics is a zero-sum Game. Ironically, the Physics theories underpinning the two systems are just the opposite--the Newtonian Physics in the background of Capitalism, with its Principle that the total energy of a System is constant, is zero-sum, while Marxian Dialectics is a Principle of emergent growth. In any case, the ongoing contemporary conflict between Capitalism and Marxism rarely seems to be expressed in terms of zero- vs. non-zero-sum debate. Empirical evidence as to which of the latter is a more accurate characterization of Economic activity is, at best, inconclusive. Capitalist Economies stagnate, while Socialist ones grow. While the American Economy of the 1990s was plainly growing, it is difficult to distinguish between real growth, due to Digital innovation, and 'growth' merely on paper, i. e. profits from loan interest. In Evolvementalism, both maintainance at a constant level and expansion are degrees of Evolvement, hence, both zero-sum and non-zero-sum, respectively, phases are possible. More significantly, perhaps in contrast to both Capitalism and Marxism, Evolvementalism does not regard Economics as autonomous sphere, rather, it regards Economic activity as no more than a quantification of certain aspects of collective activity in general. Hence, whether or not Economics is or is not zero-sum, is a expression of the more general Evolvemental condition of a society.

Cartesian Evolvement

Because his 'I think, therefore I am' notion initiated a trend in which concrete thinking, and no longer an abstract Universal such as God or a Platonic Form, is the measure of Philosophizing, Descartes is often considered the 'Father of Modern Philosophy'. Given that traceable to that Principle are the more general modern trends of Secularism, Humanism, and Subjectivism, he could also be considered the 'Father of Modern Civilization', which would not be honorific coming from those who regard those trends as decadent. But any characterization, even Heidegger's, of Descartes as 'Subjectivistic' is hasty if it ignores his other profound contribution to modern civilization--the 'Cartesian Plane'. This Descartes initially intended to illustrate the Arithmetization of Geometry, which went on to facilitate the quantification of Physics that is the basis of all modern Science, and which is, more commonly, the forerunner of every graph. Not only would admirers and critics alike be hard-pressed to classify this innovation of his as 'Subjectivistic', this aspect of Cartesiansim suggests an alternative interpretation of his theory of Selfhood. The fact that the significance to him of the 'I think' is its indubitability shows that its importance lies not in its Subjectivism, but in its Objectivity, i. e. no matter how hard he tries, and regardless of what he wishes, he cannot doubt the existence of 'I think'. Regardless of what trends followed Descartes, the result of his analysis is more accurately a self-Objectivization, which in Evolvementalism, is the beginning of Individuality.

Prisoner's Dilemma

'Game Theory' studies decision strategy in determining an optimal course of action in situations involving multiple participants and multiple variable factors. The best-known Game Theory model is the 'Prisoner's Dilemma'. The scenario of the basic version of the model is--two associates are arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime, placed in separate cells, and each is told that: if only one of them is ratted out by the other, the sentence will be 10 years imprisonment; if both are ratted out, then they will each receive 5 years; and, if both remain silent, then they will both go free. What most interests Game Theory analysts is that acting on the basis of Self-Interest will likely result in 5-year sentence for each, because each will choose the optimal course of action in their power, namely to rat out the other. In other words, the Principle of Self-Interest is self-defeating in the context, because it cannot accommodate the one option, namely proceeding on the basis of mutual trust, that would in fact yield the optimal Self-Interested outcome. Or, as Evolvementalism puts it, collective interest is an enhancement, not an exclusion, of Individual Interest. And, more generally, Game Theory demonstrates how Wisdom is a function of breadth of perspective.

Education Reform

For Aristotle, the purpose of Education is to cultivate good citizenship. If such a notion seems anachronistic today, it may only be because the de facto character of being a 'good American' is not usually made explicitly honest. A telling familiar expression on the topic is 'a productive member of society', which is a clue that 'good citizenship' is defined in Economic terms, which, in turn, sheds light on the real role of Education in this society. For most, Education is a means to a career, and, for most of those who are slow to learn that, the first educational-loan repayment installment is usually an effective remedial lesson. What the U. S. Education System, both lower and higher, impresses on a student, without having to make it explicit, and, therefore, that much more effectively so, is the ethos of Economic 'Individualism', namely the Principle of Economic Self-Interest. Now, as has been previously discussed, such 'Individualism' does not express the literal meaning of the term, 'undivided', but expresses what would be more accurately characterized as 'Reactive Particularism', namely, a definition of what something is strictly in terms of a sort that it is not, e. g. being 'not part of the crowd'. And, as has been previously discussed, Reactive Particularity is an under-Evolved form of true Individuality, an adolescent version of an adult. It is the latter, becoming an Individual, and an Evolving Individual, that is the purpose of Evolvemental Education. But insofar as Education is a function of the prevailing ethos of 'good citizenship', Education reform is futile without a reform of the latter. In other words, until U. S. society Evolves by e. g. making voting mandatory, thereby reforming the ethos of Economic Self-Interest, Education, regardless of what is substantively taught in a classroom, will remain an investment in a career.

Rousseau and Nietzsche

There is an underappreciated parallel in the developments of Rousseau and Nietzsche. For both, an ecstatic Festival experience was the foundation of a theory of human nature. In the earlier phase of their subsequent careers, both produced a devastating and influential indictment of prevailing decadence. And, both eventually offered a constructive alternative. One difference that emerges in the latter phase is that Rousseau's Principle, the Social Contract, is Egalitarian, while Nietzsche's, the Will to Power, is not. But, on the one hand, Rousseau's Egalitarianism is derived from his formative ecstatic experience. On the other, while Nietzsche's is generally thought to be likewise, i. e. that Will to Power is a manifestation of Dionysus, the genealogy does not support such an interpretation. For, according to Nietzsche himself, the Dionysian Festival is an eradication of all Particularity, which amounts to an egalitarianism amongst the revellers. Hence, the Inegalitariansim of his Will to Power derives from a subsequent Principle, probably the Apollinian. In a Phronetocracy, there is no intrinsic contradiction between its Egalitarianism, and the possibility of a distinction between leaders and followers. But, as is the case in the formation of the views of both Rousseau and Nietzsche, Egalitarianism is primary.

Conditional Propositions

Two main premises of Analytical Logic are, first, that every well-formed Proposition is either True or False, and not both; and, second that the Truth-Value , i. e. True or False, of a compound Proposition is a function of the Truth-Values of its constituent Propositions. One continued irritant to Analytical Logicians is the problem of the Valuation of Conditional Propositions, i. e. 'If A, then B'. For, for example, 'If John resides in Boston, then John resides in Massachusetts' is True according to Analytical Logic, and to the layman seems to involve cogent reasoning. But that Truth does not depend on the Truth-Value of its constituent Propositions, i. e. the reasoning still seems cogent even if John is in fact a resident of Worcester MA, in which case 'John resides in Boston' is False, and 'John resides in Massachusetts' is True; or even if John actually resides in Hartford CT, making both the antecedent and the consequent False. The effort to resolve this problem has become a cottage industry in Analytic Philosophy, and the general aversion to jettisoning those two main premises of the Logic excludes the suggestion that in Conditional Propositions, the constituents are neither True nor False. For, as Husserl might put it, the 'If' suspends the Actuality of the Proposition, meaning that it suspends any question of correspondance between the suspended Propositions and the actual world. Now, within the suspension, 'True' could denote a coherence between the Propositions, e. g. Boston is in Massachusetts, but the coherence notion of 'Truth' is at odds with the correspondance notion of 'Truth' that determines whether e. g. 'John resides in Boston' is True. But, even if Analytical Logic were to rely on a hybrid notion of Truth, internal coherence does not restore Truth-Value to each of the suspended constituent Propositions. Evolvemental Logic regards the problem as irresolvable, because it regards Conditional Propositions as fundamentally practical, in which case they do not refer to Actuality, and, so, not merely do they have no Truth-Value, in the correspondance sense of the term, but the very question of Truth, in this sense, is inapplicable them. Analytic Logic's appropriation of Conditionality suppresses, but does eliminate, this inapplicability.

Political Representation and Proportionality

The Phronetocratic unit is a Polity of maximum Complexity, i. e. a leadership of a maximum number of followers. When a Polity becomes too numerically diverse for effective unification, Representation must be implemented. While what that maximum might be is circumstantial, a necessary condition of a sustainable Representative Phronetocracy is proportionality. A Representative Democracy must preserve the Principle of One Citizen-One Vote, which it can only accomplish by uniform proportionality of Representation, i. e. via sub-Polities of equal population, and of equal power within a Polity, which is nothing more than their unifier. Now, measuring the proportionality of U. S. Representativity is difficult, because it is so labyrinthine--a typical citizen is part of a municipality, a district, a county, a state, and the nation, entities that are often incommensurate with each other. But one glaring disproportionality in the system, one that is occasionally a target of criticism, is the equality of the number of U. S. Senators in a state, regardless of how populous the state might be. Hence, a citizen of a less populous state has a greater voice in the U. S. Senate than does a resident of one that is more densely populated. And, since how many Electoral College votes a state has is a function of how many U. S. Senators it has, a Presidential vote of the former likewise carries greater weight than that of the latter. Hence, the U. S. would Evolve by eliminating the Electoral College, and by at least considering that the Principle of 'States' Rights' may no longer be as effective a protector of Individual Rights as it was originally intended.

The Economy

A main topic of popular discussion these days is 'The Economy', usually specifically regarding its 'bad' shape. This kind of talk suggests that first, there is a unitary phenomenon corresponding to the term 'The Economy', and second, that the judgement of 'badness' is the product of a methodical evaluative procedure based on unequivocal criteria. But what this 'The Economy' is is not made in the least bit clear by these discussions of it. It is said to have its 'leading indicators', such as Unemployment rates, the Dow Jones Average, the National Deficit, Interest Rates, the Exchange Value of the Dollar, the Rate of Inflation, Sales of Homes, etc., each of which have their own evaluative criteria, but what unifies them is unclear. Some Economists seem to have mathematical formulae that homogenize all these data, but, again, if these equations are more than quantificational abstractions, they would have some unambiguous referent. In Formaterialism, every entity, every event, is a System, and the soundness of a System is measured by its degree of Evolvement, i. e. its rate of growth, with a minimum degree being mere maintainance. So, according to Formaterialism, the lack of any definitive phenomenon answering to the term 'The Economy' means that no such System actually exists, which might go a long way to explaining why 'it' seems to be in such 'bad' shape. That while 'The Economy' is said to have been 'growing' in the 90s, a significant portion of the American citizenry was not benefitting from the trend, only underscores its fictitiousness.

Atomism and Adamism

Though 'atom' and 'Adam' are only coincidentally homophonic, Analytic Philosophy, and its Logic, is both Atomistic and, in a sense, 'Adamistic'. Its Atomism is rooted in Aristotelian Metaphysics which has, as the ultimate constituents of Reality, individual Substances. It is 'Adamistic', because, as was the case with Adam in Genesis, Language begins with the naming of individual creatures. Language is henceforth constructed out of such Atoms--the names of individual items combining with the names of predicates, to form Propositions, and Propositions combining with other Propositions to produce a 'World'. Both Atomism and Adamism have been widely criticized for a variety of reasons, and some specific problems with its central combinatory process, Inference, have previously been addressed here. Many have argued against its Metaphysical premises, maintaining instead that, e. g. Events are more fundamental than static Substances, or, as in Evolvementalism, that Individual Humans are cumulative processes, entailing nothing constant to which a fixed name corresponds. Others have argued against the Epistemological premise that cognition of an item occurs in isolation, e. g. Gestaltism, which shows how the perception of an item always entails a background of at least other items in its proximity. Likewise, some Philosophies of Language have noted that the objects of childhood naming are not things but situations. And others, e. g. Structuralism, insist that names, and particular words in general, are empty sounds or scrawls without reference to every other word in a language. Especially because it presents its versions of 'Philosophy' and 'Logic' as exclusive, the predominant school of Academic Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy, is that much more impoverished.

Economics and Ecology

Typical discourse concerning current events would seem to suggest that 'Economics' and 'Ecology' are two spheres of human activity that intrinsically are potentially in conflict with each other. For example, 'Ecological' concerns, such as air pollution, are often presented as contrary to 'Economic' issues, such as profits and employment. If there is an intrinsic conflict, its nature is not apparent from the two terms themselves, which are as etymologically similar as they seem--'household management' vs. 'the study of households'. A better clue as to their differences might come from the association of 'Ecology' with the 'Environment'. But, the natural resources that are industrially extracted and refined are just as much a part of the 'Environment' as are the waste products of those processes. In fact, one meaning of the term 'waste' suggests at least an intersection of Economic and Ecological concerns, namely the squandering of natural resources. However, the other main property of waste, consequential toxicity, does seem to be at the heart of the conflict. But, the use rubric 'Economic' in these debates obscures the real conflict by glossing over its almost exlusive reference to the private sector alone. In other words, the Economics vs. Ecology conflict is primarily one of private sector profits vs. public health concerns, regarding the consequences of toxic waste produced by the processes of the former. Furthermore, the indifference to the Environmental effects of for-profit enterprises is also rooted in Spiritualist doctrines that conceive Humanity as ultimately immune to the physical world into which they are 'incarnated'. Evolvementalism rejects such Spiritualisms, and deems the private sector indifference to the public sector as under-Evolved. For it, rather, Economics and Ecology are no more in conflict than are inhalation and exhalation.

Derrida and Rousseau

The best-known features of Rousseau's Political Philosophy are the idea that society is a corruption of the 'state of Nature', and his promotion of Government based on a 'social contract'. Given that the former seems to imply an advocacy of Anarchism, the two are easily taken as contradictory. However, the first is representative of the earlier, deconstructive, phase of his thinking, while the latter, his later, constructive, offerings. Thus, conspicuously absent from Derrida's own deconstructive study of Rousseau, which successfully targets the Atomistic premises of the latter's phonological Naturalism, is its relevance to Rousseau's later phase, and, hence, more generally, is any constructive dimension of his own efforts. So, contrary to Derrida's reputation as being in the vanguard of contemporary thinkers, he is actually a reactionary, albeit an unorthodox one. For, among the central Philosophical developments of the past half-millenium is Kant's redefinition of Humanity as 'Homo Faber', from 'Homo Sapiens', i. e.representing the asendancy of Practice over Theory. And, while Pragmatists, Marx, and the later Nietzsche were drawing out the implications of this Kantian turn, Phenomenologists, both Hegelian and Husserlian, as well as those trying to escape the shadow of the latter, notably the later Heidegger, the earlier Sartre, Levinas, and Derrida, fall short of making that turn. In contrast with Derrida, his peer Philosopher of Difference, Deleuze, understands that original Difference is a Principle of 'Becoming-Active'. Hence, unlike in Evolvementalism, with its active Principles of Difference, i. e. Becoming-Diverse, and its Individual mode, Expostion, Derrida's 'Differance' does not seem to make much of a constructive difference.

The Logic of Greater and Lesser

Whether or not it is the essence of Philosophy, Logic is at least extremely important to it. For, the Wisdom, of whatever sort, that Philosophy seeks, is presumed to apply most generally, and, hence, is expressible as a Principle, i. e. in 'Universal' terms, e. g. "All Reality is such-and-such", "All Humans must do such-and-such", etc. And, the evaluating of Principles centers on their applicability to Particular cases, e. g. "All men are Romans" fails as a Principle, since Socrates is Greek. So, since the heart of Logic has generally been the Universal-Particular relation, or vice versa, Philosophy seems unthinkable without it. Therefore, the adequacy of Logic has depended on the presumption that its scope is finitistic, namely, is between closed totalities and irreducible atoms, a presumption to which Science no longer subscribes. Furthermore, the Universal-Particular relation is not even itself most fundamental. Rather, it is a special case of the Greater-Lesser relation, which is the essence of all relations of inclusion, that is, the essence of all Logical relations. Evolvemental Logic--the characterization of the movement between lesser and greater Complexity--is based on this perhaps more modest, but more essential scope, and, so, presumes to be more adequate to 'Reality' than traditional Logics. Likewise, by its own Logic, it does not presume itself to be the final word on the topic.

Patriotism

Patriotism is widely, perhaps universally, recognized as a civic Virtue. However, the term has three different meanings, only one of which has Phronetic worth. The first, which could be called 'Populist', refers to an intersection, if not union, of interests of the inhabitants of the same geographical region. The second, 'Totalitarian' refers to the priority, in principle, of the interest of the regional collective, as a unit, over that of any participant. And, in the third, 'Martial', the benefit of the regional collective entails the detriment of some other regional collective. In the latter, a citizen is treated as a Particular, i. e. as a member of the home polity, and as not a member of some foreign one. In Totalitarian Patriotism, personal difference is completely suppressed. So, it is only in the Populist variety that participants are treated as Individuals, such that Patriotism is an enhancement of each's Individuality. Hence, it is only in this case that Patriotic activity is an occasion of Individual Evolvement. Of course, what is probably the commonest use of 'Patriotism', namely, as empty rhetoric, insults the intelligence of an Individual, and, has no Phronetic worth.

Political Philosophy and Humpty Dumptyism

Complicating debates in Political Philosophy over the status of the 'state of Nature' is equivocation. In some cases, 'Nature' is synonymous with 'Physical World', and, hence, 'Natural' is contrasted with 'Metaphysical'. In others, it denotes a condition of original Innocence, and, hence, 'Natural' is contrasted with 'Artificial'. In the latter case, 'Artificial' has a derogatory connotation, but, in the former, it can be ameliorative. So, for example, in Kantianism, 'Natural' is of the first type, to which the artifice of Politics is an imperfect corrective. But, in Rousseauism, 'Natural' is of the second type, so the artifice of Politics is corruptive. Common to the two types is the Humpty Dumpty pre-Fall vs. Fallen paradigm, with the state of Nature as Fallen in the first case, and pre-Fallen in the second. In contrast, Theories that do not implicate 'Nature' in Humpty Dumptyism--Aristotelianism, Evolvementalism, possibly Spinozism--have less trouble defending the constructive role of Political activity in Human development. More generally, these considerations further expose the inadequacy ofTheorizing that abstracts the Political sphere from more comprehensive Philosophical, i. e. Systematic, concerns.

Possible Worlds

The notion 'Possible World' came to Philosophical prominence with Leibniz' assertion 'This is the best of all possible worlds', famously ridiculed by Voltaire. For Leibniz, it is a Theological concept, referring to the capacity of God's Intellect to consider alternatives before deciding, on the basis of 'Bestness', which World to create. In contemporary Philosophy, the term is most prominent in a branch of Analytic Logic, Modal Logic, which shares few of Leibniz' concerns. Even though Modal Logic is typically presented as a Theory of 'Possible Worlds', its main objective is to define Analytic Logic's useful operator Necessity, which it ultimately equates to the classic Logical quantificational notion Universality, i. e. 'in all cases'. Possibility is, correspondingly quantificational Particularity, i. e. 'in some cases', whereas a 'World' is simply a set of entities. 'Bestness', unless it is implicitly defined as 'Necessity', is of no concern to this Modal Logic, and, that in the latter, the Actual World also qualifies as a Possible World, even trivializes the very concept of 'Modality'. In Evolvementalism, Actuality is what has become the case, Possibility is an option that could become the case, whereas Necessity applies only to some features within Actuality. In other words, what distinquishes Possibility from mere compresent alternality is its deliberative context, just as it was for Leibniz.

Political Philosophy and the State of Nature

A crucial element in most Political Philosophies has been the concept of 'Nature'. For Plato and Aristotle, Aristocracy is a fulfillment of Nature. For Hobbes, Nature is a condition of universal belligerence to which Political organization is an arbitrary artificial construct that serves as a corrective. For Rousseau, Nature is a state of original Goodness that had been corrupted by Political artifice. While Kant agrees with Hobbes that Nature is disharmonious, his solution, Rational organization, is an artifice based on Ideality. For Marx, the 'state of Nature' is a piece of fiction, so Political structure is a product of only the Dialectic of Economic History. Hence, the value of artifice in a Political Philosophy is a function of the value that it accords Nature. In Evolvementalism, artifice is no more 'unnatural' than the building of a house, so for it, deliberate Political construction is an artifice that is part of Human Nature, i. e. a 'Natural' extension of it. And, any critique of 'Artificiality' by a Political Philosophy should begin by considering whether or not it itself is artificial.

Analytic Logic

The focus of Analytical Logic, the most prevalent type of contemporary Academic Logic, is 'Valid Inference'. An 'Inference' is a transition from one or more assertions to another one, and a 'Valid' Inference is one that is 'Truth-preserving', namely one in which given the Truth of the initial assertions, the subsequent one cannot be False. Unlike in its ancestor, Aristotelian Deductive Logic, the nature of Valid Inference is vague in Analytic Logic. Aristotle's Deductive process reflects, as Dewey has shown, the pattern of connections described by his scientific classficatory technique, which captures the Genus-Species relation in Nature, i. e. a container-contained relation. Hence, Valid Inference for Aristotle is an accurate description, and, accordingly, Invalid Inference imagines a connection that does not obtain in actuality. But with the rise of Modern Science, with its shift in focus from the Genus-Species relation to Cause-and-Effect, on the bases of the innovations of Bacon, and the debunking by Hume, Inductive Logic emerged as best capturing the patterns of Scientific description. Thus, despite the admirable efforts of the likes of Russell, the relevance of Deductive Logic has dwindled over the centuries, to the extent that Analytic Logic often seems little more than a game of symbol-manipulation referring to nothing other than itself. For example, in it, a False assertion followed by a False assertion qualifies as a Valid Inference, which it attempts to justify by reference to 'possible worlds'. Now, the process of adding a True assertion to pre-given True assertion is an Evolvement. But if Analytic Logic is to recognize itself as a special case of Evolvemental Logic, it will have to begin by examining its own premises.

Evolvemental Logic

While Logic is regarded by some as the essence of Philosophy, the term has hardly been univocal. It might be defined generally as 'the study of Consequence', namely of the following of something from some given condition or conditions. The primary disagreement in Logic concerns whether it inheres in Existence, or it is an interpretation of Existence. Hybrid positions include the view that Logical Interpretation mirrors Existential Logic, and the thesis that Interpretation is itself Existential, namely, an Objective process incarnating in a Subject. The main types of Logic are Deductive, Inductive, and Dialectical. In Deductive Logic, Particularity follows from Universality; in Inductive Logic, Universality from Particularity; and, in Dialectical Logic, a Universal follows from contradictory Particulars. Standard contemporary Academic 'Logic' courses are a type of Deductive Logic that might be called 'Analytic'. Deductive Logic, at its Aristotelian inception, was Interpretation mirroring Existence. Analytic Logic is Interpretative, but uncertain as to its Existential presuppositions. Inductive Logic is non-Existentially Interpretive. Dialectical Logic, notably Hegelian and Marxist, including Interpretive processes, is Existential. Traditional Existential Logic has been Deterministic, because a Consequence inherently following would seem to preclude Freedom. Now, Evolvemental Logic, entailing the increase in Complexity from given conditions, is pervasively Existential, e. g. both in the general organic sphere, i. e.. the combination of mutation and re-integration, and intra-Individualistically, i. e. the combination of Exposition and Propriation. However, it is not Deterministic, because it entails indefiniteness, in its Becoming-Diverse component, e. g. doubling, tripling, etc. are all possible degrees of quantitative Diversification. It is this Indeterminacy that the Individual experiences as 'freedom of choice'.

Supject, Predicate, and Evolvement

A Theory of Language is typically divided into studies of Semantics and of Syntax. The former is concerned with Meaning, while the latter, more commonly known as Grammar, proposes structural rules for sentence formation. But Syntax is never completely removed from the problem of Meaningfulness, as can be seen in the Systematic commitments of the basic Subject-Predicate formation. For Aristotle, that ordering reflects the Substance-Attribute structure of all entities, while for Kant, it conforms to the Permanent-Temporary construction of Proposotional Knowledge. In contrast, Nietzsche and Bergson, for example, argue that such Syntax falsifies the world that Language tries to describe, as, e. g. 'Lightning strikes' artificially divides a unitary process into a subsisting Subject and something that it momentarily does. Evolvementalism agrees with Aristotle and Kant that regarding Individuals, the Subject precedes the Predicate. However, it agrees with Nietzsche and Bergson that a transition occurs in the event described. In 'John runs', 'John' refers to an Individual, and 'runs', to an Action of his. But this Action transforms the initial 'John' to one who is identical, except with the additional experience as now part of him. So, traditional Syntax is not adequate to Evolvemental processes.

Language, Body, and Soul

A Theory of Language typically takes its point of departure by distinguishing between the physicality. e. g. sound or scrawl, and the Meaning, of a linguistic Sign. Usually, this distinction is conceived in terms of the Body vs. Soul contrast, with the latter as the essential aspect of a Sign, and the former, inessential. In the Formaterial Individual, the fundamental pair are the processes of Externalization and Internalization. In the sphere of Language activity, the primary locus of the interaction between Externalization and Internalization is Communication, i. e. speaking and listening, writing and reading, of which the 'interior monologue' is only a special case. Hence, any abstraction from the Communicative context, i. e. the study of Signs, Speech, Writing, Thinking, etc. is not merely a derivative or superficial Theory of Language, but one that misses its fundamental nature.

Spirit and Letter

A pair of opposing concepts receiving little attention from either orthodox or heterodox Philosophy of Language is 'Spirit' vs. 'Letter'. The contrast 'Spirit of the Law' vs. 'Letter of the Law' is familiar, but it does not seem to fall easily under the rubrics of either Sense vs. Reference, or Speech vs. Writing. For, a Law has no Referent, and Speech can violate its Spirit as much as can Writing. One example which exposes the contrast is the Golden Rule--'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you'. Read literally, this Principle endorses a belligerent person's, i. e. someone who wants others to pick a fight with them, efforts to pick a fight with others, which most would agree violates its Spirit. Kant's response is, rather than either bemoaning or cheering the insubordination of Letter to Spirit, to write a better Law, one that would more precisely capture the Spirit of the original--'Act only on that maxim that you can at the same time will to be a universal Law'. While the latter does not roll easily off of a tongue, even of one of the few who are conversant with it, it better expresses the Spirit of high-minded reciprocity than does the Golden Rule. Shortcomings in all laws are similarly treated--their Letter of a Law is a not necessarily conclusive Evolvement of its Spirit.

Derrida, Writing, and Evolvementalism

Plato initiated a long tradition which has held that Speech is a copy of Thought, and Writing is a copy of Speech. This hierarchy has been provocatively challenged in recent decades by Derrida, who not merely demonstrates that Thought and Speech are inconceivable without Writing, but also suggests that they are both modes of Writing. Despite his being better received in the areas of Literary Criticism and Cultural Studies, his studies offer important contributions to topics in traditional Philosophy. His analysis of the Grammatological nature of Thought reinforces Wittgenstein's rejection of the possibility of a Private Language, and undermines atomistic theories of Consciousness and Self, thus continuing Heidegger's critique of the subjectivistic 'History of Western Metaphysics'. His notion 'Differance' complements Deleuze's challenge to the traditional priority of Identity over Difference. Formaterialism is a further attempt at the latter, and, so, it also appreciates the subversion of the traditional priority of Mind/Soul/Spirit over Body, implied by the Thought-Speech-Writing hierarchy. However, it conceives of the latter as a progression in the process of Communication--a Thought is externalized as Speech, and then further externalized as Writing. In other words, with respect to Communication, they are Evolvementally related, with Writing potentially the most highly Evolved Action of the three. Also, despite the multi-facetedness of Derrida's innovative analyses of Writing, he seems to have missed its most obvious characteristic--that it functions as retention, i. e. Writing is a committing to Memory. So, his thesis that Consciousness is fundamentally Writing is hardly a divergence from a tradition that begins with Plato's theory that Thought is Recollection.

Ignoble Lie

The split between Philosophy and Political Science has put blinders not only on the former, but on the latter, as well. For example, in the past century, a school of Political Science, primarily inspired by Leo Strauss, has cast Plato as Machiavellian. At the center of this interpretation is, seemingly, the notion of a 'noble lie', a recourse to myth to persuade citizens to do something beneficial to them, because they lack the intellectual capacity to understand that beneficiality. Despite the fact that in the Republic, Socrates, at most, only briefly entertains, without outright advocacy, in a specific context, its possible value, Straussian Allan Bloom's interpretation of Plato's Poltical Philosophy turns on the premise that the entire Republic is a 'noble lie'. Perhaps this self-styled 'Platonist' found the Republic's advocacy of the abolition of private property to be inconvenient, and perhaps the seeming Oligarchical and Plutocratic activities of Neo-Conservatives have been inspired by Bloom's Machiavellian placement of a lie as the fundamental premise of Political Philosophy. But any such interpretation of Plato does not begin to take into account the rest of his Philosophical System, with which his Political Theory is interrelated, a combination which reinforces the plausibility that the Republic is a sincere expression of Plato's views. The Philosophy-Political Science split is no doubt rooted in the priority of Theory over Practice accorded by Plato, a tradition which Phronetocratic Principles, and Formaterialism and Evolvementalism, in general, reject. Recent events suggest that the split has more than Academic implications.

The Evaluation of Rhetoric

Rhetoric is typically evaluated according to any, usually one, of three criteria--truthfulness, eloquence, and effectiveness. Because Truth pertains to what is already the case, while Rhetoric aims at what is not yet the case, truthfulness is an inadequate criterion. Hitler's murderous plans were no doubt eloquently expressed, so, nor is eloquence an adequate gauge. Likewise for effectiveness. A notion that entails all three is Comprehensiveness. The point of departure of Rhetorical Comprehensiveness is current conditions, which, the more fully accommodated, the more inclusive the audience will be. Likewise, the more expansive the aims of Rhetoric, the more robust will be its language, and, hence, the more inspirational and successful it will prove to be. In other words, the more Comprehensive Rhetoric is, the better it will motivate Individuals to follow it, i. e. the more Evolved it is.

Philosophy and Rhetoric

The current chasm in Academia between Philosophy and Political Science can only guarantee that Philosophy of Language will continue to lose sight of its original mission. The traditional tracing of the topic to Plato's Cratylus misses his more general treatment of it. His entire body of work stands as a challenge to Rhetoric, i. e. Speech that aims to persuade. Rhetoric is essentially monological, the limitations of which are exposed by Plato's confronting Rhetoricians with the master dialogician, Socrates. It is debatable whether or not these dialogues arrive at conclusive Truth, but it is less arguable that Rhetoricians are out of their depth in them. Contemporary Philosophy of Language, with its micro-analyses for the most part completely oblivious to the Political role of Speech, has lost sight of Philosophy's advocacy of Truth in the public arena. It is thus inadequate to the distinction between Rhetoric, which falls short of respecting the Individuality of others, and, e. g. Dialogue and Pedagogy, which are more Evolved Speech, both personally and Politically.

Insurance Policy

The topic of the primary current political debate in the United States is usually referred to as 'Health-Care Reform', which is a response to a problem usually described as 'The Broken Health-Care System'. This framing of the debate is misleading, and obscures the deeper conflicts at issue. First, what is actually being debated is not 'Health-Care', but Health-Insurance. Second, there currently is no general Health-Insurance 'system' in place, which means that whatever passes would the creation of a system, not a reform of a broken one. Hence, the debate is ultimately between two sets of interests--citizens who have no or limited insurance, and insurance companies that would stand to suffer financially from the implementation of a national system. A word the use of which epitomizes the deeper Principles involved is 'policy', which derives from the Greek for 'public government'. So, the phrase 'insurance policy' is ambiguous--both Plutocratic and Democratic. That a public agenda is dictated by private financial interest is Plutocratic, while that the terms of an insurance contract is subject to governmental oversight is Democratic. At the most fundamental level, what is at issue is whether the health of each is the concern of each, or is the concern of all. Evolvementalism regards the latter as the more highly Evolved of the two, and hence, more highly Evolved than any compromise between the two. However, the Principle 'Evolve as much as possible' is with respect to given conditions. So, the implementation of any American public Health-Insurance system would constitute an Evolvemental step.

Free Speech

In the United States, all public Speech, other than that which is harmful, is equal before the Law. But, not all such speech is equally Evolved. No doubt the framers of the Constitution were seeking to protect specifically the kind of dissident expression that is today still politically repressed in half the world. Part of Mill's defense of Free Speech is that even contrary opinions are beneficial to the whole, since they can spur a prevailing agenda to greater comprehensiveness. However, not all protected Speech is so civic-minded. Some of it is mere emotional venting, and some of it is partisan baiting or posturing. A lot of it is a self-interested demand. More infrequently, what is expressed is an opinion as to what might be collectively beneficial, one that respects principles of intellectual integrity. Now, while the Law does not distinguish between these various types of public Speech, they are Evolvementally unequal--only the last type is worthy of a Phronetocracy. By dignifying the other types, the U. S. Constitution promotes a complacency that is hindering the Evolvement of America into the Participatory Democracy that is presumably its primary Principle.

Expression

'Expression' is a term that is occasionally misleadingly used in descriptions of language. It will sometimes apply to any word or sequence of words. A more accurate definition would be: 'an expressive word or sequence or words'. That is, a word or sequence of words that has not been explicitly put forth in order to convey something or other does not qualify as an 'Expression'. In other words, a linguistic Expression only appears in a communicative context, and, hence, entails an Expresser, just as does any non-linguistic Expression, e. g. a smile, which entails someone who smiles in order to communicate a happy mood to someone else. Expression is thus an externalization of e. g. some information, something wanted to take place, a feeling, etc. and, hence, is a species of Exposition. Exposition is one of the components of Conduct, and, hence, is subject to Phronetic evaluation. The casual use of the term 'Expression', just like all depersonalized treatments of Language, abstract from a fundamental Phronetic context.

Language Games

A regular focal point of Philosophies of Language has been the relation between 'Sense' and 'Reference'. The Reference of a term is some object, while its Sense is an internal connotation. In the classic example, The Morning Star and the Evening Star have the same Reference, because they both point to the same object. But they have different Senses, i. e. that one appears in the morning, the other in the evening. The difference between Sense and Reference is brought out by the expression "The Morning Star = The Evening Star", because asserting that the Referent is the same as itself is trivial, whereas revealing the commonality behind the two Senses is informative. So, many of the debates in Philosophy of Language concern whether or not the Meaning of a term is its Sense or its Reference. Now, the limitations of this framing of Philosophy of Language is born out by an expression such as 'Take one step forward', which, plainly has no Reference, and, thus, which demonstrates that Language is more than merely descriptive. The later Wittgenstein is usually credited with recognizing this limitation, which he attempts to correct by broadening the scope of Language under the rubric 'Language Games'. Despite the subsequent influence of his innovation, the credit is misplaced, because Peirce broke down those methodological barriers a good fifty years before Wittgenstein's efforts, and they are implicit in Kant's Practical turn. Of especial concern to Evolvementalism is how the notion of 'Language Games' glosses over the distinction between what might be called retrospective Language, e. g. descriptions, and prospective Language, e. g. imperatives and interrogatives. In the Formaterial scheme, retrospection is Temporal, and prospection is Spatial, so, because Formaterialism insists on the incommensurability of Time and Space, it rejects Wittgenstein's homogenizing of e. g. descriptions and imperatives. That is not to say that they do not combine in Formaterialism, but, rather, their combination, which is ingredient in all Language acts, is potentially Evolvemental, which means that even the Wittgensteinian innovation misses the Phronetic and Political significance of Language.

Philosophy of Language and Evolvement

Probably the most predominant Philosophical topic of the past century is Language, with the nature of Meaning as its central problem, i. e. how a manifold of sounds and scrawls can have significance beyond themselves. At one pole of the spectrum of responses is that Meaning is derived from how these manifolds are structured, because these structures are universal, and, hence, are comprehensible by anybody. On this view, Meaning is a property of Language in itself, just as it is in Mathematics. At the other end, Meaning is a function of context, and, hence, an expression of the commonality of interests of the participants in those contexts. On this view, Language is no more than arbitrary signs, just as it is in Morse Code. Corresponding to these two theories of Meaning are two main criteria of Understanding. One is a clear and distinct private cognition of the universal features of a word, sentence, or group of sentences. The other is a fulfilling behavior sequence. For Evolvementalism, Language and Meaning are features of Communication, which entails that they are fundamentally context-bound. But, Communication can also be more or less articulated, which is a degree of refinement of the Language involved. Articulation is a structural diversification of Language, and, hence, a diversification of the Communicative context. Communication is thus an Evolvement, to a lesser or greater degree, of its participants, in which Meaning is an objectification in the Language involved of that degree of Evolvement.

Existentialism and Evolvementalism

In common parlance, 'Existentialist' usually has connotations of 'meaninglessness' and despairing', which are misleading indicators of what the Philosophical version of the term refers to. 'Existentialism' typically describes a group of Philosophers, most prominently Nietzsche, Kierkergaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre, whose affiliation seems so loose that a common Principle is difficult to discern. Indeed, Heidegger and Sartre are more overtly bound by their allegiances to Husserlian Phenomenological methodology. But, even though there is no single Principle that they all explicitly espouse, one that has been used to characterize their works is 'Existence precedes Essence'. In the terminology of these pages, 'Existence' is 'Individuality', and 'Essence' is 'Particularity', so that what each of the Existentialists presents is a theory of the internal structure of Individuality, which contrasts with the traditional definition of a Person as a Particular of a given sort, e. g. 'Rational Animal'. The alleged 'meaninglessness' of Existentialism is telling in its partial accuracy--that Existence has no pre-given Meaning frees Individuals to create it, and what 'despair' attaches to is the failure to grasp the liberating possibility involved. Evolvementalism disputes that Existence 'precedes' Essence, since it holds that Particularity is developmentally anterior to Individuality. It also appreciates the later work of Sartre, which methodically demonstrates, contrary to conventional American 'wisdom', that not merely are Individuality and Socialism not antithetical to one another, but that the latter, not Capitalism, is the collective organization that best accommodates the former. Amongst the Existentialists, Sartre best supports the Evolvemental thesis that Individuality entails involvement in a collective.

Eternal Recurrence and Evolvement

Few self-styled 'Nietzscheans' have reckoned with one of his central thoughts, 'Eternal Recurrence', and many of those who have classify it as a topic in the Philosophy of Time. They thus miss its lineage from Schopenhauer's Naturalistic challenge to Hegelian Spiritualism, i. e. regarding the privileged status in Nature that the latter accords Humanity, and, so, they miss how Eternal Recurrence serves as correction to the nihilistic Pessimism that Schopenhauerism can breed. For Nietzsche, the thinking of Eternal Recurrence is high noon, the incipience of self-creation through self-affirmation, the moment when the God of Formlessness, Dionysus, looks in the mirror, in which Apollo, the God of Form, appears. It is, thus, far from happenstance that Nietzsche hencforth devoted himself with developing his theory of Will to Power, a Form-creating force. While Evolvementalism rejects the implication that the Formal Principle is derivative, and that Eternal Recurrence is the soundest theory of Temporality, it recognizes in Nietzsche's thinking of Eternal Recurrence an emergence of an Individual, and of the potential for Humans to make History, not merely to suffer it, be it Natural or Spiritual.

Philosophy of History and Evolvementalism

While History offers a narrative of events, a Philosophy of History presents a theory of the grounds and structure of any such narrative. There have been three main theories of Historical structure--ascent, descent, and circular, and for millennia their contents were cosmic or natural events. The emergence of the Philosophy of specifically Human History began with the work of Vico, a circular theory, and Kant soon proposed a teleological, perhaps Messianic, scheme of the development of Humanity. For Hegel, the appearance, in History, of a Philosophy of History is a moment of self-awareness that signals that History is the Dialectical ascent of Rational Spirit. Marx appropriates Dialecticism, but rejects Spiritualism, positing Materialism as the motor of Human History, with the conflict of Economic Classes as the Dialectical forces, and with the dawning of Class Consciousness as the pivotal moment. Marx thus inherits a theory of History that, despite his Materialistic variation of it, remains of an exclusively Human History. In contrast, the other main 19th-Century Philosophy of History, Evolutionary Theory, is of Natural events, in which Human History is merely a special case. In contrast with both, Evolvementalism entails a Philosophy of Natural History, in which Human History is unique phase, the main theme of which is the emergence of the Individual, in which the awareness of one's Particularity qua Particularity is a transformative moment.

Menial Labor

Political Philosophies tend to be the products of abstract inspirational Beauty, which might be why they have traditionally slighted one perennial social problem, namely, how menial labor is to be performed. Hence, Aristotelian Aristocracy is impossible without slavery, the lower classes of Theocracies and Monarchies reflect either a 'divine' will, or a 'natural' ordering, and in Capitalism, the 'losers', as determined by the 'Invisible Hand of the Market', usually have little choice but to accept drudgery in exchange for subsistence. Perhaps, automation will one day solve the problem, but in the meantime Marxism tackles one aspect of it head on, namely, by attempting to eliminate the meniality from menial labor. Marx' psychological thesis is that labor becomes menial only when performed for someone else, that e. g. cleaning up after oneself is, except among the lazy, never construed as burdensome. So, one of the aims of Socialism is to transform the nature of labor by having all tasks concern the self-interest of each, i. e. as pertaining to something they themselves own. A complement to that notion is a system of a rotation of chores, as is often in effect in many cooperative enterprises, a step in the direction of which might be a mandatory 'National Service', currently being entertained by some American politicians. Along with mandatory voting, the latter would be an Evolvemental developmental in American public life.

Dimensions of Marxism

Marxism combines three main theses, one Moral, one Metaphysical, and one Historical. The first is that all Economic systems hitherto, up to and including Capitalism, are institutionalized stealing, from workers, by the entrepreneurial or ownership Class. The second is that all reality consists of Matter, so non-Material doctrines are myths that serve only to reinforce exploitative Economic relations. Finally, it holds that the primary governing Principle of human affairs is the inevitable Dialectical ascent of History to Socialism, which is the true Economic, Moral, and Metaphysical doctrine. Standard critiques of Marxism, that it is fundamentally an envy of wealth, and that it is 'Evil', fail to address its Moral and Metaphysical theses in an intellectually credible manner, while, on the other hand, the course of events, including the efforts of e. g. Stalin to force the issue, has damagingly refuted its Historical thesis. Evolvementalism agrees that much of Capitalism, especially Corporatism, is a hindrance to the growth of the Individual, but is uncertain that Socialism is the exclusive remedy. It also concurs, in general, with the Marxist diagnosis of the role of Spiritualism in the service of Economic and Political exploitation, but rejects its reductive Materialist Monism, especially given that it shares with traditional Spiritualisms and Dualisms the lack of a substantive definition of Matter, such as the one proposed by Formaterialism. Finally, it regards Dialecticism of any kind, Marxist, Hegelian, et al. as a special case of Evolvementalism, one in which the generation of an 'Antithesis' is a Diversification of precisely and uniquely a factor of 2. Likewise, Evolvementalism regards Class Conflict as only one of an infinite variety of possible social antagonisms that an Evolvemental episode can, but not necessarily will, sublate.

Abilities and Needs

One of Marxism's better-known Principles is 'From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs'. A Capitalist analogue can be articulated as 'Each will sow what they reap.' Evolvementalism rejects the latter on three main grounds. First, it disagrees with the implied Social Atomism, i. e. that the fate of each is independent of that of any other. Second, it holds that what is one's own best 'self-interest' is not what or how much one receives, but one's growth as an Individual. Finally, it disputes the priority expressed in the Principle--one reaps in order to sow at least as much as one sows in order to reap. More generally, Evolvementalism finds the entailed critique of Marxism, namely, that one has a Right to withold any of one's Inessential Property from someone whose full exercise of ability is still insufficient to meet their needs, as small-minded. On the other hand, the Marxist Principle is consistent with Evolvementalism to the extent that the fulfilment of need is a necessary condition of Individual Evolvement, and that the Evolvement of one potentially promotes the Evolvement of each and all.

Capitalism and Democracy

One of the great confusions in contemporary American life is the purported equivalence of Capitalism and Democracy. To begin with, one is an Economic system, the other a Political system. That Fascism is a form of Capitalism, and that a Democracy can be Socialist, proves that they are not identical. At its inception, as Smith explicitly conceived it, Capitalism was a great Democratizer, a leveller of Feudalism in its various manifestations, especially British Nobilism. But its non-coincidence with Democracy became evident within a few decades, as British Capitalistic Industrialism reverted to Feudal inequality. In contemporary America, it is difficult to appreciate, under the knee-jerk hysteria, that Marxism was initially devised as an exposure of the Democratic short-comings of Capitalism, an analysis that, regardless of that doctrine's own flaws, remains unconfronted by American Capitalist thought. Consequently, for example, the rebuilding of Iraq entails both an electoral process, and the fight for economic control of the country by transnational corporations. The Democratization of Feudalism was, and still can be, a great Evolvemental step in human civilization, but the globalization of Capitalism is not necessarily a continuation of any Evolvemental process.

Property

Property is one of the central issues of Political Philosophy, and a distinction needs to be drawn between 'Property Relations', or 'Possession', and 'Property Rights', since a stolen item might be a Possession, but not a piece of Property. Evolvementalism distinguishes four main types of Property Relation--'Natural', i. e. one's own body; 'Essential', i. e. what the vital processes of the body need; 'Instrumental', i. e. anything that aids or promotes those vital processes; and 'Inessential', i. e. anything else. It also distinguishes four main types of Property Acquisition--'Creation', i. e. produced by one's own efforts; 'Transfer', i. e. a sanctioned, or a mutually voluntary relocation, often as part of an Exchange; 'Finding', i. e. an unexpected encounter; and 'Expropriation', i. e. a relocation involving at least one involuntary party. In most systems, the only Property Relations that are not Property Rights are those that are the product of Expropriation. But what qualifies as the latter differs from system to system, and within them, from case to case. For example, the turning of a profit by a business owner from the work of an employee is a Transfer in Capitalism and Expropriation in Socialism. And, whether or not one has a Right to a Finding depends on circumstances. In a Phronetocracy, Property Rights are protected, how a particular Relation or Acquisition will generally be determined on a case by case basis, and the classification of the Acquisition of Inessential Property will in part be determined by the classification of the resultant Relation. That is, the Acquisition of Inessential Property from an involuntary party, for Essential or Instrumental purposes, can modify its classification as Expropriation, e. g. taxation can be a legally-sanctioned Transfer, as might be the taking of a bottle of milk from a multi-billionaire by a poor woman to feed her starving child. Complicating any particular Relation or Acquisition is the history of the item concerned, e. g. the sale of stolen goods to an unwitting buyer. Hence, the entire status of all Property Rights in the United Status is questionable, given how the country's wealth has been based on the development of land perhaps Expropriated from Native Americans, via the involuntary efforts of African-American slaves.

Voting and Evolvement

Voting has Evolvemental significance for both the collective and the Individual. For the Political entity, Freedom is the Material Principle, i. e. its Becoming-Diverse, and Equality is the Formal Principle, i. e. its Becoming-the-Same. So, since Evolvement is an increase of the Material Principle without loss of the Formal Principle, electoral processes, namely an exercise of Freedom in which Equality is also promoted, constitutes an Evolvement of the Political entity. For the Individual, voting is a process of deliberately going outside oneself, so, in other words, it is an Action in which one Evolves. Since, voter suppression is antithetical to Political Evolvement, Universal Voting Rights are entailed by Phronetocratic Principles. Furthermore, since voluntarily not voting is contrary to Individual Evolvement, making voting mandatory, with 'none of the above' as an option, is a promotion of Evolvement, and, hence, is Phronetically justified.

Freedom, Equality, and Justice

In the Republic, Plato asks 'What is Justice?', and his method of answering is based on an analogy between a Just person and a Just society. His ultimate solution is thus question-beginning, because the definition of a 'Just' society pertains to relations between a member and the whole, so his presumption from the outset that there is an analogy between them is unacceptable. Furthermore, the untenability of the analogy as proposed becomes patent, with the discordance in the consequences that, on the one hand, a Just person is a fully Rational person, but on the other, most members of a Just society are incapable of full Rationality. A perhaps less convoluted definition of Justice can be derived from a consideration of the U. S. Constitution, which entails two main Principles, Freedom and Equality. The former can be defined as 'Each citizen can do as they please, so long as there is no interference with anyone else doing likewise.' The latter can be defined as 'The vote of one person counts no more than that of any other.' That they are conflicting Principles only occasionally becomes manifest, e. g. the debate over the limits of the role of wealth in the electoral process--the exercise of Free Speech vs. an undue influence on the choosing of leaders. The Constitution does seem to recognize its internal tension, by attempting to balance the embodiment of the Freedom Principle, i. e. the Executive branch, with that of the Equality Principle, i. e. the Legislative branch, via the functioning of a third branch, i. e. the Judiciary. However, the general bias of the Supreme Court to the Freedom Principle, e. g. classifying the spending of money as 'Free Speech', the classification of a Corporation as a 'Person', etc., not to mention its susceptibilty to being filled on the basis of political loyalty, reveals it as an ineffective balancer of the two Principles. Even two of the most respected thinkers of the past several decades are incapable of rising above the tension--Nozick's theory of Justice is derived from the Freedom Principle, while Rawl's is based on the Equality Principle. The shortcoming of each of these is that 'Justice' is 'the art of the balance between Freedom and Equality'. It is an Art, because there is no higher Principle that harmonizes them in the abstract, and it is one that can only be exercised in concrete cases. A Phronetocracy is a Just society, because the wisest leader is an Artist of Justice.

Rights

The notion of 'Right' is familiar in American life--The Bill of Rights, the Right to Bear Arms, the Right to Free Speech, Human Rights, the Right to Remain Silent, even the Right to Party. But it is difficult to glean from these a univocal sense of 'Right'. There have been two main theories of Right, neither of which stem from Plato or Aristotle, for whom it was apparently nothing meaningful at all. The first, which can be called the In-Itself concept, holds that a 'Right' is something that is innately endowed to every creature, usually Humans, but sometimes Animals in general. The second rejects the sufficiency of the In-Itself version, arguing that a 'Right' is something that is intrinsically related to its being recognized, so it construes a 'Right' as a context-bound social construct. While the U. S. founding documents at times vaguely allude to the first type, the Rights that the Constitution presents are plainly of the second type, namely, it implicitly defines a 'Right' as 'An action, the interference with which is illegal.'--e. g. having the 'Right' to Free Speech means that there exists a law that forbids the suppression of speech. So, U. S. 'Rights' are first and foremost context-bound, specifically a function of the Laws, leaving other notions, e. g. Human Rights, the Right to Shelter, etc. vacuous in the absence of Laws that would create them. Now, Phronetic Axiology attaches to Conduct, which means receiving something has no normative standing. On the other hand, in a Phronetocracy, e. g. all subsistence needs are to be accommodated, but any imperative to do so derives from the idionomic motivation of Leadership, not from an in-itself demand by the needy.

The United States and Democracy

The classification of a Political entity usually confuses two topics, each of which, in turn, entails a further division into two areas. The two topics are: the means of choosing leaders, and, the processes of governance. That they need to be distinguished is evident from an example of an absolute dictator being elected, for one term, every ten years. Is this a Democracy or a Dictatorship? Obviously, it can be both. Now, in the processes of governance, pure Democracy, e. g. a referendum on every issue, is highly unfeasible. But it is not impossible, since technology may one day facilitate instantaneous voting, and the wisest leadership intuitively grasps the interests of the citizenry. Plainly, neither of these is the current case in the United States, and given the well-documented influence of wealth on governmental activity, it is difficult to classify the U. S. processes of governance as a 'Democracy'. On the other hand, the Constitutional Principle of 'one person, one vote' does qualify as 'Democratic'. However, the classification of the United States' means of choosing leaders needs to further distinguish between de jure and de facto--what that process is in theory, and what it is in practice. Given the low voter turnouts in even the most dramatic elections, often hoped for by many politicians, and the undue influence of wealth on the process, exacerbated by the continued refusal of corporate interests to accommodate free time and space for political advertising, it is difficult to classify the United States as a de facto Democracy with respect to choosing leaders, as well.

Myths of Law

For some doctrines, the stability of Law derives from its eternality, the generally-accepted paradigm of which are Mathematical relations. In such doctrines, the derivation of Laws from a presumed irrefutable origin suffices to demonstrate their immutability. The issuance of Laws from a Divine source, e. g. the Ten Commandments, as presented in a religious document, is the most familiar example of such a rigorous derivation. Analogously, Kant attempts to deduce a set of Laws from the very concept of Reason alone. And, the United States Constitution is offered as an elaboration of some 'self-evident Truths'. But, all of these efforts have been challenged at their roots: Moses may have authored the Ten Commandments, Reason is an arbitrary behavioral criterion, and the conception of 'Human Rights' may be no more than inspirational. Nietzsche has perhaps most thoroughly demystified Law--the effort to eternalize it has always been part of the myth-making that is taken as essential to effective governance. But true Democracy entails transparency, to which Myth, and perhaps even Majesty, are antithetical. The true portion of the glib 'Laws are made to be broken' is that Laws are made, so, hence, they can also be unmade, just as if one Constitutional Amendment can be repealed, so can any other. Between the awe of Law and the disdain for it, there is respect for it, and nothing breeds respect for it better than the understanding of it as an effective dimension of a healthy society, the product of wise leadership.

Straussism and Evolvementalism

The interest here in the Political Philosophies of Plato and Aristotle is not to be confused with a similar-seeming invocation of them, in recent decades, on the parts of Leo Strauss and some of his followers. Strauss's ostensible purpose is to expose the speciousness of the presumed universality and inalienability of 'Rights' that have been the foundation of Modern Democracy. In contrast to such 'Rights', argues Strauss, those Ancient doctrines are exemplary because of their idea of an impersonal 'Good', from which Aristocratism is derived as the best form of Rule, since only the few 'best' have the capacity to cognize that idea. However, what he actually accomplishes is indistinguishable from Oligarchism, Plutocratism, or Theocratism, since his notion of the 'Ancient' Era includes the Medieval Era, he fails to appreciate that for Plato and Aristotle, an Aristocracy and a Democracy are not mutually exclusive, and his attack on the Modern concept of 'Right' never once targets what is perhaps the most pervasive example of it, namely Property 'Rights'. Rather, the Political Philosophy here is derived from the Evolvemental Principle, in particular from the idea that society as a whole is Evolving, a process which combines homogenizing and innovating processes. While the Law accounts for the former, it is Individuals who are the source of the latter. So the Rule of Law is a necessary but not a sufficent condition of a healthy society, which also requires the scope of understanding of the Wisest to initiate and guide its growth.

Rule of Persons and Rule of Law

According to both Plato and Aristotle, in an Aristocracy, the best form of Government, laws are unnecessary, because all citizens never fail to act justly. But the contingency and ephemerality of the availability of 'the best' require recourse to more effective means to social stability. The most venerable of those means has been the Hereditary Monarchy, but recent centuries have seen, primarily in Europe and the Americas, the rise of the Rule of Law, usually under the rubric 'Democracy'. The pioneering works of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau cannot be fully appreciated in abstraction from their being proposed as alternatives to Hereditarism. Furthermore, their promotion, in the name of stability, of an increased impersonalization of Political Philosophy, is accompanied by a more strident rejection of Aristocratism--not merely is the latter usually impracticable, but, given the essentiality of the fallibility of Human Nature, it is Metaphysically impossible. But the wholesale elimination of the study of the Rule of Persons from Modern Political Philosophy is not merely theoretically misguided, but potentially malign. In even the most impersonal of Political entities in history, the United States of America, the Law constitutes only one dimension of the processes of Ruling. For, in the Executive branch of the Government, personal ability is of the essence, and the stability of Law is indifferent to any distinction between, say, the performance of a President who sets as national policy travelling to the Moon, and that of one who dishonestly and recklessly launches an invasion of another country. The Rule of Persons is as relevant today as it was 2500 years ago, and one of the aims of Evolvementalism is to provide a criterion for evaluating Executive performance--the degree of its promotion of Evolvement=the scope of its comprehensiveness=how wise it is. Thus, in a Phronetocracy, the Rule of Persons becomes meaningful once again.

Ancient and Modern Political Philosophy

A reader of Aristotle's Politics would be justifiably bewildered to find it endorsing 'Aristocracy' as the best type of Political entity, but devoting most of its discussion to what qualify as only inferior types. Reading it as part of a standard American Academic curriculum will likely do nothing to dispel the bewilderment, because that work most typically appears within a Political Science Department, whereas Aristotle's clarification of the issue is generally only presented across campus, in the Philosophy Department, the Academic division in which his Nichomachean Ethics is typically studied. It is the latter work that describes who the 'best' are, and the Principle of the social context in which they interact. Plato, usually regarded as inferior to Aristotle as a systematizer, is actually the better organized of the two when it comes to the presentation of Political Philosophy. For, Bestness is covered by the Republic, while his Laws is reserved for his treatment of inferior types of Government. Given this clarification, what can now be gleaned from both these pioneers of Political Philosophy is their common belief that the Rule of Persons is, potentially, at least, superior to the Rule of Law and the Rule of System. Perhaps nothing crystalizes the differences between Ancient and Modern Political Philosophy than the fact that the most noteworthy, and, possibly, the only Modern treatment of the Rule of Persons comes from Machiavelli, whose portrait of a Ruler would likely be characterized by Aristotle as of the 'Worst'. Accordingly, by advocating a Phronetocracy--the Rule of the Wisest--Evolvementalism personalizes Political Philosophy in order to re-institute the relevance to the topic of 'Bestness'.

Political Philosophy and Legitimacy

Political Philosophy can be understood as a response to the rule of Force--it is an attempt to legitimize specified Ruler-Ruled social arrangements. For Aristotle, that legitimization is the Teleology of Reason, i. e. the natural tendency towards governance by Reason, a thesis revived and variously revised centuries later by especially Kant and Hegel. Medieval Theocracy derives its authority from Divine sources. Hobbes argues that certain Political arrangements are a necessary corrective to natural deadly social antagonism. While Theocracy and Hobbesianism continue to have their advocates, more so than Rationalism, probably the predominant Modern Political Philosophy is Locke's, in which Government serves to facilitate and regulate natural, mutually benefical associations, as exemplified by Economic contracts. The essence of most subsequent Political debate has been regarding the degree of Government intervention necessary--from none at all (Anarchism), to minimal (Conservatism), to frequent and ongoing (Progessive Liberalism), to a complete overhaul (Marxism). The Phronetocratic analysis likewise takes Economic phenomena as a point of departure, but for entirely different purposes. What is significant to this perspective is the complexity of Contemporary Economics--e. g. a few localized foreclosures can lead to an International recession, as has been seen recently. Such complexity is, first of all, a reminder that Economic relations are only dimension of the complexity of all social relations. Secondly, any such complexity entails differences in the degree of comprehension of understanding it. So, since, as has been previously shown, inter-Individual association is natural and beneficial, the distinction between Leaders and Followers, based on their relative degrees of comprehension of the situation, in such associations, is also natural and beneficial to all concerned. Hence, a Phronetocracy, the Leadership of the Wisest, is legitimate.

Aristocracy, Democracy, and Phronetocracy

In the history of Political Philosophy, no term seems to have been more abused than 'Aristocracy'. These days, it is a derogatory term meaning, approximately, 'corrupt Oligarchy'. Hence, it is taken both as conflicting with Democracy, and as antithetical to any form of ideal government in general. But that meaning completely reverses its literal sense, as it was understood by the originators of the field. Literally, 'Aristocracy' means 'rule of the best', and, as Aristotle argues, Oligarchy is a degenerate form of it. However, even with that correction, Aristocracy and Democracy can still be taken to be mutually exclusive, primarily because, in an uncharacteristic lapse of analytical thoroughness, Aristotle never asks 'the best WHAT?', leaving the implication that he means 'the best Human', which contradicts the Equality entailed by Democracy. However, the contradiction can be easily dissolved, with the specification, 'the best qualified to lead', for, after all, Democracy is itself in part nothing but a means of determination of who the best-qualified leaders are. Furthermore, that specification is entirely indeterminate regarding quantity, i. e. it does not preclude a plurality, or even a universality of equally well-qualified leaders. Now, according to Evolvemental Phronetics, the criterion of leadership ability is comprehensiveness of perspective, or, to put it in more familiarly, wisdom. Hence, to avoid any terminalogical confusion, the best Political system for Evolvementalism can be called 'Phronetocracy'.

Phronetics and Equality

One main difference between Kantian and Humean Morality is widely recognized--Kant's is based on Reason, Hume's on the feeling of Sympathy. But another important difference has been treated only superficially. Kant's Principle is categorical, implying that everyone has at least the capacity to adhere to it. In contrast, Hume's is contingent, implying that not everyone has the capacity to be motivated by Sympathy. This implicit inequality has important political consequences, since Democracy presumes, like Kant does, at least an equality of capacity to participate in a process that requires recognition of one's kinship with others. So, if that capacity is lacking, Democracy reverts to at least Oligarchy, not merely in the actual governing institutions themselves, but in the processes of selecting who governs. The actual voting rates in the United States, as well as the contempt in which many Amercians are held by one political orientation or another, is strong evidence that the U. S., at least de facto, is today an Oligarchy. Now, the Evolvemental Phronetic Principle, 'Promote Evolvement as much as possible' defines 'as possible' not as Kant does, 'theoretically possible', but as Hume might, 'possible under the circumstances'. On the other hand, this allowance for an inequality of circumstance does not imply, as many of today's Oligarchs seem to have it, an immutability of any given incapacity to achieve a recognition of one's kinship with others, i. e. to participate effectively in a Democracy. Rather, it urges education in the direction of Idionomy, the factual falling short of which is no argument against its continuation.

Politics and Phronetics

Aristotle presents conflicting conceptions of the relation between Ethics and Politics. On the one hand, he has them as interrelated--the former is a preparation for the latter, and the latter is the actualization of the former. On the other hand, his highest Ethical Good, Contemplation, is explicitly apolitical activity. Christianity avoids any such confusion, with its distinction between 'rendering unto God' and 'rendering unto Caesar', which not only becomes ingrained in Euro-American culture, but implies that the basis of the distinction is a contrast between 'spiritual' and 'materialistic' Goods. But a more recent saying suggests an explanation of the distinction without invoking Metaphysical Dualism--'All politics is local'. For, Morality presumes to be Universal, which, in Political terms means that it represents an Internationalist perspective, which is usually far removed from Local concerns. Formulating the Politics vs. Ethics antagonism as Local vs. International demystifies their distinction, and suggests two ways to their reconciliation. First, the globalization of attitudes, which the Internet is effectively facilitating, can accelerate the Internationalization of Politics. Second, the cultivation of Individualism, as defined here, and as promoted by Evolvemental Phronetics, crosses borders without trivializing them. Particularity, i. e. defining someone as one of a type, is political partisanship, while Individualization transforms what one is part of to a part of what one is, i. e. transforms, for example, 'is American' from ='is a member of the set of Americans' to 'American is a member of the set of one's characteristics . Evolvementalism thus recovers the original Aristotelian conception of the complementary of Phronetics and Politics.

Phronetics and Economics

That Bentham's Moral System is a codification of Smith's Capitalism supports Dewey's contention that the Utilitarian 'calculus', including Mill's, is a reckoning that quantifies pleasures and pains as if they were monetary gains and losses. Dewey's criticism of Utilitarianism on Psychological grounds bypasses the more historically striking phenomenon of Morality becoming subordinate to Economics. In contrast, for Plato, Economic activity occurs at a lower part of the ideal Political entity, and for Aristotle, Economic well-being is a necessary condition of Happiness, but no more than that. Even Kant seems intimidated by the rise of Capitalism. While his Principle purports to transcend Economic motives, he misses an easy opportunity to explicitly subordinate the latter to the status of mere means, leaving his Theory vulnerable to Mill's interpretation of it as disguised Utilitarianism, and, hence, of disguised Economic Morality. In Evolvemental Phronetics, Economic activity is context-bound and receives no special consideration. The static possession of Economic goods, being no Action, has no Evolvemental Value. Saving or wisely investing money is likely to be more Evolving than squandering it. Turning a profit for two people is likely to be better than doing so for only one. An act that both generates a profit and is intellectually enriching is likely to be better than one that merely generates a profit, etc. In general, the pursuit of personal monetary gain is neither the best Conduct, as Bentham has it, nor 'the root of all Evil', as the saying goes, nor outside the sphere of Moral judgment, as some Systems seem to have it, but, rather, too narrow an Action to more than infrequently qualify as the choice in which one Evolves as much as possible.

Voting and Morality

There are two main theories regarding the nature of Democratic political processes. One, deriving from Locke, holds that one's vote is an expression of one's self-interest. The other, Rousseau's, holds that one's vote is an expression of one's opinion as to that is best for the collective as a whole. Considered as a Moral act, voting in the first sense is endorsed by Benthamism, while the second exemplifies Kantian and Millist Principles, i. e. Kant's Universalist paradigm, and Mill's 'greatest number' Consequentialism. There is perhaps no stronger evidence of the pervasiveness of Benthamism in American public life than the fact that few voters seem even aware of the possibility of the Rousseauian Principle. For Evolvemental Phronetics, Rousseauian voting is the more highly Evolved of the two types, because it entails a greater degree of Exposition. For sure, Lockeian Democracy is a significant Evolvement with respect to Monarchism, but the Rousseauian alternative proves that it is not the most highly Evolved Political System.

Benthamism

In scholarly circles, the Moral doctrine 'Utiliarianism' is usually associated with John Stuart Mill, but the Utilitarianism that is the more generally pervasive phenomenon may be that of the friend of Mill's father, Bentham. Bentham believed that the Highest Moral Good is the Greatest Happiness for the Greatest Number, and that the best means to that Good is everyone pursuing their own personal Happiness, so his Principle is 'Choose that act which best causes your own Happiness'. In contrast, Mill rejects the second of those beliefs, so his Principle is the more direct 'Choose that act which best causes the most Happiness for the most people. A simple example that bears out their differences is one in which person P has a choice between doing A, B, or C, in which A would benefit both P and another, Q; B would benefit P and have not effect on Q; and C would benefit P and harm Q. On Mill's evaluation, A is better than B, and B is better than C, but for Bentham, the effects on Q are irrelevant, so all three choices are of equal Moral Value. Now, while scrutiny bears up, for most analyists, the superiority of Mill's version, Bentham's codifies Adam Smith's Capitalism, and crystalizes the 'Liberty and Pursuit of Happiness' ethos of the U. S. Constitution, so his is the unofficial State Morality of the United States. But, Evolvemental Phronetics regards as especially inadequate both the Atomism and the Consequentialism of Benthamism: Atomism abstracts from the gregarious nature of the Individual, and Consequentialism places no value on the very performance of an Action. Hence, for example, the indifference to the drudgery of others that is codified in a Benthamist society, is a failure to promote Evolvement as much as possible, and, hence, is Phronetically unworthy.

Spinoza's Modes

A standard interpretation of Spinoza's Ethical program, which he does little to explicitly discourage, has it as a Rationalist Quietism that aims at the experience of an 'Adequate Idea', an epiphany which transforms the self-understanding of a human from one of an isolated creature governed by a self-preservative drive, to that of a particular 'Mode' of the Pantheistic God, who is identical to Nature, and who has both Mind and Body. However, this interpretation is difficult to reconcile with Spinoza's notion of God as fundamentally a creative process, 'nature naturing', and with his activistic Political Theory. Furthermore, he in places suggests that an 'Adequate Idea' is, in fact, genetic definition, e. g. the definition of a Circle instructs how to draw a circle, not a passive moment of realization, which is consistent with his notion of God as fundamentally a creative process. Spinoza may not have had the conceptual resources of Evolutionary Theory, or the innovations of Pragmatism, at his disposal. but this heterodox interpretation has him anticipating a transition from Quietist Ethics to Activist Phronetics, in which Modes are Individuals, not mere Particulars.

Appearance and Reality

'Appearances can be deceiving' is an uncontroversial common judgment, that entails a possibility--the 'can'-- that many prominent Philosophical doctrines have converted into a Principle. In them, 'Appearance', in general, is Ontologically inferior to, for example, 'The Thing-In-Itself', 'Reality', and 'Nothingness', and, in some cases, is treated as sub-real even without some superior correlate being posited. One problematic corollary of such doctrines is that processes such as manifesting, presenting evidence, exhibiting, and expressing, which are commonly regarded as valuable, must be dismissed as Ontologically degenerative. Now, Epistemological theories such as Coherentism and Constructivism have effectively shown how to accommodate the possible non-veridicality of an appearance without having to resort to Ontology, so they need not be repeated here. But they still fall short of accounting for the value of processes like manifesting, etc. In the Formaterial Individual, those processes are various modes of Exposition, one of the two main components of Evolvement, and, so, their value is accommodated by Evolvemental Phronetics.

Phenomenal Individuality

One version of the Humpty Dumpty doctrine has the cosmic fragmentation as a real event, with Morality as the program of actually trying to put the pieces back together. A more subtle, and powerfully influential version, might be called Phenomenal ('phenomenon'=the literally accurate 'appearance', not = the faddish 'extraordinary event') Humpty Dumpty-ism--Humpty has not actually fallen, but various parts of his body believe that he has. For example, the feeling in a particular finger might conclude not merely that this finger was absolutely severed from the others, but that the feeling itself is absolutely separate from other feelings. Analogously, many believe in the existence of a unitary collective 'Mind' or 'Soul' that is implanted in particular bodies, thereby losing sight of its own essential non-particularity. Morality in such doctrines thus consists in the Soul's or Mind's overcoming of the illusion of such particularity. Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, in places, and Heidegger, are among the more explicit advocates of such a doctrine, but it is also pervasively implicit. Correspondingly, Morality functions in them like a 'Wittgenstein's ladder', namely as a program that is rendered irrelevant by its successful completion. But, as is the case with all Humpty Dumpty doctrines, its soundness depends on its premise that Particularity lacks constructive meaning. Evolvementalism offers such a constructive meaning, so its Phronetics entails the cultivation of the Individuality of Particulars, not its repression.

Space, Time, and Phronetics

Humpty Dumpty Morality aims at the transcendence of 'Spatio-Temporality', because 'Space' and 'Time' are, according to that traditional doctrine, characteristics of the irreducible fragments that need to be re-assembled, in accordance with an original pre-condition. Even Heidegger's casting of 'Time' as that original entails the Ontological elimination of not merely particular 'Times' and 'Spaces', but of 'Space' in general. In contrast, Evolvement is an indefinite ascent into increasingly greater Complexity, and, as has been previously discussed, 'Spaces' and 'Times' are the generated structures of Individual Evolvement. Space and Time are thus intrinsic to Evolvemental Phronetics, for, the Principle 'Evolve as much as possible' is equivalent to 'Spatialize as much as can be Temporized'. In other words, in opposition to traditional Morality, Evolvemental Phronetics is essentially Spatio-Temporal.