Friday, July 31, 2015

Matter, Propagation, Pluralization

Marx and Engel's insistence, in the German Ideology, on methodical observation of the concrete activities of concrete humans, is somewhat betrayed by the generalization of such processes as 'Matter', which is as much as an abstraction from them as is 'Spirit'.  They thereby fail to discern, as has been previously discussed, the factor of physical sexual drives in the traditional hostility towards Matter.  Now, they do recognize Propagation as one of three "fundamental conditions" of History, but by conflating the three, they miss an opportunity to gain a greater insight from that particular condition into the essential character of Matter.  For, as is, Matter, for them, is either indeterminately dynamic, or else, is constituted by some of the same abstract moments, e. g. Negation and Contradiction, that are native to Hegel's concept of Mind.  In contrast, the concrete observation of reproduction reveals a process of Pluralization, which, once attributed to Matter, becomes a necessary condition of any Materialist concept of Socialism.

Thursday, July 30, 2015

Materialism, Reproduction, Tyranny

At the beginning of the German Ideology, included in Marx's introduction of Materialism, are the terms "reproduce", "increase of population", and "intercourse".  Now, while the actual context of these usages is the exploitation of the working class, they are a reminder that a significant factor in the traditional Theological aversion to Materialism is the tyranny of not the leisure classes, as Marxism asserts, but of the senses, e. g. Buddha, Augustine, etc.  Still, the biological means of production, i. e. the reproductive organs, evince that the Social Atomism that grounds Capitalism is a fiction that abstracts from the actual function of parts of the individual human body.

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

Materialism and Ordinalism

According to Monism, there is one Substance, and according to Dualism, there are two Substances.  In contrast with each is what can be called 'Ordinalism', according to which there are two fundamental elements, ordered as superior and inferior in some respect.  A chronic confusion in the history of Philosophy is that nearly all systems, whether classified as 'Monist', or as 'Dualist', are, in fact, Ordinalist.  For, typical of Monism is the suppression of an inferior element, often via the dismissal of it as 'irreal' in some respect, e. g. Multiplicity, for Parmenides, Individuals, for Schopenhauer, etc.  Similarly, typical of Dualism is a denigration of one of its Substances, often via the thesis of a unilateral interaction between them, e. g. most Mind-Body theories, Kant's Noumenon-Phenomenon pair, etc. but perhaps more often via a normative distinction, e. g. Manichean Light vs. Dark, God vs. the Devil, etc.  Now, Marxism is no exception from this traditional confusion.  He presents his Materialism as Monist, but never quite explains how e. g. Form, Consciousness, Ideas, etc., each of which plays a role in his system, is, are only Matter.  Indeed, the dynamic factor in his system, Negation, which is distinct from the positive Matter to which it is attributed, is indistinguishable from the ex machina visitations in the systems that it presumably inverts, e. g. Spirit, Mind, etc.  So, Marxism includes a suppressed element, which, according to Marx himself, is a symptom of Ideology in what he seeks to supplant.

Tuesday, July 28, 2015

Materialism and Form

It is difficult to conceive how Marx might disagree with Hegel's characterization of Labor as an imposition of Form.  But, the traditional correlate of Form is Matter, and, in at least one prominent system, i. e. Platonism, Form and Idea are identical.  So, a challenge to Marxism is to accommodate Form in Materialism, e. g. to derive Form from Matter.  Now, Dialectical Materialism neither answers nor avoids the challenge, since Dialectic is a Form, i. e. is a pattern, whether of Ideas or of Matter.  What the formidability of that challenge indicates is the inadequacy of any Monism, whether Spiritualism, Idealism, or Materialism, to the Form-Matter duality.  In other words, Marx can no more conceive of Labor as Form-imposing without a guiding Idea, than Hegel can conceive of it without a physical agency to accomplish it, or at least in the absence of a proof of a psychokinetic power of Consciousness.

Monday, July 27, 2015

Consciousness, Psychokinesis, Labor

In the Phenomenology, Hegel attributes Labor, i. e. the process of imposing form on an outer object, to Consciousness.  In the Philosophy of Right, this process constitutes taking possession of an object, but in this case the Mind uses an "instrument", as he characterizes it in #48--"the body".  So, presumably, in his system, Consciousness has the power of psychokinesis, and contingently resorts to physical means to take possession of the products of Labor.  Analogously, therefore, it is the employer of physical means of Labor who is the owner of what is thereby produced, according to Hegelianism.  So, if the the Capitalist's claiming of possession of the fruits of the Labor of others is unjust, the required correction is undoing of the original Mind-Body split, but necessarily an inversion of the subordination of the latter to the former.

Sunday, July 26, 2015

Self-Consciousness and Means of Production

With the positing of 'I exist' as the fundamental proposition of Modern Philosophy, a variety of Idealism is established as its predominant theory, and the duality of Self-Conscious as its central problem.  Treatments of the problem have ranged from the extraction from it of a cosmic Dialectic, to the extrapolation from it of an infinite hall of mirrors.  But, because of its self-imposed limitation of not accepting the existence of anything outside the egological sphere, such Idealism cannot recognize the embodiment of Self-Consciousness in any simple tool.  Now, any tool, as an extension of its user, is Subjective, and, as something that can itself be worked on, is Objective.  So, it tends to confirm the thesis of Parallelism, that Subject and Object are two corresponding but non-coinciding perspectives on one and the same entity.  In other words, the tool demonstrates that a finite entity in a plural world can both act and be acted upon, a mundane characteristic in the light of day that gets mystified when interiorized.  But, the mysterious apparent tension of the Self-Consciousness therein is not between the I-Subject and the I-Object, as Idealists usually take it to be.  Rather, the instability experienced is the resistance of its duality to the futile attempts at a Monistic reduction of it by the I that is entertaining it.  Now, a tool is a means of production.  So, to the Marxist, the Means of Production is the locus of not only Capitalist exploitation, but of the resolution of the contradiction of Idealism, as well.

Saturday, July 25, 2015

Property and Means of Production

Following his introduction, in Philosophy of Right, of grasping and form-imposition, as modes of "taking possession", Hegel next considers the use of an object.  Now, insofar as using an object requires grasping it, and taking possession is a means to use, the latter is prior to and presupposed by grasping.  Furthermore, if he were thinking dialectically in these passages, he might discover the synthesis of the use of an object with the imposition of form on another, e. g. in, as he himself presents, agricultural and raw material processes.  In other words, implicit in these passages on the topic of Property is the concept of the Means of Production, the conspicuous absence of explicit recognition of which is significant from a Marxist perspeective.

Friday, July 24, 2015

Labor and Property

In #55 and #56 of Philosophy of Right, as part of his study of Property, Hegel distinguishes two types of "taking possession of" an object: physically grasping it, and imposing form on it.  His primary basis of the distinction is that the former is contingent on spatial proximity, while the latter is not, i. e. that the latter is potentially more permanent than the former.  But, two more fundamental differences are 1. Physical grasping is a process of internalization, while imposing form is one of externalization; and 2. An object pre-exists the grasping, while it is only first created by the imposition of form.  Accordingly, form-imposition might be more accurately characterized as 'making', rather than 'taking', possession.  Now, among the examples of form-imposition that he presents are the extraction of raw materials, and agricultural procedures, or, in other words, Labor.  Thus, some rudiments of a Marxist critique of Capitalism are incipient in these brief passages: 1. Labor is prior to Exchange; 2. Exchange is inadequate to and incommensurate with Labor; 3. Property established by Labor is inalienable in Exchange; and 4. Labor is the origin of Property.  If Marx recognizes the potential significance of these passages, which are prefigured in Hegel's resolution to the Master-Slave Dialectic in the Phenomenology, he gives no explicit indication of it.

Thursday, July 23, 2015

Materialism, Method, Empiricism

The title of an early section of the German Ideology, "Materialist Method", is, on the face of it, peculiar in two respects.  First, Materialism is a thesis about the constituency of Existence, and is not a 'method'.  Second, it includes no reference to the Method usually associated with Marxism, namely Dialectics.  Indeed, the method of what follows is Empiricist and analytical, implicit in which is a significant Philosophical criticism that Marx does not pursue.  For, in the tradition of most of his Modern predecessors, he offers a foundational moment that serves his study as a point of departure.  But, rather than the Sense-Datum of the procedures of Descartes, Locke, and Hegel, alike, his fundamental element of human experience is the modification of material conditions for the production of sustenance, i. e. Labor.  That choice by itself exposes the arbitrary non-Empirical refinements that condition the extraction of a Sense-Datum from immediate Experience.  So, he has at his disposal, but does not pursue, a criticism of prominent rival methods, and, in particular, of what is conventionally known as 'Empiricism', the ideological premises of which are easily consequently exposed.

Wednesday, July 22, 2015

Idealism and Practice

For Plato, Idealism has Epistemological, Ontological, and Moral dimensions.  An Idea is that through which particulars are known; the world of Ideas is Real, with respect to which the world of their instantiations is irreal; and an Idea is an Ideal, i. e. is a perfection, with respect to which its instantiations are deficient.  Now, while the first dimension, somewhat modified, has apparently survived the most in Modern Philosophy, the other two have been useful to formalizing the main relations in the Creator-Creation concept of religions such as Christianity.  But, Marx's immediate target in his inversion of 'Idealism' is specifically the Ontological dimension, e. g. 'Heaven', which he exposes as derived from 'Earth', and, so, as not Real, in the Platonist sense.  In the process, he does not recognize his own transposition of the other two functions into the context of Practice--an Idea as illuminating a course of Action, and, insofar as a course of Action aims to better preceding conditions, its guiding light can be an Ideal, as well.  For example, Socialism serves him as both an Idea and an Ideal, demonstrating that he does not consider that he himself incorporates a Practical Idealism into his works.

Tuesday, July 21, 2015

Socialism and Messianism

Marx's diagnosis of Christian Dualism as an expression of secular contradictions might accurately apply in some circumstances, but it does not reflect the actual historical genesis of the concept.  Rather, it is the product of the Platonization, by Augustine, of Christian Messianism, which is derived from Jewish Messianism.  Now, the latter is originally a secular concept, entailing the political recovery of Jerusalem under the leadership of a corporeal champion.  Thus, as a secular ideal, Marxist Socialism can be understood as a recovery of that Messianic tradition from the incorporeal variation that has predominated in much of the world for more than a millennium.

Monday, July 20, 2015

Idealism, Materialism, Theory, Practice

The idea of a chair can be derived from perceiving a chair, and a chair can be constructed on the basis of an idea of a chair.  Likewise, the idea of Socialism can guide the establishment of a Socialist state, and from the observation of a Socialist state, an idea of Socialism can be derived.  Furthermore, that idea is also a theory, for Marx an application of another theory, Materialism.  So, while his distinction between interpreting the world and changing the world is relatively clear-cut, the antitheses between Idealism and Practice, Theory and Practice, and Materialism and Theory, that he presumes upon to explain it, are not.

Sunday, July 19, 2015

Will, Labor, Materialism

In any perceptual process, including Interpretation and Contemplation, something external to the perceiver is internalized in them. The Everse of Perception, whereby an internal datum, e. g. a Concept, is externalized, is Will. Now, occasionally, that externalization is characterized as 'materialization'. Even given the casualness of the latter, it is an indication that Marx uncritically accepts Matter as given, rather than as the product of a more fundamental process. Accordingly, insofar as Labor is an expression of Will, it transcends Materialism.

Saturday, July 18, 2015

Will, Practice, Matter

Kant's incorporation of Rousseau's concept of General Will into his system, Pure Practical Reason, is an Idea. In other words, his concept of Will is the basis of an Idealist concept of Practice, and a Philosophical principle for changing the world, and not merely interpreting it, which is the function in his system of Theoretical Reason. Thus, this model is problematic for Marx's criticism of Feuerbach in two ways. First, it refutes the implication that Idealism is antithetical to Practice. Second, it illuminates the shortcoming in Marx's own system--a Materialist concept of Will. To the latter, which would consist in one mass of Matter deliberately acting upon another mass of Matter, e. g. Labor, there seems to be no obvious derivation from a concept of mere Matter, even one of dynamically Dialectical Matter. In the absence of such a concept of Will, a Materialist concept of Practice is not nearly as self-evident as Marx seems to take it to be.

Friday, July 17, 2015

False Consciousness, Inadequate Idea, Private Property

The internalization of Ideology, called 'False Consciousness' by Marxists, though not by Marx himself, is a special case of taking Appearance for Reality, termed by Spinoza 'Inadequate Idea'. Now, the immediate example of the latter in Spinoza's system is the interpretation of Mind itself as 'one's own', independent of any other existent, i. e. as not a mode of some general power. On that basis, the widely-accepted Idealist concept of Consciousness as exhaustively internal in the Individual is likewise Inadequate. Thus, even the most fundamental private property claim of Capitalism, which, as has been previously discussed, is Epistemologically Idealist, is an expression of False Consciousness.

Thursday, July 16, 2015

Idealism and Capitalism

As has been previously discussed, according to several varieties of the Idealism of which Materialism is an Eversion, the entire 'world' is within one's own Mind. Now, that such a theory seems indistinguishable from what is often called 'solipsism' indicates that it is also a variety of Egoism, among the instances of which are Berkelian Phenomenalism and Hegelian Phenomenology. Furthermore, since Hume's Empiricism elaborates on the former, so, too, is Smith's Humean system an example of Egoist Idealism. Hence, the Eversion of Hegelianism is also part of a critique of Capitalism.

Wednesday, July 15, 2015

Materialism, Inversion, Eversion

Marx's previously discussed conflation of Metaphysical Materialism and Epistemological Materialism reflects the duality of what he is responding to--Hegel's concept of Mind, which is both Metaphysical Substance and Epistemological Subject. Now, the image of an 'inversion' of Hegelianism, i. e. "turning it on its head", implies a hierarchical relation, specifically one found in the Metaphysical dimension of Hegelianism--Heaven and Earth. However, no corresponding hierarchy obtains in its Epistemological dimension. Instead, a different structure there suggests an alternative reversal of Hegelianism. For, a notable feature of Hegelian Phenomenology, and of many other post-Cartesian theories, is the internalization of 'the world'. Accordingly, one reversal of that concept is its eversion, i. e. from the 'world inside one' to 'one in the world'. Now, in Marxism, what effects that eversion is the emergence of Collective-Consciousness, which is not necessarily a Materialist concept.

Tuesday, July 14, 2015

Materialism, Spiritualism, Idealism

There have been three main senses of 'Matter' in the history of Philosophy--Logical, Metaphysical, and Epistemological, juxtaposed with which are Form, Spirit, and Mind, respectively. Accordingly distinguishable are three varieties of 'Materialism'--Logical, Metaphysical, and Epistemological, juxtaposed with which are Formalism, Spiritualism, and Idealism, respectively. Now, a significant example of Metaphysical Materialism is Feuerbach's inversion, of which Marx approves, of the traditional Spiritualist Heaven-Earth relation. Furthermore, Metaphysical Materialism and Epistemological Materialism are not necessarily identical. For, while the subjective dimension of any cognitive process is amenable to a Metaphysical Materialist rendering, e. g. entailing neural and cerebral processes, it is not so to an Epistemological Materialist one, in which Matter is always at the object pole. Thus, Marx's criticism of Feuerbach's privileging of Contemplation, on the grounds that it is a lapse into Idealism, fails because it is based on an equivocation, and expresses an inconsistency in his own use of 'Materialism'.

Monday, July 13, 2015

Dialectical Materialism and Master-Slave Dialectic

While Marx presents Dialectical Materialism as an inversion of Hegel's Dialectical Idealism, textual evidence strongly suggests that it is actually already a moment in the latter.  For, in the passage of Phenomenology of Mind usually referred to as the 'Master-Slave Dialectic', the Slave achieves liberation from the Master through Labor, in which he arrives at Self-Consciousness, constituted by the recognition of himself in his Labor.  In turn, Hegel, in that passage, is likely influenced by Kant's 'Refutation of Idealism', from the second edition of the 1st Critique, in which "the game played by idealism has been turned against itself, and with greater justice", as Kant puts it in B276. Furthermore, this modification of the first edition reflects the incorporation of Rousseau's General Will into Kant's system, specifically in the establishment of the priority of Practice over Theory, a transformation that also includes Kant's acknowledgement of kinship with the 'Copernican Revolution',  So, Marx only assumes the already established inversion, with his novel contribution to the tradition being its application to Capitalism, in particular.

Sunday, July 12, 2015

Dialectical Materialism and Science

The fundamental proposition of Science, 'A causes B', is structurally identical to 'A is a means to B'.  Thus, Science entails a systematic relation between, on the one hand, Theory, Description, and Interpretation, and, on the other, Practice, Prescription, and Change.  Now, the essential pattern of Dialectical Materialism, which, according to Marx, is the 'Science' that informs 'Scientific Socialism', is Conflict-Resolution.  Thus, as a means to changing the world, Dialectical Materialism prescribes Conflict.  However, mere Class-Conflict does not include seizing the means of production or abolishing private property.  Hence, Dialectical Materialism is inadequate as a 'scientific' formula for changing Capitalism into Socialism.

Saturday, July 11, 2015

Ideology, Eternity, History

Marx surpasses Feuerbach by recognizing Theology as Ideology, in which power relations are codified by concepts such as Omnipotence and Eternity.  But, as has been previously discussed, the Necessity of Dialectical Materialism is, similarly, Force disguised as Concept.  The contrast with Spinoza exposes the shortcoming in Marx's thinking.  While a Mode in the Pantheism of the former is commonly taken to submerge itself in the Necessity of God/Nature, what Spinoza is actually explaining is how it harnesses the power of the latter, e. g. fire.  In contrast, Marx offers no such explanation, leaving the Proletariat as submissive to the omnipotence of History as it had been to that of Eternity.

Friday, July 10, 2015

Ideology and Necessity

Most generally, an 'Ideology' is a system of ideas.  Since Marx, it has meant a particular system of ideas masquerading as universal, i. e. a system of ideas that promotes the interests of the ruling class.  However, one idea not only transcends particularization, it is fundamental to the efficacy of any Ideology, in the Marxist sense--Necessity.   For example, insofar as Necessity is predicated of Dialectical Materialism, its historical moments, including Revolution and the arrival of a Socialist state, become mandatory for those involved.  So, the physical force that is integral to his own doctrine is evidence that at least some elements of Ideology transcend Marx's attempt to particularize it.

Thursday, July 9, 2015

Prescription, Description, Ideology

While the scope of a Prescription may be no more than particular, that of a Description, i. e. of an objective proposition, is universal.  Thus, the casting of a Prescription as a Description can exemplify what Marx calls 'Ideology', in which special interests are codified and entrenched as 'truths'.  For example, in Capitalism, the prescription "One should always act in one's self-interest exclusively" is converted to the Psychological description "One inherently always acts in one's self-interest exclusively", thereby validating the good fortune of those who benefit from the system, and, thus, reinforcing their power in it.  So, detecting that distinction is significant to his potentially revolutionary exposure of Capitalist Ideology.  

Wednesday, July 8, 2015

Change-Interpret and Prescribe-Describe

Despite his continued efforts to develop it as such, Marx's distinction between "change the world" and "interpret the world" is accurately represented by neither the Practice-Theory, nor the Materialism-Idealism, contrast.  In fact, 'change the world' itself mis-formulates his aim, which, more precisely, is 'change the world for the better'.  For, underlying his goal of a transformation of Capitalism into Socialism is not a principle of change for change's sake, but the judgment that Socialism is better than Capitalism.  Thus, the contrast that he has in mind is Prescription vs. Description, later expressed by Nietzsche as Legislation vs. Labor.  Now, missing that mark allows him to circumvent a more fundamental problem--justifying the preference without recourse to at least one descriptive proposition.  For example, the implicit justification for 'Socialism is better than Capitalism', i. e. 'Justice is better than injustice', is itself descriptive.  So, the Change-Interpret contrast is not quite as clear-cut as he takes it to be, as is implicit in his frequent reliance on Dialectical Materialism--an interpretation of History--to ground his calls for revolution.  Of course, the more immediate illustration of the problem is that his preference for Change over Interpretation is itself prescriptive, and is justified by his descriptive "the point is".

Tuesday, July 7, 2015

Ideology and Pantheism

One of Marx's important insights is into the Ideological grounds of intellectual systems, i. e. into how class characteristics and interests are encoded as apparently 'universal' and 'eternal'.  For example, while Theory and Idealism express the unconcern of the privileged class with need, Practice and Materialism signify the inescapability of  Labor for underclasses, with the priority of the former two over the latter two the entrenchment of power relations between them.  In other words, the Idealist privileging of Theory over Practice, common to most preceding Philosophical systems, are Ideological, according to Marx.   However, in Spinoza's Pantheism, Understanding and Will are identical, i. e. adequate knowledge is adequate causality, and Mind and Body, aside from an unnecessary digression in book V of the Ethics, are complementary.  Furthermore, the human world is embedded in a more comprehensive Nature, just as it is for Darwin.  So, if there is a latent Ideology in that system that is consistent with Marxist analysis, it is unclear what it entails.

Monday, July 6, 2015

Materialist Pure Practical Reason and Dialectical Materialism

Marx's system effects two inversions of Hegelianism--not only Materialism over Idealism, as is generally explicitly recognized, but Praxis over Theory, as well.  So, in the latter regard, he has more in common with Kant, whom, like Hegel, he nevertheless tends to marginalize as a merely abstract thinker.  Still, a Materialist inversion of Kant's Practical Idealism, reveals some genetic foreshadowing of Marxism.  For example, a Materialist Pure Practical Reason closely resembles Rousseau's General Will, providing an analysis of the overcoming of Self-Interest by the latter, though hindered by a Bourgeois adherence to private property rights, i. e. an incapacity to recognize the Kingdom of Ends as populated by a 'We', rather than by a collection of 'I's.  Furthermore, the concept of a History of a Materialist Pure Practical Reason, constituted by a progression towards greater social comprehensiveness, in which war functions as a frequent productive means, very closely resembles the movement of Dialectical Materialism.  So, the influence of Rousseau on Marx is perhaps mediated more by Kant than by Hegel.

Sunday, July 5, 2015

Self-Determination and Maturity

While a child is both new and innocent, it is also dependent.  Now, Marxist Socialism is a system of collective self-determination, a product of the labor of its members.  Hence, those members are adults, not children.  Accordingly, while the "Allons" of the Marseillaise also expresses the collectivity of Socialism, the subsequent "enfants de la Patrie" has more in common with 'the children of God' than with the mature members of that collectivity.

Saturday, July 4, 2015

Cogito, General Will, Private Property

Rousseau's General Will is represented by Smith as an impersonal Invisible Hand, and by Kant as a superpersonal Pure Practical Reason. In contrast with each, perhaps with the advantage of greater hindsight, for Marx, seemingly, the meaning of the General Will is fully and concretely expressed in the anthemic "Allons" of the French Revolution. Accordingly, he can better recognize that the Practical 'We' of the latter supersedes the meditative 'I' of the Cogito that initiates the preceding Philosophical era. But, 'We' entails 'Our'. Hence, he surpasses the prevailing interpretations of Rousseau's innovation by proposing that Private Property is inconsistent with it.

Friday, July 3, 2015

Private Property and Labor

Sometimes attributed to Marx is a shared ideal with Rousseau of a society without private property. However, that attribution is usually mistaken in several respects. To begin with, while Rousseau, perhaps for only heuristic purposes, there is no private property in an idyllic hypothetical 'state of nature', he does allow that in some social constructions, the institution of private property could have positive value. In other words, his denial is of a natural right of private property, though not necessarily of a convential one. In sharp contrast, and often overlooked, Marx does recognize one natural right of private property--of one's labor and its fruits. Furthermore, his Socialism does not abolish that; rather, it sublates it in collective ownership. Fundamental to his departue from Rousseau is that overcoming of private property is an episode in the self-making of humans, not an apriori or a pre-historical given.

Thursday, July 2, 2015

General Will and Private Property

Plainly influencing Marx in his Introduction to his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right is the French Revolution, and, hence, Rousseau. Accordingly implicit in the passages is both a critique of Capitalism, and a clarification of his championing of the Proletariat. For, Smith, too, is influenced by Rousseau, with his Invisible Hand a representation of the General Will of the latter. However, one significant distinction between the two concepts is that while the General Will is the expression of a social condition that precedes Private Property, the Invisible Hand not only presupposes the latter, but preserves and, perhaps, redeems it, as the principle of Justice in Smith's system. The distinction thus illustrates that Private Property hinders social integration. from which Marx likely inferred that the only possible concrete locus of any universal Practical principle is the property-less Proletariat.

Wednesday, July 1, 2015

Private Property and Proletariat

In his Introduction to his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Marx champions the Proletariat, explaining that they share an interest in the abolition of private property. Now, while his own advocacy of the latter is implicit in his preceding targeting of Democritus' Mechanistic Atomism, his ascription of the interest to the Proletariat is based on his analysis that, upon the assumption of power, the attributes of the new ruling class become ruling values, e. g. the property-lessness of the Proletariat. However, that analysis assumes that the Proletariat value and not merely have endured that attribute. In contrast, his later argument that the Proletariat are exploited as a consequence of the institution of private property entails a more plausible interest in its abolition. So, his attempt to align himself with them in the Hegel Introduction, as heartfelt as it might be, bears a trace of if not condescension, at least romanticization.