Tuesday, November 30, 2010

Bergson, Duration, Art

Bergson's concept of Durational Consciousness is plainly inspired by his appreciation of the fluidity of music. However, that appreciation does not seem to extend to the associated fact that music does not merely appear of its own accord, but is produced by players, the fluidity of whose movements is expressed by the sonic seamlessness that Bergson enjoys. So, if he were not apparently committed to a Spirit-Matter, and, hence, to a Consciousness-Action, opposition, he might have recognized that artistic activity strikes an equilibrium of Consciousness and Movement, and, hence, that experiential Duration is a characteristic of that activity, not an exclusive property of immaterial Consciousness. Accordingly, his study of 'creative evolution', might have focused more on a generalization of personal artistry to the creativity of Nature, rather than getting bogged down trying to explain the degeneration of Spirit into Matter.

Monday, November 29, 2010

Bergson, Retrospection, Intuition

Bergson characterizes Intellect as 'retrospective' consciousness. So, since retrospection is necessarily subsequent to its object, any object of Intellect is necessarily complete and immobile. He thus sharply opposes Intellect to Intuition, the object of which is dynamic and ongoing. His examination of retrospection, however, seems to gloss over an important distinction--between its object being given as already complete, and the immobility of its object being the product of Intellect's own hypostasization of whatever it encounters. The latter uncertainty cannot be resolved by an appeal to direct examination, which can only beg the question. But, in cases where Bergson stipulates the mobility of an object, and, hence, the inadequacy of Intellect to it, the Intellect is exposed as effecting its own hypostasization of the object, and Bergson has no grounds for assuming that it does not function likewise in all cases. Now, as Bergson himself characterizes it, the object of Intuition is immediately given. So, insofar as it is given, an object of Intuition precedes the Intuition of it. In other words, Intuition is no less retrospective than is Intellect, and its object is no less a product of hypostasization than that of the latter.

Sunday, November 28, 2010

Bergson, Consciousness, Inertia

One of Bergson's cardinal theses is that the Intellect is an hypostasization of Consciousness that accommodates it to inert Matter, and, is, hence radically opposed to Intuition, which is the Consciousness of dynamic process. But his concept of 'inertia' varies--in some cases he treats it as absolute, and, in others, as only relative, i. e. it consists in processes that have become stabilized. Accordingly, his concept of the Intellect varies as well--in the former case, hypostasization is necessary to accommodate Consciousness to Matter, but in the latter, Consciousness need only adjust to the frequencies of those processes. In other words, insofar as inertia is relative, the Intellect in its successful operation achieves sympathy with Matter, which does not distinguish it from Intuition, which, as Bergson plainly formulates, is a type of Sympathy. Hence, his contention that Intellect and Intuition are radically opposed is only a function of his thesis that Matter is absolutely inert, a thesis which he himself seems at times to disown.

Saturday, November 27, 2010

Bergson and Free Will

The standard English-language title of Bergson's first work, 'Time and Free Will', is hardly a direct translation of the original French, 'Essay on the Immediate Givens in Consciousness'. Still while 'Time' crucially misrepresents the main theme of the book, the essay does include a defense of Free Will. The main thread of the argument for the latter is that experience is fundamentally in heterogeneous flux; Deterministic theories all represent experience as static and homogeneous; hence, Determinism misrepresents experience, whereas Free Will, understood as a relation between a concrete self and an act that it performs, is self-evidently given in experience. The 'freedom' that Bergson espouses is therefore not as radical as Sartre's notion, since the latter entails the occurrence in experience of disruptive Nothingnesses, whereas for Bergson, transitions are seamless. But, as he expands in his later work on his original insights, this concept of Free Will as an episode in a seamless flux becomes vulnerable to new challenges. For example, in Creative Evolution, he now characterizes 'will' as a continuation of an impulsion, which, in turn, is a result of interactions that include solar energy, derived ultimately from vegetation. So, while the inter-species flow of these processes may still elude Deterministic homogenization, they are now exposed to a Humean or a Schopenhauerian criticism--that a 'self' is not given either as an element in, or as circumscribing, the immediate data of Consciousness. Hence, the 'free will' that, according to Bergson, is a function of that 'self', is not self-evidently given, and is, thus, possibly impersonal, as Schopenhauer argues.

Friday, November 26, 2010

Bergson, Elan Vital, Solar Energy

Some passages in Creative Evolution suggest that 'Elan Vital' is nothing other than what is more commonly known as 'solar energy'. Bergson traces the transmission of the latter, from plants that store it up, often via animals, to humans, who have the capacity to 'turn heat into light'. Hence, his references to the illuminatory power of Consciousness can be taken literally. Now, in its purest mode, according to Bergson, Consciousness is Intuition, of which the Intellect is a derivative application, i. e. to Matter. Hence, not only does he, as he announces in the introduction to Creative Evolution, expose the inadequacy of the Intellect to Elan Vital, he demonstrates that Reason, i. e. the Intellect, is neither the most highly evolved nor the most spiritual power in nature. In the process, he, like Nietzsche, presents a naturalistic derivation of Reason, as well as a literal counterpart to Plato's heliotropism.

Wednesday, November 24, 2010

Alexander's Nisus

Alexander generally treats the relation between an Emergent and its underlying constellation of processes as fortuitous inter-level compresence. However, occasionally, primarily in the context of his discussion of Deity, he cites a 'nisus' as the motivation of a rise of a higher level quality from a lower. Now, if, as he implies, the entire extant universe is striving towards Deity, then the latter is the ultimate telos of all motion in that universe, including that of human activity. However, his elaborate analysis of the Mind-Object relation only very briefly acknowledges that cognition is a special case of practical conation. In other words, conspicuously lacking in his system is any detailed consideration of how human interaction with the world is implicated in the general nisus towards Deity. So, it is perhaps Alexander's relative neglect of Psychology that has, despite its innovations and ambitions, diminished, in comparison with its rivals from Spinoza and Whitehead, the influence of his system.

Tuesday, November 23, 2010

Bergson, Matter, Evolution

Because Elan Vital is the monistic Spiritual principle of Bergson's system, he is challenged to explain the derivation and the status in the system of Matter. In many places, he characterizes Matter as degraded Spirit, a sedimentary product of the relaxation of Elan vital. But, in others, he presents it as an obstacle to Spirit, the overcoming of which by the latter produces organized Material structures. This ambivalence bears significantly on his concept of 'evolution'. If Matter is degraded Spirit, then the impetus of evolution is towards purer Spirituality. But, if Matter is complicit with Spirit in the generation of more comprehensive vital processes, manifested by more complex physical structures, then evolution is the drive towards higher combined Spirituality and Materiality. His attribution of evolutionary superiority to humans in nature, qua unique bearers of Spirit, further expresses his ambivalence regarding the status of Matter--he leaves it unclear whether or not he considers human Materiality to be essential to that superiority.

Monday, November 22, 2010

Alexander, Morality, Religion

Alexander asserts that Deity is 'beyond good and evil', and that Religion is independent of Morality. Nevertheless, he also suggests that Deity is "on the side of" goodness. However, a conjunction of several other components of his system seems to imply that both of these judgments are inaccurate. For, he maintains that Moral good consists in social harmony, that a concomitant of an Emergent is the unity of its underlying processes, and that Deity is an Emergent of the extant universe. It therefore follows that Deity will unify the universe, and, hence, that it will harmonize human society. In other words, Deity entails the actualization of goodness, and, so, Religion and Morality are, despite his assertions to the contrary, interrelated in his system.

Sunday, November 21, 2010

Bergson and the Geometry of Duration

One of Bergson's original central arguments is that the geometricization of Duration as a straight line is inadequate to Durational continuity. However, he himself later represents Elan Vital as a curve. Perhaps in the interim he comes to recognize that a straight line is per se itself continuous, and that it is not actually fractured by the superimposition over it of a perpendicular line. Perhaps he further realizes that the inadequacy of a straight line to Duration consists not insofar as it is internally divisible, but insofar as even an infinite aggregate of discrete straight lines, e. g. tangents, can only approximately reconstruct a curve. Now, the curve-tangent relation is a geometrical representation of the Acceleration-Velocity contrast. Furthermore, Force is defined in terms of Acceleration, and Elan Vital is conceivable as a Force. In other words, the inadequacy of a straight line as a representation of Duration consists not in its divisibility, nor in its geometrical nature, but because it is simply the wrong geometrical representation of it, i. e. while a straight line represents Velocity, Duration is an accelerating motion.

Saturday, November 20, 2010

Alexander, Emergence, Acceleration

Alexander's notion 'Emergence' has been susceptible to criticisms that it is abstract, vague, or even mystical. However, given, as he readily acknowledges, that his 'Space-Time' that underlies all emergents is nothing but Motion, a more concrete characterization of Emergence is available.
For, as is familiar in Modern Physics, higher levels of Motion can emerge from lower ones, simply by an increase in the rate of change, e. g. Acceleration emerges from Velocity, an increase in Acceleration emerges from Acceleration, etc. Furthermore, as is the case with multiple levels of Quality for Alexander, different levels of Motion can occupy one and the same location, e. g. one and the same phenomenon can be characterized either as Velocity or as Acceleration. Given that he seemingly accords little attention to Acceleration, it is unclear if he would accept an interpretation of Emergence in terms of it. Nevertheless, it does seem to provide that notion with some grounded concrete precision that it otherwise lacks.

Friday, November 19, 2010

Bergson--Intuition, Duration, Elan Vital

In Bergson's system, Elan Vital is the immanent creative process, Duration is the continuity of that process, and Intuition is the means by which Duration or Elan Vital is experienced. Furthermore, since he also characterizes Intuition as a reflective process, what is intuited must be in the subject. Now, the cognition of Duration is possible only via a detached, fixed perspective. On the other hand, there are no grounds for assuming the existence of unintuited inner Elan Vital, which means that there are no grounds for positing that Intuition is detached from inner Duration. Hence, Intuition must be somehow implicated in inner Elan Vital, though, since the latter is the primary principle of all processes, Intuition cannot be its source. Intuition may thus be the Formal Cause of inner Elan Vital, i. e. the guide and shaping of the process, and, hence, the source of the unity of inner Duration. On this analysis, any relation of Intuition to external Elan Vital can only be mediated. More generally, as is arguably the case with Spinoza, the continuity of experience, for Bergson, seems to be not a sometimes revealed given, but actively created.

Thursday, November 18, 2010

Alexander and Color

At first glance, Alexander's thesis, that Color emerges from underlying physico-chemical processes, seems aligned with Locke's theory of Secondary Qualities. However, it diverges from the latter in one significant respect--whereas for Locke, the emergence occurs in a perceiver, Alexander locates it in the object itself, independent of any perceptual act. Perhaps because of the ample scientific evidence that tends to support Locke's theory, Alexander defends his divergence with an appeal to common sense, i. e. that a color appears as existing in an object, at a distance from a perceiver. However, the same argument is ineffective for the appearance of a color in a mirror, plus, an appeal to common sense, in the context of an argument that unperceived physico-chemical processes exist in the same location as a perceived color, seems anomalous. Furthermore, Alexander does not even entertain one of the strongest presumed counter-examples to his position--cases of color-blindness, which seem to demonstrate that the perception of color is a function of the condition of perceptual processes, independent of any perceptual object. Thus, his reluctance to reject the possibility that Color emerges in the perceiver, from the physico-chemical processes that constitute the interaction of an object with a perceptual apparatus, seems based less on the merits of the thesis itself, and more on his contention that it is the tertiary qualities, Goodness, Beauty, Truth, that emerge from subject-object interaction.

Wednesday, November 17, 2010

Bergson and the Pre-Socratics

With the priority in his system of dynamic processes over immobile matter, Bergson seems to have revived the ancient Becoming vs. Being debate, aligning himself with Heraclitus, against Parmenides, among the pre-Socratics. However, that Fire is the cardinal element for Heraclitus suggests that Bergson's philosophical ancestor is someone else. For, the most prominent imagery that Bergson uses to describe his fundamental principle is liquid, plus, that principle is the source of vitality in nature. In other words, Bergson's pre-Socratic precursor is Thales, more than Heraclitus. Furthermore, the significance for Bergson of fluidity is not merely its mobility, but also its continuity. Now, the more immediate antithesis of fluid continuity is not static unity, such as Parmenides 'the One', but an aggregate of inert particulars. In other words, the pre-Socratic that Bergson is most directly opposed to is the father of Atomism, Democritus.

Tuesday, November 16, 2010

Alexander, Contemplation, Enjoyment

Alexander introduces the terms 'contemplation' and 'enjoyment' to expose and avoid what he takes to be a traditional equivocation--'consciousness', as in 'consciousness of an external object', vs. 'consciousness', as in 'self-consciousness'--with 'enjoyment' not connoting 'accompanied by pleasure'. In other words, he holds that the relation of mind to an external object, and the accompanying one of mind to itself, are heterogeneous. As a precedent, he cites Spinoza's distinction, within the same experience, between an idea of the cause of a modification of the body, and an idea of that modification of the body. However, Alexander's reference is puzzling, since 'enjoyment', for him, is an intra-psychic relation, while Spinoza's idea of a modification of the body is not, plus, Alexander also distances himself from Spinoza's own intra-psychic relation, i. e. an idea of an idea. On the hand, a lineage with which Alexander could not be familiar seems to be the similarity between his contemplation/enjoyment pair and Sartre's eventual thetic/non-thetic contrast. Furthermore, the power of Alexander's projected Deity to contemplate enjoyment likewise resembles the structure of Sartre's 'God', namely, in-itself-for-itself. Still, Alexander does not seem to entertain a Kantian analysis--that experience consists in neither two homogeneous acts of consciousness, nor two heterogeneous ones, but, rather, one act, predicated alternatively of either an external object or of the experiencing subject.

Monday, November 15, 2010

Bergson, Intellect, Intuition

According to Bergson, the object, in general, of the Intellect is static, either inert matter, or hypostasized dynamic processes. Accordingly, Zeno's Paradoxes are exposures, according to Bergson, of the inadequacy of the Intellect to Motion, e. g. the aggregate of the representations of various stages of a flight of an arrow can never unify into a perception of its actual continuous movement. Instead, only Intuition directly perceives the flux of immediate experience, according to him. Now, on his analysis, Intuition is Instinct having "become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting on its object". In turn, he identifies Instinct with Sympathy. Hence, it follows that for Bergson, Intuition is disinterested Sympathy. So, one consequence of his having solved one classic paradox, is the generation of, if not an out-an-out contradiction, at least, another paradox. But, what his analysis of Intuition does bear out is that it is less antithetical to Intellect then a combination of the latter and Instinct.

Sunday, November 14, 2010

Alexander and Deity

Alexander's presentation of 'Deity' focuses primarily on its emergent structure as a hitherto non-existent quality that will unify and transcend the entirety of what currently exists, as. e. g. a color emerges from underlying physico-chemical processes. Though an exposition of the quality is premature, Alexander projects its general structure by analogy--it will consist in an objective experience of the subjective dimension of experience, or, in his terminology, a 'contemplation' of 'enjoyment'. However, one peculiarity of this concept is that it is not as unprecedented as Alexander seems to take it to be. For sure, an external understanding of any internal experience, one's own or that of others, seems impossible for humans as currently constituted, but the concept of a God with such powers is nothing new. For, the ability, often attributed to traditional notions of God, to understand one's innermost thoughts, seems already to exemplify a 'contemplation of an enjoyment'. So, if Alexander's Deity is to surpass all hitherto qualities, it's structure will have to be something other than one that has already been conceived.

Saturday, November 13, 2010

Spinoza, Bergson, Alexander, Nietzsche, Pantheism

While both Bergson and Alexander have been classified as 'Pantheistic', comparisons between their systems and Spinoza's only underscore their limitations with respect to the rigorous standards established by the latter. In general, whereas for Spinoza, everything in Nature is divine, for both Bergson and Alexander, only portions of it are. For Bergson, Elan Vital is God, but Matter is like fallen angels. For Alexander, the relation of Deity to Nature is, in some key respects, like that of an incipient tree-ring to a given tree--when fully emerged, Deity might contain all of Nature, but it itself is only a part of Nature, and Nature has existed without it. In contrast with both Bergson and Alexander, Nietzsche comes closer to expressing Spinoza's reverence for all of Nature, in his affirmation of Eternal Recurrence, which resists imposing any anthropomorphic judgment on any aspect of Nature. In other words, all four Philosophers can be classified as 'Naturalistic', but, insofar as any component of Nature, at any stage of development, is conceived as non-divine, the concept of Nature of which it is a part is not 'Pantheistic' in the Spinozistic sense.

Friday, November 12, 2010

Spinoza and Bergson.

Bergson's system is sometimes classified as Pantheistic, because, like Spinoza's 'natura naturans', his 'Elan Vital' is an immanent creative principle. However, Bergson diverges from Spinoza in holding that Matter is nothing more than degenerated Elan Vital, and, furthermore, that both Spinozistic Extension and Thought are only an arrangement and a structuring of Matter. Hence, he rejects the thesis that Extension and Thought are attributes of the fundamental creative impetus. Similarly, since Body and Mind, as Spinoza understands them, are modes of Extension and Thought, they, too are extrinsic characterizations of individual conatus, which, on Bergson's account, is localized Elan Vital. Now, for Bergson, Freedom consists in the liberation of Elan Vital from Matter, and Reason, even as an organizing principle, is an accommodation of Mind to Matter, notably to the Emotions, which, on Spinoza's own account, are no more than physical interactions. Thus, for Bergson, while Reason can serve as a means to Freedom, it cannot be its ground. However, Spinoza need not accept this divergence from his own theory of Freedom as a critique of it, because it is based on a premise to which he does not subscribe, namely that Matter is degenerated natura naturans. Furthermore, that premise precludes an interpretation of Extension and Thought that Bergson apparently does not appreciate--that they are dynamic powers, not static properties.

Thursday, November 11, 2010

Spinoza and Alexander

Samuel Alexander is sometimes characterized as a contemporary Spinozist. The main basis for that classification is Alexander's system, which, like Spinoza's is Naturalistic, and features two primary attributes. For Alexander, those attributes are Space and Time, in contrast with Spinoza's Extension and Thought, such that everything that exists is a combination of Space and Time. However, unlike Spinozism, Alexander's system features a hierarchical structure, organized in terms of relations of 'emergence', in which higher qualities emerge from lower Space-Time configurations, e. g. colors from physical processes, though, both levels may be in the object itself, rather than as Locke has it. The current highest level of Nature, according to Alexander is Mind, which emerges from cerebral neural patterns. But, Alexander projects the eventual emergence of a next level, 'Deity', from Mind. Hence, while, like Spinoza's God, Alexander's Deity is Naturalistic, unlike the former, it is neither co-extensive with Nature nor eternal. Furthermore, Alexander's Deity, whether while in the process of emerging, or completely emerged, seems to have no practical implications for current actual individual conduct, unlike Spinoza's God, the knowledge of which promotes the freedom of an individual.

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

Spinoza and Individuality

Previously discussed here has been the distinction between the common connotation of 'individual', i. e. 'discrete', and its rarely used literal meaning, i. e. 'undivided'. That the two meanings are not equivalent is clear from the fact that the former type of 'individuality' entails finitude, while the latter does not. Though Spinoza does not dwell on the usages of the terms themselves, his system expresses his appreciation of the significance of the distinction between them. For, as he argues, modular individuality is defined by the persistence of its effort to exist, which entails continuity. In contrast, the idea of oneself as a discrete entity is only an inadequate idea, nor does a mere aggregate of such ideas add up to an adequate one. Instead, experiential continuity is possible for Spinoza only as rational development, and the primary principle of Rationality is internal coherence, i. e. non-contradiction. Hence, 'individuality', meaning 'undivided' is indicative of adequacy, whereas 'individuality', meaning 'discrete', is indicative of inadequacy, in a system one cardinal principle of which is the distinction between adequate and inadequate knowledge.

Tuesday, November 9, 2010

Wolfson and Spinoza's Geometrical Method

Wolfson asserts that "there is no logical connection" between the substance of Spinoza's Ethics, and its manner of presentation, which Spinoza himself characterizes as a 'geometrical method'. Wolfson does acknowledge that Spinoza's anti-Teleological Necessitarianism does reflect Spinoza's appreciation of Mathematical relations, but he still maintains that the 'literary style' of the work is primarily pedagogically motivated, i. e. because of the clarity of the geometrical method. However, if Wolfson's interpretation is correct, then Spinoza has either undermined the substance of his system, or has, at least, violated one of its central principles. For, if, as the system proposes, all events are rationally ordered, then so, too, must be the relation between the event of Spinoza's presentation of the system and the rest of Nature. So, if, as Wolfson implies, the presentation is an arbitrary deviation from that system of Nature, then either the system is not true, or it is has an inadequate idea of itself. Surely Spinoza believes that the system is true. Furthermore, it is difficult to accept Wolfson's implication that the deductive development of the argument of the Ethics, from self-evident axioms, with the help of definitions and postulates, is not, first and foremost, an expression of Spinoza's conscientiousness regarding one of the cardinal principles of the system, namely the difference between adequate and inadequate knowledge. So, regardless of the erudition of Wolfson's interpretation, it seems to miss its mark.

Monday, November 8, 2010

Spinoza and Reflection

Spinoza's proposition, in the Ethics, that "the idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body", is often interpreted as his attempt to incorporate a concept of Reflection into his system. Several difficulties seem to challenge that attempt--distinguishing an idea of an idea from the initial idea; the generation of an infinite recursion; and, an apparent violation of his Parallelism thesis, i. e. an idea of an idea is a connection that seems to have no correlate between things. Still, some commentators, e. g. Wolfson, seem to regard that incorporation as significant enough to gloss over those apparent inconsistencies. However, in so doing, they miss the primary function of the Spinoza's introduction of the concept. As he puts it in On the Improvement of the Understanding, "in order to know, there is no need to know that we know", and, conversely, the main theme of the propositions that succeed the above one in the Ethics is that the reflection of an inadequate idea does not transform it into an adequate one. In other words, the potential inconsistencies are irrelevant to the main purpose of the introduction of the concept, which is to repudiate theories in which Reflection has a privileged status, e. g. Cartesianism and Aristotelianism.

Sunday, November 7, 2010

Spinoza and Logic

For Spinoza, an Adequate Idea is one that God thinks, and, since such an idea entails antecedents and consequences, it is not a singular occurrence, but part of a sequence of thoughts. Hence, when an individual Mind thinks an Adequate Idea, it is functioning as perfectly rationally as God does. But, doing so is not accidental, but of the essence of any Mind, because, it is only in functioning in this manner that a Mode can persist in its own being. For, otherwise, it is no more than a component of some external chain of events, in which it does not truly persist in its own being. Hence, because a Mode is only itself insofar as it thinks adequate ideas, Spinoza occasionally characterizes it as a rational "automaton". In other words, Logic, for him, is not, as it most prevalently is currently, a merely normative discipline, but is, rather, a description of the essential nature of Mind, from which deviation occurs only because of the susceptibility of a finite Mode to external influences, not because of an internal 'irrational' dimension of its being.

Saturday, November 6, 2010

Spinoza, God, Logos

For Spinoza, the object of Intuition is a relation, independent of the terms that it relates, either Causation or Inference. But, Causation is an expression of God's power of Extension, and Inference is an expression of God's power of Thought, i. e. God's two attributes are dynamic processes, not static properties. Hence, God, in one respect or the other, is the object of Intuition, i. e. of Spinoza's 'third kind of Knowledge'. Furthermore, as a rational creative force, God is identical to not only Nature, but, even though Spinoza never formulates it as such, to the Logos, in the Heraclitan or Stoic sense, as well. In other words, in Spinoza's Pantheism, the Logos is God, not merely one of God's properties, powers, or manners of expression, as other traditions have it.

Friday, November 5, 2010

Spinoza, Reason, Intuition

The preceding discussion distinguishes between two interpretations of Spinoza's notion 'Adequate Idea'. According to one, an Adequate Idea is knowledge of an effect the cause of which is also known, or, equivalently, it is the conclusion of a valid deductive process. According to the second, an Adequate Idea is knowledge of the relation itself that obtains between a cause and an effect, or, equivalently, between a premise and a consequence. However, these are not conflicting interpretations of Spinoza's notion; rather, the first is a characterization of what Spinoza calls 'Reason', while the second, of what he calls 'Intuition', i. e. his 'second' and 'third' kinds of Knowledge, respectively. These characterizations correspond to his example of the two knowledges of a mathematical ratio--one the result of an orderly derivation from Euclidean premises, the other, the result of a direct insight into the numerical relation itself. More precisely, the idea of a relation as Causality or Reasoning per se accords with Spinoza's definition of an Intuition as 'an idea proceeding from the essence of God's attributes', i. e. from Extension or from Thinking, respectively, understood as dynamic powers, not as static properties.

Thursday, November 4, 2010

Spinoza, Adequate Cause, Adequate Idea

For Spinoza, an Adequate Idea of a created entity entails knowledge of the proximate cause of the entity. Furthermore, an 'Adequate Cause', for him, is a cause through which its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived. It thus follows that the object of an Adequate Idea of a created entity entails the Adequate Cause of the entity as well. Hence, the proper of object such an Adequate Idea is not so much an entity, or its cause, but the causality that connects them. Likewise, an Adequate Idea is not so much either the conclusion of a deductive procedure, or the premise from which it is deduced, but that deductive process itself.

Wednesday, November 3, 2010

Spinoza, Deleuze, Adequacy, Justification

Deleuze interprets Spinoza's concept of an 'Adequate Idea' of a finite entity as entailing not merely knowledge of the cause of the entity, but also "expression" of the cause of the idea itself. Insofar as 'Expression' has a perhaps idiosyncratic ontological significance for Deleuze, it is not immediately clear in what respect an idea can be said to 'express' its cause. However, his discussion suggests that what the term denotes is approximately equivalent to a more traditional relation, one that similarly clarifies Spinoza's concept of Adequate Idea. For an idea to 'express' its cause seems to mean to Deleuze that it entails the intellectual process by which it is derived. In other words, it entails what is more traditionally called 'justification'. Accordingly, Spinoza's concept of an Adequate Idea is what is traditionally characterized as a 'justified belief', which as Spinoza plainly asserts, is independent of the relation between an idea and its object, i. e. is independent of whether or not it is also 'true'.

Tuesday, November 2, 2010

Spinoza, Sartre, Emotion

One Philosophical context in which Spinoza and Sartre often appear conjointly is the topic of 'Free Will vs. Determinism'. Since Spinoza holds that every proximate cause of human action is itself the effect of a preceding cause, and Sartre holds that no cause of human action is the effect of a preceding cause, the two are often recognized as prototypes of diametrically opposed positions on the topic. Less well noted is their virtual agreement on another issue--that an Emotion is a derivative and diminished psychological condition. For Spinoza, an Emotion is, in general, an increase or decrease in strength that is the effect of an external cause, while for Sartre, it is a vicarious substitute for a thwarted action. So, for both, an Emotion is neither a psychological Atom, nor a fully active condition. The two thus oppose both philosophical traditions that affirm the ontological irreducibility of an Emotion, and conventional moralities that not only treat Emotions as the distinctive elements of personal character, but tend to glamorize them as well. Spinoza's analysis, in particular, demonstrates that an Emotion is no more distinctively human than any effect of a mechanical cause.

Monday, November 1, 2010

Spinoza, Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil

Deleuze suggests that Spinoza is an inspiration for Nietzsche's 'beyond Good and Evil' notion. The 'Good and Evil' that Nietzsche repudiates has three main dimensions--a psychological strategy, an ontological doctrine, and an historical tradition. The psychological strategy is the use of those value terms as weapons of the weak against strength. The ontological doctrine holds that Being is fundamentally a conflict between a benign force and a malignant force. The historical tradition is the Christian dogma that has dominated in Europe for centuries. In contrast, Spinoza is plainly aware that his system diverges from orthodox Judaeo-Christianity, and he does offer not so much a psychological but an epistemological diagnosis of the ideas 'Good' and 'Evil', i. e. they are inadequate ideas. But the more significant dimension of the three for him is the ontological one, since his Monism, with which Good-Evil Dualism is incompatible. Still, even more fundamental for him is the principle that his Monism expresses, namely his Rationalism. For, Rationality demands systematic unity, and an ontological Good-Evil split violates that unity. Likewise, the unitary source for Nietzsche of all three dimensions of 'Good and Evil', including the ontological one, is his Will to Power principle, from which each of his three repudiatios follows.