Spinoza, Sartre, Emotion

One Philosophical context in which Spinoza and Sartre often appear conjointly is the topic of 'Free Will vs. Determinism'. Since Spinoza holds that every proximate cause of human action is itself the effect of a preceding cause, and Sartre holds that no cause of human action is the effect of a preceding cause, the two are often recognized as prototypes of diametrically opposed positions on the topic. Less well noted is their virtual agreement on another issue--that an Emotion is a derivative and diminished psychological condition. For Spinoza, an Emotion is, in general, an increase or decrease in strength that is the effect of an external cause, while for Sartre, it is a vicarious substitute for a thwarted action. So, for both, an Emotion is neither a psychological Atom, nor a fully active condition. The two thus oppose both philosophical traditions that affirm the ontological irreducibility of an Emotion, and conventional moralities that not only treat Emotions as the distinctive elements of personal character, but tend to glamorize them as well. Spinoza's analysis, in particular, demonstrates that an Emotion is no more distinctively human than any effect of a mechanical cause.