Ought, Can, Reason

Some contemporary Deontic Logicians study a thesis that they attribute to Kant--Ought implies Can.  However, both the Logical status of the thesis, and the attribution, are problematic.  To begin with, if Can has any Modal meaning, it is Possibility.  But the formulation Ought implies Possibility conflates Deontic Logic and Modal Logic, and, hence, as is, is meaningless in either.  Now, Kant does assert the thesis, but as an expression of principles that seem well beyond the scope of its putative adaptation.  To begin with, their example of the case of someone who cannot repay a loan because of dire financial straits is irrelevant to Kant's derivation of Ought on the grounds that a false-promise Maxim cannot be Universalized.  So, the citing of that example indicates a lack of recognition that Kant's Ought is specifically one of Reason.  Likewise, there seems to be no recognition that for Kant, the motivator is not Ought per se, but Ought for Ought's sake, the ground of which is Reason for Reason's sake.  But of great significance to him is that acting on Reason for Reason's sake, as opposed to merely obeying Reason, entails voluntarily giving oneself Reason, i. e. Autonomy, and it is insofar as Reason creates this option that is the source of a Can.  So, the attribution, by some Deontic Logicians, of 'Ought implies Can' to Kant, abstracts the Deontic Morality dimension of his doctrine from its Rational Ethics dimension.

Actuality and Deontic Logic

To act means to do, and in Greek, Praxis means Doing.  Hence, if Actuality is an element in Modal Logic, it can only be in Deontic Logic.  But the relations of Actuality to Obligation and Permissibility are at least as uncertain as those of it to Necessity and Possibility.  For, plainly, that some behavior is Actual does not entail that it is Permissible, and that some behavior is Obligatory does not entail that it is Actualized.  The latter inadequacy especially inconveniences Kant, who, having characterized the source of Obligation as 'Will', upon recognizing that volition is the source of the choice of whether or not to obey, is forced to introduce a second concept of 'Will'.  But Kant is far from alone in failing to systematize Actuality--it eludes any incorporation into a Modal system, Theoretical or Practical--for the simple reason that Modality is a category of Thought, and Actuality is independent of Thought.  Now, the Deontic operators can be relevant to behavior, i. e. knowing whether or not some behavior is mandatory, or whether or not it is permitted, can be a factor in deliberation, as preparation for action.  But, in such a context, recourse to explicit Deontic calculation is rarely required, and can be, rather, a source of confusion.  For example, in ordinary contexts, 'X is permitted' grants permission to everybody, whereas Deontic 'X is Permissible' has no Universalist connotation.  The example illustrates the general questionability in the actual world of the value of Deontic Logic.

Actuality and Modal Logic

A debate in contemporary Modal Logic is whether or not there is an Actual World.  The debate seems confused in two main respects.  First, as is the case with the discipline in general, it is unclear if the debate is Methodological or Ontological.  Second, arguments against recognition of an Actual World are often on the grounds that there is no such privileged World.  So, in that case, what is being affirmed is that there are multiple Actual Worlds, not none, i. e. as if it were an expression of a variety of Perspectivism.  Regardless, at the root of the confusion is the absence, conspicuous in a context in which precision is among the highest values, of any definition of 'actuality'.  The defense of that absence on the grounds that the term is primitive seems to evade potentially considerable complication.  For, even as primitive, the use must be consistent with the pervasive uses of terms like 'act', activate', 'actualization', etc., all of which seem too unwieldy for Modal Logic.  For example, in the terms of that system, to 'actualize' might be represented as to 'move from a possible world to an actual world', thereby raising a manifold of questions about what obtains in between a possible world and an actual world, answering which seems well beyond the scope of casual Ontology or Epistemology.  So, as is, in the context of contemporary Modal Logic, 'actuality' is no more than a symbol that is as empty as the square and the diamond, to be evaluated only in terms of its fruitfulness, with respect to which any other debate about it is idle.

Rational Ethics and Deontic Logic

As has been previously discussed, what begins as the development by Kant of a Rational Ethics, stops well short of Actualization, which would require an introduction of Technical Reason to explain how Reason can create behavior.  Instead, he introduces into the breach the concept of Duty, as part of his effort to coordinate Rational Ethics with conventional, Theology-based, Deontic Morality.  As a result, Obedience replaces Autonomy as the behavioral focus of his doctrine, and, hence, is the ground of Virtue.  Accordingly, to whatever extent Kant's Moral doctrine can be credited with pioneering more recent Deontic Logic, it is not on the basis of his Rationalist Ethics, which transcends the mere exercise of the so-called Practical Syllogism.

Critique of Practical Reason and Technical Reason

One reason why the Critique of Pure Reason is so much longer than the Critique of Practical Reason is that absent from the latter is an analysis of Action that is as detailed as that of Cognition in the former.  While the former explains how concepts and sense-information interact, the latter takes the interaction of concepts and motor activity for granted. In other words, he recognizes no difference between intending to act on a maxim and successfully acting on a maxim, which might be no problem for evaluation in service of Theologically-based conventional Morality, but it leaves a Critique of Practical Reason incomplete.  At the heart of what is missing is a Practical correlate of Schematism, i. e. an explanation of how a Maxim that has been adopted does in fact guide behavior, and how uncertainties in that implementation might affect evaluation.  For example, someone in extreme pain might lack the ability to resist suicide, to cultivate their talents, or to promote the happiness of others, therefore rendering them non-virtuous, and, hence, unworthy of happiness.  The Practical correlate of Schematism that would fill that gap is Technical Reason, a kin of Practical Reason either as its general case, or as an instance of it, as has been previously discussed.  But including an analytic of Technical Reason potentially alters the scope of what constitutes Totality for Practical Reason, and how a deity might be involved.  For, there is an uncertainty in such an analytic, i. e. in the gap between Intention and Actualization. Accordingly, filling that gap is required for achieving Totality, and if a deity must be invoked by Practical Reason, it is for filling the gap, which, indeed, occurs in conventional religion whenever someone petitions their deity for 'strength' to accomplish something.  But, in that case, the goal of Practical Reason is Actualization, and its principle is Sufficiency.  This is a scope of Practical Reason that is different from Kant's, in which the principle is Practical Necessity, i. e. Duty, and the goal is Happiness in proportion to obedience to that principle.

Practical Reason, Technical Reason, Pantheism

Traditionally, Praxis and Techne are distinguished as Doing vs. Making.  Also implicit in that distinction is that of the object of the process--oneself vs. something external.  But, Doing can also be conceived as Making-oneself, i. e. common phrases like 'making something of oneself' or 're-inventing oneself' connote Techne as much as Praxis.  But, that connotation has more rarified origins.  In Immanent Pantheism, e. g. Spinoza's, all divine creating is self-creating, as is, therefore, the conduct of a Mode who instantiates that divinity.  Likewise, a creature who is created 'in the image' of its creator, e. g. in Genesis 1, is itself a creator, first and foremost.  So, there are Theological grounds for conceiving Practical Reason as a special case of Technical Reason, but they are generally not recognized as such because of heterodox premises.  On those grounds, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is actually a Principle of Sufficient Technical Reason, a potential Theologically-based fundamental Ethical principle, e. g. Spinoza's doctrine.

Sufficient Reason and Deity

That this is the 'best of all possible worlds' is, according to Leibniz, the reason why his deity creates it rather than some other world.  Hence, it functions as a Principle of Sufficient Practical Reason for that deity.  Now, Leibniz stops short of offering an explanation as to why that deity creates anything at all.  But, whatever the reason for that might be, the deity is employing a Principle of Sufficient Practical Reason.  So, at least implicit in Leibniz' Theology is the primacy of Practical Reason, and of Actualization over Modality, which is at the service of the former.  Now, when Kant introduces Pure Practical Reason, and elevates it above Pure Theoretical Reason, i. e. by attributing Autonomy to it, he signifies that the fundamental principle of Pure Practical Reason is a Principle of Sufficient Practical Reason, thereby elevating the goal of Praxis, i. e. actualizing some behavior, over any goal of Theoretical Reason, e. g. Totality or Necessity.  Thus, when he invokes Totality as a reason for incorporated a deity into his system, he abandons the priority of Practical Reason over Theoretical.  He thereby squanders an opportunity to more fully develop what is an innovative exposition of a Principle of Sufficient Practical Reason, including a stronger affirmation of the priority of Actualization over Totalization or Necessity. But it is not Theology per se that compromises the novelty; such an exposition would be consistent, and perhaps even illuminating, in the case of a Theology in which the first act of a deity is to create, e. g. the deity of Genesis 1, whose creation in its 'own image' is likewise first and foremost a creative being.

Sufficient Reason and Behavior

The Principle of Sufficient Reason has usually been in the service of Knowledge, i. e. in the seeking of an explanation of why something that exists does exist.  Hence, in that context, the Principle is that of, more precisely, Theoretical Reason.  But, it can also be applied to the production of an existent, e. g. to behavior, in which context Principle of Sufficient Practical, or Technical, Reason is a more accurate formulation.  Now, there is nothing new in the determination of why an action should occur rather than not occur--the name for such a determination has been Ethics or Morality.  In such a context, a Moral or Ethical principle functions as a Principle of Sufficient Reason, though it has rarely been characterized as such.  Accordingly, Reason is therein at the service of a Moral or Ethical principle, or, in other words, functions heteronomously, as Hume and others insist.  But there is one case in which Reason can function autonomously--when Rationality is itself the fundamental principle, i. e. seeking to produce behavior that is rational for its own sake. That Autonomy is Kant's ambition--his Principle of Pure Practical Reason aims for the production of rational behavior, defined as 'universalizable'.  So, his principle can also be characterized as a Principle of Sufficient Practical Reason, a response to Hume's subordination of Reason.  However, its purity is arguably compromised when, like Descartes with his Method, Kant turns Reason to Theological use.

Sufficient Reason, Theoretical Reason, Technical Reason

As has been previously discussed, the product of Descartes' Truth-seeking Method actually contains several concepts of Truth, and, correspondingly, several methods.  But, there is one method of establishing Truth that is perhaps more immediate and more successful than any of those--when Method itself produces an existence.  An example of Method producing an existence is right in front of Descartes--the work entitled the Discourse on the Method.  Likewise, while the Principle of Sufficient Reason is generally applied to given existents, there is little consideration given to the sufficiency of its own productivity, e. g. any work on just that topic.  In such a case, sufficient reason is a condition of production, not product.  In other words, there is a generally unrecognized distinction between Principle of Sufficient Theoretical Reason, and Principle of Sufficient Technical Reason.  Kant might have recognized his Principle of Pure Practical Reason as a case of the latter, i. e. as a principle for the production of rational behavior, but like Descartes, he gets sidetracked by Theological commitments.

Reason, Sufficiency, Actuality

The Principle of Sufficient Reason is, most generally, 'Everything that exists has a sufficient reason', with whether or nor 'reason' is synonymous with 'cause' the basis of a significant dispute between Rationalists and Empiricists.  Thus typically ignored is what 'Sufficient' might signify, i. e. how it is distinguished from 'Reason'.  One possibility is that it connotes a difference between conflicting reasons.  So, is there is a conflict of reasons in the simplest case, namely a single entity or event, it can only be a reason for it to exist vs. a reason for it to not exist, a conflict that underlies every conflict between multiple entities or events.  In other words, Sufficiency is a condition of Actualization, i. e. implicit in which is the rejection of non-Actualization.  Now, though Actuality is sometimes classified as a Modality, it is more than a Modality.  For, Modality is a category of Thought, whereas Actuality is independent of Thought.  Thus, Sufficiency is a stronger Rational condition than even Necessity, which is never more than Virtual, as is evinced by the insufficiency of Moral Necessity, i. e. Obligation, to compel obedience.  So, to accordingly modify it, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is 'Everything that exists has a reason why it is actual rather than non-actual'. 

Certainty, Necessity, Sufficiency

As has been previously discussed, one inadequacy of Descartes' condition of Certainty to Truth is that it is merely Subjective, while the latter is Objective.  Accordingly, Necessity is a more accurate indication of Truth.  However, as even contemporary practitioners of Modal Logic acknowledge, Necessity is not the strongest Logical condition.  Rather, it is Sufficiency.  Nevertheless, Logicians seem to lack a direct representation of Sufficiency, usually defining it only indirectly, i. e. negatively.  Likewise, the usual standard of Necessity, the Principle of Contradiction, is inadequate as a direct determinant of Sufficiency.  In contrast, Necessity can be derived directly from Sufficiency, as a special case--Unique Sufficiency, i. e. if A is the only sufficient condition of B, then it is also its Necessary condition. Instead, only adequate in that regard is a Principle of Sufficient Reason, whatever that might entail.  Now, while Descartes' Method seeks to establish Certainty, it does involve Sufficiency in one respect--in that very task.  In other words, implicit in its operation is the supposition that it suffices to determine Truth, a supposition that, as has been previously discussed, becomes falsified when Descartes must resort to the adoption of other Methods to establish the Truth of propositions beyond 'I exist' and 'God exists'. Similarly, in a comprehensive Logical system, a means of generating new propositions out of an initial set of tautological propositions is required.  However, Sufficiency never becomes an explicit criterion in Descartes' seminal works of Modern Philosophy.

Method and Truth

As is articulated in the full version of the title of the Discourse, Descartes devises his Method to seek Truth.  Now, there are multiple concepts of Truth, two of which Correspondence and Coherence.  The Correspondence concept of Truth is constituted by a relation between a belief and a state-of-affairs.  The Coherence concept of Truth is constituted by a relation between two or more beliefs.  Accordingly, there are multiple Truth-seeking Methods, one of which evaluates a single belief, another of which evaluates several beliefs at the same time.  So, plainly Descartes' Method of Doubt is a Correspondence Method, e. g. rejecting a belief as True on the grounds that it may be a dream, and, hence, its content does not correspond to that of an identical state-of-affairs.  But, at one juncture of the Meditations, Descartes becomes no longer interested in testing for Correspondence, and switches to attempting to establish Coherence.  This is when he links beliefs that are Certain with beliefs that are Doubtable, thereby switching to the Coherence Method.. Now, the link between the two sets of beliefs is the belief that 'God would not deceive me'.  But Descartes accepts that belief without subjecting it to either the Correspondence or the Coherence Method.  Rather, he implicitly accepts it via a third Method, which can be called Faith.  Subsequently, the resulting presumed Coherence becomes the basis of the Dualism in which traditional Theology and emergent Science cohere, thereby presenting a solution to the problem that is clearly motivating Descartes, i. e. how to reconcile those two sets of beliefs.  So, if his Dualism is the structure of Truth, then his Method of Doubt is not by itself successful in the capacity of establishing that Truth. And it might be noted that the actual 'pineal gland' that he proposes as the link between Mind and Body is his faith that his deity would not deceive him.

Method, Groundwork, Foundation

At the outset of the Discourse, Descartes likens the development of a Method to the laying of a foundation of a building.  But, his metaphor betrays him.  For, as Kant recognizes, a foundation does not merely support a structure that is built upon it, it also rests upon some ground.  Thus, without adequate groundwork, the stability of the structure is threatened.  So, the Discourse is, more accurately, his groundwork, and the Meditations is his structure, from the foundation up.  Now, Descartes is in fact mindful, contrary to the subsequent glossing of him as a 'foundationalist' might suggest, that there exists a ground in need of work--the emergence of new Science that threatens traditional Theology.  So, the challenge for him is to develop a Method that is adequate to the task of working this ground.  But it is unclear if it is so adequate.  For, the Method consists in determining the believability of a proposition, whereas the problem is not one proposition or another, but the systemization of two sets of propositions.  Indeed, his apparent solution is to the problem of systemization, the cardinal element of which is not even established via his Method--the heart of his proposed solution is a systemizing proposition, 'God would not deceive me regarding Mathematics, i. e. thereby reconciling Theology and Science.  Furthermore, that proposition is not one that is ascertained via his Method, and, hence, is groundless--he takes it on faith.  Accordingly, the structure thereafter is, in terms of Descartes' own metaphor, a castle built on air, even if to that point the construction has been methodically sound.

Objectivity and Virtuality

As has been previously discussed, Kant's representation of Descartes' Certainty-Doubtable distinction as one of Objective vs. Subjective exposes Descartes' confusion between 'If I think, then I exist' and 'I exist'.  But this confusion extends far beyond Descartes' Method for proving the latter.  To begin with, it is the same confusion that, according to Kant, is ingredient in all the Medieval proofs of 'the existence of God'.  Hence, it also afflicts Descartes' versions of those proofs, which are independent of his Skepticism.  Now, the source of that affliction is a broader problem that originates in what has been previously dubbed here as 'Virtual Philosophy'--the scope of which is the contents of a book that have been abstracted from the concrete writing of the book, often inhabited by an Avatar, in the contemporary sense of the term, of the author.  Thus, for example, Descartes proves only the Virtual existences of his Avatar and the deity of his Avatar, just as Hume reduces his Avatar to a Bundle of Perceptions.  Now, the Objective-Subjective distinction is the basis for Kant of not only his Necessary vs. Contingent contrast that is vital to his concept of Causality in the 1st Critique, but to his Law vs. Maxim and Determinate Judgment vs. Reflective Judgment distinctions that are cardinal in the 2nd and 3rd Critiques, respectively.  Nevertheless, he does not go so far as to extend the contrast to Objective vs. Virtual, i. e. to his acts writing his books vs. their contents, in which all his distinctions are merely Virtual.  Accordingly, he does not consider that his criticisms of Descartes and Hume are themselves merely Virtual, the equivalent of dreaming that one has woken up.  The metaphor is more than casual--given Kant's "Hume woke me from my dogmatic slumber", observation, though he seems to not further consider that there can also be skeptical slumber.

Certainty, Necessity, Objectivity

Rationalist Skepticism targets Sense-Experience; Empiricist Skepticism targets the connection between Sense-Data.  Hume specifically challenges the attribution of Necessity to the connection between Cause and Effect, on the grounds that the attribution is based on merely an observed repeated conjunction, a challenge with which Descartes might agree.  Kant's response to Hume is based on a distinction between Objectivity and Subjectivity that Hume, like Descartes, does not seem to recognize, i. e. that 'A causes B' entails that B could not have been perceived prior to A, unlike in the case of a merely subjective sequence of perceptions.  Kant thus recasts the Certain-Doubtable and Necessary-Contingent distinctions as Objective vs. Subjective, with the implication that Skepticism, whether Rationalist or Empiricist, as a Subjective condition, has no Objective relevance.  Now, Objectivity connotes independence from Subjectivity.  So, if Descartes' 'I exist' is Objective, then it is independent of his thinking that it does.  But, he never establishes the independence of Sum from Cogito, or that of Cogito from any mental operation.  Likewise, the only Certainty that he establishes is that of 'If I think, then I exist', not that of 'I exist'.  Hence, either his Method establishes that there is no Certain existence, or it is inherently flawed, i. e. because it lacks the capacity to succeed as a means of establishing that there is an existence that is Certain. 

Certainty and Necessity

As has been previously discussed, two seemingly minor terms in the often overlooked full title of Descartes' work on Method suggest not so minor flaws in the Method.  A third, more substantive, term implies a further shortcoming that is best illuminated by a development of one of his successors.  The term is Truth, which, as connoting Objectivity, contrasts sharply with the Subjectivity of the two main features of the Method--Certainty and Doubt, i. e. each of which is a subjective psychological condition. Descartes' ambition becomes clearer in the light of Leibniz' development of Modal Logic, i. e. what he is seeking in Certainty is actually an Objective condition--Necessity.  Likewise, subjective Doubt correlates to objective Contingency, demonstrable by a possible counter-example, e. g. a perception caused by a dream, rather than by a real object.  Now, the significance of Leibniz' innovation emerges historically long before the current pervasive reliance on Modal Logic--Necessity is the pivotal topic in the Hume-Kant debate over Causality, ingredient in which is an exercise of Skepticism that is different than Descartes', i. e. one that targets the connection of Sense-Data, rather than Sense-Data itself.  While the explicit target of this Empiricist Skepticism is the application of Modality to Sense-Experience, it originates in Locke's challenge to Descartes' premise that Doubting that one Doubts consists in two simultaneous propositions, and, hence, is subject to the Principle of Contradiction.  Instead, according to Locke's alternative analysis, Doubting that one Doubts is diachronic, constituted by two, successive, acts of Doubting, conjoined by memory.  Thus, even Descartes' Certainty is unestablished.  In contrast, Kant re-establishes Necessity by locating it beyond the ken of both Rationalist and Empiricist Skepticisms--in the Technical Reason of Schematism--and, hence, beyond the scope of Descartes' Method.

Method and Reason

The work of Descartes' that is sometimes glossed as 'Discourse on Method', is, in fact, titled 'Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences'.  Now, the definite article in the title, which implies that several established alternatives are not legitimate in some respect, is open to easy challenge.  But more problematic for Descartes is the conjunction in the title.  For, it implies that Reason only seeks Truth.  However, Method seeks, first and foremost, Efficacy, i. e. that it can be effectively executed.  So, the title implies that any Method, including his own, is Irrational.  But, a Method is not Irrational; rather, it is an expression of Technical Reason, which, perhaps, Descartes might have discovered in a preparatory Discourse on Method.

Technical Reason and Events

Kant more than merely systematizes the conflicting Modern Rationalism and Modern Empiricism.  He surpasses both traditions by, probably influenced by Newton, no longer conceiving the objects of Knowledge as things, but as events, and, hence as temporally constituted.  Accordingly, a link between concepts and a temporal sensory manifold is required, and Schematism provides that link in his system.  However, he still does not recognize that Newtonian Physics is itself only preparatory--for the harnessing of the forces that it represents.  Accordingly, even in recognizing the priority of Practical over Theoretical Reason, he does not recognize that the Experience of the World no longer consists in the mere observation of Events, but in the harnessing of them.  Thus, what is required by a Philosophical grounding of Experience is a Practical correlate of Schematism, i. e. a explanation of how concepts can harness causal relations, as if they were raw materials. That correlate is Technical Reason.  But, unlike Schematism, Technical Reason is not a hitherto concealed art only first discovered by Kant.  Rather, it is well-known as Techne, by Aristotle, and it is the basis of Method, which is familiar to all Kant's Modern predecessors, but never as itself an object of their studies.

Acceleration and Life-Force

Via Calculus, Physicists can only approximate, no matter how closely, to to the continuity of Motion.  In contrast, if, as Kant proposes, there is a Schematism, then there is also a direct perception of Motion to which their representation approximates.  Accordingly, Bergson's criticism that Physics spatializes Duration does not necessarily apply to Schematism.  But even granted one or the other means of a direct perception of Motion, neither explains Acceleration, which consists in not merely Motion, but an increase in rate, thereby leaving the objective actuality of Acceleration still in question.  However, despite his innovation, Bergson shares with Kant, and with most of theorists of Temporality, the attribution to Time of mere Continuation.  So, little attention is given to how Newton's discovery of a correlation between Force and Acceleration might apply to a special case of the former---Life-Force.  In other words, even Bergson does not consider that the essential character of Temporality is not mere Continuation, but Growth, on the basis of which Continuation a special case.  So, if the Temporality of a Human is essentially Growth, then so, too, is that of Schematism, from which it follows that there is an Epistemological ground of the direct perception of Acceleration.

Acceleration and Technical Reason

As Hume's Skepticism demonstrates, Empiricism seems to lack the capacity to ground any direct perception of the uniformly increasing Velocity entailed in the concept of Acceleration that is a foundation of Modern Physics.  On the other hand, while Rationalism can be the source of the Unity that is entailed in the perception of homogenized Motion, which would be required for Acceleration to be directly perceived, the application of a fixed concept to Motion seems problematic.  Now, a potential third alternative is proposed by Kant--his faculty of Schematism, which temporalizes his Categories.  So, if that faculty is, as he asserts, "an art concealed in the depths of the human soul", and not a mere ad hoc gimmick, then it, with a qualifier of Increase, could be the source of a direct perception of Acceleration.  Likewise for Technical Reason, if, as has been previously discussed, Schematism is an expression of that faculty. So, in the absence of a compelling rejection of Kant's discovery of Schematism--a rejection that is does not take for granted the kind of quasi-Dualism that, since Parmenides, Rationalists and Empiricists alike have been espousing--Technical Reason is the Epistemological ground of one of the foundations of Modern Physics.

Rationalism, Empiricism, Acceleration

Descartes' specific Mathematical innovation is the application of Algebra to phenomena.  Newton develops that technique further, by inventing Calculus, to apply to his most fundamental discovery--the correlation of Force and Acceleration.  But, despite this combination of Rational and Empirical methods, neither Newton nor anybody else has represented Acceleration by anything more than an approximation, i. e. 'approaching zero differential'.  In other words, even though Acceleration is accepted as concretely existing, neither Rationalists nor Empiricists have supplied an immediate Epistemological foundation of such an existent.  Nor does Bergson's later Intuition of Motion explain Acceleration, i. e. as opposed to any other rate.  So, despite the predominance of Epistemology in Modern Philosophy, and the centrality to the era of debates between them, neither proves adequate to the phenomenon that is perhaps the foundation of Modern Physics.

Method, Skepticism, Mathematics

On the basis of the standard academic Philosophy curriculum, the seminal work of Modern Epistemology is the Meditations.  Accordingly, the seminal Philosophical Method of the era is Skepticism.  However, that status of the work is belied by its being predated by not only the Novum Organum, but Descartes' other projects, as well.  Taking those into consideration, his Skepticism serves one specific purpose--to incorporate his deity into those other projects.  Once he accomplishes that in the Meditations, his real methodological innovation becomes clear, when the first application of the newly-gained Certainty is to Mathematics.  He thereby grounds the Method that surpasses Bacon, and has had a profound influence on history everywhere except in insular Philosophy--the quantification of Experience.  Accordingly, a significant factor in the Empiricist responses to Descartes, and, subsequently, Leibniz, is a counter to any thesis that Mathematical knowledge is innate.  But in sharp contrast to this Rationalism vs. Empiricism debate that dominates Philosophy for a few centuries, scientists recognize that the value of observation and Mathematics is as combined, i. e. as the method of quantifying evidence.  So, while Kant's system sometimes seems to be an attempt to reconcile Modern Rationalism and Modern Empiricism, it can also be interpreted as a formalization of a synthesis that already been widely actualized in that same period.

Empiricism and Democracy

For Bacon, Empiricism is an active, methodical, collective process.  For Locke, the foundation of Empiricism is a passive experience of an individual subject, though his concept of Space as a Primary Quality maintains a recognition of the existence of a public sphere that is independent of the individual subject.  For Berkeley, that existence is eliminated, transforming Empiricism into a characterizing of the passive relation of a private subject to a communicating deity.  Thus, despite Locke's efforts to coordinate Empiricism and Democracy, i. e. his concept of Tabula Rasa grounds both, his own abstraction from the active, methodical, collaborative dimension of Bacon's Empiricism paves the way for Berkeley's elimination of the rest of its Democracy, i. e. by grounding the possibility of an a posteriori inegalitarianism. This two-stage radical privatization of Experience, implicitly inherited by Smith, remains to this day a destructive threat to Democracy, and suggests that the significant sequence in Modern Empiricism is not, as it usually taught, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, but Bacon, Locke, and Berkeley.

Method, Technical Reason, Autonomy

Technical Reason is procedure in accordance with an ordered sequence of concepts.  Thus, a Method is an expression of Technical Reason.  So, even though Modern Rationalism and Modern Empiricism are each Methods, their common basis remains unrecognized by each in most of the works of Modern Philosophy.  Spinoza implicitly employs Technical Reason in his brief discussion of the concept of Definition, e. g. how to draw a Circle, but he never develops it explicitly when discussing Reason.  Kant glimpses it, in his concept of Schematism, but fails to recognize the equivalence of Technical Reason and Autonomy, conduct guided by a rule that one gives oneself.  As a result, in the Critique of Practical Reason, it is not that Technical Reason is an "art concealed in the depth of the human soul".  Rather, Technical Reason is suppressed by Kant in the concept of Pure Practical Reason, which is a kind of Reason by means of which a human can conform to the standards of an incorporeal deity, thereby compromising the concept of Autonomy.  Comparable is the concept of human Free Will that is compromised by the Theological imperative that only one choice is acceptable.   Technical Reason is thus correspondingly suppressed in the Critique of Judgment--characterized there as a faculty that can be attributable only heuristically, by humans, to Nature or to a Natural being.  So, because of his Theological commitments, Kant squanders an opportunity to expose the Rationalism, and the entailed Autonomy, that transcends the presumed Rationalism vs. Empiricism conflict of Modern Philosophy.

Empiricism, Method, Virtual Reality

As has been previously discussed, according to a rigorous execution of Cartesian Skepticism, 'I doubt' means 'I methodically doubt'.  On that basis, 'I think' means 'I think methodically', or, in other words, 'I reason technically', i. e. because Techne consists in proceeding according to a rule, which is what 'methodically' means.  Now, Locke also neglects that Empiricism is a Method, and, hence, that it is constituted by Technical Reason, though the possibility of that self-discovery remains open to an Empiricist who locates Sense-Experience in the plainly evident context of Action.  However, Berkeley emphatically eliminates that possibility, by completely privatizing Empiricism, transforming it into a Virtual Reality doctrine, the only activity in which of his disembodied Avatar is receiving communications from a deity.  Often overshadowed in that privatization by the reduction of Primary Qualities to Secondary Qualities, is his reduction of depth-perception to a construct out of Secondary Qualities, thereby eliminating any externality from Experience.  Even as putatively secularized by Hume and Smith, that doctrine accordingly transforms Lockeian Democracy into a Virtual Reality Political Philosophy, the influence of which continues today.  In the process, the concept of Citizenship in a Democracy as consisting in Technical Reason, i. e. Self-Rule, remains an obscured potential.

Method, Doubting, Certainty

More fully articulated, Descartes' method of Doubting can be formulated as: 1. Try to doubt X; 2a. If X can be doubted, it is not certain; 2b. If X cannot be doubted, it is certain.  So, in the self-application of the method, X = #1, and the result is 2b, on the grounds that trying to doubt X and not trying to doubt X cannot occur simultaneously, i. e. constitutes a logical contradiction.  But, if this is the decisive result that his Avatar is aiming it in the Virtual Reality of the Meditations, then he fails.  For, in the apparent application of the Principle of Contradiction, 'I cannot doubt that I am doubting', X = doubting, and, hence, the complete method.  But, if so, the subsequent inference of the Avatar, from 'I am doubting' to 'I am thinking' is problematic, insofar as 'I think P' means either 'I believe that P is true', or even 'I entertain that P'.  Rather, it is the method itself that = X in 2b, so, as a logical argument, the rumination of Descartes' Avatar in the Meditations is valid only if 'I think' = 'I exercise the method of Doubting'.  Likewise, if, as a result, 'I am' is certain, then it is only insofar as what I am is a practitioner of a variety of Skepticism.  On that basis, the validity of the argument from 'I exist' to 'God exists' is more complicated than Descartes' Avatar presents it to be.

Self, Avatar, Virtual Philosophy

In Hinduism, the source of the term, an Avatar is an incarnation of a deity.  So, the common contemporary use of the term, i. e. a dis-incarnated representation of a corporeal player in a virtual reality context, is antithetical to its original meaning.  Regardless, the concepts of Avatar and Virtual Reality, as commonly understood these days, are hardly novelties.  For, the Self of Descartes, or of Locke, or of Berkeley, or of Hume, is such an Avatar--a dis-incarnated representation of its creator, who is a corporeal writer.  Likewise, the 'world' that it inhabits in such a work is a Virtual Reality.  Hence, these writings can be called Virtual Philosophy.  That is not to say that these Avatars are without Philosophical value.  For example, for Locke, it is an analytical tool that promotes liberation from political dogma, and has pioneered the elaboration of the perceptual process.  However, when ontologized, e. g. by Descartes or Berkeley, its kinship with the Hindu concept of Avatar gets exposed--an attempt to dis-incarnate the embodied Self, in order to re-associate it with an incorporeal deity.  Accordingly, the de-mystification of Virtual Philosophy can begin simply by maintaining the recognition that it is nothing more than a product of an embodied writer.

Skepticism, Rationalism, Empiricism

While Modern Rationalism begins with Cartesian Skepticism, Modern Empiricism culminates in Humean Skepticism.  The primary target of the former is Sense-Data, that of the latter is connections between Sense-Data.  With the advantage of being subsequent, Hume targets the two presumed survivers of Cartesian Skepticism--the I, and proofs of the existence of a deity.  For example, he dissolves the 'I' into a 'bundle of perceptions'.  However, in doing so, he betrays his method, by not applying it to the concept of a 'bundle'.  That lapse is a tip-off that he shares with Descartes the same general falsification--abstracting his exercise of Skepticism from the actual concrete immediately given, i. e. an I that is sitting at a desk conducting the exercise in a continuous piece of writing.  Likewise actually at a desk writing, while purporting to dissolve Bacon's original Empiricist method of observation, repetition, and generalization, are the intermediary Skeptics of Rationalism--Locke and Berkeley.  So, the two main doctrines of Modern Philosophy, Rationalism and Empiricism, are each a variety of selective Skepticism that falsifies its initial conditions.  Consequently, their shared concept of a methodical I becomes completely obscured, and virtually lost to history.

Skepticism Of Skepticism

When, in the Meditations, Descartes considers that he might be being deceived, the irony is that he is a fictional character, in a fictional situation, concocted by the real Descartes, who is actually at a desk, writing the account.  Furthermore, the real Descartes is attempting to execute a Method, one traditionally characterized as Skepticism.  Now, in the actual world, the criterion for a Method is not whether or not it is certainly occurring whenever one seems to be executing it.  Rather, it is whether or not it is effective in what it is being employed to accomplish.  Thus, accordingly, Skepticism about Skepticism concerns whether or not it accomplishes its goal, e. g. establishing resistance to some Dogmatism.  So, within the fiction, 'Descartes' might not be able to deny that he is 'Doubting' at the same time that he is 'Doubting', but this attempted 'Doubting' of 'Doubting' falsifies what constitutes actual Skepticism of Skepticism.  Now, despite their prominence in the history of Philosophy, Cartesian Cogito and Sum have not stood up well to scrutiny, e. g. they entail no identity over time.  But, Descartes' method itself has rarely been challenged.  Hence, generally overlooked has been its failure in its stated purpose--to establish an Existence that is Certain.  Yet, those varied criticisms of the Existents that are the purported achievements of the method thus entail criticism of the method itself.  But perhaps the more conclusive basis for Skepticism of Descartes' Skepticism is that the latter is ultimately only a circular procedure--arriving at an I and its Thinking that are entailed in the method from the outset.

Doubt and Autonomy

Descartes' method of Doubt consists in controlled doubting.  Now, as has been previously discussed, Certainty is merely Autonomy, i. e. control, abstracted from the corporeality of the subject.  Thus, Descartes' pivotal conclusion that Doubting is certain, i. e. 'I cannot doubt that I am doubting', is uninformative--it means merely that when one is employing a method, one is in control of what is doing, and likewise for when one is 'thinking'. Now, his 'I Think' is abstracted from an Object, i. e. from 'I think that X', or, in other words, from 'I believe that X'.  Furthermore, Pragmatists have defined a Belief as a 'disposition to act'.  Accordingly, a Doubt can be defined as an 'indisposition to act'.  Thus, methodical Doubt can be defined as 'controlled indisposition to act'.  So, re-embodied, the Meditations presents a technique for achieving Autonomy, rather than, as it is usually interpreted, an intricate esoteric Epistemological exercise.