Sufficient Reason and Deity

That this is the 'best of all possible worlds' is, according to Leibniz, the reason why his deity creates it rather than some other world.  Hence, it functions as a Principle of Sufficient Practical Reason for that deity.  Now, Leibniz stops short of offering an explanation as to why that deity creates anything at all.  But, whatever the reason for that might be, the deity is employing a Principle of Sufficient Practical Reason.  So, at least implicit in Leibniz' Theology is the primacy of Practical Reason, and of Actualization over Modality, which is at the service of the former.  Now, when Kant introduces Pure Practical Reason, and elevates it above Pure Theoretical Reason, i. e. by attributing Autonomy to it, he signifies that the fundamental principle of Pure Practical Reason is a Principle of Sufficient Practical Reason, thereby elevating the goal of Praxis, i. e. actualizing some behavior, over any goal of Theoretical Reason, e. g. Totality or Necessity.  Thus, when he invokes Totality as a reason for incorporated a deity into his system, he abandons the priority of Practical Reason over Theoretical.  He thereby squanders an opportunity to more fully develop what is an innovative exposition of a Principle of Sufficient Practical Reason, including a stronger affirmation of the priority of Actualization over Totalization or Necessity. But it is not Theology per se that compromises the novelty; such an exposition would be consistent, and perhaps even illuminating, in the case of a Theology in which the first act of a deity is to create, e. g. the deity of Genesis 1, whose creation in its 'own image' is likewise first and foremost a creative being.