Actuality and Deontic Logic

To act means to do, and in Greek, Praxis means Doing.  Hence, if Actuality is an element in Modal Logic, it can only be in Deontic Logic.  But the relations of Actuality to Obligation and Permissibility are at least as uncertain as those of it to Necessity and Possibility.  For, plainly, that some behavior is Actual does not entail that it is Permissible, and that some behavior is Obligatory does not entail that it is Actualized.  The latter inadequacy especially inconveniences Kant, who, having characterized the source of Obligation as 'Will', upon recognizing that volition is the source of the choice of whether or not to obey, is forced to introduce a second concept of 'Will'.  But Kant is far from alone in failing to systematize Actuality--it eludes any incorporation into a Modal system, Theoretical or Practical--for the simple reason that Modality is a category of Thought, and Actuality is independent of Thought.  Now, the Deontic operators can be relevant to behavior, i. e. knowing whether or not some behavior is mandatory, or whether or not it is permitted, can be a factor in deliberation, as preparation for action.  But, in such a context, recourse to explicit Deontic calculation is rarely required, and can be, rather, a source of confusion.  For example, in ordinary contexts, 'X is permitted' grants permission to everybody, whereas Deontic 'X is Permissible' has no Universalist connotation.  The example illustrates the general questionability in the actual world of the value of Deontic Logic.