Monday, June 30, 2014

Reason and Species

In "the laws of human reason . . . pursue the true interest and preservation of mankind", from II, 8 of Political Treatise, Spinoza could be alluding to the human capacity to adapt the resources of Reason to its own purposes.  But, it could also be implying that such Reason originates from within the human Mind, and is an expression of the structure of the latter.  For, the essence of Reason is the entailment relation between greater and lesser, e. g. between Universal and Particular.  So, insofar as a human includes both individual and species elements, Reason is first constituted as the relation of entailment between the latter and the former.  In other words, in Spinoza's naturalization of it, Reason is the species instinct as experienced by an individual, though he leaves unaddressed the relation between humanity and the rest of Nature.

Sunday, June 29, 2014

Reason and Nature

Spinoza's statement, from II, 8 of the Political Treatise, that "the bounds of nature are not the laws of human reason, which do but pursue the true interest and preservation of mankind, but other infinite laws, which regard the eternal order of universal nature, whereof man is an atom", has two main points.  1. It denies Anthropocentrism, thus complementing the Copernican repudiation of Geocentrism; and 2. It asserts the inadequacy of human understanding to Nature, thus anticipating Kant's critique.  However, the distinction between Natural Law and Human Reason is not as sharp as the statement seems to imply.  For, first, the human capacity to adapt natural causal relations, e. g. agricultural processes, proves that the two are not absolutely incommensurate.  And, second, since  Humanity is part of Nature, then the laws of its reason must be a special case of natural laws, and, likewise, human interests and preservation must play some role in the larger order.  So, Spinoza misses an opportunity here to consider some Ecological implications of his Naturalism.

Saturday, June 28, 2014

Hope, Fear, Power

One of the distinctive features of the Ethics is Spinoza's devaluation of a prevalently esteemed, notably by Kant, emotion--Hope.  As he explains in xii and xiii of the Definitions of the Emotions, in Part III, Hope entails not only uncertainty, but Fear, and, hence, is a partly debilitated condition.  Accordingly, the status of it as a political motivation, i. e. as a response to promises, is on a par with that of Fear--one of dependence, and, hence, of powerlessness, even if Spinoza problematically attempts to confer a Right on it.  So, it is in that context that his depreciation of Hope comes into sharper relief--it is as antithetical to Self-Determination as is Fear.  The further Theological implications of that contrast are resisted by Kant, unsuccessfully, as has been argued here at length earlier.

Friday, June 27, 2014

Fear and Power

As Spinoza discusses in II, 10-11 of Political Treatise, a primary example of irrational political motivation is Fear.  Now, because in submission to external threats the cause is the latter, fearfulness is also powerlessness.  On the other hand, fearfulness can also be diagnosed as motivated by one's survival instinct, and, hence, according to Spinoza's analysis, is, in fact, an expression of one's natural power.  However, one significant result of the Ethics is that the only response to threat that is truly an expression of one's persistence in being is resisting Fear, accompanied by acquiescence to one's fate.  Thus, the irrational response to a threat is the powerless response, which casts further doubt on Spinoza's attribution of 'Natural Right' to irrational behavior, e. g. in II, 8.

Thursday, June 26, 2014

Individual, Nature, Wrong

In II, 18, of Political Treatise, Spinoza states that "in the state of nature, . . .  if anyone does wrong, it is to himself, not to another", an example which, therefore, can be classified as 'Individual Natural Wrong'.  Now, in his system, any such behavior involves Inadequate Ideas, and, hence, is 'Passive'.  However, in II, 5, he argues that "passive affections" are protected as a Natural Right, on the basis that irrational behavior, as much as rational, is a modification of God's Right.  In contrast, grounding Individual Natural Right on the concept of Selfhood, previously proposed here, exposes the root of Spinoza's apparent confusion over the status of irrational behavior.  For, since Passivity entails Heteronomy, one is not the Adequate Cause of irrational behavior, in which case Selfhood does not obtain, and, therefore, nor is there any Right to it.  Spinoza does have at his disposal, which he does not explore, an analogous argument in his own terms--that God's processes involve only Adequate Ideas, so, therefore, behavior involving Inadequate Ideas, i. e. irrational behavior, is not protected as an instance of those processes, from which it follows that there can be no Individual Natural Wrong.

Wednesday, June 25, 2014

Right and Self

Spinoza's assertion, in II, 23, of Political Treatise, that "nature offers nothing that cannot be called this man's rather than another's, . . . under nature everything belongs to all", seems plainly false in one type of case.  For, every part of Nature has a natural privileged relation to one part of Nature--itself.  So, that relation is sufficiently distinctive to ground a concept of Individual Natural Right, comprising both one qua agent, and one qua the object of its own actions.  Such a Right does not preclude coordination with some social distributive principle, one which respects the former, e. g. as one of its necessary conditions.  The superiority of grounding Individual Natural Right on Selfhood, rather than on Divine Right, as Spinoza proposes, is that it concretely manifests the essential structure of the concept of Right--irreducible inaccessibility from without, as the phrase 'one's own' connotes.

Tuesday, June 24, 2014

Natural Right, Individuality, Contingency

That Spinoza, in II, 23 of his Political Treatise, conceives Individual Right as a function of a distributive principle, indicates a relatively weak concept of Individual Natural Right.  But, that weakness is not rooted in either his concept of Right, or in that of Nature.  Rather, its source is a unwitting limitation shared by virtually every mainstream concept of human Individuality--Contingency.  For, just as traditional Theology fails to adequately explain why a presumably perfect Deity creates anything else, Spinoza offers no sufficient reason for any modification of God/Substance, e. g. no demonstration that the concept of Deity entails that of a process of Pluralization.  Furthermore, that, as he posits, the essence of a Mode is its persistence in being, rather than, say, its creativity, expresses an arbitrary, and, hence, inadequate idea of the God-Mode relation.  Likewise, such Contingency is only underscored by doctrines that dogmatically present the existence of Individuals as irreducibly given.  So, lacking Necessity, there can be nothing inherently absolute, i. e. Natural, in a concept of Individual Right.  Accordingly, in the absence of any Principle of Individuation that is also a Principle of Sufficient Reason, a concept of Individual Natural Right can only be artefactual, and subject to other systematic considerations, which is what PT, II, 23, at bottom expresses.

Monday, June 23, 2014

Right and Property

There are strong indications in chapter II of Political Treatise that by 'Right', Spinoza means, more precisely 'Property Right'.  For example, in 2, he asserts that "God has a right to everything", and in 4, 13, and 16, he uses the phrase "right over nature".  Eventually, in 23, he contrasts "nature offers nothing that can be called this man's rather than another's, . . . under nature everything belongs to all", with "it is by common law determined what belongs to this man, and what to that".  So, to organize his concept of Right more methodically: 1. Every action alters some part of Nature; 2.  Every part of Nature has a Right to act on any part of Nature; 3. The correlation of Action-Object is the basis of that of Power-Right; 4. Every human has a Right to act on any part of Nature; 5. It is only on the basis of some political distribution that a Right is exclusive to a specific human.  In other words, the contrast between a-political Right and political Right is one of a heuristic, because essentially uncontestable, general concept, and an Individual one. 

Sunday, June 22, 2014

Survival and Freedom

In III, ix of the Ethics, Spinoza proposes that the principle of persistence in being is effective in the possession of adequate ideas, and of inadequate ideas, equally.  Thus, it is not inherently predisposed to the former.  But, if not, then, the principle does suffice to ground any special nisus towards Freedom, and, therefore, towards a Polity that promotes Freedom.  In contrast, Hobbes' Leviathan, as resolving the 'war of all against all', does follow from the premise of a survival instinct.  Now, one reconciliation of Freedom and Survival within Spinoza's system is the briefly entertained idea of the immortality of an incorporeal individual Mind, which, however, transcends any social organization, and, thus, moots his Political Treatise and his Theologico-Political Treatise, thereby reducing each to an exercise in frivolity uncharacteristic of their author.  So, as part of his Political Philosophy, either Freedom is implicitly no more than a means to persistence in being, or else, as an ultimate goal, it requires a more adequate principle, e. g. that every entity seeks to indefinitely grow, i. e. to indefinitely increase in strength.

Saturday, June 21, 2014

Freedom, Self-Control, Reason

At the heart of Ethics, IV, lxxiii, "The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in solitude, where he is independent", is the contrast between 'free' and 'independent'.  Seemingly identical, by 'freedom', Spinoza means 'self-control', while, as is more patent in the context, by 'independence', he means 'isolation'.  Implicit in the contrast is an analysis almost unrecognizable in American 'individualism'--that social independence does not entail Self-Control, e. g. intemperate, pre-conditioned, and even violent behavior are routinely classified as 'free' in American society.  Likewise, law-abidingness out of fear is not 'free' in Spinoza's sense of the term.  For, only conduct guided by Reason entails Self-Control, and, so, it is only insofar as law-abidingness is an expression of Rationality that it is truly 'free' conduct, as Kant develops a century later.  Conversely, Rationalism, in general, is alien to even the collectivist strains of the predominant American ethos, which are mediated by Sympathy, not by Reason, and, hence, entail Self-Control no more than do the individualist ones.

Friday, June 20, 2014

Right, Nature, Polis

A sufficient basis for Spinoza's Political Philosophy appears in a sequence in Part IV of the Ethics, especially xxxvi-vii, culminating in lxxiii, "The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of laws, than in solitude."  Now, in these passages, the concept of individual Natural Right appears only peripherally, and, as inessential to the demonstration.  Yet, that concept, apparently in agreement with Hobbes, is seemingly the foundation of the Political Treatise, with its introduction at the outset of the presentation, in II, 2.  However, Spinoza eventually concludes that "natural right . . . can hardly be conceived. . . except where mean have general rights" (II, 15), and that a person "has, in fact, no right . . . but that the common law allows." (II, 16).  So, implicit, at least, in the combination of these passages, contrary to some standard interpretations, is that his concept of Natural Right functions not to align Spinoza with Hobbes, but to express his disagreement with his predecessor's thesis that individual Natural Right pre-exists any social arrangement, i. e. that Polis is, in some respect, non-Natural.  

Thursday, June 19, 2014

Knowledge, Power, Self-Control

In casual contexts, the phrase 'Knowledge is Power' tends to connote 'Information is advantageous', while for a scientist, it signifies the applicability of Theory to Practice.  For Spinoza, it expresses an equivalence--Knowledge is possession of Adequate Ideas, an Adequate Idea is efficacious, and efficacy is Power.  It is, thus, also, an active condition, i. e. it activates, which, in a finite entity involves the overcoming of passivity, i. e. of external influence, experienced as Inadequate Ideas.  Thus, in humans, Knowledge and Power both entail self-control, aka 'Freedom' in Spinoza's system.

Wednesday, June 18, 2014

Right, Power, Reason

Spinoza correlates Right with Power, though the ascription to him of the popular formulation, 'Might is Right', tends to ignore that he also conceives Power to be a function of Reason, i. e. the possession of adequate ideas, as is explained in a variety of places in the Ethics, e. g. IV, def. viii; III, def. i; and III, i.  Now, his attribution of Right to even irrational behavior, e. g. Political Treatise, II, 4, is based on the premise that the existence of every Mode is an expression of God's Power, to which correlates a 'divine' Right.  However, as has been previously discussed, the concept of Right is inapplicable in the case of an isolated entity, e. g. his God, without which, there is, therefore, no Right to irrational behavior.  An example illustrates why this criticism of his concept of Right could appeal to Spinoza.  For, the Right to persist in one's being is, in effect, the Right to self-defense, which, unconditioned by Rationality, endorses killing in presumed 'self-defense' even in the case of a mus-perceived 'threat', e. g. racial prejudice.  Even the U. S. jurisprudential system recognizes some criteria for such perceptions.

Tuesday, June 17, 2014

Right and Nature

Spinoza's Monism eliminates traditional absolute distinctions between 'divine', 'natural', and 'artificial',  Hence, despite his insistence, his classification of Right as 'natural' is indistinctive.  Now, those three realms can be re-cast within his system as, respectively, Substantive, Modal, and Artefactual.  Accordingly, for example, human making is, at the same time, both a natural process and a manifestation of divine activity, whereby 'artefactual' is not pejorative, as 'artificial' tends to be.  Now, since Right entails the existence of at least two entities--a bearer, and one to either respect or violate it--and the scope of Substantive and of Modal is each an individual entity, Right can only be Artefactual.  For, there is only one Substance in his system, and the essence of a Mode is to persist in its being, an inessential means of which is by associating with others, within which Right is, likewise, an inessential device. 

Monday, June 16, 2014

God and Right

Spinoza's introduction of the idea of 'Right', in his Political Treatise, explains its relation to the ideas of Existence and Power, and, hence, who its bearers are.  However, he does not analyze the idea itself, thereby overlooking that it is essentially a social concept, i. e. it functions to mediate relations between different entities, and, thus, presupposes a plurality of them.  Thus, his assertion, in II, 3 of PT, that "God has a right to everything", is problematic, if by 'God' he means the one and only Substance of his system.  For, in that case, the possibility of an impingement on the activity of God is unthinkable, and, therefore, the phrase is meaningless.  Instead, if it has any content at all it must be as equivalent to 'Insofar as a Mode is a part of God, i. e. is a modification of Substance, its right to persist in its being, i. e. to exercise its power, is divine.  In contrast, in the Ethics, he is usually very careful to distinguish God qua unique and infinite, from God qua manifested in its finite Modes.

Sunday, June 15, 2014

City of God and City of Man

In its opening chapters, Spinoza makes clear that he conceives A Political Treatise to be a continuation of the Ethics, thereby expanding a system the scope of which is already probably unmatched in Modern Philosophy--spanning Ethics, Theology, Metaphysics, Physics, Epistemology, Psychology, and, now, Political Philosophy.  The expansion also complicates any thesis that the culmination of the earlier work is the concept of detachment from worldly affairs.  Now, the mediating link between the two works is the equation of Power and Natural Right.  But, in Spinoza's system, God and Nature are one and the same.  So, not only does he restore the systematic connection between Ethics and Political Philosophy, he reconciles the bifurcation of City of God and City of Man, a radical Dualism commonly accepted upon the rise of Medieval ideologies.

Saturday, June 14, 2014

Virtue, Power, Happiness, Acquiescence

Spinoza conceives 'Virtue' as the performance of action determined by Rational Knowledge.  Furthermore, on his analysis, Pleasure signifies an increase in Power (III, xi), and Virtue and Power are identical (IV, def. viii), from which it follows that Virtue and Happiness are one and the same, a thesis not to be confused with 'Virtue is its own reward', which implies a separation of Virtue and Happiness, as Cause and Effect.  Now, as he explains in the long Note in II, xlix, Happiness sufficiently overrides, i. e. "tranquillizes", both the expectation of any reward for Virtue, as well as any concern about adverse fate.  Thus, in this strain of the Ethics is the possibility of a reconciliation of Empowerment and Acquiescence, an otherwise problematic relation in his system, as has been previously discussed--the former pertains to the performance of an action, while the latter pertains to its possible implications.  Now, this derivation bypasses the idea of a disembodied Mode, which initiates the deduction of the idea of Acquiescence in the sequence from V, xxii-vii.  But, given that the traditional Theological value of that idea is to provide the occasion for divine reward or punishment, i. e. an occasion which is implicitly unnecessary on the basis of the identity of Virtue and Happiness, jettisoning the idea disrupts nothing essential in the Ethics.

Friday, June 13, 2014

Mode, Knowledge, Mortality

Spinoza's proposition that the essence of a Mode consists in its effort to persist in its being, entails that any knowledge of its finitude can be derived only from its knowledge of God, i. e. from the self-knowledge that it is no more than a modification of Substance.  In other words, its knowledge of God entails that of its own mortality.  Accordingly, his contention knowledge of God reveals its immortality seems a lapse into the consoling anthropocentrism that he fervently opposes elsewhere, an anomaly in the context comparable to a sudden conclusion from Copernicus that the discovery of Heliocentrism by an inhabitant of Earth proves Geocentrism.  So, Spinoza's concept of Wisdom in the Ethics vacillates from the knowledge that one is mortal, to the knowledge that one is immortal, an apparently irreconcilable vacillation.

Thursday, June 12, 2014

Self-Approval, Empowerment, Acquiescence

In #XXV of the Definitions of the Emotions, Spinoza formulates that "Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action".  Furthermore, in IV, lii, he notes that Self-approval surpasses fame as the "most powerful of incitements to action".  Now, incitement to action disrupts a state of acquiescence.  Thus, Spinoza's reliance on the concept of Self-approval, in V, xxvii, not only compromises his stated attempt there to prove that Intuition "gives rise to the highest possible mental acquiescence", it demonstrates, to the contrary, that what it gives rise to is Empowerment.  Now, the original Latin confirms that he unequivocally means 'peace of mind' by 'acquiescence'.  So, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the sequence from V, xxii to xxvii, the focus of which is the possibility of a disembodied Mind, expresses Spinoza as straying from most of the rest of the text.  Nevertheless, that sequence has predominated in interpretations of the Ethics, resulting in the prevalent classification of it as 'Stoicism' or 'Rational Theology', rather than as 'Vitalism', or 'Pragmatism', which are supported by the majority of the work.  The emphasis on Acquiescence, as opposed to Empowerment, also tends to obscure the systematic relation between the Ethics and Spinoza's Political theory,

Wednesday, June 11, 2014

Intuition, Empowerment, Acquiescence

There seem to be two concepts of of 'Intuition' in the Ethics.  One, an alternative means to Reason with the same end (II, xl), has causal relations as its objects, and achieves Empowerment, i. e. since such Knowledge is, at the same time, a "power of action" (II, vii).  Hence, it can be classified as 'Practical', just as Reason often is when serving the same function.  In contrast, is a variety that can be characterized as 'Contemplative', the sole object of which, according to the sequence beginning at V, xxii, is an incorporeal personal essence that is inaccessible to Reason, and that achieves "acquiescence" (V, xxvii).  Whether or not Spinoza recognizes the vacillation is unclear, as is whether or not the two varieties of Intuition are reconcilable within his system.

Tuesday, June 10, 2014

Deity and Skill

In the Preface to Part V of the Ethics, Spinoza distinguishes between 1. Ethics--which concerns "how far the reason can control the emotions"; 2. Logic--"the true method and means whereby the understanding may be perfected"; and 3. Medicine--"the skill whereby the body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of its functions".  So, since the purview of Logic is the Mind alone, and the scope of Ethics includes phases of human weakness, it is Medicine that best illustrates the Thought-Extension unity of "God's power of thinking" with "his power of realized action" (II, vii)--but not insofar as its object is the body, rather, insofar as it is a 'skill'.  In other words, it follows from II, vii that Know-How is an expression of Deity in a Mode, with respect to which the idea of a disembodied Mode, which is the focus of a lot of Spinoza's subsequent attention in V, seems problematic, at minimum.  Now, Skill may be poor evidence of a divine presence in Theism, according to which a Deity only occasionally intervenes in human affairs, but not in Pantheism, according to which a Deity is eternally ubiquitous.

Monday, June 9, 2014

Parallel, Correspondence, Detachment

'A is parallel to B' entails both 1. 'There is a one-to-one correspondence between A and B', and 2. 'A and B never interact'.  Thus, the possession by a Mode of an Idea in Spinoza's Deity entails the possession of the Deity's "realized power of action" (Ethics, II, vii.)  Accordingly, a Mode's Knowledge of one such Idea, by either Reason or Intuition, is Practical, and its attainment is an occasion of empowerment.  So, the possibility of an 'intuition' of the Idea of a Mind detached from its Body, which dominates Part V of the Ethics, abstracts from #1, and, arguably, expresses a straying from what, to that point, is an unequivocal doctrine of Empowerment.

Sunday, June 8, 2014

Reflection and Introspection

The application of Spinoza's distinction between Adequate and Inadequate to his concept of an Idea of an Idea suggests a corresponding contrast between Reflection and Introspection.  Now, an Adequate Idea consists in the understanding of Rational antecedents and consequence, and, is, simultaneously an Adequate Cause.  Thus, the "power of thinking" and the "realized power of action" (Ethics, II, vii) are identical, whether in his Deity or in one of its Modes, i. e. he conceives Understanding and Will as one and the same.  Hence, Logic and Psychology are, likewise, one and the same study in his system.  In contrast, based on the distinction between Logic and Medicine that he draws in the Preface to Part V, he would approve of the contemporary classification of Freudian 'Psychology' as a 'Medical' science.  Regardless, it follows that Introspection is edificatory only as an initial stage in the cultivation of Rational Conduct.

Saturday, June 7, 2014

Intuition, Immortality, Reflection, Detachment

Though he does not use the term, Spinoza introduces what is often called 'Reflection', in a sequence beginning at II, xx of the Ethics.  Now, though he also does not draw the possible connection, the structure of Reflection--the idea of a mind, equivalent to the idea of the idea of a body--seems similar to the "idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity" (V, xxii), and which is the part of the mind that is not "absolutely destroyed with the body" (V, xxiii) at death.  In other words, it may be Reflection, not his problematic, as has been previously discussed, Intuition, that provides him with better evidence of an idea that is both associated with a specific body, and, yet, is detachable from it.  Furthermore, in Reflection, one takes an objective perspective on oneself, the same vantage point of Reason and of Adequate Ideas, the achievement of which is the primary goal of the Ethics.  Now, idea-idea Reflection still seems inconsistent with idea-thing Parallelism.  Regardless, if by "under the form of eternity" he means 'objectively considered', then Intuition is Reflection, without some of the neo-Medieval connotations that bog it down in Part V of the Ethics, and the possibility of a Mind surviving the death of its Body is an inference from the experience of detachment.  Accordingly, that inference is a variation of one of Descartes'--from the dubitability of corporeal existence and the certainty of the Cogito, to the immortality of the latter.

Friday, June 6, 2014

Mind, Parallelsim, Immortality

The possibility of a Mind surviving the death of its associated Body, broached by Spinoza at V, xxii-xxiii, seems more consistent with traditional Theological Dualism, than with the innovative Parallelism that he introduces at II, vii.  Now, the previously proposed reconciliation of the passages--the distinguishing, based on the example of 'non-existent' rectangles, from II, viii., between actual and non-actual entities--is unsatisfactory, because it does not adequately explain that distinction, i. e. each is equally a modification of Substance in his system.  Otherwise, the closest that he offers to a concrete grounding of the possibility of a disembodied entity is the example of an intuited ratio, in II, xl.  However, a ratio, disembodied or otherwise, is common to an infinite number of pairs of  numbers, whereas, the object of Intuition posited by him as surviving the death of its Body, is individual, i. e. is of "this or that human body" (V, xxii).  So, the best explanation of this concept of Immortality may be Wolfson's exhaustive analysis, which confirms that the concept is more closely aligned with Medieval Theology than with Spinoza's innovative Parallelism, an allegiance that, as Spinoza acknowledges at V, xli, is inessential to the main arc of the Ethics.

Thursday, June 5, 2014

Extension, Existence, Actuality

While the existence, proposed by Spinoza in II, viii of the Ethics, of "ideas of particular things, or modes, that do not exist", seems to contradict the Idea-Thing correspondence proposed in the previous proposition, he argues that, to the contrary, it is "evident" from the latter.  Now, the example--'non-existing' rectangles--that he presents in the included Note may be more illuminating than he seems to be appreciate.  For, what he seems to mean by 'non-existent', is 'non-actual', i. e. nevertheless both existing and possessing extension.  In other words, in his system, all the modifications of the Deity's attribute of Thought both exist and are ideas of an extended entity, though not all of them are actualized, a distinction more recently classified by a term to which Spinoza has precluded use, namely 'modal'.  The Theological significance of that distinction emerges later, since it grounds the apparent separation of Mind and Body, proposed in V, xxiii, which, rather than amounting to a reversion to the traditional Supernaturalism that his system challenges, is, more precisely, the separation of a possible Mode from an actual one.    

Wednesday, June 4, 2014

Matter, Life, Deity

Though Spinoza does not directly address the topic, his attribution of Extension to Deity seems to entail that Matter is essentially not inert, a thesis at odds with that of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, among many, as well as with the imagery of Genesis 2.  The significance of the disagreement with the latter is that is preempts the ensuing drama that has dominated Western culture for millennia.  For, without the antithesis of Life and Matter, the distinctive characteristic of the 'tree of knowledge of good and evil', i. e. that it is potentially death-causing, dissolves, as does, therefore, the subsequent Fall-Redemption arc.  Instead, as Spinoza shows, Knowledge of Good and of Evil is conducive to Life, and, hence, is not at all a divergence from the ideas of a Deity the essence of which is its vitality.

Tuesday, June 3, 2014

Deity, Existence, Life

In the 5th Meditation, in his version of the Ontological Argument, Descartes uses the phrases 'God exists' and 'There is a God' interchangeably.  So, when, by virtue of the definitions of Part I of the Ethics, Spinoza asserts that the essence of Deity entails its eternal existence, he is more than recapitulating the conclusion of that Argument.  Rather, he is anticipating III, vii, in which he proposes that the "endeavor . . . to persist in its own being is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question".  For, the latter proposition is more than a Psychological thesis--it is Theological, insofar as that persistence is a mode of the eternal existence of Deity.  In other words, when he attributes existence to Deity, he is asserting not that it 'is', but that it 'lives', just as does any of its modes.  In this respect, Spinoza is a forerunner of Bergson and other Vitalists.

Monday, June 2, 2014

Will, Understanding, Deity

As has been previously discussed, Descartes' concept of Deity entails the existence of Evil, which, in turn, requires the thesis that Will and Understanding are not identical.  In contrast, Spinoza's concept does not entail that existence, which, allows him to posit that every Perception is Volitional, i. e. involves an affirmation of the existence of its object.  On that basis, error is due to incompleteness, not to unclarity and indistinctness.  Accordingly, while Descartes seeks, via convincing proof, the free assent to the proposition that his God exists, Spinoza's project, via exhaustive explanation, is that the Deity the existence of which is affirmed, is one that is adequately understood.  Implicit in the latter is, therefore, the contention that Descartes' concept of Deity is inadequate.

Sunday, June 1, 2014

Deity, Substance, Principle

From the outset of the Ethics, Spinoza makes it clear that his concept of Deity is equivalent to a concept of Substance.  However, given some traditional connotations of 'substance'  either as static or as Teleological, he thereby runs the risk of undermining his concept of God as an Efficient Self-Cause.  Now, one less encumbered alternative to 'Substance' is 'Principle'.  That replacement has the advantage of suggesting the association of his 'natural naturans' with other Principles, e. g. Schopenhauer's Will, Nietzsche's Dionysus, and Bergson's Elan Vital.  As result, Spinoza's system can be appreciated as having more in common with Vitalism than with the Rationalist Theisms, i. e. Descartes', Leibniz's, and Kant's, with which it is more usually classified, plus, the God of each of those can be better recognized as a Principle.