Self-Approval, Empowerment, Acquiescence

In #XXV of the Definitions of the Emotions, Spinoza formulates that "Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action".  Furthermore, in IV, lii, he notes that Self-approval surpasses fame as the "most powerful of incitements to action".  Now, incitement to action disrupts a state of acquiescence.  Thus, Spinoza's reliance on the concept of Self-approval, in V, xxvii, not only compromises his stated attempt there to prove that Intuition "gives rise to the highest possible mental acquiescence", it demonstrates, to the contrary, that what it gives rise to is Empowerment.  Now, the original Latin confirms that he unequivocally means 'peace of mind' by 'acquiescence'.  So, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the sequence from V, xxii to xxvii, the focus of which is the possibility of a disembodied Mind, expresses Spinoza as straying from most of the rest of the text.  Nevertheless, that sequence has predominated in interpretations of the Ethics, resulting in the prevalent classification of it as 'Stoicism' or 'Rational Theology', rather than as 'Vitalism', or 'Pragmatism', which are supported by the majority of the work.  The emphasis on Acquiescence, as opposed to Empowerment, also tends to obscure the systematic relation between the Ethics and Spinoza's Political theory,