Intuition, Immortality, Reflection, Detachment

Though he does not use the term, Spinoza introduces what is often called 'Reflection', in a sequence beginning at II, xx of the Ethics.  Now, though he also does not draw the possible connection, the structure of Reflection--the idea of a mind, equivalent to the idea of the idea of a body--seems similar to the "idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity" (V, xxii), and which is the part of the mind that is not "absolutely destroyed with the body" (V, xxiii) at death.  In other words, it may be Reflection, not his problematic, as has been previously discussed, Intuition, that provides him with better evidence of an idea that is both associated with a specific body, and, yet, is detachable from it.  Furthermore, in Reflection, one takes an objective perspective on oneself, the same vantage point of Reason and of Adequate Ideas, the achievement of which is the primary goal of the Ethics.  Now, idea-idea Reflection still seems inconsistent with idea-thing Parallelism.  Regardless, if by "under the form of eternity" he means 'objectively considered', then Intuition is Reflection, without some of the neo-Medieval connotations that bog it down in Part V of the Ethics, and the possibility of a Mind surviving the death of its Body is an inference from the experience of detachment.  Accordingly, that inference is a variation of one of Descartes'--from the dubitability of corporeal existence and the certainty of the Cogito, to the immortality of the latter.