Intuition, Empowerment, Acquiescence

There seem to be two concepts of of 'Intuition' in the Ethics.  One, an alternative means to Reason with the same end (II, xl), has causal relations as its objects, and achieves Empowerment, i. e. since such Knowledge is, at the same time, a "power of action" (II, vii).  Hence, it can be classified as 'Practical', just as Reason often is when serving the same function.  In contrast, is a variety that can be characterized as 'Contemplative', the sole object of which, according to the sequence beginning at V, xxii, is an incorporeal personal essence that is inaccessible to Reason, and that achieves "acquiescence" (V, xxvii).  Whether or not Spinoza recognizes the vacillation is unclear, as is whether or not the two varieties of Intuition are reconcilable within his system.