Natural Right, Individuality, Contingency

That Spinoza, in II, 23 of his Political Treatise, conceives Individual Right as a function of a distributive principle, indicates a relatively weak concept of Individual Natural Right.  But, that weakness is not rooted in either his concept of Right, or in that of Nature.  Rather, its source is a unwitting limitation shared by virtually every mainstream concept of human Individuality--Contingency.  For, just as traditional Theology fails to adequately explain why a presumably perfect Deity creates anything else, Spinoza offers no sufficient reason for any modification of God/Substance, e. g. no demonstration that the concept of Deity entails that of a process of Pluralization.  Furthermore, that, as he posits, the essence of a Mode is its persistence in being, rather than, say, its creativity, expresses an arbitrary, and, hence, inadequate idea of the God-Mode relation.  Likewise, such Contingency is only underscored by doctrines that dogmatically present the existence of Individuals as irreducibly given.  So, lacking Necessity, there can be nothing inherently absolute, i. e. Natural, in a concept of Individual Right.  Accordingly, in the absence of any Principle of Individuation that is also a Principle of Sufficient Reason, a concept of Individual Natural Right can only be artefactual, and subject to other systematic considerations, which is what PT, II, 23, at bottom expresses.