Individual, Nature, Wrong

In II, 18, of Political Treatise, Spinoza states that "in the state of nature, . . .  if anyone does wrong, it is to himself, not to another", an example which, therefore, can be classified as 'Individual Natural Wrong'.  Now, in his system, any such behavior involves Inadequate Ideas, and, hence, is 'Passive'.  However, in II, 5, he argues that "passive affections" are protected as a Natural Right, on the basis that irrational behavior, as much as rational, is a modification of God's Right.  In contrast, grounding Individual Natural Right on the concept of Selfhood, previously proposed here, exposes the root of Spinoza's apparent confusion over the status of irrational behavior.  For, since Passivity entails Heteronomy, one is not the Adequate Cause of irrational behavior, in which case Selfhood does not obtain, and, therefore, nor is there any Right to it.  Spinoza does have at his disposal, which he does not explore, an analogous argument in his own terms--that God's processes involve only Adequate Ideas, so, therefore, behavior involving Inadequate Ideas, i. e. irrational behavior, is not protected as an instance of those processes, from which it follows that there can be no Individual Natural Wrong.