Right, Nature, Polis

A sufficient basis for Spinoza's Political Philosophy appears in a sequence in Part IV of the Ethics, especially xxxvi-vii, culminating in lxxiii, "The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of laws, than in solitude."  Now, in these passages, the concept of individual Natural Right appears only peripherally, and, as inessential to the demonstration.  Yet, that concept, apparently in agreement with Hobbes, is seemingly the foundation of the Political Treatise, with its introduction at the outset of the presentation, in II, 2.  However, Spinoza eventually concludes that "natural right . . . can hardly be conceived. . . except where mean have general rights" (II, 15), and that a person "has, in fact, no right . . . but that the common law allows." (II, 16).  So, implicit, at least, in the combination of these passages, contrary to some standard interpretations, is that his concept of Natural Right functions not to align Spinoza with Hobbes, but to express his disagreement with his predecessor's thesis that individual Natural Right pre-exists any social arrangement, i. e. that Polis is, in some respect, non-Natural.