Will, Health, Exercise

In the Preface to Part V of the Ethics, Spinoza defines the method of perfecting physical performance as 'Medicine'. In contrast, Plato, in the Gorgias, proposes that two arts are devoted to physical well-being--Medicine and Gymnastics. The contrast emphasizes the incapacity of Spinoza's system to express that even simple physiological exercise, of which Gymnastics is a refinement, is of value beyond the recovery of health, and, furthermore, beyond the mere maintenance of health, as is demonstrated by strength-increasing physical exercise. The distinction between exercise, and the recovery/maintenance of health, illustrates Will, i. e. Motility, as an excess with respect to a given physical condition, an excess which, as is demonstrated by Gymnastic competitions, is nevertheless amenable, as such, to evaluation. In other words, the characterization 'beyond good and evil', with respect to Spinoza's system, corresponds primarily to the limitations of his perfectionism.

Will, Necessity, Evaluation

One type of entity that is sometimes described as 'beyond good and evil' is one that functions out of Necessity, thereby precluding the possibility of choice, and, hence, precluding an occasion for evaluation. Spinoza's 'rational automaton' is construable as such an entity, as is Schopenhauer's Individual, the behavior of which is always an inevitable expression of immutable character. So, insofar as Nietzsche inherits this concept from Schopenhauer, his 'beyond good and evil' is interpretable as referring to that necessity of behavior. Now, Sartre's 'condemned to be free' thesis, while seemingly overcoming the Necessity-Freedom antithesis, still does not yield a concept of Evaluation that is compatible with Necessity, in part because of his ambivalence regarding the nature of that Freedom. For, in Nausea, Freedom is 'de trop', an absurd superfluity that provides no ground for a meaningful Axiology, while in Being and Nothingness, Freedom is a 'lack', and, hence, is no more than constrained to fill that lack. In contrast, here, Will is a principle of Excession, and, hence, is analogous to the former of Sartre's two interpretations of 'Freedom'. More generally, it is a principle of Diversification, and because 'Diversification' entails indefinite possibility, the exercise of Will is the occasion for choosing between alternatives, and, hence, of Evaluation. Furthermore, Diversification is a dimension of the general systematic Conatus of Evolvement, so the exercise of Will is an expression of the 'necessity' of personal nature. Hence, on this model, Necessity of function does not preclude significant Evaluation.

Will, Egoism, Atomism

Underlying the positive-negative antithesis entailed in 'good vs. bad', 'good vs. evil', etc. axiologies, is a self vs. other antagonism. That antagonism is also the source of apparently 'universalistic' doctrines, which are, upon closer examination, generalizations of it to exclusionary 'we vs. they' systems, e. g. humanity vs. the rest of Nature, for Spinoza, rational beings vs. heteronomous influences, for Kant. So, because the self-other distinction is typically conceived as immutable, these doctrines are all variations of what might be called 'Atomistic Egoism'. In contrast, here, Self-Other is defined in terms of Interior-Exterior, which, in turn, hypostasizes and abstracts from the fundamental personal processes of Interiorization and Exteriorization, i. e. Comprehension and Will, respectively. In other words, a more decisive alternative to Egoism than traditional Universalism avoids Atomism from the outset, by conceiving Self as fundamentally in interaction with Alterity, an interaction the variability of which is appropriately evaluated by a Comparative Axiology.

Will, Ressentiment, Axiology

One of the main ambitions of Nietzschean Ethics is the overcoming of Ressentiment. For example, the 'slave', i. e. the 'good vs. evil', morality that he repudiates in favor of 'master', i. e. 'good vs. bad', morality, is, on his diagnosis, an expression of hostility by the weak against the strong, whereas, in his alternative, the strong merely distance themselves from the weak. Nevertheless, Ressentiment may be implicit in his master morality, as well. For, insofar as that morality is derived from Spinoza's 'useful'-harmful' axiology, 'good vs.bad' still expresses a 'self vs. other' antagonism that is only partially tempered by the recognition of it as a merely human contrivance. At the root of that antagonism is a positive-negative antithesis that is entailed in 'good-bad' as much as it is in 'good-evil'. In contrast, a Comparative Axiology, i. e. the fundamental terms of which are 'better' and 'worse', facilitates evaluation without resorting to vilification. For example, here, that a greater exercise of Will is 'better' than a lesser one, does not entail that the 'worse' alternative is 'bad', 'evil', 'harmful', etc.

Will, Ethics, Therapy

Spinoza's thesis, that the acquisition of knowledge of one's emotions suffices to gain control over them, anticipates Psychoanalysis by two centuries. Conversely, the similarity reinforces the hypothesis that his ethical program is primarily therapeutic, i. e. that it aims at achieving full functionality. Nietzsche's doctrine, too, is sometimes characterized as 'therapeutic', i. e. insofar as the affirmation of Eternal Recurrence cures Ressentiment. But, in both cases, the concept of Ethics as Therapy also exposes the limitations of the program, for, it implies that the nuances of healthy conduct is beyond the scope of Ethics, an implication that is encouraged by the formulation 'beyond good and evil' that, as has been previously discussed, is to be found in Part IV of the Ethics, as well as, of course, in Nietzsche's works. Accordingly, neither doctrine, especially Spinoza's, has the resources to evaluate the exercise of surplus strength, though Nietzsche's has the potential for a related normative principle, such as 'Perform the alternative that consists in the greatest exercise of strength'. In contrast, here, the exercise of Will is the occasion, whether in sickness or in health, of an increase in strength, for which the normative principle 'Maximize volition', or, equivalently, 'Evolve as much as possible', is unfettered by an a priori concept of full capacity, e. g. by 'health', 'perfection', 'active', etc. Thus, on this model, Ethics is a cultivation of personal growth, not a corrective therapy.

Will and Akrasia

Akrasia--the experiential sequence consisting in 1. The awareness that it is better that one do X than that one do Y; and then, 2. One does Y--is often characterized as 'weakness of the will'. According to Aristotle, the 'weakness' entailed is a diminishing of capacity. According to Nietzsche, the 'weakness' is a submission to greater strength. Finally, Spinoza combines the two analyses with the thesis that the diminishing of capacity in an entity can be caused only by a stronger external influence. Still, that apparent defense of Aristotle's diagnosis overlooks his own recognition that a stronger external influence can be pleasurable, and, hence, can cause an increase in one's strength, and not a diminishing of one's capacity. In other words, that one does Y sufficiently proves that the above description suppresses--1A. The awareness that it is better to do Y--which constitutes an at least temporary increase in strength. Furthermore, as analyzed here, Will, in itself, is indeterminate, so, 'stronger' and 'weaker' are fundamentally characteristics of the representations that impart determinacy to it. Hence, Akrasia might be more fruitfully described as 'weakness of comprehension', to focus attention on the inadequacy of an erroneous, albeit temporarily compelling, intention.

Will and Slave Morality

Nietzsche's concept of Slave Morality entails a process of self-abnegation that seems antithetical to Spinozistic Conatus, for which self-weakening is impossible. On the other hand, Spinoza agrees with Nietzsche's thesis that any evaluation, including one expressing self-subservience, originates only in that Self. Here, Slave Morality is construed as primarily not a diminishing of Will, but as an over-extension of it, in which it is severed from its origin. On that model, in Nietzschean language, Slave Morality is a Will, not to Nothingness, but to Everythingness, which entails its own effacement in order to achieve pure Universality. If he were familiar with Nietzsche's doctrine, Spinoza might classify its Slave Morality as an 'inadequate' idea of its Master Morality. Also, the self-aggrandizement/self-effacement dialectic of Slave Morality explains its applicability to philosophical procedures that are not conventionally categorized as 'Moral', e. g. to the Epoche of Phenomenology.