Personalism and Division of Labor

As has been previously proposed, 'Person' can be defined as 'particular Human', thereby signifying that a Person is a part of the Human species, not in an antagonistic relation with it.  Accordingly, Personality is one's distinctive character, and Personalism is the promotion of Personality.  So, specialization is one expression of Personality, perhaps best exemplified by a member of an orchestra.  Likewise, a Division of Labor can be conceived as Personalist.  Now, Marx's "from each according to one's ability" seems a commitment to Personalism.  On the other hand, earlier, in the German Ideology, he adamantly opposes Division of Labor, associating specialization with oppression.  So, perhaps, his appreciation for Personalism expresses maturation.

Private Sector and Public Sector

In their common Economic usages, 'private sector' and 'public sector' signify a possibly antagonistic adjacency.  However, that 'private' and 'public' themselves are related as 'closed' to 'open' suggests that a more radical distinction between them is being homogenized in those usages.  Indeed, their actual relation is entailed in the concept of Division of Labor, which presupposes an organization of a work-force, and, hence, requires an organizer of its parts.  In the Republic, that organizer is the Philosopher-King, the modern correlate of which is the Government, in an orchestra, the conductor.  So, the Private-Public distinction, properly conceived, is that of Part to Whole, and any apparent antagonism, e. g. profits vs. regulation, is a symptom of a dysfunctional organization, comparable to unhealth.  Likewise, the reduction of the scope of the Public to a 'sector' that is commensurate with another 'sector', is a reduction of the Whole to a Part, and, so, signifies a dysfunctional Economic condition.

Quantification, Human, Person

While De-Personalization usually meets with disapproval, that judgment tends to lack Moral resonance.  One reason for such tepidity might be reflected in the contingent status of 'impersonal', which, like 'detached', can mean either 'impartial' or 'uncaring', depending on the circumstances.  Another reason might be that a systematic derivation of Person seems to be lacking.  Now, one approach is to define 'Person' as 'individual Human'.  However, that derivation burdens the concept with the previously discussed problem that 'individual' actually renders indistinct what it quantifies, as well as with Individual-Universal antagonism.  So, instead, without those burdens, is an alternative Quantifier--Particular, which designates a substantive as a Part of a Whole, thereby preserving its distinction from other Parts.  Accordingly, 'Person' can be defined as 'particular Human', from which it follows that De-Personalization is particular De-Humanization, and the bearer of whatever Moral status that that might entail.  In other words, if the species has an active principle of generating unique Particulars, e. g. Variations in Darwinism, and such a unique Particular is what a Person is, then De-Personalization is a type of De-Humanization, i. e. stifling the Humanness of a Person just as much a subjecting them to involuntary functioning is.

Quantification, De-Humanization, De-Personalization

Quantification per se does not de-humanize, e. g. counting a group of people, though it might when representing someone as an item in an accounting ledger.  But, it does homogenize its objects, thereby potentially de-personalizing each human being thus represented, i. e. since it abstracts from their differences.  Thus rarely noticed is that 'individualism', as it is popularly conceived, is quantification that de-personalizes.  For, 'individual' means 'one', a characteristic that is common to each in a plurality, even if counting or adding does not ensue.  So, labelling someone an 'individual' abstracts from any differences between them and any other 'individual', thereby de-personalizing them. Thus, such 'individualism' accomplishes the opposite of its aim of distinguishing each person from every other person.

Quantification, Money, Interest

Quantification entails homogenization and commensuration.  Money is mobile quantified purchase power of Demand. Price is quantified Supply.  So, contemporary Macro-Economics is far removed from Plato's Political Economy.  The latter is constituted by Demand-Supply harmonization, i. e. vital needs and a Division of Labor to meet them.  But, the fundamental unit of the former is Money-Price correlation, i. e. Price establishes the terms of the availability of Supply, the acquisition of which by Demand is facilitated by Money.  Thus, the Demand-Supply relation is switched--Price demands, and Money is supplied.  Now, Quantity is signified by a Cardinal Number, as the product of Counting, which is carried out in terms of Ordinal Numbers.  So, Quantification produces Cardinal Numbers.  But then, Cardinal Numbers are themselves enumerable, and themselves quantifiable.  It is that reflexive capacity of Quantification that facilitates the treatment of Money as itself a commodity--an object of Demand with a Price--or, in other words, facilitates Interest.  In Interest, Money homogenizes itself and makes itself commensurate with substances from which it, as a property of theirs, is categorially distinguished, and, hence, incommensurate with.

Chresmatism, Money, Quantification

Chresmatism can transpire without Money, e. g. trading a bag of rice for a pair of shoes, and then trading the shoes for two bags of rice.  But, as the example illustrates, it does require Quantification.  Or, to put it analytically, Chresmatism is Profit-seeking, and Profit is a comparison of two Quantities.  Instead, if Money is valuable to the process, it is as expediting it, by virtue of functioning as a mobile bearer of Quantity, i. e. quantity of purchase power.

Chresmatism, Greed, Exploitation

Chresmatism is a crucial factor in Marx's analysis of Exploitation, elevating its harm to more than that of Greed.  The latter deprives another of their fair share, and, so, expresses either indifference or cruelty.  In Chresmatism, a Commodity functions as a Means to Profit, and Labor is a Commodity in the Capitalist ledger.  Hence, in Chresmatism, a worker is concretely de-humanized--the Midas touch, as Aristotle suggests, applied to humans--while cruelty feeds on the humanness of its victim, and indifference ignores it without negating it.  So, insofar as Capitalism is Chresmatistic, it systematically de-humanizes, though Marx tends to not focus on its harm to the beneficiary of Exploitation, perpetual dis-ease, as has been previously discussed.  Thus, the branding of Capitalists as advocating that 'Greed is Good' does not penetrate to the source of their ill.

Chresmatism, Means, End

As has been previously discussed, since Aristotle and Marx share a condemnation of Chresmatism, i. e. the pursuit of Money for its own sake, that position is independent of the Private Property vs. Collective Property dispute.  Now, one distinction between the two treatments is while Marx focuses on the harm to others of Chresmatistic behavior, i. e. exploitation, Aristotle diagnoses it as personally harmful; he does not need to ground that diagnosis in any concept of Greed, though that approach is available to him.  Instead, an analysis that they each present reveals the source of a more fundamental dis-ease, in the literal sense of the term.  For, ease comes with the achieving of an End, but even as the Chresmatist tries to make Money an End, it retains its essential nature as a Means, and, so, satisfaction perpetually eludes them.  Thus, at the heart of Chresmatism there is a profound confusion that is manifested as not merely as perpetual instability, but as the seeking of stability in what is actually profound instability.  Or, in more popular terms, the love of money is not a root of evil; it is already evil.

Capitalism, Economics, Chresmatistics

In Politics I:9, Aristotle distinguishes Money and Wealth as a Means, from Money and Wealth as an End.  He characterizes the former as "natural", the latter as not.  As Marx transliterates Aristotle's terms, the classification of the former is "Economic", and the latter, "Chresmatistic".  The significance of the distinction to him is that, as the title of Smith's book suggests, in Capitalism, Money and Wealth is an End.  Hence, Capitalism is a Chresmatistic, not an Economic, system, a conclusion that is not necessarily from a Socialist perspective, since Aristotle is an advocate of Private Property.

Political Economy and Macro-Economics

The common concept of 'Macro-Economics' as a more contemporary synonym of 'Political Economy' suppresses a significant distinction between them.  'Macro-Economics' connotes a generalized 'Micro-Economics', and, hence, that of some private enterprise.  Thus, any Means of Production in Macro-Economics is privately owned.  In contrast, 'Political Economy' connotes 'Economy of a Polis', which, as the title of Plato's Polis, 'Republic', signifies, is a public system.  Accordingly, any Means of Production in a Political Economy is collectively owned.  Now, Smith vacillates between the two--insofar as the scope of his work is national, it is Political Economy, but insofar as the Ethics of his model is Egoistic, it is Macro-Economics.  In contrast, many of his followers are less equivocal, advocating a model of Economic activity that excludes consideration of Means of Production, and, so, is less Macro- than one that does incorporate it and studies its consequences, e. g. exploitation.  Of course, Means of Production is central to the Socialist alternative, though usually without a recognition of the argument that public ownership of it follows from Smith's own nationalization the Division of Labor.

Demand: Vital and Non-Vital

Demand can be divided into vital need and non-vital want.  Correspondingly, other Economic categories can be likewise divided--Use-Value, Utility, Supply, etc.  Conversely, that the division is not recognized is reflected e. g. where the Demand for Viagra and the Demand for heart medication are indifferently ascribed to a 'Consumer'.  So, one example of a Prescriptive Economics formulation that is not to be found in a Descriptive Economics is the principle that distinguishes vital from non-vital Demand, and sets the universal meeting of it as a priority.

Will to Power and Impulse Purchase

As has been previously discussed, according to a precise application of Will to Power, i. e. that it seeks to discharge strength, the primary goal of Economic activity is expenditure, for its own sake.  Thus explained are phenomena such as impulse purchasing and recreational shopping.  On this basis, the value of an object of an impulse purchase derives from neither Labor, Exchange, Use, Marginal Utility, or any other of the traditional candidates.  Rather, its value consists simply in being an outlet for the impulse, the underlying stratum of all purposeful behavior thus being briefly exposed.  In other words, what according to most other concepts of Economic behavior is an inconsequential moment, is in Nietzsche's, a revelation of its essence.  So, a radical re-orientation of Economics is one of the implications of the supplanting of Will to Live by Will to Power.

Economics, Prescription, Description

The earliest 'Economics' is, as has been previously discussed, micro-Economics, with macro- first emerging with Smith's nationalization of the topic.  Now, a less recognized distinction, that transcends that one, is between descriptive Economics and prescriptive Economics.  For example, Wealth of Nations is prescriptive insofar as it recommends the implementation of Division of Labor, as is Communist Manifesto in its call for a revolution.  But, though its ulterior motive is prescriptive, Marx' Capital is descriptive, a status ignored by those who dismiss its analyses as Socialist propaganda, thereby willfully turning a blind eye to internal flaws in Capitalism.  Generally, contemporary Economics is descriptive, thus missing the prescriptive potential of a principle such as Equilibrium, as has been previously discussed.  But, it also sometimes confuses prescription and description, most notably when Smith's recommendation that one focus exclusively on self-interested motivation is taken for the assertion that all behavior is immutably self-interested, or when inducted patterns are characterized as 'natural'.  By suppressing the possibility of prescription in such cases, status quo de facto conditions are reinforced.

Equilibrium, Income, Expenditures

One of the earliest works on Economics, debatably attributed to Aristotle, reflects the literal meaning of the term, 'household management'--micro-Economic in scope, emphasis on management and organization, and non-quantificational.  One principle that it espouses that is relevant to Modern Economics is Equilibrium--applied to the relation between income and expenditure.  So, the author of that work might strongly disapprove of the centrality in its descendants of borrowing and lending.

Profit-Seeking and Will to Power

As has been previously discussed, an equivalence between Self-Interest and Profit, taken for granted by most Capitalists since Smith, is not easy to reconcile with the traditional equivalence of Self-Interest and Will to Live.  So, though not usually explicitly cited as the reason, that discrepancy might explain the appeal for them of Nietzsche's alternative to Will to Live, Will to Power, i. e. because of the possibility of equating Wealth and Power.  However, the latter interpretation of Nietzsche's principle misses one of its significant nuances.  For, he characterizes it, more precisely, as seeking to "discharge strength".  Accordingly, it is more precisely applicable to the act of spending, as is expressed by the common phrase 'spending power'.  But, that act is itself independent of any increase in wealth that might have preceded it, e. g. money being spent might have come from selling something for the original purchase price.  Furthermore, a discharge of strength that empowers another has high value for Nietzsche, but is forbidden by Capitalist Egoism. So, Will to Power does not ground the equivalence of Self-Interest and Profit, despite the presumption of some that it does.

Rationality and Economics

Part of Spinoza's concept of Rational behavior is that it adequately promotes one's well-being.  Part of Kant's is that it promotes the happiness of others.  In contrast, the concept of Rational behavior that is a staple of modern Economic theory, though usually not explicitly formulated, seems to be Humean--the calculation of the best means to maximum personal pleasure and minimum personal pain.  Apparently validated by that concept are gaining where others lose, and purchasing a pet rock.  Now, the Prisoner's Dilemma exposes some of the inherent weaknesses in that concept, but regardless, it plainly diverges from both Spinoza's and Kant's.  For, according to the former, Pleasure is usually no more than a semi-Rational motivation, and according to the latter, profiting from the loss of another usually violates Rationality.  In other words, the concept of Rationality taken for granted in these theories, reflecting their origins in British Sentimentalism, is arbitrary.

Economics and Equilibrium

Most, if not all, fundamental constituents of an Economy are binary--sow-reap, produce-consume, supply-demand, sell-buy, etc.  Thus, the evaluation of an Economy must accord equal value to each term in such a pair.  So, insofar as a highest Moral or Political Good is unitary, e. g. Freedom, Happiness, etc., it is inadequate as a criterion for that evaluative function. Now, Equilibrium is widely accepted as descriptive of some Economic relations, e. g. Price as determined by Supply vs. Demand, but not as normative for others, e. g. the relation between Supply and Demand themselves.  The desirability of Equilibrium is clearer in some cases, e. g. in comparison with Demand exceeding Supply, i. e. Scarcity, than in others, e. g. in comparison with a surplus of Supply, which can entail waste, of both the good and the labor by which it has been produced.  In other words, Equilibrium signifies maximum efficiency, but not to the disadvantage of vitality, i. e. in the context of a society of animate beings, it signifies neither mechanical rigidity nor stagnation.  So, for example, with Equilibrium as the standard, an Economy which, at the same time, produces an excess of food for some, and leaves others underfed, is woefully inadequate, regardless of how well it measures up in terms of GNP, employment rate, etc.

Sowing, Reaping, Philosophy of Economics

Paul the Apostle sserts that there is a causal connection between sowing and reaping.  Kant elaborates that the causality, divinely mediated, is between the intention of a sower and what they reap. Marx conceives that there is an obligation to sow, and that reaping what another has sown and needs is stealing.  Economics studies the empirical relations between sowing and reaping, aka production and consumption, or Supply and Demand.  In contrast, a Philosophy of Economics proposes what is the ideal relation between them, e. g. an equilibrium.

Economics and Philosophy of Economics.

Traditionally, Economic topics, e. g. Distributive Justice, Private Property, by Philosophers are usually subsumed under Morality or Political Philosophy.  Marx diverges from that tradition by conceiving Economics to be the foundation of Philosophy, on the basis of his thesis that Economic behavior, not some Epistemological datum, for example, is the foundation of Experience.  Still, insofar as he presupposes some variety of Dialectics, and some Moral principle according to which exploitation is Evil, that grounding is not completely original.  Furthermore, the foundational status of Economics is irrelevant to one of his masterworks, Capital.  So, despite the Philosophical attention to Economics, still lacking is an endeavor that can be called Philosophy of Economics, the main aim of which is to define the best Economic system, i. e. is contrasted with Economics just as Political Philosophy is with Political Science or Political Theory.

Supply, Demand, Equilibrium

'The Law of Supply and Demand' usually connotes the tendency of the price of a good to reach equilibrium, as a function of the relation between its supply and its demand.  The fundamental concepts of that function are that as Supply increases, Price decreases, and that as Demand increases, Price increases, with more elaborate formulations of them usually the interest of Economists.  One constant in their projections is the 'rational' behavior of participants, conceived as the well-informed seeking to maximize gain and minimize loss in any transaction.  Thus, the actuality of their hypotheses is contingent on the actuality of such behavior.  In any case, any such Law presupposes a relation between Supply and Demand themselves, of which there are three main possibilities--Supply exceeds Demand, Demand exceeds Supply, and Supply and Demand are in equilibrium.  Now, in the case of this Supply-Demand equilibrium, there is no presumption of a inherent tendency towards it.  To the contrary, as in the example of Plato's commensuration between need and work-force, that equilibrium is an ideal.  Accordingly, the best Economic system can be defined as one in which Supply-Demand Equilibrium obtains.

Division of Labor and Supply-Demand

Smith is hardly the first to present a Division of Labor; Plato's concept of a three-tiered Polis is a less detailed version of the model.  But the focus of the latter is not Division of Labor; rather it is the commensuration between the needs of the Polis and the types of citizens who can fulfill them.  In other words, his primary interest is a balance in the relation between what has become known as Supply and Demand.  Now, at the heart of the Economic conflicts of the past two centuries is a dispute over the general way that that balance can be achieved.  According to one side, either there is an internal dynamic that tends towards it, or there is a transcendent force that guides towards it.  According to the other, evidence of either is lacking, requiring, instead, active planning to achieve balance, an approach that is condemned by the first side as interference.  So, there is tacit agreement regarding Supply-Demand balance as the fundamental goal of an Economic system, though those who advocate a laissez-faire approach do not seem to recognize that their very own 'Supply-side' Economics violates their own principle.

Division of Labor and Invisible Hand

As has been previously discussed, Smith's innovative concept of Division of Labor is detached from principles that he advocates in other contexts.  It also entails a criticism of one of the cardinal features of his Economic model itself.  For, Division of Labor presupposes Organization of Labor, and, hence, deliberate social organization.  So, if Division of Labor conduces to national wealth, then deliberate social organization is a vital factor in achieving that goal.  Thus, Division of Labor entails a repudiation of the possibility that national wealth can be achieved via some mysterious force, i. e. via his Invisible Hand.  With greater emphasis on the organizational factor in his system, the subsequent history of Capitalism might have been very different, e. g. with less insistence on laissez-faire conditions.

Division of Labor and Organism

Smith's primary Economic innovation is the organization of the work-force, aka the Division of Labor.   Now, essential to any such organization is Structure.  But, Atomism, according to which relations are inessential, cannot recognize that status of Structure.  Likewise inadequate to Structure is Empiricism, since it cannot be reduced to Sense-Data.  Now, effective functioning in a Division of Labor requires a recognition of the Good of the Structure.  But, such recognition cannot be derived from Selfishness, nor can it be grounded in Sympathy, which is merely undifferentiated fellow-feeling.  In other words, Smith's innovation strays from each of the Philosophical positions that he espouses over the course of his career.  Instead, as the term 'organization' suggests, the model for his system is the concept of Organism, though he does not extend it to his concepts of Psychology or Ethics.

Egoism and Division of Labor

Somewhat lost in subsequent history is that Smith's own Economic model modifies, if not conflicts with, his advocacy of Egoism.  For, the fundamental innovation of that model consists in the organization of a labor force that is the ground of a Division of Labor.  In that context, 'individuals' are actually specialists in what Smith imagines is a more efficient, and, hence, more productive, Economic system.  Accordingly, his Egoism is not unconditional therein, i. e. the exclusive focus on what one is doing presupposes its role in a larger structure, and, so, likewise, any personal satisfaction to be enjoyed is not independent of that of one's co-workers.  Thus, the compatability of Egoism and Division of Labor requires that included in the latter is the role of Organizer, e. g. a musical conductor, in which case, each attending to their own task will produce the general satisfaction that is the sum of the satisfactions of each.  But, then, the lack of that inclusion is not an internal failure of Smith's system, which may be why the resulting structural incoherence has not had the attention of its critics.

Interest, Atomism, Organicism

According to Atomism, Relations are External, or, in other words, an Atom remains essentially unaffected by its relation to any other Atom.  Accordingly, Social Atomism entails that a person is essentially unaffected by how they treat another person, which grounds any justification of indifference to or mistreatment of others.  In contrast, according to Organicism, Parts are essentially interrelated, from which it follows that if one diminishes another, one, at the same time, diminishes oneself.  On that basis, Egoist justification for exploitative practices, e. g. Interest-charging, is undercut, and is exposed as promoting its antithesis.

Interest and Usury

In the U. S., Usury laws vary from state to state, from context to context.  So, generally recognized is that Interest-charging can inflict harm on a borrower, and implicit in a set rate is that it is a threshold of such harm.  But, if 10% is harmful, why not 9%, or 8%, or, indeed, any rate?  Thus implicit in the very existence of these laws is an essential malignancy in the practice of Interest-charging, ignored only arbitrarily.  In other words, they reflect that Interest is essentially usurious, i. e. at any rate.

Interest and Morality

According to some Moral doctrines, e. g. Egoism, charging Interest might be virtuous conduct, i. e. because it promotes personal gain.  But, in others, its status is more equivocal.  The standard scenario in which Interest-charging occurs is one in which A has an excess of some good, often money, and B has a deficiency.  So, there are four main possible courses of action for A: 1. Do nothing; 2. Make a gift to B; 3. Extend an interest-free loan to B; and 4. Extend a loan, charging interest, to B.  Now, according to some doctrines, #2, and perhaps #3, are virtuous, while #1 and #4 are not. Furthermore, as a Utilitarian analysis shows, the relative values of the latter two are contingent on the details of the possible consequence in #4.  Thus, #4 is better than #1 in the case of a fruitful investment, but not when temporary relief from a deficiency not only merely defers it, but eventually compounds it, the general concern for which is reflected in Usury laws.  So, the more elaborate analysis shows, at minimum, that the Egoist espousal of Interest-charging is short-sighted.

Interest and Self-Interest

Among the commonest contemporary sources of Profit is one of the oldest, one that pre-dates most Economic institutions--Interest.  But, as is the case with Slavery, at least until recently, age does not justify its continued wide acceptance.  Nor does Interest involve any vital Self-Interest, consisting in merely a combination of Excess and Deficiency, which, as is the case in lending between friends or relatives, can be balanced without recourse to Interest.  To the contrary, a society without Interest might be one absent both living beyond means and a frequent opportunity for exploitation.  Of course, such a society is nowhere in sight at this stage of human history, though the illegalization of slavery might have seemed unimaginable until relatively recently in that history.

Profit, Self-Interest, National Wealth

Four ways of generating Profit are: 1. Adding value to material via Labor on it; 2. Owning the means used in #1; 3. Stealing; and 4. Interest.  Now, the main debate in Economics over the past two centuries has been in the case where #1 and #2 are not identical, whether or #2 becomes #3.  Socialists, of course, claim that it does, but, rather than denying it, Capitalists who do not ignore the challenge tend to also affirm it, but with some justification, e. g. Social Darwinists.  In any case, #1 is unlike the others in two ways.  First, the Profit that it generates does not entail a corresponding Loss by someone else.  Second, the process can involve personal growth, e. g. the exercise of skill in the transformation of raw material.  So, a responsible defense of Smith's system needs to explain both how an increase in personal wealth contributes to that of a nation, and how Self-Interest and Profit-seeking are identical in cases that do not involve personal growth.

Profit and Sympathy

Unresolved by subsequent scholars has been the relation between Smith's earlier espousal of Sympathy and his later exhorting to Selfishness.  Now, his attribution to his Invisible Hand of what has since come to be known as 'trickle-down' distribution of wealth, i. e. a correction to any concentration of wealth, suggests a projection of Sympathy into that purported force.  However, that projection is undermined by one of the consequences of Profit that he does not seem to consider--that it entails loss elsewhere.  Thus, he does not consider that Self-Interest entails the possibility of the suffering of others, thereby burdening Sympathy well beyond the function of mere compensation for indifference.

Empiricism, Profit, Pleasure

Two of Smith's influential concepts plainly violate his previous orientation.  First, his combination of promoting Self-Interest and repressing Sympathy is clearly antithetical to his previous advocacy of the latter.  Second, his concept of an Invisible Hand is antithetical to his Empiricist roots, even as a metaphor for a generalization, since, as yet non-existent, his system offers no evidentiary basis for such a generalization.  Now, a third is also ungrounded, though a methodical derivation of it is not impossible.  That concept is that of Self-Interest as Profit, which diverges from the traditional principle of Self-Preservation.  But, available is a derivation from the Utilitarian Hedonism that Hume espouses.  For, a Hedonist can, borrowing from Spinoza, argue that Pleasure signifies an increase in strength, so an increase in wealth can correspond to Hedonist Self-Interest.  However, Spinoza's analysis is not available to an Empiricist, though Smith may no longer be that when he introduces the profit-motive as the fundamental principle of human behavior.