Will, Health, Exercise

In the Preface to Part V of the Ethics, Spinoza defines the method of perfecting physical performance as 'Medicine'. In contrast, Plato, in the Gorgias, proposes that two arts are devoted to physical well-being--Medicine and Gymnastics. The contrast emphasizes the incapacity of Spinoza's system to express that even simple physiological exercise, of which Gymnastics is a refinement, is of value beyond the recovery of health, and, furthermore, beyond the mere maintenance of health, as is demonstrated by strength-increasing physical exercise. The distinction between exercise, and the recovery/maintenance of health, illustrates Will, i. e. Motility, as an excess with respect to a given physical condition, an excess which, as is demonstrated by Gymnastic competitions, is nevertheless amenable, as such, to evaluation. In other words, the characterization 'beyond good and evil', with respect to Spinoza's system, corresponds primarily to the limitations of his perfectionism.

Will, Necessity, Evaluation

One type of entity that is sometimes described as 'beyond good and evil' is one that functions out of Necessity, thereby precluding the possibility of choice, and, hence, precluding an occasion for evaluation. Spinoza's 'rational automaton' is construable as such an entity, as is Schopenhauer's Individual, the behavior of which is always an inevitable expression of immutable character. So, insofar as Nietzsche inherits this concept from Schopenhauer, his 'beyond good and evil' is interpretable as referring to that necessity of behavior. Now, Sartre's 'condemned to be free' thesis, while seemingly overcoming the Necessity-Freedom antithesis, still does not yield a concept of Evaluation that is compatible with Necessity, in part because of his ambivalence regarding the nature of that Freedom. For, in Nausea, Freedom is 'de trop', an absurd superfluity that provides no ground for a meaningful Axiology, while in Being and Nothingness, Freedom is a 'lack', and, hence, is no more than constrained to fill that lack. In contrast, here, Will is a principle of Excession, and, hence, is analogous to the former of Sartre's two interpretations of 'Freedom'. More generally, it is a principle of Diversification, and because 'Diversification' entails indefinite possibility, the exercise of Will is the occasion for choosing between alternatives, and, hence, of Evaluation. Furthermore, Diversification is a dimension of the general systematic Conatus of Evolvement, so the exercise of Will is an expression of the 'necessity' of personal nature. Hence, on this model, Necessity of function does not preclude significant Evaluation.

Will, Egoism, Atomism

Underlying the positive-negative antithesis entailed in 'good vs. bad', 'good vs. evil', etc. axiologies, is a self vs. other antagonism. That antagonism is also the source of apparently 'universalistic' doctrines, which are, upon closer examination, generalizations of it to exclusionary 'we vs. they' systems, e. g. humanity vs. the rest of Nature, for Spinoza, rational beings vs. heteronomous influences, for Kant. So, because the self-other distinction is typically conceived as immutable, these doctrines are all variations of what might be called 'Atomistic Egoism'. In contrast, here, Self-Other is defined in terms of Interior-Exterior, which, in turn, hypostasizes and abstracts from the fundamental personal processes of Interiorization and Exteriorization, i. e. Comprehension and Will, respectively. In other words, a more decisive alternative to Egoism than traditional Universalism avoids Atomism from the outset, by conceiving Self as fundamentally in interaction with Alterity, an interaction the variability of which is appropriately evaluated by a Comparative Axiology.

Will, Ressentiment, Axiology

One of the main ambitions of Nietzschean Ethics is the overcoming of Ressentiment. For example, the 'slave', i. e. the 'good vs. evil', morality that he repudiates in favor of 'master', i. e. 'good vs. bad', morality, is, on his diagnosis, an expression of hostility by the weak against the strong, whereas, in his alternative, the strong merely distance themselves from the weak. Nevertheless, Ressentiment may be implicit in his master morality, as well. For, insofar as that morality is derived from Spinoza's 'useful'-harmful' axiology, 'good vs.bad' still expresses a 'self vs. other' antagonism that is only partially tempered by the recognition of it as a merely human contrivance. At the root of that antagonism is a positive-negative antithesis that is entailed in 'good-bad' as much as it is in 'good-evil'. In contrast, a Comparative Axiology, i. e. the fundamental terms of which are 'better' and 'worse', facilitates evaluation without resorting to vilification. For example, here, that a greater exercise of Will is 'better' than a lesser one, does not entail that the 'worse' alternative is 'bad', 'evil', 'harmful', etc.

Will, Ethics, Therapy

Spinoza's thesis, that the acquisition of knowledge of one's emotions suffices to gain control over them, anticipates Psychoanalysis by two centuries. Conversely, the similarity reinforces the hypothesis that his ethical program is primarily therapeutic, i. e. that it aims at achieving full functionality. Nietzsche's doctrine, too, is sometimes characterized as 'therapeutic', i. e. insofar as the affirmation of Eternal Recurrence cures Ressentiment. But, in both cases, the concept of Ethics as Therapy also exposes the limitations of the program, for, it implies that the nuances of healthy conduct is beyond the scope of Ethics, an implication that is encouraged by the formulation 'beyond good and evil' that, as has been previously discussed, is to be found in Part IV of the Ethics, as well as, of course, in Nietzsche's works. Accordingly, neither doctrine, especially Spinoza's, has the resources to evaluate the exercise of surplus strength, though Nietzsche's has the potential for a related normative principle, such as 'Perform the alternative that consists in the greatest exercise of strength'. In contrast, here, the exercise of Will is the occasion, whether in sickness or in health, of an increase in strength, for which the normative principle 'Maximize volition', or, equivalently, 'Evolve as much as possible', is unfettered by an a priori concept of full capacity, e. g. by 'health', 'perfection', 'active', etc. Thus, on this model, Ethics is a cultivation of personal growth, not a corrective therapy.

Will and Akrasia

Akrasia--the experiential sequence consisting in 1. The awareness that it is better that one do X than that one do Y; and then, 2. One does Y--is often characterized as 'weakness of the will'. According to Aristotle, the 'weakness' entailed is a diminishing of capacity. According to Nietzsche, the 'weakness' is a submission to greater strength. Finally, Spinoza combines the two analyses with the thesis that the diminishing of capacity in an entity can be caused only by a stronger external influence. Still, that apparent defense of Aristotle's diagnosis overlooks his own recognition that a stronger external influence can be pleasurable, and, hence, can cause an increase in one's strength, and not a diminishing of one's capacity. In other words, that one does Y sufficiently proves that the above description suppresses--1A. The awareness that it is better to do Y--which constitutes an at least temporary increase in strength. Furthermore, as analyzed here, Will, in itself, is indeterminate, so, 'stronger' and 'weaker' are fundamentally characteristics of the representations that impart determinacy to it. Hence, Akrasia might be more fruitfully described as 'weakness of comprehension', to focus attention on the inadequacy of an erroneous, albeit temporarily compelling, intention.

Will and Slave Morality

Nietzsche's concept of Slave Morality entails a process of self-abnegation that seems antithetical to Spinozistic Conatus, for which self-weakening is impossible. On the other hand, Spinoza agrees with Nietzsche's thesis that any evaluation, including one expressing self-subservience, originates only in that Self. Here, Slave Morality is construed as primarily not a diminishing of Will, but as an over-extension of it, in which it is severed from its origin. On that model, in Nietzschean language, Slave Morality is a Will, not to Nothingness, but to Everythingness, which entails its own effacement in order to achieve pure Universality. If he were familiar with Nietzsche's doctrine, Spinoza might classify its Slave Morality as an 'inadequate' idea of its Master Morality. Also, the self-aggrandizement/self-effacement dialectic of Slave Morality explains its applicability to philosophical procedures that are not conventionally categorized as 'Moral', e. g. to the Epoche of Phenomenology.

Will, Interpretation, Perfection

If, as Nietzsche proposes, the Moralization of Nature is an interpretation, then, so, too, is the Naturalization of Morality. Hence, without further analysis, 'X is good = X is useful' is not an interpretation, but is only a stipulation of terminological convenience regarding the use of the terms 'good' and 'useful'. In contrast, the aspect of Spinoza's explanation of Moral Evaluation that is explicitly an interpretation is his concept of Perfection, which he acknowledges is a anthropomorphic teleological interpretation of purposeless Nature. It is to this aspect of Spinoza's doctrine that Nietzsche's concept of Morality has direct relevance, though not merely qua Interpretation, but because of Nietzsche's further insight regarding Interpretation. That insight is that interpretations, and, specifically, moral evaluations, are themselves subject to evaluation, which raises the question of the usefulness of Spinoza's Perfectionism. Spinoza, at least implicitly, plainly regards weighing behavior in terms of Perfection-Imperfection as useful, while Kant, in the Third Critique offers a more explicit defense. In contrast, here, as has been previously discussed, to establish some behavior as 'perfect' is to arbitrarily delimit indefinite Will, one consequence of which is problematic for Spinoza, himself, namely insofar as he has no way to represent increases in strength after 'perfection' has been achieved. So, on that assessment, Spinoza's Perfectionism is potentially harmful to the well-being of some entity, as is any concept of 'good' that is derived from it. Nietzsche's own evaluation of Perfectionism is unclear.

Will, Morality, Interpretation

While Nietzsche's formulation, 'There are no moral phenomena, only moral interpretations of phenomena', may be original, Spinoza's concept of Moral Evaluation exemplifies it two centuries earlier. Regardless, that Interpretation, for Nietzsche, imposes form on its object, exhibits how Moral Evaluation, and Will to Power, in general, are 'form-imposing' processes. However, Nietzsche's formulation also exposes a limitation of his concept of Morality. For, 'X is good' can be more than an interpretation of X--it can be an exhortation to perform X, and, hence, it can entail causality other than Formal. For example, Moral Evaluation for Spinoza is an Efficient Cause, while here, insofar as it initiates action, it entails Material Causality, i. e. Will. In other words, Nietzsche seems to miss that Morality not only interprets phenomena, but can be the source of phenomena, as well, and, more generally, that Will to Power can empower. Genealogical analysis explains that oversight--the ancestor of Nietzsche's concept of Interpretation is not Spinoza's activating Adequate Idea, but Schopenhauer's action-neutralizing Representation.

Will, Evaluation, Power

Nietzsche sometimes characterizes Will to Power as 'form-imposing'. Thus, insofar as the process of Evaluation is, as he asserts, an expression of Will to Power, it functions in the constitution of ethical Self-Control as a Formal Cause. Now, higher Soul, Thought, and Reason, are the Formal Causes of the concepts of Self-Control of Aristotle, Spinoza, and Kant, respectively. Furthermore, just as form-imposition entails form-receiving Matter, in those concepts, lower Soul, Extension, and inclination, respectively are their Matters. In the case of Nietzsche, the constitution of the concept is uncertain--in his later work, Will to Power is ascribed to the Dionysian principle, but in his earliest phase, the Apollinian principle is the source of Form, which implies that the Dionysian is its corresponding Matter. Regardless, he agrees with his predecessors that the controlled part of the Self is inferior to, and a recipient of, Form, if not inert. In contrast, here, Will, the Material Principle of personal experience, is equipollent to the Formal Principle, Comprehension, and, hence, is as dynamic as the evaluation process that imparts Form to its exercise, i. e. that imparts Form to action. Thus, on this model, in contrast with Nietzsche's, Power is not exclusively form-imposing. So, if he had maintained his original Dionysian-Apollinian dichotomy, he might have arrived at a similar conclusion, one which is also implied by Deleuze's reading of Spinoza's Attributes as Powers, i. e. one that conceives Evaluation as empowering, not as constraining.

Will and Self-Mastery

The doctrines of Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, and Nietzsche each advocate Self-Control, with Spinoza's and Kant's varieties each Universalistic, and Aristotle's and Nietzsche's each Relativistic. Nietzsche's primary innovation in the tradition is to derive values from an act of evaluation, on the basis of which, he demonstrates that self-mastery is a species of mastery. His method also illuminates an important distinction between Spinoza's and Kant's Universalism--for the former, the principle of evaluation is Self-Preservation, while for the latter, it is Reason. Still, even Nietzsche's concept of self-mastery implies an intra-psychic split between mastering and mastered. In contrast, here, that split is between the two fundamental principles of personal experience, Will and Comprehension, components of a conatus seeking their balance, which produces Evolvement, or, more commonly, growth. Hence, here, the evaluation of conduct is in terms of degree of Evolvement, or, equivalent quantity of Volition, so the doctrine diverges from the Self-Control tradition. The promotion of balance between Extension and Thought in Spinoza's system, and between the Dionysian and Apollinian in Nietzsche's, would transform them into Evolvemental doctrines.

Will, Good, Virtue

While Spinoza's hypothetical 'free' man forms no concept of 'good', it expressedly possesses Virtue, so any characterization of his rational automaton as 'amoral' is inappropriate. Since he conceives 'virtue' as equivalent to 'active behavior', a virtuous person forms no concept of 'good' for the same reason that a healthy person has no need of medicine, i. e. 'X is good' may adequately represent the utility of some thing, but it is inadequate knowledge of Virtue. This subordination of the Good to Virtue aligns Spinoza with Aristotle against Plato, and helps illuminate Nietzsche's 'master' morality as an Ethics of Virtue, not as 'Subjectivism' or 'Immoralism'. Furthermore, the identification of Virtue and Activity grounds Ethics in the very performance of an action. For example, here, the fundamental locus of evaluation is the exercise of Will, i. e. in terms of quantity of Volition, or, equivalently, degree of Evolvement, and not, as is more prominently the case, an abstract idea, an intention, the consequences of action, a feeling, etc.

Will and Beyond Good and Evil

Spinoza's definitions of 'good' and 'evil', in terms of 'utility' and 'harm', anticipates the anti-Manicheanism of Nietzsche's 'master' morality, though not the anti-universalism of the latter. Spinozism is also 'beyond good and evil' in another respect--his infallible rational automaton has no need of axiological alternatives, though Deleuze's characterization of that infallibility as 'amoral' seems misleading. Still, as appealing as that rational ideal is to Spinoza, and to many of his successors, it lacks the necessity that he, and they, attribute to it. For, as analyzed here, all conduct entails Will, a principle of indefinite self-activation, so any delimitation of its exercise, e. g. via the maximality of an ideal, is extrinsically arbitrary. Spinoza's repeated reliance on that ideal seems undermined by his own Preface to Part IV of the Ethics, in which he acknowledges the inadequacy of the ontological perfectionism from which the ideal is derived.

Will, Relativism, Universalism

At IV, xxxv. of the Ethics, Spinoza asserts that "men, insofar as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human nature, and consequently for each individual man", thereby refuting the suggestion, previously proposed here, that he is a Relativist, and, instead, demonstrating his anticipation of Kantian Universalism. The position also seems to commit him to the judgment that a quantitatively similarly donation from a richer and a poorer person is equally 'generous'. In contrast, here, the locus of evaluation is personal Will, i. e. the extent of one's exertion with respect to antecedent conditions. Hence, according to this Relativism, for example, how 'generous' an act is is a function of one's capacity to donate, and not at all of the performance of another. In any case, the above passage still seems to override Spinoza's earlier Subjectivistic definition of 'X is good' as 'I desire X'.

Will, Subjectivism, Relativism, Comparativism

Spinoza vacillates, seemingly unwittingly, between two Axiological positions that can be called 'Subjectivism' and 'Relativism'. He expresses the first when he defines 'X is good' as 'I desire X', and the second, when he defines it as 'I know that X is useful to me'. Within his system, the latter, but not necessarily the former, is an adequate idea. Thus, his defense of the hypothesis that someone 'born free' would form no concept of either 'good' or 'evil', on the basis of the classification of any idea of 'evil' as inadequate, is Subjectivistic, not Relativistic. However, on either theory, Spinoza has no way to express the difference between a more useful thing and a less useful thing, i. e. each of which would be deemed to be 'good'. In contrast, here, as has been previously discussed, the quantification of the exercise of Will, i. e. in terms of 'Vols', can accommodate such a distinction. In other words, aside from the Axiological positions Subjectivism and Relativism, there is also Comparativism, i. e. according to which, value judgments are fundamentally in terms of 'better vs. worse', rather than of 'good vs. evil', or of 'good vs. bad'.

Will, Ethics, Theology

The Ethics begins with definitions, axioms, and propositions pertaining to the relation between God and Modes, and ends with the thesis that a Mode's intuition of God is its highest good. Presumably, therefore, Spinoza, from the outset, has an intuition of God, so, what follows is a derivation, from those fundamental formulations, of the supreme moral value of that intuition. The focal point of that derivation is the divinization of the self-preservative efforts of a Mode, so the implicit premise in the project is that God is good. Now, that premise does not distinguish Spinoza's doctrine from the fear-mongering theocracies that he opposes, but the implication of that focal point--that God would not harm a Mode--is radically heterodoxic. So, the primary ambition of the Ethics is Theological, not Moral. In contrast, with Morality as his priority, Spinoza might have emphasized how the intuition of God empowers a Mode, via the discovery of its own self-activating principle, e. g. Will.

Will, Mode, Organism

While Spinoza's doctrine seems easily classifiable as 'Naturalistic' or 'Vitalistic', Kant's and Whitehead's definitions of 'organism', as entailing a Teleological principle, seems to preclude the recognition of Spinoza's system as a 'philosophy of organism', i. e. because Spinoza rejects Teleology. However, as has been previously discussed here, 'organism' can be sufficiently defined as a combination of Formal and Material causality, i. e. non-Teleologically. Still, Spinozism lacks a concept of Organism for a different reason--its God, as perfect, does not grow, whereas, a fundamental characteristic of an organism is its self-growth. Similarly, therefore, growth is not of the essence of God's Modes, which is why, on his analysis, biological functions serve only to maintain an entity, and why increases in the strength of an entity are, more properly, reductions of its imperfection. In contrast, here, Evolvement, i. e. growth, is the fundamental human conatus, not only biologically, but experientially. For, the combination of Will and Comprehension, the fundamental principles of personal experience, constitute Evolvement, whereas, Spinoza's Modes can never become anything more than they already are, or than they are conceived to be by their God.

Will, Being, Growth

Spinoza's definition of the actual essence of an entity as the 'endeavor to persist in its being' implies distinctions between 'to endeavor', 'to persist', and 'to be'. Now, as has been previously discussed, though Spinoza does not clearly define the first two, here, they can be adequately distinguished, i. e. endeavor is Will, and persistence is Comprehension, the Material Principle and the Formal Principle, respectively, of Experience in the system. Hence, because, in this system, every entity is sufficiently constituted by some combination of the two principles, there is no 'being' of an actual entity over and above its endeavor to persist. But, the fundamental problem with Spinoza's formulation is not that the term 'being' is superfluous in it. Rather, the perfection of God entails that he does not grow, so the essence of one his Modal instances cannot be that it grows. Hence, the term 'being' in the definition exposes the incapacity of Spinoza's system to recognize that to grow--rendered here as to 'Evolve', a combination of Will and Comprehension--is an essential characteristic of an actual entity.

Will, Courage, Reason

In the note to III, lix, Spinoza defines 'courage' as the "desire whereby every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance with the dictates of reason". So, since he also defines individual actual essence as the 'endeavor to persist in one's being', it follows that Courage is the rational expression of individual essence, and, therefore, that Cowardice is its irrational expression. The pre-eminence in his doctrine of Courage, and its relation to Reason, are clarified in the preface to the Theologico-Political Treatise, in which he singles out Fear as the most influential inadequate idea, the most effective vehicle of which is Superstition. In other words, on his diagnosis, Reason, by combating Superstition, overcomes Fear, thereby expressing Courage. On the other hand, it would seem to follow that Cowardice, while undeniably an effort to persist in one's being, is the weaker of the two responses to Fear. Here, that relative weakness can be quantified by comparing the amount of Volition entailed in Courage, i. e. in which Will is amplified, to that entailed in Cowardice, in which Will is restricted. Hence, Spinoza's attempts to recognize Courage and Cowardice, and, in general, rational behavior and irrational behavior, as equivalent expressions of the endeavor to persist in one's being, seems ungrounded within his system.

Will, Bible, Inadequate Ideas

As theologically unconventional as his Ethics is, Spinoza's more notorious heterodoxy appears in the Theologico-Political Treatise, in which he pioneers the thesis that Biblical scriptures are primarily not literally true, but present sound practical precepts in figurative guise. In other words, those passages exemplify what he calls 'inadequate' ideas, beginning with that of a God that transcends its creation, e. g. his God-Mode relation is the adequate interpretation of the idea that God created humans in his "own image". However, Spinoza misses the significance of God's exhortation to "be fruitful and multiply", which here is interpreted as a Pluralistic principle. Accordingly, he misses the pluralistic implication of God's Extension, as well of that of its Modal correlate, here rendered as Will.

Will, Persistence, Reason

For Spinoza, the actual essence of an individual entity is its endeavor to "persist" in its being. Now, persistence entails an ongoing unity of effort, but, as has been previously discussed, effort is Will, a discrescent process, thereby requiring a separate source to integrate it. Here, that source is Comprehension, while for Spinoza, it is Reason. It would seem, therefore, to follow, that, for him, only rational behavior expresses the actual essence of an individual. Nevertheless, he recognizes irrational behavior as also expressing that essence, thereby leaving unexplained how persistence obtains in the event of the intrusion into experience of an unanticipated, and perhaps, hostile, external influence. The implications of this apparent equivocation for his concept of Democracy, i. e. via the correlation between Essence and Natural Right, has been previously discussed.

Will and Endeavor

Spinoza defines the actual essence of an individual entity as its "endeavor" to persist in its being. Now, endeavor, i. e. effort, exertion, etc., is a familiar moment in mundane experience, with its origin in a mental command becoming explicit on some occasions. One significant characteristic of endeavor is that it can be generated only internally, i. e. that it is the process of self-activation that is here called Will. Furthermore, it plainly functions independently of any processes commonly classified as 'rational'. So, insofar as the primary ambition of Spinoza's program is to cultivate active behavior, endeavor, not the ideas the impart determinacy to it, is the fundamental locus of that cultivation.

Will, Intuitive Inference, Instantiation

For Spinoza, both Reason and Intuition entail Inference, but, apparently, two different kinds of Inference. For, Reason concerns, in his system, the knowledge of 'common notions', and, hence, not of individuals, so, rational inference is Aristotelian, i. e. is fundamentally a transition from 'all' to 'some'. In contrast, his Intuition is knowledge of individuals qua instances of God, and, hence, a transition from 'all' to 'one', so intuitive inference is Instantiation. In Set Theoretical terms, rational inference is a set-subset relation, while intuitive inference is a set-element one. Now, as has been previously discussed, adequate knowledge of Inference entails the capacity to execute an inference. Hence, intuitive inference entails Will, the personal principle of Diversification, because Instantiation entails Diversification. More generally, quantification in contemporary Logic, i. e. with its 'existential quantifier', is, in Spinozistic terms, intuitive, rather than rational, so perhaps his theory of Intuition constitutes a turning point in the history of Logical Theory.

Will, Vitality, Deficiency

Spinoza characterizes the vitality of a Mode in a variety of ways--1. 'Desire' or 'appetite'; 2. Transition from passive to active; 3. Transition from imperfect to perfect; 4. The maintaining of structural integrity; and 5. Instance of God's vitality, i. e. of 'natura naturans'. However, the relations between the five are unclear, e. g. between 4 and 2 or 3, and, more significantly, between 5 and the others. For, the first four each entail a possibly distinctive deficiency, whereas God's vitality is a self-sufficiently incessant process. So, furthermore, the intuition of God, which entails the realization that one's vitality is a modification of God's, seems to expose the others as inadequate ideas of that vitality. In contrast, here, the distinctions between the 5 disappear, because vitality consists in Evolvement, not in Self-Preservation, which is a minimal special case of Evolvement, i. e. Evolvement entails Will, which is a principle of Excession, and, hence, is a striving-beyond that is not an expression of a deficiency.

Will, Virtue, Reward

At best, the formula 'Virtue is its own reward' can serve as a useful heuristic representation of Spinoza's thesis that Virtue and Blessedness are identical. But, insofar as it is commonly taken to be exemplified by the proposal that 'helping another will make one feel good about oneself', the formula is crucially antithetical to Spinoza's ambitions. For, in his doctrine, the idea of 'Ethical reward' is an inadequate one that falsifies the function of Ethics, which, for him, is fundamentally a program of self-enhancement, not one of self-denial. However, he himself encourages the misinterpretation, by using the terms 'desire' and 'appetite' to apply to the persistence in being of even a rational automaton, i. e. terms that connote a lack, whereas the latter entity is one that has perfected itself. Here, the confusion is avoided, because the fundamental Conatus is conceived as Evolvement, in which Will is the impetus to a surplus, not to perfection, and, hence, is never in a condition of lack that a reward can fill.

Will, Intuition, Inference

Spinoza's one concrete example of what he calls 'intuition' involves the solution of 1:2 = 3:x at a glance, without either methodical calculation or discursive proof. Since that solution entails, in his own words, "inference", his notion of intuition, unlike that of others, is not simple. Still, it is unclear from his example which of the following is his concept of the relation between intuition and inference--that the former reveals the latter, or that it mimics it, in which case intuition is itself inferential. One advantage to the latter interpretation is that it better explains how someone can themselves execute an inference, which Spinoza's concept of personal intellectual processes as modes of God's active Thought seems to entail. Indeed, as his general definition of it articulates, intuition is the idea of the God-Mode relation itself. Hence, the inference that constitutes it is a process of modification, i. e. of Diversification. Thus, Spinozistic intuition entails Will, the principle of Diversification in personal experience.

Will and Immaterial Automaton

While for many doctrines, rational principles are normative, for Spinoza, they are descriptive, i. e. for him, any transgression of logical laws is caused not by whim, but by the overpowering of a mind by external influences, experienced as an inadequate idea. Occasionally, Spinoza characterizes a perfectly rational being as an "immaterial automaton". However, the heuristic value of that phrase, with its emphasis on 'automaton', obscures the seemingly unresolved problems that the qualifier 'immaterial' poses for Spinoza's system. For, on the premise that mental sequences have a corporeal correlate, those immaterial processes must have a physiological correlate, yet Spinoza never seems to explain what the body is doing while the mind is performing so rationally. A more contemporary thesis--that the correlate processes are functions of the brain--seems unacceptable to Spinoza, since in his system the correlate of Mind is Body, whereas the brain is only a part of the body. Regardless, that thesis exposes a further entailed difficulty for Spinoza, namely that he conceives Mind both as representing corporeal modifications, and as initiating them. Here, that distinction is an expression of principle, i. e. that Mind functions as both Comprehension, and as Will, which are complementary components of personal experience, but neither is reducible to the other.

Will, Conatus, Reason

Spinoza seems to conceive the relation between human Conatus and Reason in two ways. In the first, all behavior, passive as well as active, endeavors to persist in its being, for which rational calculation functions as the most effective means. In the second, rational behavior alone actualizes that endeavor, so Conatus and Reason are identical. Accordingly, Democracy can be conceived as promoting Rationality in either of two ways--as the best means to the harmonization of the satisfaction of the needs of its participants, or as a coordination of the performances of all. In contrast to both, here, the fundamental Conatus is not merely to survive, but to Evolve, for which collectivity is the opportunity not for mere co-existence, but for interaction, the potential for which Democracy optimizes. In that context, Reason is a mode of Will that has been previously termed 'Examplification', whereby one projects oneself towards all, thus producing the concept of oneself as an objective member of a collective. In other words, this concept of Reasoning does not accept, as Spinoza's more traditional one does, its transpersonal character as given, but as a product of a transcending projection that originates in the private dimension of personal experience. On that concept, Reason is one of the fundamental constituents of human Conatus.

Will, God, Homo Faber

It is well-recognized that Spinoza's identification of God and Nature entails one of 'supernatural' and 'natural', and of 'metaphysical' and 'physical', even if studies of Spinoza do not always reflect the latter. Less appreciated seems to be the identification of another traditional dichotomy involving Nature--'natural' and 'artificial', a myopia perhaps due to the general lack of enthusiasm for Pantheism. Regardless, insofar as humans are Modes of God, Homo Faber is an expression of divine creativity, and the world that humans manufacture is an expression of divine attributes. For example, Will, i. e. Modal Motility, is a micro-cosmic instance of God's self-extending power.