Will and Akrasia

Akrasia--the experiential sequence consisting in 1. The awareness that it is better that one do X than that one do Y; and then, 2. One does Y--is often characterized as 'weakness of the will'. According to Aristotle, the 'weakness' entailed is a diminishing of capacity. According to Nietzsche, the 'weakness' is a submission to greater strength. Finally, Spinoza combines the two analyses with the thesis that the diminishing of capacity in an entity can be caused only by a stronger external influence. Still, that apparent defense of Aristotle's diagnosis overlooks his own recognition that a stronger external influence can be pleasurable, and, hence, can cause an increase in one's strength, and not a diminishing of one's capacity. In other words, that one does Y sufficiently proves that the above description suppresses--1A. The awareness that it is better to do Y--which constitutes an at least temporary increase in strength. Furthermore, as analyzed here, Will, in itself, is indeterminate, so, 'stronger' and 'weaker' are fundamentally characteristics of the representations that impart determinacy to it. Hence, Akrasia might be more fruitfully described as 'weakness of comprehension', to focus attention on the inadequacy of an erroneous, albeit temporarily compelling, intention.