Will and Slave Morality

Nietzsche's concept of Slave Morality entails a process of self-abnegation that seems antithetical to Spinozistic Conatus, for which self-weakening is impossible. On the other hand, Spinoza agrees with Nietzsche's thesis that any evaluation, including one expressing self-subservience, originates only in that Self. Here, Slave Morality is construed as primarily not a diminishing of Will, but as an over-extension of it, in which it is severed from its origin. On that model, in Nietzschean language, Slave Morality is a Will, not to Nothingness, but to Everythingness, which entails its own effacement in order to achieve pure Universality. If he were familiar with Nietzsche's doctrine, Spinoza might classify its Slave Morality as an 'inadequate' idea of its Master Morality. Also, the self-aggrandizement/self-effacement dialectic of Slave Morality explains its applicability to philosophical procedures that are not conventionally categorized as 'Moral', e. g. to the Epoche of Phenomenology.