Will, Ressentiment, Axiology

One of the main ambitions of Nietzschean Ethics is the overcoming of Ressentiment. For example, the 'slave', i. e. the 'good vs. evil', morality that he repudiates in favor of 'master', i. e. 'good vs. bad', morality, is, on his diagnosis, an expression of hostility by the weak against the strong, whereas, in his alternative, the strong merely distance themselves from the weak. Nevertheless, Ressentiment may be implicit in his master morality, as well. For, insofar as that morality is derived from Spinoza's 'useful'-harmful' axiology, 'good vs.bad' still expresses a 'self vs. other' antagonism that is only partially tempered by the recognition of it as a merely human contrivance. At the root of that antagonism is a positive-negative antithesis that is entailed in 'good-bad' as much as it is in 'good-evil'. In contrast, a Comparative Axiology, i. e. the fundamental terms of which are 'better' and 'worse', facilitates evaluation without resorting to vilification. For example, here, that a greater exercise of Will is 'better' than a lesser one, does not entail that the 'worse' alternative is 'bad', 'evil', 'harmful', etc.