Will, Interpretation, Perfection

If, as Nietzsche proposes, the Moralization of Nature is an interpretation, then, so, too, is the Naturalization of Morality. Hence, without further analysis, 'X is good = X is useful' is not an interpretation, but is only a stipulation of terminological convenience regarding the use of the terms 'good' and 'useful'. In contrast, the aspect of Spinoza's explanation of Moral Evaluation that is explicitly an interpretation is his concept of Perfection, which he acknowledges is a anthropomorphic teleological interpretation of purposeless Nature. It is to this aspect of Spinoza's doctrine that Nietzsche's concept of Morality has direct relevance, though not merely qua Interpretation, but because of Nietzsche's further insight regarding Interpretation. That insight is that interpretations, and, specifically, moral evaluations, are themselves subject to evaluation, which raises the question of the usefulness of Spinoza's Perfectionism. Spinoza, at least implicitly, plainly regards weighing behavior in terms of Perfection-Imperfection as useful, while Kant, in the Third Critique offers a more explicit defense. In contrast, here, as has been previously discussed, to establish some behavior as 'perfect' is to arbitrarily delimit indefinite Will, one consequence of which is problematic for Spinoza, himself, namely insofar as he has no way to represent increases in strength after 'perfection' has been achieved. So, on that assessment, Spinoza's Perfectionism is potentially harmful to the well-being of some entity, as is any concept of 'good' that is derived from it. Nietzsche's own evaluation of Perfectionism is unclear.