Will, Virtue, Reward

At best, the formula 'Virtue is its own reward' can serve as a useful heuristic representation of Spinoza's thesis that Virtue and Blessedness are identical. But, insofar as it is commonly taken to be exemplified by the proposal that 'helping another will make one feel good about oneself', the formula is crucially antithetical to Spinoza's ambitions. For, in his doctrine, the idea of 'Ethical reward' is an inadequate one that falsifies the function of Ethics, which, for him, is fundamentally a program of self-enhancement, not one of self-denial. However, he himself encourages the misinterpretation, by using the terms 'desire' and 'appetite' to apply to the persistence in being of even a rational automaton, i. e. terms that connote a lack, whereas the latter entity is one that has perfected itself. Here, the confusion is avoided, because the fundamental Conatus is conceived as Evolvement, in which Will is the impetus to a surplus, not to perfection, and, hence, is never in a condition of lack that a reward can fill.