Will, Ethics, Therapy

Spinoza's thesis, that the acquisition of knowledge of one's emotions suffices to gain control over them, anticipates Psychoanalysis by two centuries. Conversely, the similarity reinforces the hypothesis that his ethical program is primarily therapeutic, i. e. that it aims at achieving full functionality. Nietzsche's doctrine, too, is sometimes characterized as 'therapeutic', i. e. insofar as the affirmation of Eternal Recurrence cures Ressentiment. But, in both cases, the concept of Ethics as Therapy also exposes the limitations of the program, for, it implies that the nuances of healthy conduct is beyond the scope of Ethics, an implication that is encouraged by the formulation 'beyond good and evil' that, as has been previously discussed, is to be found in Part IV of the Ethics, as well as, of course, in Nietzsche's works. Accordingly, neither doctrine, especially Spinoza's, has the resources to evaluate the exercise of surplus strength, though Nietzsche's has the potential for a related normative principle, such as 'Perform the alternative that consists in the greatest exercise of strength'. In contrast, here, the exercise of Will is the occasion, whether in sickness or in health, of an increase in strength, for which the normative principle 'Maximize volition', or, equivalently, 'Evolve as much as possible', is unfettered by an a priori concept of full capacity, e. g. by 'health', 'perfection', 'active', etc. Thus, on this model, Ethics is a cultivation of personal growth, not a corrective therapy.