Whitehead and Intensity

According to Whitehead, every Process is concrescent, and every Concrescence aims at a maximum of Intensity. By 'Intensity', he means 'Complexity', a balance between Identity and Diversity. Hence, a maximum Intensity entails a balance between a maximum Identity and a maximum Diversity. Therefore, by implication, every Concrescence aims at both a maximum Identity and a maximum Diversity. But, 'concrescence' means 'growing together', so its primary pattern is unification, not diversification. Thus, either the aim at Intensity partially contradicts the more general concrescent pattern of any Process, or the aim of a Process at maximum Intensity is the more comprehensive structure of Organism. If the latter, then Whitehead's neglect of diversifying processes in his system is otherwise pervasive, and would explain his inattention to, as previously discussed, motor processes, with are, arguably, diversifications.

Whitehead, Locke, Bergson, Perception

Whitehead's concept of Perception follows Bergson's in some crucial respects, but not in at least one other. That concept is also essentially Lockeian, i. e. perceptual objects combine Primary Qualities that inhere in an object, with Secondary Qualities that are the projections back into the Primary Qualities of modified received physical transmissions. Since perceived Secondary Qualities are not actually in those objects, Whitehead refers to perceptual objects as 'object-images', which is evocative of Bergson's similar analysis of Perception, i. e. for Bergson, perceptual objects are "images". However, for Bergson, Perception is inherently preparation for subsequent physical modification of a perceiver's environment, in accordance with its practical needs. In contrast, Whitehead only briefly, and vaguely, alludes to the potential future "relevance" of object-images to a perceiver, i. e. while he exhaustively analyzes the development of a received physical transmission to the formulation of a purpose, he seems to have no specific account of the experiential transition from the formulation of a purpose to its being physically carried out. So, the comparison with Bergson regarding Perception exposes Whitehead's lack of attention to what the former characterizes as the motor phase of experience.

Whitehead, Sartre, Consciousness

According to Whitehead, the fundamental mode of experience is Feeling, of which there are two main kinds--Physical and Mental. A Physical Feeling is primarily a reception of an influx of energy, which the concepts of Mind subsequently operate upon in a variety of ways. On such way is the introduction of negative Feelings into experience, via a conceptual potential that is diverse in some respect from the given Physical actuality, a special, advanced case of which is Consciousness. Whitehead thus aligns himself with Bergson, and anticipates Sartre, in characterizing Consciousness as essentially entailing a negation of actuality. However, his more versatile scheme avoids some of Sartre's more awkward formulations. To begin with, for Whitehead, Consciousness is always subsequent to some positive, conformal Feeling, so the latter entails neither Consciousness, nor, hence, the 'non-thetic' Self-Consciousness that Sartre is forced to concoct, in order to explain how someone can be both absorbed in an external object, and, yet, apparently, simultaneously aware of what one is doing. Furthermore, the subsequent Feeling of a given Conscious Feeling is, in Whitehead's analysis, not a negation of it, but a conformal reproduction of it. Hence, the subsequent Feeling is, for Whitehead, not, strictly speaking, the 'Consciousness' of a Consciousness that, for Sartre, devolves into a labyrinth of reflecting Nothingnesses. In general, Whitehead's theory of Feelings exposes the oversimplifying reductionism of Sartre's theory of Consciousness.

Whitehead and Hume

Whitehead presents a multi-faceted critique of Hume's privileging of the sensory 'Impression', an immediate, simple, discrete, immobile datum of experience, that somehow escapes the attention of Bergson. First, he shows how an Impression is an hypostasization of an antecedent feeling of a transmission from an external source. Second, since that more primitive reception entails a feeling of the Causality of its transmitter, that awareness of Causality antecedes Hume's pivotal concept of Causality i. e. that Causality is a combination of Impressions. Third, the imaginability, which Hume himself acknowledges, of a color not previously sensed, disproves, for Whitehead, contrary to Hume's dismissal of the example as trivial, the latter's principle that all experience is derived from Impressions, and proves that some components of experience originate in Platonistic 'Eternal Objects'. Finally, these explicit criticisms imply a fourth, of Hume's Moral Sentimentalism, which originates in feelings of like and dislike, and eventuates in the recognition of Sympathy as the highest Good. For Whitehead, valuations originate in Eternal Objects, and Sympathy originates in the primitive feeling of a transmission. Hence, Hume's Moral doctrine is not rooted in an Impression. More generally, Whitehead demonstrates why the stringency of Hume's Impression inevitably leads to the latter's Scepticism.

Whitehead, Bergson, Duration

Whitehead argues, against Bergson, that the spatialization of Duration is not an Intellectual distortion of lived experience, but is fundamental to the constitution of any physical object. In other words, his target is not so much the structure of Bergson's concept of Duration per se, but Bergson's denigration of physicality, in general. However, Whitehead's own concept of Duration provides the resources for a direct criticism of Bergson's concept of Spatialization. His does not preclude the possibility of intra-Durational contemporaneity. Furthermore, the consciousness of Contemporaneity entails a consciousness of Spatiality, i. e. as obtaining between any two contemporaneous elements. Now, as Deleuze notes, Bergson is ambivalent about the possibility of intra-Durational Pluralism, which shows that he, at minimum, entertains a concept of non-distorted Spatiality. Regardless, in Bergson's account, any Intuition is a consciousness of a process that is contemporaneous with the Duration of the Intuition of it. Hence, Whitehead's stronger argument against Bergson is that Duration is essentially Spatial, with respect to which the Spatializations that constitute ordinary lived experiences are only a special case.

Whitehead and Organism

Whitehead's concept of 'Organism' is innovative in two main respects. First, it is primarily a Metaphysical notion, of which the more familiar Biological version is a special case. Second, it connotes the pattern of a dynamic process, not the structure of a static entity. This second feature resolves a difficulty that, as previously discussed, Kant encounters--cognitive-purposive heterogeneity, that the Kantian system cannot systematize without recourse to a fiction. For, qua process, Whiteheadian Organism consists in precisely a transition from a multiplicity of cognized givens, to their unity as the realized satisfaction of a purpose. Whitehead's system does not accommodate all the antitheses encountered by Kant or Bergson, e. g. he merely describes, without explanation, that in an organism, organic and inorganic processes are found to stand in a "regnant"-"subservient" relation. Still, he does manage to find middle ground between Biology and Physics, i. e. by classifying the motility of an organism as a 'Physiological' phenomenon.

Bergson, Kant, Organism

The Critique of Judgment implicitly acknowledges the inadequacy of the Intellect to biological phenomena, and, hence, implicitly affirms the irreducibility of Biology to mechanistic Physics. Bergson agrees with that affirmation, furthermore proposing that Intuition is adequate where Intellect is not, i. e. as cognitive access to the primal biological force, Elan Vital. However, Intuition is, nevertheless, inadequate to a significant biological phenomenon, for a reason that is inverse to that of the shortcoming of Intellect. An Organism is a vital unity of multiple functions, of which, as Kant shows, Intellect can constitute only those functions, thereby requiring a complementary postulation of uncognizable Purposiveness to account for the unity entailed in any knowledge of Organism. In contrast, Bergson's Intuition is a consciousness of only unitary phenomena, which is reflected in his struggle to account for the multiplicity of physical relations that are unified in an Organism. His vacillating descriptions of the Matter of an Organism present that multiplicity as sometimes a degenerate aspect of, as sometimes an incidental byproduct of, but, in either case, as incommensurate with, its Spiritual unity. In other words, while asserting the irreducibility of Biology to Physics, Bergson leaves the inorganic processes that constitute an Organism severed from its vital principle.

Bergson, Kant, Succession

At first glance, Bergson's concept of Duration is Kantian, with a minor variation. For both, the structure of inner experience is successive, but, for Bergson, with the added refinement that the succession is fluid, not atomistic. However, Bergson's distinction constitutes more than a descriptive nuance. For Kant, the inner succession is inadequate as objective knowledge without the coordination of an Intellectual concept, without which an inner and an outer sequence cannot be distinguished. However, Bergson agrees with Schopenhauer that the Kantian construction of objective experience not only remains within the realm of appearances, which Kant himself acknowledges, but that it further remains only at the service of the pursuit of personal interests, and, hence, never transcends subjectivity. In contrast, Durational Consciousness, i. e. Intuition, alone gives, according to Bergson, direct access to the fluid in-itself, and, hence, is the true objective mental faculty, not Intellect. For Bergson, proof of the cognitive superiority of Intuition over Intellect is the adequacy of the former in contrast with an inadequacy of the latter that Kant himself recognizes, namely to biological phenomena.

bergson, Spinoza, Rational Ordering

Bergson asserts that the sequence of successive inner states is a coherent but, in comparison with the necessary causal connectivity of Matter, a looser, indeterminate concatenation. In contrast, according to Spinoza's theory of Mind, the degree of coherence of those states is variable, a function of the degree of activeness of experience, with the most active, i. e. Rational experience, generating a connectivity that is equivalent to that of physical relations. Furthermore, according to Spinoza's Ethical theory, a Rational experience is superior to the loose and indeterminate one, because it constitutes Freedom. However, Bergson is unmoved by Spinozism, since he maintains that Rational ordering reflects an artificial accommodation of Mind to Matter, thereby compromising the native Freedom of indeterminate Consciousness. But, in a different context, Bergson implicitly undermines his resistance to Spinoza. For, he plainly appreciates Music, and it seems difficult for him to deny that Music impresses a greater coherence upon Consciousness, via Material means, i. e. the playing of instruments. Hence, that appreciation implicitly acknowledges that the coherence of the inner sequence is variable, that a more coherent sequence can be a superior one, and that the influence of Matter is irrelevant to the latter judgment. Now, such an acknowledgment is not an explicit concession to Spinozism, but it does undermine his grounds for rejecting that Rationalism.

Bergson's Cone

One notable contrast between Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory is that while the former is critical of the misrepresentation of lived experience by geometrical figures, in the latter Bergson uses them on several occasions to illustrate his theory of Memory. For example, he portrays experience as an inverted cone, with the down-pointing apex representing the Present in its engagement in action upon Matter, and with the base representing the Past, constituted by pure Memory, therewith presenting the emergence of Memory into action as a "descent". However, just prior to this demonstration, he characterizes the Past as an immaterial powerless limbo. Hence, by means of the geometric illustration, he inverts that characterization, recasting Memory as a effective, superior influence upon action, thereby recasting his descriptions to suit his Spiritualism. In other words, by means of the properties of a geometrical figure that he himself has chosen to represent experience, he proves the contrary of what description apparently reveals, and defies the main theme of his earlier work.

Bergson and Immateriality

A central thesis of Matter and Memory is that the Past does not cease to exist, rather, that it ceases to have present use, leading Bergson to conclude that Memory does not require any special storage facility. Now on the definition of 'material' as 'important', the Past is thus 'immaterial'. Thus, when he classifies Memory, the realm of the Past, as 'Spirit', he, perhaps unwittingly, refers it to a Practical, not to an Ontological, category, i. e. to 'Spirit' qua 'immaterial' = 'unimportant'. So, regardless of what he argues in other contexts, he here demonstrates that Spirit is derived from Matter.

Bergson, Pure Memory, Motor-Memory

Bergson distinguishes pure Memory from motor-memory, and his assertion of the independence of the former from the latter is essential to his thesis of the superiority of Spirit over Matter. According to him, experiential evidence of such independence is that the stages of the development of a motor-memory, e. g. the learning of a lesson, can also be remembered as individual events, independent of their implication in a cumulative process. However, on that interpretation, my recollection of having stated "three" is independent of my having stated "one" and "two", or that my memory of passing a soccer ball to a high school teammate is independent of my having learned to play soccer, having attended that high school, having lived in that town, etc. In other words, Bergson's example does not demonstrate that his assertion of the independence of these individual memories from others is not question-begging, i. e. that the independence is not a product of abstraction. Hence, the example does not demonstrate the independence of pure Memory from motor-memory, thereby weakening his thesis that Spirit is superior to Matter, to whatever extent that thesis depends on the example.

Bergson, Nietzsche, Moral Vitalism

A significant ambivalence in Bergson's Philosophy comes to light in a comparison with a Nietzschean principle. 'Vitalism' can be defined as both a Metaphysical and a Moral doctrine. Metaphysical Vitalism holds that everything that exists is an expression of an immanent Life force. Moral Vitalism holds that Life is the Highest Good and the criterion of all normative judgments. Nietzsche is both a Metaphysical and a Moral Vitalist--he asserts that everything that exists is an expression an immanent Life force, i. e. Dionysus, and he affirms that Life is the Highest Good and the criterion of all normative judgments. In contrast, Schopenhauer is a Metaphysical Vitalist, but not a Moral Vitalist, since while he asserts that all existence is an expression of Will, for him, Moral Goodness consists in Life-denial. Now, Bergson is a Metaphysical Vitalist, since he holds that everything that exists is an expression of Elan Vital. However, that he is not a Moral Vitalist is evident from his depreciation of repetitive life-forms, which shows that he would not affirm Eternal Recurrence, Nietzsche's fundamental Moral Vitalist formula. Rather, he affirms Life only insofar as it is innovative, which, according to Nietzsche's criterion, is only conditional Vitalism. Instead, Bergson's unconditional Moral principle is Spirit, so, he is more accurately classified as a Metaphysical Vitalist, but a Moral Spiritualist.

Bergson, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche--Individuation

Bergson agrees with Schopenhauer that a human being is an individuated incarnation of a universal vital principle, in his case Elan Vital, in Schopenhauer's, Will. He also agrees that the human condition is an unsatisfactory one, though he disagrees with Schopenhauer regarding the unalleviability and the degree of the suffering involved. However, while Schopenhauer seeks freedom from Will, Bergson finds freedom in excarnated Elan Vital. Now, the earlier Nietzsche is Schopenhauerian, calling Will 'Dionysus', but otherwise accepting the general scheme of Schopenhauer's concept of the human condition. However, he eventually repudiates Schopenhauer, with a variation that also entails a critique of Bergsonism. His 'Will to Power' is more than a mere surrogate for Schopenhauer's 'Will'--while the latter is Monistic, the former is Pluralistic. That is, intrinsic to the dynamic of Will to Power is its specificity of actualization, i. e. its production of individual entities. In other words, from Nietzsche's perspective, Bergson, as much as Schopenhauer, errs in conceiving corporeal individuality as a misfortune that befalls Vitality, not its intrinsic actualization.

Bergson, Spirit, Pluralism

While Bergson's Spirit is Monistic, he, at minimum, lacks grounds for denying that it is Pluralistic. Its Monism is based on the presumption that the creative impetus is, in every case, e. g. in the drawing of a line, in the writing of a poem, in the generating of a new species, one and the same process. But, evidence of such identity cannot be given to the immediate consciousness of such movements. To the contrary, the positing of that identity appears to concrete consciousness as entailing abstraction and generalization. What is instead concretely given is the occurrence of distinct acts of creativity, in which specific 'congealing of Matter', as Bergson characterizes it, is not a digression from creativity, but constitutes its very fulfillment. On that interpretation, which Bergson, at minimum, lacks grounds to refute, Creativity consists in the Materialization of Spirit, in which both Matter and its multiplicity are intrinsic to elan vital.

Bergson, Spirit, Dualism

The etymological root of 'spirit' is 'breath', and it seems likely that Spiritualism is inspired by the metaphor of the invisibility of the source of vitalization. But, breathing entails both inhalation and exhalation, both of which are processes that are vital to life. Thus, holding one's breath is only delayed exhalation. Likewise, the relaxation caused by a 'detente' of Spirit that, according to Bergson, generates extensive Matter, is an interruption of the mobility of Spirit, but a withholding of its active distending expansiveness. Bergson's incorrect diagnosis of the moment of 'detente' leads him to interpret Spirit as a monistic principle, and not, like breathing, entailing two inverse processes. On the latter interpretation, the production of Matter contributes to, not hinders the Evolution generated by elan vital.

Bergson--Spirit, Form, Matter

Though the relation between Spirit and Form has rarely been a topic of Philosophical examination, that they are each often presented as the antithesis of Matter suggests that the relation must be intimate. Bergson, for one, proposes that Form is Spirit in its interaction with Matter, and that Form, upon interruption, becomes Matter, thereby proving that Matter is congealed Spirit. In one of his examples, the drawing of a line is a mobile Formative process, which, when halted, is observed to have left in its wake Matter, i. e. an immobile line. Now, this drawing-drawn relation has been regarded by others as significant, e. g. Spinoza's naturing-natured and Schopenhauer's Will-objectification contrasts seem analogous. But, Bergson's interpretation of it as one of Form-Matter is questionable. For, the process of drawing a line is a shaping of lead, ink, or paint, so, one of them, not the line, is the 'Matter' of the example, and this Matter is contemporaneous with the 'Formative' drawing motion, not subsequent to it, the result of the halting of it. Hence, as an attempt to prove that Matter is congealed Spirit, the example backfires on Bergson. Furthermore, treating Form as a surrogate for Spirit only transposes the more fundamental problem with that thesis--it fails to explain how a monistic, intrinsically dynamic principle such as Spirit comes to relax, let alone cease movement, to begin with. Instead, the example reinforces the counter-thesis that Matter is an independent, complementary principle to Spirit or Form.

Bergson and James

Given Bergson's repeatedly expressed denigration of Praxis, his association with seminal Pragmatist William James seems surprising. However, his Intuitive method is almost surely inspired by James' anteceding study of the 'stream-of consciousness', as James coins it, a method which, in turn, James, in his later period, begins to appreciate. Still, this latter appreciation is not a renunciation of James' long-time espousal of the value of Practical Reason, but a supplement to it, according to James, suggesting that he never repudiates the Pragmatist thesis that experience is the criterion of Truth, nor that he ceases being a "man of science", as Peirce puts it. So, any similarity between the two philosophies does not override the fact that James' demonstrates that Bergsonian Spiritualism is neither a necessary nor an exclusively valid interpretation of the meaning of the data of the stream of consciousness.

Bergson and Imagination

What is probably most notable about Bergson's theory of Imagination is that he has none. Perhaps he considers one unnecessary, since he classifies all objects of Consciousness, including outer ones, as already "images", thereby preempting any need to attribute them to some mental faculty. In any case, the lack of such a theory is potentially damaging to his cardinal thesis that Intuition is the creative mode of Consciousness. For, both conventional wisdom and many philosophers associate mental creativity with Imagination, not with a receptive faculty like Intuition. Now, Bergson can be excused for his unfamiliarity with Sartre's not yet extant theory of the radical creativity of Imagination, and he might argue that a notion with which he is familiar, Kant's theory of Productive Imagination, is ultimately only at the service of Intellect, and, hence, is not truly creative. Still, it is difficult to accept that it never occurs to someone who appreciates music as much as he does that the inspiration for the compositional process is at least sometimes the sudden imagination of a melody. In contrast, Bergson, as has been previously argued, never successfully demonstrates that, as he seems to presume, the Consciousness of Creativity is a Creative Consciousness. Accordingly, his thesis that Intuition is the pre-eminent creative mode of Consciousness seems implicated in his generally unsatisfactory speculations, e. g. his Spiritualistic interpretation, of the meaning and value of the immediate data of lived experience.

Bergson, Praxis, Morality

Bergson affirms the priority of Intuition over Intellect, and he defines Intellect as a mode of Consciousness conditioned by practical need. Hence, his critique of Intellect is a re-affirmation of the traditional priority of Contemplation over Praxis. However, by segregating Intuition from practical activity, he undermines the potential efficacy of his doctrine. To begin with, by treating the Free Will vs. Determinism debate as a de jure and not a de facto question, he eliminates, from the outset, any possibility of recognizing that some behavior is, in fact, free, and some is, in fact, conditioned. Hence, he preempts the possibility of distinguishing, within the flux of Duration, repetitive data patterns. Therefore, Bergsonian Intuition lacks the capacity to recognize, let alone influence, the conditioned behavior that is typically involved in practical interests. Consequently, his Moral doctrine offers no program for the cultivation of creative conduct, e. g. by equating Intuition and Attention, and promoting attentive behavior. In the absence of any concrete application of Intuition to conduct, his Highest Good is as much a contemplative state as is Aristotle's.

Bergson and Superman

Bergson asserts that Philosophy "should be an effort to go beyond the human state", and, indeed, he refers to the product of the evolutionary transcendence of man as "superman". This Superman is a possessor of "supra-consciousness", i. e. Intuition, which Bergson characterizes as pure "creative activity". Though he does not cite Nietzsche, the implicit reference to the latter seems likely. In any case, the comparison is not flattering to Bergson. For, Nietzsche's concept of Superman entails a clear distinction from the all-too-human, the transition from which is also a transformation, i. e. to life-affirming, ressentiment-free conduct. In contrast, nothing new emerges in the attainment of Bergsonian supra-consciousness. First, Intuition is no more than 'vision', so it itself generates nothing new, even when its object is a creative process. Second, a transition from Intellect to Intuition does not affect its subject--even mechanical, repetitive inner states appear to Intuition as part of the continual flow of Duration. The general problem for Bergson is that by isolating Intuition from practical activity, he segregates it from all activity, and, hence, from creativity, without which it is difficult to ascribe to any mode of Consciousness the novelty that his concept of superiority requires.

Bergson, Counting, Evolution

At the heart of Bergson's critique of the Intellectualization of lived experience is the quantification of it, which originates in Counting. For, insofar as the latter process entails that its objects share a common characteristic, it must homogenize the contents of Duration. However, he also asserts that Duration continually "accumulates: it goes on increasing." Hence, he does recognize a fundamental quantitative characteristic of Duration, i. e. the one that is implicit in the notion of 'increase'. Furthermore, this continual accumulation is one expression of what has previously here been termed the 'Ordinality' of Duration. More generally, Bergson might have recognized that continued accumulation is a fundamental pattern of any 'evolutionary' process, i. e. of the production of increasingly complex entities. However, such possible recognition is obscured by his vacillation between that concept of Evolution, and one in which it is conceived as the ongoing Spiritualization of Nature, which, while arguably progressive, is not a cumulative process.

Bergson and Ordinality

Bergson attributes to Duration 'succession', but not 'order'. That is, lived experience is given sequentially, but to assert an ordering relation between any two moments entails a comparison of them, which, according to Bergson, is possible only via an homogenizing abstraction of them from the flow of Duration. Hence, he glosses over another, more fundamental, ordering characteristic of Duration, that can be termed its 'Ordinality'. 'Ordinality' can be defined as the 'earlier-later' character of Duration, also often variously called the 'directionality', the 'asymmetry', or the 'anisotropy' of Time. If he recognizes the Ordinality of Duration, it is not apparent when he seems to affirm that Succession is reversible, or that the contents of Memory can return to the Present upon becoming useful. For, reversibility is antithetical to Ordinality, applicable only to an abstraction from it. For example, an experiential arc from older to younger is imaginable, but it seems impossible to imagine that even that course can be lived from later to earlier, i. e. even older=earlier and younger=later in that imaginary scenario. Furthermore, Bergson's analysis of the process of counting abstracts from its directionality, thereby bypassing an opportunity to better examine its evolutionary nature.

Bergson and the Critique of Technology

Bergson's demonstration that Intellect falsifies lived experience, especially insofar as it quantifies it, is sometimes interpreted as a 'Critique of Technology'. However, neither an Epistemological distinction, i. e. Intuition vs. Intellect, nor a Metaphysical one, i. e. Spirit vs. Matter, no more suffices as a 'Critique' than does the Ontological distinction between Being and beings, which is the context of a presumed similar effort from Heidegger several decades later. The implicit premise in such an interpretation is that Technology dehumanizes, which, however, is a vulnerable ground of a Critique of it, since, just as Intellect, as Bergson himself agrees, has been beneficial to humanity, arguably, so, too, has been Technology. Regardless, even if it is granted that Technology is universally and absolutely a dehumanizing influence, the premise still lacks what is necessary to any Critique, namely some normative principle. In other words, a Critique of Technology is first and foremost a Moral issue, and, hence, must be based on some normative principle, which Metaphysics, Epistemology, or Ontology, at best, only obliquely supplies. In contrast, Bergson's Moral doctrine does seem to present such a principle--'Spiritual e\Evolution is good'. However, even that thesis is not a sound ground for the proposition 'Technology dehumanizes', since Evolution itself is arguably a dehumanizing process, i. e. it is the promotion of a post-human entity. In contrast, Kant's Rational principle--'Never treat a human being as a mere means to an end'--does sufficiently address the common underlying concern with Technology. It is therefore ironic that perhaps the definitive basis of a Critique of Technology is a product of the very Intellect that is the prime target of Bergson's version of such a Critique.

Bergson and The Future

For Bergson, the distinctive characteristics of Duration include its mobility, its continuity, its heterogeneity, and its indefiniteness. Accordingly, his critique identifies traditional four falsifications of Duration, under the rubric 'time', by Intellect--immobility, discontinuity, homogeneity, and completeness. However, he misses a further characteristic that invites a conflation to which he himself subscribes. His concept of lived experience is similar in some crucial respects to the Phenomenological ones of Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty--immediately given to Intuitive Consciousness are what he calls "images", which practical Intellect interpretively represents as potential use items, thereby projecting upon them a futural character. But every such representation is concomitantly a current presentation. Hence, the Intellect imports the Future into the Present, thereby encouraging the Determinist thesis that the Future is settled in the Present. Bergson seems to miss this further falsification of lived experience, and, hence, a similar one in Intuition. For, on his account of the Intuition of Duration, the 'Future' is 'nascent' in the data that are immediately given to Consciousness. But, since, in even the bare immediate categorical Intuitive datum, 'there will be subsequent data', something futural is settled in advance in the Present, the Intuition of Duration is as susceptible to a Determinist interpretation as is the Intellection of it.

Bergson, Memory, Spirit

In Matter and Memory, Bergson studies the interaction of Matter and Memory in lived experience, as part of his development of a theory of the relation between Spirit and Matter. Accordingly, in contrast with the intricacy of his examination of the Memory-Matter relation, that Memory is an instance of Spirit seems almost taken for granted. Bergson thus seems to overlook a problematic consequence of that latter assumption. Every memory begins as a perception, and, while Bergson's definition of Perception tends to vacillate, all its varieties entail a Material component. In other words, Memory originates as at least partially Matter, a process which, therefore, demonstrates that Spirit can originate in Matter, which is contrary to a main thesis of Creative Evolution. So, once again, Bergson's commitment to a speculative doctrine such as Spiritualism seems to complicate the results of his methodical direct examinations.

Bergson, Attention, Intuition

According to Bergson, Attention is a mode of Consciousness that involves physical effort, and that entails an interpretation of its object. While he does not explicitly formulate the relation between Attention and Intuition, his discussions suggest that they, at minimum, often coincide. For, on the one hand, he does affirms that his method is 'Intuition', and, on the other, throughout his works, he pervasively characterizes an examination of a phenomenon as an operation of 'Attention'. In any case, it is difficult to conceive Intuition as inattentive. So, in the absence of any explicit exclusion of Attention from acts of Intuition, the Duration that Bergson presumes to be the object of immaterial, transparent Intuition, is indistinguishable from a reflected product of sustained attentive effort. For example, the segues in experience that he posits as being discovered by the nuanced awareness exclusive to Intuition might, in fact, be introduced into it by reflective Attention, as Gestalt theory shows. On that account, Duration is, as proposed here previously, a characteristic of conscious performance, not of Consciousness of its own accord. Bergson's more general problem is that if there are grounds for rejecting such a proposal, it seems impossible that they can be cognized by his method of Intuition alone.

Bergson, Duration, Art

Bergson's concept of Durational Consciousness is plainly inspired by his appreciation of the fluidity of music. However, that appreciation does not seem to extend to the associated fact that music does not merely appear of its own accord, but is produced by players, the fluidity of whose movements is expressed by the sonic seamlessness that Bergson enjoys. So, if he were not apparently committed to a Spirit-Matter, and, hence, to a Consciousness-Action, opposition, he might have recognized that artistic activity strikes an equilibrium of Consciousness and Movement, and, hence, that experiential Duration is a characteristic of that activity, not an exclusive property of immaterial Consciousness. Accordingly, his study of 'creative evolution', might have focused more on a generalization of personal artistry to the creativity of Nature, rather than getting bogged down trying to explain the degeneration of Spirit into Matter.

Bergson, Retrospection, Intuition

Bergson characterizes Intellect as 'retrospective' consciousness. So, since retrospection is necessarily subsequent to its object, any object of Intellect is necessarily complete and immobile. He thus sharply opposes Intellect to Intuition, the object of which is dynamic and ongoing. His examination of retrospection, however, seems to gloss over an important distinction--between its object being given as already complete, and the immobility of its object being the product of Intellect's own hypostasization of whatever it encounters. The latter uncertainty cannot be resolved by an appeal to direct examination, which can only beg the question. But, in cases where Bergson stipulates the mobility of an object, and, hence, the inadequacy of Intellect to it, the Intellect is exposed as effecting its own hypostasization of the object, and Bergson has no grounds for assuming that it does not function likewise in all cases. Now, as Bergson himself characterizes it, the object of Intuition is immediately given. So, insofar as it is given, an object of Intuition precedes the Intuition of it. In other words, Intuition is no less retrospective than is Intellect, and its object is no less a product of hypostasization than that of the latter.

Bergson, Consciousness, Inertia

One of Bergson's cardinal theses is that the Intellect is an hypostasization of Consciousness that accommodates it to inert Matter, and, is, hence radically opposed to Intuition, which is the Consciousness of dynamic process. But his concept of 'inertia' varies--in some cases he treats it as absolute, and, in others, as only relative, i. e. it consists in processes that have become stabilized. Accordingly, his concept of the Intellect varies as well--in the former case, hypostasization is necessary to accommodate Consciousness to Matter, but in the latter, Consciousness need only adjust to the frequencies of those processes. In other words, insofar as inertia is relative, the Intellect in its successful operation achieves sympathy with Matter, which does not distinguish it from Intuition, which, as Bergson plainly formulates, is a type of Sympathy. Hence, his contention that Intellect and Intuition are radically opposed is only a function of his thesis that Matter is absolutely inert, a thesis which he himself seems at times to disown.

Bergson and Free Will

The standard English-language title of Bergson's first work, 'Time and Free Will', is hardly a direct translation of the original French, 'Essay on the Immediate Givens in Consciousness'. Still while 'Time' crucially misrepresents the main theme of the book, the essay does include a defense of Free Will. The main thread of the argument for the latter is that experience is fundamentally in heterogeneous flux; Deterministic theories all represent experience as static and homogeneous; hence, Determinism misrepresents experience, whereas Free Will, understood as a relation between a concrete self and an act that it performs, is self-evidently given in experience. The 'freedom' that Bergson espouses is therefore not as radical as Sartre's notion, since the latter entails the occurrence in experience of disruptive Nothingnesses, whereas for Bergson, transitions are seamless. But, as he expands in his later work on his original insights, this concept of Free Will as an episode in a seamless flux becomes vulnerable to new challenges. For example, in Creative Evolution, he now characterizes 'will' as a continuation of an impulsion, which, in turn, is a result of interactions that include solar energy, derived ultimately from vegetation. So, while the inter-species flow of these processes may still elude Deterministic homogenization, they are now exposed to a Humean or a Schopenhauerian criticism--that a 'self' is not given either as an element in, or as circumscribing, the immediate data of Consciousness. Hence, the 'free will' that, according to Bergson, is a function of that 'self', is not self-evidently given, and is, thus, possibly impersonal, as Schopenhauer argues.

Bergson, Elan Vital, Solar Energy

Some passages in Creative Evolution suggest that 'Elan Vital' is nothing other than what is more commonly known as 'solar energy'. Bergson traces the transmission of the latter, from plants that store it up, often via animals, to humans, who have the capacity to 'turn heat into light'. Hence, his references to the illuminatory power of Consciousness can be taken literally. Now, in its purest mode, according to Bergson, Consciousness is Intuition, of which the Intellect is a derivative application, i. e. to Matter. Hence, not only does he, as he announces in the introduction to Creative Evolution, expose the inadequacy of the Intellect to Elan Vital, he demonstrates that Reason, i. e. the Intellect, is neither the most highly evolved nor the most spiritual power in nature. In the process, he, like Nietzsche, presents a naturalistic derivation of Reason, as well as a literal counterpart to Plato's heliotropism.

Alexander's Nisus

Alexander generally treats the relation between an Emergent and its underlying constellation of processes as fortuitous inter-level compresence. However, occasionally, primarily in the context of his discussion of Deity, he cites a 'nisus' as the motivation of a rise of a higher level quality from a lower. Now, if, as he implies, the entire extant universe is striving towards Deity, then the latter is the ultimate telos of all motion in that universe, including that of human activity. However, his elaborate analysis of the Mind-Object relation only very briefly acknowledges that cognition is a special case of practical conation. In other words, conspicuously lacking in his system is any detailed consideration of how human interaction with the world is implicated in the general nisus towards Deity. So, it is perhaps Alexander's relative neglect of Psychology that has, despite its innovations and ambitions, diminished, in comparison with its rivals from Spinoza and Whitehead, the influence of his system.

Bergson, Matter, Evolution

Because Elan Vital is the monistic Spiritual principle of Bergson's system, he is challenged to explain the derivation and the status in the system of Matter. In many places, he characterizes Matter as degraded Spirit, a sedimentary product of the relaxation of Elan vital. But, in others, he presents it as an obstacle to Spirit, the overcoming of which by the latter produces organized Material structures. This ambivalence bears significantly on his concept of 'evolution'. If Matter is degraded Spirit, then the impetus of evolution is towards purer Spirituality. But, if Matter is complicit with Spirit in the generation of more comprehensive vital processes, manifested by more complex physical structures, then evolution is the drive towards higher combined Spirituality and Materiality. His attribution of evolutionary superiority to humans in nature, qua unique bearers of Spirit, further expresses his ambivalence regarding the status of Matter--he leaves it unclear whether or not he considers human Materiality to be essential to that superiority.

Alexander, Morality, Religion

Alexander asserts that Deity is 'beyond good and evil', and that Religion is independent of Morality. Nevertheless, he also suggests that Deity is "on the side of" goodness. However, a conjunction of several other components of his system seems to imply that both of these judgments are inaccurate. For, he maintains that Moral good consists in social harmony, that a concomitant of an Emergent is the unity of its underlying processes, and that Deity is an Emergent of the extant universe. It therefore follows that Deity will unify the universe, and, hence, that it will harmonize human society. In other words, Deity entails the actualization of goodness, and, so, Religion and Morality are, despite his assertions to the contrary, interrelated in his system.

Bergson and the Geometry of Duration

One of Bergson's original central arguments is that the geometricization of Duration as a straight line is inadequate to Durational continuity. However, he himself later represents Elan Vital as a curve. Perhaps in the interim he comes to recognize that a straight line is per se itself continuous, and that it is not actually fractured by the superimposition over it of a perpendicular line. Perhaps he further realizes that the inadequacy of a straight line to Duration consists not insofar as it is internally divisible, but insofar as even an infinite aggregate of discrete straight lines, e. g. tangents, can only approximately reconstruct a curve. Now, the curve-tangent relation is a geometrical representation of the Acceleration-Velocity contrast. Furthermore, Force is defined in terms of Acceleration, and Elan Vital is conceivable as a Force. In other words, the inadequacy of a straight line as a representation of Duration consists not in its divisibility, nor in its geometrical nature, but because it is simply the wrong geometrical representation of it, i. e. while a straight line represents Velocity, Duration is an accelerating motion.

Alexander, Emergence, Acceleration

Alexander's notion 'Emergence' has been susceptible to criticisms that it is abstract, vague, or even mystical. However, given, as he readily acknowledges, that his 'Space-Time' that underlies all emergents is nothing but Motion, a more concrete characterization of Emergence is available.
For, as is familiar in Modern Physics, higher levels of Motion can emerge from lower ones, simply by an increase in the rate of change, e. g. Acceleration emerges from Velocity, an increase in Acceleration emerges from Acceleration, etc. Furthermore, as is the case with multiple levels of Quality for Alexander, different levels of Motion can occupy one and the same location, e. g. one and the same phenomenon can be characterized either as Velocity or as Acceleration. Given that he seemingly accords little attention to Acceleration, it is unclear if he would accept an interpretation of Emergence in terms of it. Nevertheless, it does seem to provide that notion with some grounded concrete precision that it otherwise lacks.

Bergson--Intuition, Duration, Elan Vital

In Bergson's system, Elan Vital is the immanent creative process, Duration is the continuity of that process, and Intuition is the means by which Duration or Elan Vital is experienced. Furthermore, since he also characterizes Intuition as a reflective process, what is intuited must be in the subject. Now, the cognition of Duration is possible only via a detached, fixed perspective. On the other hand, there are no grounds for assuming the existence of unintuited inner Elan Vital, which means that there are no grounds for positing that Intuition is detached from inner Duration. Hence, Intuition must be somehow implicated in inner Elan Vital, though, since the latter is the primary principle of all processes, Intuition cannot be its source. Intuition may thus be the Formal Cause of inner Elan Vital, i. e. the guide and shaping of the process, and, hence, the source of the unity of inner Duration. On this analysis, any relation of Intuition to external Elan Vital can only be mediated. More generally, as is arguably the case with Spinoza, the continuity of experience, for Bergson, seems to be not a sometimes revealed given, but actively created.

Alexander and Color

At first glance, Alexander's thesis, that Color emerges from underlying physico-chemical processes, seems aligned with Locke's theory of Secondary Qualities. However, it diverges from the latter in one significant respect--whereas for Locke, the emergence occurs in a perceiver, Alexander locates it in the object itself, independent of any perceptual act. Perhaps because of the ample scientific evidence that tends to support Locke's theory, Alexander defends his divergence with an appeal to common sense, i. e. that a color appears as existing in an object, at a distance from a perceiver. However, the same argument is ineffective for the appearance of a color in a mirror, plus, an appeal to common sense, in the context of an argument that unperceived physico-chemical processes exist in the same location as a perceived color, seems anomalous. Furthermore, Alexander does not even entertain one of the strongest presumed counter-examples to his position--cases of color-blindness, which seem to demonstrate that the perception of color is a function of the condition of perceptual processes, independent of any perceptual object. Thus, his reluctance to reject the possibility that Color emerges in the perceiver, from the physico-chemical processes that constitute the interaction of an object with a perceptual apparatus, seems based less on the merits of the thesis itself, and more on his contention that it is the tertiary qualities, Goodness, Beauty, Truth, that emerge from subject-object interaction.

Bergson and the Pre-Socratics

With the priority in his system of dynamic processes over immobile matter, Bergson seems to have revived the ancient Becoming vs. Being debate, aligning himself with Heraclitus, against Parmenides, among the pre-Socratics. However, that Fire is the cardinal element for Heraclitus suggests that Bergson's philosophical ancestor is someone else. For, the most prominent imagery that Bergson uses to describe his fundamental principle is liquid, plus, that principle is the source of vitality in nature. In other words, Bergson's pre-Socratic precursor is Thales, more than Heraclitus. Furthermore, the significance for Bergson of fluidity is not merely its mobility, but also its continuity. Now, the more immediate antithesis of fluid continuity is not static unity, such as Parmenides 'the One', but an aggregate of inert particulars. In other words, the pre-Socratic that Bergson is most directly opposed to is the father of Atomism, Democritus.

Alexander, Contemplation, Enjoyment

Alexander introduces the terms 'contemplation' and 'enjoyment' to expose and avoid what he takes to be a traditional equivocation--'consciousness', as in 'consciousness of an external object', vs. 'consciousness', as in 'self-consciousness'--with 'enjoyment' not connoting 'accompanied by pleasure'. In other words, he holds that the relation of mind to an external object, and the accompanying one of mind to itself, are heterogeneous. As a precedent, he cites Spinoza's distinction, within the same experience, between an idea of the cause of a modification of the body, and an idea of that modification of the body. However, Alexander's reference is puzzling, since 'enjoyment', for him, is an intra-psychic relation, while Spinoza's idea of a modification of the body is not, plus, Alexander also distances himself from Spinoza's own intra-psychic relation, i. e. an idea of an idea. On the hand, a lineage with which Alexander could not be familiar seems to be the similarity between his contemplation/enjoyment pair and Sartre's eventual thetic/non-thetic contrast. Furthermore, the power of Alexander's projected Deity to contemplate enjoyment likewise resembles the structure of Sartre's 'God', namely, in-itself-for-itself. Still, Alexander does not seem to entertain a Kantian analysis--that experience consists in neither two homogeneous acts of consciousness, nor two heterogeneous ones, but, rather, one act, predicated alternatively of either an external object or of the experiencing subject.

Bergson, Intellect, Intuition

According to Bergson, the object, in general, of the Intellect is static, either inert matter, or hypostasized dynamic processes. Accordingly, Zeno's Paradoxes are exposures, according to Bergson, of the inadequacy of the Intellect to Motion, e. g. the aggregate of the representations of various stages of a flight of an arrow can never unify into a perception of its actual continuous movement. Instead, only Intuition directly perceives the flux of immediate experience, according to him. Now, on his analysis, Intuition is Instinct having "become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting on its object". In turn, he identifies Instinct with Sympathy. Hence, it follows that for Bergson, Intuition is disinterested Sympathy. So, one consequence of his having solved one classic paradox, is the generation of, if not an out-an-out contradiction, at least, another paradox. But, what his analysis of Intuition does bear out is that it is less antithetical to Intellect then a combination of the latter and Instinct.

Alexander and Deity

Alexander's presentation of 'Deity' focuses primarily on its emergent structure as a hitherto non-existent quality that will unify and transcend the entirety of what currently exists, as. e. g. a color emerges from underlying physico-chemical processes. Though an exposition of the quality is premature, Alexander projects its general structure by analogy--it will consist in an objective experience of the subjective dimension of experience, or, in his terminology, a 'contemplation' of 'enjoyment'. However, one peculiarity of this concept is that it is not as unprecedented as Alexander seems to take it to be. For sure, an external understanding of any internal experience, one's own or that of others, seems impossible for humans as currently constituted, but the concept of a God with such powers is nothing new. For, the ability, often attributed to traditional notions of God, to understand one's innermost thoughts, seems already to exemplify a 'contemplation of an enjoyment'. So, if Alexander's Deity is to surpass all hitherto qualities, it's structure will have to be something other than one that has already been conceived.

Spinoza, Bergson, Alexander, Nietzsche, Pantheism

While both Bergson and Alexander have been classified as 'Pantheistic', comparisons between their systems and Spinoza's only underscore their limitations with respect to the rigorous standards established by the latter. In general, whereas for Spinoza, everything in Nature is divine, for both Bergson and Alexander, only portions of it are. For Bergson, Elan Vital is God, but Matter is like fallen angels. For Alexander, the relation of Deity to Nature is, in some key respects, like that of an incipient tree-ring to a given tree--when fully emerged, Deity might contain all of Nature, but it itself is only a part of Nature, and Nature has existed without it. In contrast with both Bergson and Alexander, Nietzsche comes closer to expressing Spinoza's reverence for all of Nature, in his affirmation of Eternal Recurrence, which resists imposing any anthropomorphic judgment on any aspect of Nature. In other words, all four Philosophers can be classified as 'Naturalistic', but, insofar as any component of Nature, at any stage of development, is conceived as non-divine, the concept of Nature of which it is a part is not 'Pantheistic' in the Spinozistic sense.

Spinoza and Bergson.

Bergson's system is sometimes classified as Pantheistic, because, like Spinoza's 'natura naturans', his 'Elan Vital' is an immanent creative principle. However, Bergson diverges from Spinoza in holding that Matter is nothing more than degenerated Elan Vital, and, furthermore, that both Spinozistic Extension and Thought are only an arrangement and a structuring of Matter. Hence, he rejects the thesis that Extension and Thought are attributes of the fundamental creative impetus. Similarly, since Body and Mind, as Spinoza understands them, are modes of Extension and Thought, they, too are extrinsic characterizations of individual conatus, which, on Bergson's account, is localized Elan Vital. Now, for Bergson, Freedom consists in the liberation of Elan Vital from Matter, and Reason, even as an organizing principle, is an accommodation of Mind to Matter, notably to the Emotions, which, on Spinoza's own account, are no more than physical interactions. Thus, for Bergson, while Reason can serve as a means to Freedom, it cannot be its ground. However, Spinoza need not accept this divergence from his own theory of Freedom as a critique of it, because it is based on a premise to which he does not subscribe, namely that Matter is degenerated natura naturans. Furthermore, that premise precludes an interpretation of Extension and Thought that Bergson apparently does not appreciate--that they are dynamic powers, not static properties.

Spinoza and Alexander

Samuel Alexander is sometimes characterized as a contemporary Spinozist. The main basis for that classification is Alexander's system, which, like Spinoza's is Naturalistic, and features two primary attributes. For Alexander, those attributes are Space and Time, in contrast with Spinoza's Extension and Thought, such that everything that exists is a combination of Space and Time. However, unlike Spinozism, Alexander's system features a hierarchical structure, organized in terms of relations of 'emergence', in which higher qualities emerge from lower Space-Time configurations, e. g. colors from physical processes, though, both levels may be in the object itself, rather than as Locke has it. The current highest level of Nature, according to Alexander is Mind, which emerges from cerebral neural patterns. But, Alexander projects the eventual emergence of a next level, 'Deity', from Mind. Hence, while, like Spinoza's God, Alexander's Deity is Naturalistic, unlike the former, it is neither co-extensive with Nature nor eternal. Furthermore, Alexander's Deity, whether while in the process of emerging, or completely emerged, seems to have no practical implications for current actual individual conduct, unlike Spinoza's God, the knowledge of which promotes the freedom of an individual.

Spinoza and Individuality

Previously discussed here has been the distinction between the common connotation of 'individual', i. e. 'discrete', and its rarely used literal meaning, i. e. 'undivided'. That the two meanings are not equivalent is clear from the fact that the former type of 'individuality' entails finitude, while the latter does not. Though Spinoza does not dwell on the usages of the terms themselves, his system expresses his appreciation of the significance of the distinction between them. For, as he argues, modular individuality is defined by the persistence of its effort to exist, which entails continuity. In contrast, the idea of oneself as a discrete entity is only an inadequate idea, nor does a mere aggregate of such ideas add up to an adequate one. Instead, experiential continuity is possible for Spinoza only as rational development, and the primary principle of Rationality is internal coherence, i. e. non-contradiction. Hence, 'individuality', meaning 'undivided' is indicative of adequacy, whereas 'individuality', meaning 'discrete', is indicative of inadequacy, in a system one cardinal principle of which is the distinction between adequate and inadequate knowledge.

Wolfson and Spinoza's Geometrical Method

Wolfson asserts that "there is no logical connection" between the substance of Spinoza's Ethics, and its manner of presentation, which Spinoza himself characterizes as a 'geometrical method'. Wolfson does acknowledge that Spinoza's anti-Teleological Necessitarianism does reflect Spinoza's appreciation of Mathematical relations, but he still maintains that the 'literary style' of the work is primarily pedagogically motivated, i. e. because of the clarity of the geometrical method. However, if Wolfson's interpretation is correct, then Spinoza has either undermined the substance of his system, or has, at least, violated one of its central principles. For, if, as the system proposes, all events are rationally ordered, then so, too, must be the relation between the event of Spinoza's presentation of the system and the rest of Nature. So, if, as Wolfson implies, the presentation is an arbitrary deviation from that system of Nature, then either the system is not true, or it is has an inadequate idea of itself. Surely Spinoza believes that the system is true. Furthermore, it is difficult to accept Wolfson's implication that the deductive development of the argument of the Ethics, from self-evident axioms, with the help of definitions and postulates, is not, first and foremost, an expression of Spinoza's conscientiousness regarding one of the cardinal principles of the system, namely the difference between adequate and inadequate knowledge. So, regardless of the erudition of Wolfson's interpretation, it seems to miss its mark.

Spinoza and Reflection

Spinoza's proposition, in the Ethics, that "the idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body", is often interpreted as his attempt to incorporate a concept of Reflection into his system. Several difficulties seem to challenge that attempt--distinguishing an idea of an idea from the initial idea; the generation of an infinite recursion; and, an apparent violation of his Parallelism thesis, i. e. an idea of an idea is a connection that seems to have no correlate between things. Still, some commentators, e. g. Wolfson, seem to regard that incorporation as significant enough to gloss over those apparent inconsistencies. However, in so doing, they miss the primary function of the Spinoza's introduction of the concept. As he puts it in On the Improvement of the Understanding, "in order to know, there is no need to know that we know", and, conversely, the main theme of the propositions that succeed the above one in the Ethics is that the reflection of an inadequate idea does not transform it into an adequate one. In other words, the potential inconsistencies are irrelevant to the main purpose of the introduction of the concept, which is to repudiate theories in which Reflection has a privileged status, e. g. Cartesianism and Aristotelianism.

Spinoza and Logic

For Spinoza, an Adequate Idea is one that God thinks, and, since such an idea entails antecedents and consequences, it is not a singular occurrence, but part of a sequence of thoughts. Hence, when an individual Mind thinks an Adequate Idea, it is functioning as perfectly rationally as God does. But, doing so is not accidental, but of the essence of any Mind, because, it is only in functioning in this manner that a Mode can persist in its own being. For, otherwise, it is no more than a component of some external chain of events, in which it does not truly persist in its own being. Hence, because a Mode is only itself insofar as it thinks adequate ideas, Spinoza occasionally characterizes it as a rational "automaton". In other words, Logic, for him, is not, as it most prevalently is currently, a merely normative discipline, but is, rather, a description of the essential nature of Mind, from which deviation occurs only because of the susceptibility of a finite Mode to external influences, not because of an internal 'irrational' dimension of its being.

Spinoza, God, Logos

For Spinoza, the object of Intuition is a relation, independent of the terms that it relates, either Causation or Inference. But, Causation is an expression of God's power of Extension, and Inference is an expression of God's power of Thought, i. e. God's two attributes are dynamic processes, not static properties. Hence, God, in one respect or the other, is the object of Intuition, i. e. of Spinoza's 'third kind of Knowledge'. Furthermore, as a rational creative force, God is identical to not only Nature, but, even though Spinoza never formulates it as such, to the Logos, in the Heraclitan or Stoic sense, as well. In other words, in Spinoza's Pantheism, the Logos is God, not merely one of God's properties, powers, or manners of expression, as other traditions have it.

Spinoza, Reason, Intuition

The preceding discussion distinguishes between two interpretations of Spinoza's notion 'Adequate Idea'. According to one, an Adequate Idea is knowledge of an effect the cause of which is also known, or, equivalently, it is the conclusion of a valid deductive process. According to the second, an Adequate Idea is knowledge of the relation itself that obtains between a cause and an effect, or, equivalently, between a premise and a consequence. However, these are not conflicting interpretations of Spinoza's notion; rather, the first is a characterization of what Spinoza calls 'Reason', while the second, of what he calls 'Intuition', i. e. his 'second' and 'third' kinds of Knowledge, respectively. These characterizations correspond to his example of the two knowledges of a mathematical ratio--one the result of an orderly derivation from Euclidean premises, the other, the result of a direct insight into the numerical relation itself. More precisely, the idea of a relation as Causality or Reasoning per se accords with Spinoza's definition of an Intuition as 'an idea proceeding from the essence of God's attributes', i. e. from Extension or from Thinking, respectively, understood as dynamic powers, not as static properties.

Spinoza, Adequate Cause, Adequate Idea

For Spinoza, an Adequate Idea of a created entity entails knowledge of the proximate cause of the entity. Furthermore, an 'Adequate Cause', for him, is a cause through which its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived. It thus follows that the object of an Adequate Idea of a created entity entails the Adequate Cause of the entity as well. Hence, the proper of object such an Adequate Idea is not so much an entity, or its cause, but the causality that connects them. Likewise, an Adequate Idea is not so much either the conclusion of a deductive procedure, or the premise from which it is deduced, but that deductive process itself.

Spinoza, Deleuze, Adequacy, Justification

Deleuze interprets Spinoza's concept of an 'Adequate Idea' of a finite entity as entailing not merely knowledge of the cause of the entity, but also "expression" of the cause of the idea itself. Insofar as 'Expression' has a perhaps idiosyncratic ontological significance for Deleuze, it is not immediately clear in what respect an idea can be said to 'express' its cause. However, his discussion suggests that what the term denotes is approximately equivalent to a more traditional relation, one that similarly clarifies Spinoza's concept of Adequate Idea. For an idea to 'express' its cause seems to mean to Deleuze that it entails the intellectual process by which it is derived. In other words, it entails what is more traditionally called 'justification'. Accordingly, Spinoza's concept of an Adequate Idea is what is traditionally characterized as a 'justified belief', which as Spinoza plainly asserts, is independent of the relation between an idea and its object, i. e. is independent of whether or not it is also 'true'.

Spinoza, Sartre, Emotion

One Philosophical context in which Spinoza and Sartre often appear conjointly is the topic of 'Free Will vs. Determinism'. Since Spinoza holds that every proximate cause of human action is itself the effect of a preceding cause, and Sartre holds that no cause of human action is the effect of a preceding cause, the two are often recognized as prototypes of diametrically opposed positions on the topic. Less well noted is their virtual agreement on another issue--that an Emotion is a derivative and diminished psychological condition. For Spinoza, an Emotion is, in general, an increase or decrease in strength that is the effect of an external cause, while for Sartre, it is a vicarious substitute for a thwarted action. So, for both, an Emotion is neither a psychological Atom, nor a fully active condition. The two thus oppose both philosophical traditions that affirm the ontological irreducibility of an Emotion, and conventional moralities that not only treat Emotions as the distinctive elements of personal character, but tend to glamorize them as well. Spinoza's analysis, in particular, demonstrates that an Emotion is no more distinctively human than any effect of a mechanical cause.

Spinoza, Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil

Deleuze suggests that Spinoza is an inspiration for Nietzsche's 'beyond Good and Evil' notion. The 'Good and Evil' that Nietzsche repudiates has three main dimensions--a psychological strategy, an ontological doctrine, and an historical tradition. The psychological strategy is the use of those value terms as weapons of the weak against strength. The ontological doctrine holds that Being is fundamentally a conflict between a benign force and a malignant force. The historical tradition is the Christian dogma that has dominated in Europe for centuries. In contrast, Spinoza is plainly aware that his system diverges from orthodox Judaeo-Christianity, and he does offer not so much a psychological but an epistemological diagnosis of the ideas 'Good' and 'Evil', i. e. they are inadequate ideas. But the more significant dimension of the three for him is the ontological one, since his Monism, with which Good-Evil Dualism is incompatible. Still, even more fundamental for him is the principle that his Monism expresses, namely his Rationalism. For, Rationality demands systematic unity, and an ontological Good-Evil split violates that unity. Likewise, the unitary source for Nietzsche of all three dimensions of 'Good and Evil', including the ontological one, is his Will to Power principle, from which each of his three repudiatios follows.

Spinoza--Good and Evil

According to Spinoza, 'Good' and 'Evil' are ideas that exist only in the mind of a finite entity, as perceptions of external objects as constructive or destructive, respectively, of it. Hence, God, an infinite entity, has no concept of either, and, since an 'adequate idea', in Spinoza's system, is one that God thinks, 'X is good' and 'X is evil' are always inadequate ideas. On the other hand, God has an adequate idea of every finite entity, and, hence, has one of every modification of a finite entity. Thus, he has one of every harmful encounter in the experience of a finite entity. But a harmful encounter of P with X, is, by definition, one in which X is 'evil' for P. Hence, Spinoza seems to have not precluded that God does have thoughts of Evil, and, for similar reasons, of God, in a relativized sense. So, if God does think 'X is evil for P', it is an adequate idea. Thus, if P thinks 'X is evil for me', e. g. P is aware of being allergic to X, then it is not necessarily an inadequate idea, depending on the degree of reasoning involved, and likewise for thoughts of 'Good'. However, Spinoza seems to give no indication of recognizing the adequacy of 'Good' and 'Evil' in this relativized respect, without which, he seems committed to the potentially harmful dismissal of any individual perception of a legitimate threat to them as an 'inadequate' idea.

Spinoza and Political Philosophy

In Spinoza's system, individuals are Modes, i. e. modifications of Nature. They are thus naturally in a condition of interdependence, so the function of political life is to optimize the natural symbiosis. In other words, Spinoza conceives political association as an enhancement of the good of any individual involved. In contrast, for Hobbes, political association is a corrective to natural antagonism, via constraint on the self-interest of any individual involved. On the other hand, Locke agrees with Spinoza that political association enhances the individual, but unlike for Spinoza, such enhancement, for Locke, is contingent, rather than necessary, in the metaphysical sense. And, the optimization that political association, according to Spinoza, promotes, is not an approximation to a Rousseauian lost natural harmony, nor is the general good attributable to a Rousseauian particular Will. So, Spinoza's Political Philosophy is akin to, but distinguishable from, its prominent peers of the era. More generally, since political association is a means to the good of each of its members, Political Philosophy is a branch of Ethics, according to Spinoza, not antagonistic to it. Likewise, because God and Nature are identical in Spinozism, 'rendering unto Caesar' is not antithetical to 'rendering unto God', but is, more accurately, itself a divine rendering.

Spinoza and Courage

For Spinoza, Virtue is Rational conduct, and the most general Virtue is 'Fortitude', which he defines as 'strength of character'. In turn, the two main types of Fortitude are Courage, which aims at the good of the agent, and 'Highmindedness', i. e. Generosity, which aims at the good of others. While the inclusion of Courage among a list of Virtues is not unusual, that Spinoza reduces Temperance to a species of it, is. The cardinality, for him, of Courage can be interpreted as autobiographical, given the threats provoked by a theory coming from a scientific Jew in an era still dominated by Christian dogmatism. However, the primacy of Courage is systematically grounded. For, Spinoza regards Philosophy as, first and foremost, an alternative to Superstition, which he diagnoses as rooted in Fear, i. e. in the uncertainty of indifferent, if not hostile, Nature. Hence, he attempts to demonstrate how each individual is implicated in a divine, rationally necessary, natural system, which, based on the premise that Knowledge eliminates all passions, thereby overcomes Fear. The result secondarily serves as fortification against social authority that demands submission to it insofar as it purports to mediate appeasement of presumably supernatural forces as a response to Fear.

Spinoza and Egoism

Spinoza's Ethics can be classified as 'Egoism', but his anti-Teleological version distinguishes it from many of the standard varieties. While Psychological Egoism asserts that one always acts in one's self-interest, Ethical Egoism asserts that one should always act in one's self-interest, implying not merely that one does not always act that way, but that one can fail to act that way even while believing that they are doing so, e. g. conditioned behavior. Thus, Teleological 'self-interest', in which one finds satisfaction in the attainment of external goods, whether 'higher' or 'lower', is only conditioned behavior, and, hence not truly for one's own good. Instead, argues Spinoza, only the endeavor itself to persist in one's being is in one's self-interest, because it constitutes independence from external influences, which, rather serve it as promoting it. Furthermore, since mutual interpersonal activity enhances the endeavors of each involved, Egoism and sociality are not antagonistic, according to him. Finally, Spinoza's kind of Egoism is divinely based, because the endeavor of a Mode to persist in its being is nothing but a modification of God's ceaseless creativity.

Spinoza, Modification, Sense Experience

According to Spinoza, sense experience consists of representations of bodily modifications, e. g. a visual perception is a representation of the effect of the object of perception on one's visual apparatus. The primary significance for him of such an analysis of sense experience is that a sensory representation is, thus, an inadequate idea, both of the affected body and of the affecting object. So, he does not pursue some of its other implications. For example, since a modification is a variation on a previous condition, the previous condition is entailed in the representation of the modification. Spinoza thereby challenges the long traditions, commonsensical, as well as Platonist and Empiricist, that treats the experience of a secondary quality as a synchronous event, as if each such experience occurred to a tabula rasa. Furthermore, since a modification is a transition from a prior to a subsequent condition, this account entails the fundamental temporality of sense experience, without needing to resort, as Kant does, to a transcendental demonstration of that temporality. Finally, since sense experience is a contrast with a prior condition, the more accurate type of language to describe it would seem to be comparative, rather than positive, modifiers, e. g. 'I am feeling colder' as opposed to 'I am cold', despite the long tradition otherwise.

Spinoza, Kant, Virtue, Reward

Both Spinoza and Kant believe that personal Virtue consists in Rational conduct. But, whereas the former holds that Virtue is its own reward, Kant regards it as an incomplete Good without Happiness. Spinoza's formulation that 'Virtue is its own reward' is slightly inaccurate, because Virtue is accompanied by a certain degree of Pleasure, and it is the latter which seems to be the actual locus of the satisfaction that he attributes to the attainment of Virtue. Hence, his judgment regarding Virtue is contingent, as Kant's dissatisfaction with that Pleasure bears out. In contrast, Kant maintains that the insufficiency of that Pleasure can serve as a disincentive to acting Rationally, i. e. that it is insufficient to counter other miseries that can interfere with Rational conduct. Furthermore, he argues that the Highest Good, which entails Virtue, is incomplete without Happiness. However, both of these points seem to undermine his Rational Principle. For, according to that Principle, one should obey Reason for its own sake alone, regardless of circumstances or consequences, and, hence, independently of the degree of Pleasure involved, of the strength of temptation to do otherwise, or of any hardship that might ensue. So, while his denial that Virtue is its own reward might have merit, Kant cannot ground it in his Rational Principle. Without this buttress, he encourages the suspicion that his disagreement with Spinoza reduces to a theological issue--his attempt to rescue the possibility of afterwordly rewards that is precluded by Spinoza's Pantheism.

Spinoza, Pity, Hope

Spinoza offers analyses of the various Emotions, as well as a moral assessment of each. The assessments of two of the Emotions that he considers, while not receiving from him any special attention, are contrary to not only conventional wisdom, but also some significant Moral theories. According to the analysis, the two fundamental Emotions are Pleasure and Pain, and the rest entail them in various combinations. According to the assessment, anything that strengthens an individual is a 'Good' for them, and anything that weakens one is an 'Evil' for them. The connection between the analysis and the assessment is that Pleasure is the idea of one's being strengthened, and Pain the idea of one's being weakened. For example, Pity, or, alternatively, Sympathy, Compassion, Commiseration, etc., is a sharing of Pain. Thus, Pity is an Evil, from which it does not follow that it is not Moral to alleviate the suffering of others, just that the state itself is one of weakness. Also, Hope entails, to at least some degree, a Fear of failure, and Fear is a Painful state. Hence, Hope, at best, is not an unalloyed Good. The Ethical status of Pity and Hope for Spinoza are thus contrary to many conventional Moralities. Furthermore, they present sharp challenges to Schopenhauer, for whom Pity is the Highest Good, and to Kant, for whom Hope is both an ingredient in his Highest Good, and a component of his Architectonic.

Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Thought

Schopenhauer's Philosophy is explicitly a variation on Kant's system. It interprets the 'thing-in-itself' as Will, and appearances, including the Self, as epiphenomena, and, hence, as irreal. But it can also be understood in terms of its divergence from Spinoza's system. Schopenhauer's Will is Spinoza's God, qua naturing nature, but without the attribute of Thought. That Will lacks Thought has two important consequences. First, since the existence of individual bodies is proven, for Spinoza, by their ideas being in the Thought of God, they are merely natured nature in the absence of that attribute. Second, Rationality has no adequacy, and is only a localized process, even in its Practical manifestation, if Will does not Think. Thus, the irreality, for Schopenhauer, of Individuality, is, from the perspective of Spinozism, primarily a function of the Thoughtlessness of Will, with respect to which the ontological status of Modes as epiphenomena is derivative.

Spinoza, Leibniz, Voltaire

It seems inarguable that Leibniz is a target of Voltaire's mockery in Candide. For, he explicitly challenges Leibniz' thesis that 'this is the best of all possible worlds' with factual examples of human suffering. But, his target is slightly inaccurate, for, it is, rather, another of Leibniz' principles to which those examples more immediately apply, one that is implicit in Spinoza's system, as well. What e. g. the Lisbon earthquake would more directly refute is, instead, the thesis of 'pre-established' harmony, which presumes to preclude the possibility of the existence of such dissonant events., as does Spinoza's Rationalism. And, since Spinoza rejects Leibniz' Best World thesis, because he argues that the thought of possible but non-actual worlds does not exist in the mind of God, it is, more precisely, the Harmony thesis that the existence of human suffering would refute. One fundamental problem for any Rational system is to explain the existence of conflict in a world presumably governed by a principle of non-contradiction, i. e. a world in which Harmony is guaranteed from the outset. Voltaire's expression of dissatisfaction with Leibniz' solution to that problem also applies to Spinoza's system.

Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Organism

As has been discussed, the concept of Organism is problematic in terms of Causality for Spinozism. But, it may be weaker in a different respect. Schopenhauer's thesis that individuality is illusory means that any distinction within a monistic system is arbitrarily drawn, and Spinozism is such a system. Hence, the existence of any Mode, including organisms, may be problematic for Spinoza. Schopenhauer's thesis implies, for example, that Spinoza's attempts to distinguish bodies on the basis of motion-and-rest, or on contiguity, are inadequate. Likewise, since Mind is no more than the idea of Body, and a possibly inadequate one, it cannot be the ground of individuation in the system, either. More generally, the lack of a Principle of Sufficent Reason for the generation of Modes, means that Spinoza does not demonstrate that God's creativity is, say, undifferentiated emanation, the interpretation of which as a chain of discrete causes and effects is an inadequate idea. Schopenhauer's criticism applies potentially to any theory that asserts the existence of individuals, but especially so to Spinoza's most conscientiously Rational system.

Reason and Organism

Kant's concept of Organism seems to be derived from his Rational Idea, the 'Kingdom of Ends'. If so, then his focus on Purposiveness distracts him from a deeper problem with any Spinozist concept of Organism. The primary characteristic of Reason, Purposive or otherwise, is its non-contradictoriness. Hence, a Nature that is a product of Reason should be conflict-free. And, yet, Spinoza affirms that one part of Nature can be harmful to another. So, the question for Spinozism is not 'how are organisms possible?', but 'how are non-organistic entities possible?, and it is unclear that he has a satisfactory answer.

Spinoza, Kant, Whitehead, Organism

Since Kant holds that the concept of Purposiveness is essential to the concept of Organism, his dissatisfaction with Spinoza's treatment of the former amounts to a challenge to the capacity of Spinozism to accommodate the latter. In scientific terms, Kant rejects the reduction of Biological nature to Mechanistic nature, and interprets Spinoza's system as purely Mechanistic. In contrast, Whitehead judges that his 'philosophy of organism' is "closely allied" with Spinozism, perhaps noting, as Kant seems not to, that Spinoza asserts that all created entities, human or otherwise, are "animated". In other words, Whitehead seems to reject the interpretation of Spinozism as Mechanistic. If so, however, he thereby seems to overlook his own grounds for criticizing Spinoza. For, his scheme categorically distinguishes between living and non-living entities, whereas, for Spinoza, any difference is only one of degree. Furthermore, that distinction is based, for Whitehead, on the irreducibility of the thought 'I want X' to Efficient Causality, a reducibility which Spinoza seems to affirm. Thus, it is open to Kant to respond that Whitehead's system is not in fact allied with one in which living entitities are not motivated by Teleological Causality. In other words, despite Whitehead's support, Spinoza's non-Teleological notion of animation lingers as problematic. One, and perhaps the only, solution, is for Spinoza to admit into his system another kind of Causality, such as Formal Causality, in which all intentions function as determinative of action qua the shaping and guiding of motion. Otherwise, he seems to be committed to accepting either that stones are organisms, or that humans are not organisms.

Spinoza, Kant, Purposiveness

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant attributes to Spinoza an explanation of Purposiveness that he regards as inadequate. Kant terms that explanation 'fatalistic'--that different elements of nature are suitable to one another can only be due, according to Kant, to fortuitous circumstance in Spinoza's non-Teleological system, because the latter rules out the possibility that such suitability reflects intentional design. Now, though Spinoza does not explicitly espouse such a position, it does seem consistent with what he does articulate. Spinoza also does not have at his disposal the non-Teleological explanation of natural suitability that arises to prominence two centuries later, namely the process of evolutionary Adaptation. Nevertheless, the latter is not only consistent with his non-Teleological doctrine, but it confirms his thesis that his knowledge of Nature is by no means complete. So, even if the notion of Adaptation is unknown to both him and Kant, Kant is wrong to assert that natural suitability is inexplicable from Spinoza's premises. Regardless, Kant's argument as presented is besides the point. For, his own concept of Purposiveness is a Regulative Idea only, i. e. he explicitly agrees with Spinoza that Efficient Causality cannot ground Purposiveness. Hence, his disagreement with Spinoza regarding Purposiveness must, first and foremost, be in terms of its heuristic value, not its content, and, so, his objection must directly address Spinoza's thesis that it is an idea that is deleterious to the intellect of a Mode. Plainly, Kant's argument is otherwise occupied.

Spinoza and Teleology.

Probably following the example of modern Physics, Spinoza attempts to eliminate Teleology from Metaphysics. That is, God, in Spinozism, never acts purposefully, either proximally or remotely. Instead, the root of Teleological thinking, according to Spinoza, is the same idea that is the origin of the thesis of Free Will, namely, the consciousness 'I want X', from which the mind has the tendency to infer 'X is for me', in turn from which the notion that 'God has a plan' is an extrapolation. But, 'I want X' is an inadequate idea, not only because it is ignorant of its preconditions, but because it cannot be an idea in God, and, hence, is not adequate. Thus, the emergence in his system of an idea of the form 'O is useful to S' seems ungrounded, for, its structure is plainly purposive. Spinoza treats it as if it follows from 'S endeavors to persist in its being', and 'O preserves or increases the strength of S', but it would follow only with a further proposition "'O causes S' is equivalent to 'O is a means to S'". However, the latter cannot be an idea in God, so, it is not an adequate idea, in which case, it can have no place in Spinoza's deduction, leaving him with a vestige of Teleology.

Spinoza, Kant, and The Power of Reason

Spinoza and Kant are traditionally classified as being in dispute regarding the possibility of Free Will--Spinoza denies it, holding that every cause, except God, is the effect of a preceding cause, while Kant affirms it, arguing that some events can be interpreted as both having and not having such an antecedent. However, the issue is more complicated. Spinoza, as has been recently discussed, does advocate a concept of Freedom, and identifies Reason and Will. Furthermore, his concept of conatus has a zone of indeterminacy--the endeavor to persist in being does not explain how an entity can seek to increase its strength. Meanwhile, despite his efforts to identify Pure Practical Reason and Free Will, Kant fails, eventually acknowledging that freedom of choice requires a notion of 'Will' that is distinct from Pure Practical Reason. But, one point of agreement seems to be that Practical Reason has the power to overcome heteronomous influences, whether it is the aroma of unhealthy food or money that a false promise could secure. Even in his inability to explain why his Principle of Pure Practical Reason can be motivationally compelling, Kant is implicitly agreeing with Spinoza that when it is so, it exercises a more powerful influence on an entity than a competing force. However, it is unclear if Kant would go so far as to agree with Spinoza that the resistance to Reason and an inadequate idea of a Rational principle are one and the same. Still, the two might agree that the categorical limits that Hume, for example, places on Reason is an arbitrary expression of contingent weakness.

Spinoza, Kant, Practical Reason

Spinoza is typically classified as a 'Continental Rationalist', and taught in a sequence that also includes Descartes and Leibniz. For sure, Descartes influences Spinoza, and Spinoza influences Leibniz. However, what sharply distinguishes Spinoza from the other two is that his notion of 'Reason' is, more properly, 'Practical Reason', in which respect, his closer historical peer is, rather, Kant. Nevertheless, Kant's only reference to Spinoza in relation to Practical Reason does not appear until the Critique of Judgment--he rejects Spinoza's thesis that Virtue is its own reward. But, since Virtue for both means Rational conduct, Spinoza is, on this issue, the more consistent Rationalist, because he affirms, while Kant denies, that Reason is a sufficient Good. Otherwise, since it is generally accepted that Spinozist 'Reason' is only Theoretical, the Critique of Pure Reason is generally taken as an implicit critique of Spinozism. Furthermore, even qua Practical, Spinozist Reason seems to exemplify what Kant variously classifies as 'technical' or 'prudential', i. e. a mere means to personal non-rational ends, in contrast with 'moral', which alone for Kant qualifies as 'Pure Practical Reason'. On the other hand, Spinoza's assertion that "the good which each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also for others" expresses the same content as Kant's Principle of Pure Practical Reason, so Spinozist Reason is also 'moral' in the Kantian sense. Thus, Kant, but not Spinoza, draws a distinction between self-interested and impersonal Practical Reason, thereby implying a disagreement between the two as to the essence of Practical Reason. The ground of the disagreement is theological--for the Pantheist, natural and divine Practical Reason are one and the same, while for the Theist, they are not--so Kant, but not Spinoza needs to distinguish between supernatural Practical Reason from natural Practical Reason, as expressed in his distinctions between 'moral' and 'prudential', and 'categorical' and 'hypothetical', among others. Hence, Kant's most significant advance with respect to Spinoza on the topic is to formulate Practical Reason in imperatival terms.

Spinoza, Plato, Empowerment

Some passages in the Ethics encourage a Platonist interpretation of Spinoza's "knowledge of God". That, for Spinoza, such knowledge is intuition; that the knowledge of God entails understanding the eternity of God; and that such knowledge qualifies as the highest virtue, suggest a similarity of his 'knowledge of God' and the Platonist 'contemplation of the Good'. However, the differences are significant. First, whereas the Platonist 'Good' is supernatural, the Spinozist 'God' is Nature, qua dynamic creativity. Second, while, Platonic Forms are generally interpreted as simple, for Spinoza, the idea of God entails God's causality. Third, while for Plato, the idea of the Good is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of Virtue, for Spinoza, the knowledge of God is not necessary to virtuous conduct. More generally, every idea has an effect, according to Spinoza, which means that, unlike the contemplation of the Good for Plato, the knowledge of God is not an end-in-itself. Rather, like all knowledge, it promotes an increase in the activity, and a decrease in the passivity, of the knower. In other words, for Spinoza, the knowledge of God is empowerment more than enlightenment, and Spinoza is as much a Baconian as a Platonist or a Cartesian.

Spinoza, Parallelism, Form-Matter

Mind-Body parallelism is not happenstance in Spinoza's system. It is entailed by the more fundamental thesis that Mind and Body are two aspects of the experiences of one and the same entity. Likewise, Mind and Body are either both active or both passive in his system, in contrast with traditions for which one is active and the other passive. Spinoza originally introduces the distinction between 'active' and 'passive' as that between 'nature naturing' and 'nature natured', or, more commonly, creator-created, as preparation for terming God's creatures 'Modes'. But Modes are not thereby immutably passive, and can become active to a lesser or greater degree, depending on the acquisition of adequate ideas. In On the Improvement of the Understanding, Spinoza specifies that adequate ideas are definitions that meet certain criteria, and in the case of the definition of a created thing, one criterion is that the definition comprehend the proximate cause of the thing, e. g. a 'circle' is a "figure described by a line whereof one end is fixed and the other free". Hence, drawing a circle with this definition in mind exemplifies active conduct, as well as what he elsewhere characterizes as action "determined" by reason. Now, as has been argued previously here, in the performing of such an action, the definition is the 'Form' of the performance, and the physical motion its 'Matter', with both dynamic processes. Thus, qua active, Mind and Body are a Form-Matter relation, which, by analogy, suggests that so, too, are God's attributes, Thought and Extension. However, if so, then that God can possess additional attributes, as Spinoza speculates, is impossible, i. e. Form and Matter are exhaustively complementary.

Spinoza and Practical Parallelism

Hume's treatment of Causality not merely challenges Spinoza's Parallelism, but transforms it from an Ontological to an Epistemological thesis. Hence, what Spinoza conceives as a relation between the physical and the mental aspects of events is re-conceived as a relation between events and the representation of events, a transformation that Kant's response to Hume reinforces. It has been only more recently, by e. g. Alexander, Whitehead, and Deleuze, that Ontological Parallelism in its own right has been revived. Still, these treatments seem to ignore a further species of Parallelism, that even Spinoza only occasionally addresses. Since, every course of human conduct is a sequence of events, Ontological Parallelism applies to it as well, i. e. the sequence consists of both a concatenation of motions and a concatenation of ideas, that are the same. In other words, the thesis entails what might be termed 'Practical Parallelism'. Spinoza offers only brief allusions to the dynamics of Practical Parallelism, but, in characterizing actions as "determined" by Reason, as well as in his advocacy of genetic definitions, he seems to suggest that he conceives Body and Mind as a Matter-Form relation, which would, at least, qualify as a parallel.

Spinoza's Parallelism

Spinoza's 'Parallelism' is a common reference to his proposition that 'the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things'. Seemingly under-appreciated is that the proposition most immediately challenges the Teleological concept of Nature, in which the order of ideas is the inverse of the order of things--in the Teleological order of ideas, the End is prior to the Means, but in the order of things, the Means, i. e. the Efficient Cause, is prior to the End, i. e. the effect of that Cause. Now, Hume's theory of Causality is often taken as a refutation of Spinoza's Parallelism. The main thread of his argument is that Spinoza confuses three distinct structures--the analytical relation of a priori ideas, the synthetic relation of a posteriori ideas, and the relation between events--and that causal knowledge is the second type, with no correspondence to either the first or the third. An easy response for Spinoza is that the absence of the correspondence between the second and the other two only confirms the inadequacy of that kind of knowledge, and of its irrelevance to Parallelism, which pertains only to the relation between the those other two structures. That response also applies to interpretations of the course of events by not only common sense, but by theories of History as well, including Hegel's, i. e. that they are all inadequate constructions. A stronger objection to Parallelism can come from Pragmatism--since only God can verify it, there is no human way to either confirm or disprove it, so, hence, the proposition is meaningless. However, a Kantian might defend it as a useful 'Regulative' idea, i. e. as a potentially fruitful guide to any construction of a sequence of events, of both mundane and of historical scope.

Spinoza and Conatus

Spinoza defines the essence of any individual human as 'the endeavor to persist in its own being', with 'persist' also translatable as 'persevere'. However, this concept of conatus is often, e. g. Wolfson, represented as 'self-preservation', thereby aligning Spinoza with a long Stoic-based tradition, that includes, most influentially, Hobbes. The difference between 'persist'/'persevere' and 'preserve' is perhaps subtle, but of potentially great significance. Whereas, 'preserve' connotes the maintaining of some already determined entity, 'persist'/'persevere' is open-ended. Indeed, the Spinozistic Mode not only persists, but has the capacity to increase its strength. In other words, preserve, but not persist/persevere, precludes the possibility of growth. Now, the contrast between self-preservative conatus and evolvemental, i. e. self-growth, conatus has been previously discussed here, with some of the main conclusions being that the former, which has dominated Anglo-Saxon culture for centuries, breeds greed and antagonism, and, thus, stunts, the development of a healthy society. So, to take Spinoza's formulation at face value, his theory of conatus stands as a variation on the traditional one, and anticipates one that does not emerge into prominence for another two centuries.

Spinoza and Freedom

'Determinism' is the thesis that every event is the effect of a preceding cause, while 'Free Will' asserts that there are acts that are not the effects of some preceding cause. So, it is seemingly contradictory for Spinoza to both plainly affirm the former, and, yet, propose a theory of Freedom. His solution is to conceive 'Freedom' as a type of causal chain, specifically a rational sequence. On this account, Freedom, rational conduct, active conduct, and persistence in being are identical. Rationality achieves persistence in being by generating consistency in conduct, which is Free, because it resists external influences that produce the emotions that cause passive behavior. For Spinoza, 'persistence in being', not to be confused with 'self-preservation', is the essence of the individual, so only rational conduct is the individual's mode of being in accordance with its essence, since irrational behavior is willy-nilly, and, hence, inconsistent, i. e. lacking in persistence. With this doctrine, Spinoza is not attempting to reconcile his theory of Freedom of with the traditional one, but to reform it. He is, thus, not in dispute with e. g. Sartre regarding the nature of human motivation, but, rather, regarding the validity of the latter's thesis that Freedom consists in a spontaneous upsurge that negates all that precedes it, a challenge which Spinoza could substantiate by pointing out that Sartre himself eventually finds the thesis unsustainable. Still, what remains lacking in this new notion of Freedom is how, given that he is already committed to the position that Mind and Body have no causal interaction, Reason can guide conduct. One solution is that as such a guide, Reason is functioning as a Formal Cause, not an Efficient one, a possibility seemingly not inconsistent with other aspects of his system, but not one that Spinoza explicitly affirms.

Descartes, Spinoza, Method

Spinoza's advocacy of the 'geometric' method of proof implies a rejection of Descartes' method of doubt. The latter is, according to Spinoza, procedurally inadequate, for two main reasons. First, it employs as primitive, i. e. 'certainty' and 'doubt', notions that, at minimum, require definition, if not derivation, and, likewise, 'Mind' and 'Body' are soon introduced without preparation. Second, since the geometric method advances from certain proposition to certain proposition, 'I doubt X' cannot appear in a sound proof. Also unsound, according to Spinoza, is any attempt to prove the existence of anything without the existence of God as its initial premise. Conversely, any proof in which the existence of God is a conclusion is likewise unsound. Furthermore, Spinoza shows that any thought of the thought of X is no more certain than the thought of X, which means that Descartes cannot be both certain that he thinks that he thinks that his body exists and doubt that his body exists. Finally, Spinoza argues that every representation of X is an affirmation of the existence X, which means, first, that Descartes' affirmation of his conclusion that he exists is superfluous, and, second, that Descartes cannot simultaneously think X and doubt the existence of X, which his method seems to entail.

Whitehead on Descartes and Spinoza

Whitehead proposes that the fundamental relation between Descartes and Spinoza is that the latter provides a more coherent framework for the principles of the former, citing Spinoza's unification of Descartes' two substances as parallel attributes of the same subject. The same interpretation also seems to apply to Descartes' other significant dualism--Creator and Created--which Spinoza recasts as Substance and Mode, respectively. A further innovation of Spinoza's also follows from this second synthesis--since Mode is not independent of Substance, as a Creature is of its Creator, then the purported free will of a Cartesian existent is illusory. However, Whitehead's hypothesis does not seem to accommodate the most explicit of Spinoza's radicalizations--that the resultant system is an 'Ethics'. In particular, Whitehead does not explain how Cartesian enlightenment becomes Spinozistic empowerment, i. e. how Cartesian freedom from sensory cognition becomes Spinozistic freedom from emotional motivation. In other words, Cartesian Mind is essential cognitive, while Spinoza's is practical, a distinction that Whitehead's own system seems incapable of recognizing.