Spinoza and Freedom

'Determinism' is the thesis that every event is the effect of a preceding cause, while 'Free Will' asserts that there are acts that are not the effects of some preceding cause. So, it is seemingly contradictory for Spinoza to both plainly affirm the former, and, yet, propose a theory of Freedom. His solution is to conceive 'Freedom' as a type of causal chain, specifically a rational sequence. On this account, Freedom, rational conduct, active conduct, and persistence in being are identical. Rationality achieves persistence in being by generating consistency in conduct, which is Free, because it resists external influences that produce the emotions that cause passive behavior. For Spinoza, 'persistence in being', not to be confused with 'self-preservation', is the essence of the individual, so only rational conduct is the individual's mode of being in accordance with its essence, since irrational behavior is willy-nilly, and, hence, inconsistent, i. e. lacking in persistence. With this doctrine, Spinoza is not attempting to reconcile his theory of Freedom of with the traditional one, but to reform it. He is, thus, not in dispute with e. g. Sartre regarding the nature of human motivation, but, rather, regarding the validity of the latter's thesis that Freedom consists in a spontaneous upsurge that negates all that precedes it, a challenge which Spinoza could substantiate by pointing out that Sartre himself eventually finds the thesis unsustainable. Still, what remains lacking in this new notion of Freedom is how, given that he is already committed to the position that Mind and Body have no causal interaction, Reason can guide conduct. One solution is that as such a guide, Reason is functioning as a Formal Cause, not an Efficient one, a possibility seemingly not inconsistent with other aspects of his system, but not one that Spinoza explicitly affirms.