Spinoza, Pity, Hope

Spinoza offers analyses of the various Emotions, as well as a moral assessment of each. The assessments of two of the Emotions that he considers, while not receiving from him any special attention, are contrary to not only conventional wisdom, but also some significant Moral theories. According to the analysis, the two fundamental Emotions are Pleasure and Pain, and the rest entail them in various combinations. According to the assessment, anything that strengthens an individual is a 'Good' for them, and anything that weakens one is an 'Evil' for them. The connection between the analysis and the assessment is that Pleasure is the idea of one's being strengthened, and Pain the idea of one's being weakened. For example, Pity, or, alternatively, Sympathy, Compassion, Commiseration, etc., is a sharing of Pain. Thus, Pity is an Evil, from which it does not follow that it is not Moral to alleviate the suffering of others, just that the state itself is one of weakness. Also, Hope entails, to at least some degree, a Fear of failure, and Fear is a Painful state. Hence, Hope, at best, is not an unalloyed Good. The Ethical status of Pity and Hope for Spinoza are thus contrary to many conventional Moralities. Furthermore, they present sharp challenges to Schopenhauer, for whom Pity is the Highest Good, and to Kant, for whom Hope is both an ingredient in his Highest Good, and a component of his Architectonic.