Thursday, November 30, 2017

Leader and Follower

The main works of Political Philosophy all appear in reaction to some problematic circumstances--the death of Socrates, the English Civil War, the decay of the Feudal order, etc.  And yet, each of them is presented as unconditioned, entailing universal truths--the Idea of the Good, Psychological Egoism, Individual Right, etc.  Accordingly, they preempt consideration of the significance and characteristics of Leadership, which, as has been previously discussed, is integral to periods of social transition.  Hence, for example, the Leader-Follower relation, which, because possibly obtaining in a period of dissolution, cannot be reduced to an eternal or institutional structure.  Hence, it cannot be easily attributed to Reason.  Instead, the perhaps uncanny resonance of a Leader in a Follower suggests a binding together, in particular circumstances, effected by an instinctual influence, e. g. a Species-drive.  So, insofar as in stable periods, a Leader-Follower relation underlies a Ruler-Ruled relation, i. e. accounts for a personal dimension that is otherwise lacking, e. g. compensated for by threats or promises, the major works ignore what might be a significant factor in a Political Philosophy.

Wednesday, November 29, 2017

Form of the Good, Genius, Species

The distinction between Ruler and Leader can be illustrated by the contrast between Solomon and Moses--even the Philosopher-King might not be a pioneer.  Likewise, beyond the Form of the Good as a motivator, there is Genius, which breeds exemplary conduct, and, hence, inspires others to follow, without any of the trappings of established Power, even benign ones.  Now, Genius needs no supernatural explanation; rather, it might be a manifestation of a Species-drive, with a Leader as the medium of propagation.  So, a Ruler might be the appropriate sovereign in a period of stability, and a Leader, in a period of transition, a distinction not recognized in standard Political Philosophy.

Tuesday, November 28, 2017

Ruler and Leader

Though 'ruler' and 'leader' are sometimes used interchangeably, there is one important distinction between them.  While the ruler-ruled relation is synchronic, that of leader-follower is diachronic, i. e. to 'lead' is to 'go first'.  Thus, the Ideal Ruler does not entail change, while the Ideal Leader does.  Accordingly, the object of the vision of the Ideal Leader is not the Idea of the Good, but the Idea of the Better, relative to the status quo.  So, not only is the significance of Leadership not taken into account by Plato, whose Republic is static, but by Marx, as well, who does recognize the historicity of Political Philosophy, but fails to appreciate the essentiality of Leaders in the revolutionary process.

Monday, November 27, 2017

Monism, Pluralism, Dualism

The standard Monist-Pluralist contrast of Spinoza and Leibniz connotes that the former recognizes the existence of one entity, while the latter, many entities.  But, underlying that Pluralism is a Creator-Creature Dualism that Leibniz shares with the other 'Rationalist' of the tradition, Descartes, as well as, correspondingly, a Mind-Body Dualism. Similarly, unlike those Rationalists, Spinoza is not an Epistemological Dualist.  For, his primary distinction in that respect is Adequate Idea and Inadequate Idea, with two varieties of the former--Intuition and Reason--while Inadequate is, more properly, Semi-Adequate.  So the difference between Reason and Sense for Spinoza is not, as it is for Descartes and Leibniz, absolutely Dualistic.  But perhaps the most important distinction between Spinoza and the other two is that his concept of Reason is fundamentally Practical, i. e. he conceives it as identical to Will, while for them, Cognition-Volition is another manifestation of the Theological Dualism.  In other words, for Spinoza, Reason is fundamentally Techne, which also explains why he, unlike Descartes and Leibniz, can extend it to a Political Philosophy.

Sunday, November 26, 2017

Monism vs. Pluralism, City of God, City of Man

The standard academic classification of Spinoza and Leibniz as each a 'Rationalist', with the former a 'Monist', and the latter a 'Pluralist', is both misleading and uninstructive.  It is misleading, because it does not take into account Spinoza's Intuitionism, and because it does not distinguish between Spinoza's concept of Sense-Experience as incompletely real, and Leibniz' of it as irreal.  It is uninstructive because it abstracts from the Theological ground of the Monist-Pluralist distinction.  That ground is that Spinoza's deity is corporeal, while Leibniz' is not.  Consequently, while they agree that the only real Causality is divine, it is immanent in the corporeal inter-Mode Causality of the former, while there can be no corporeal inter-Monad Causality for the latter.  Hence, because connected, the Modes are part of the same Substance, but because disconnected, the Monads are Plural.  Now, a further distinction between the two is lost in the limbo that separates Philosophy from Political Science in academic.  The immanence of Spinoza's deity entails that the City of God and the City of Man are one and the same, whereas on the basis of the transcendence of Leibniz' deity, only the City of God is real.

Saturday, November 25, 2017

Action and Fallibility

As Whitehead posits, and Neurophysiology has confirmed, the stimulation of a sense-organ by some object, and its reception in the brain, are not simultaneous.  Accordingly, even if the initial content remains unmodified along the neural path, there is an irreducible differential between an object of perception and the cause of the perception.  But it does not necessarily follow from that differential that the perceptual field is irreal, or that any attempt to modify it is inherently in vain.  Rather, it can also follow that Action is inherently probable but fallible and experimental, which therefore grounds the shortcomings of an immanent Species-drive.  In other words, on that basis, there is not the need for an extrinsic rationale for the existence of disharmony, as there is if human existence is attributed solely to an omnipotent deity, e. g. the rationale that this is "the best of all possible worlds", or, equivalently "God moves in mysterious ways", or "God has a master plan".

Friday, November 24, 2017

Perspective, Epiphenomenon, Prospective

Leibniz characterizes the perceptual field of a Monad variously as Perspective, Reflection, and Representation.  But, Whitehead's detailed analysis reveals crucial distinctions between them.  For sure, to begin with, none of them is a Phenomenalist In-Me World, i. e. entirely Second Quality.  However, while Perspective is For-Me, Reflection suggests not, say, the surface of an object facing one, but a variety of Epiphenomenon, i. e. an insubstantial representation of such a surface.  But what Whitehead bears out is that the representation, like that of the Gestaltists, is a projection, more accurately characterized as From-Me.  In other words, the perceived surface, is a product of a cognitive synthesis that includes the causal effects, slightly previous, of the surface on sense-organs, as well as what is subjectively added, e. g. structuring.  However, like Leibniz, Whitehead does not seem to recognize the organic function of this projection--to present a field of potential Action, rather than a mere object of Contemplation or Geometrical analysis, i. e. that it is a Prospective.  So, Whitehead, perhaps unwittingly, reinforces Leibniz' Theological thesis that the only source of Agency is a deity, with the implication that bettering the World via Political Philosophy is an expression of no more than human vanity.

Thursday, November 23, 2017

Psychology and Cosmopolity

According to what, for at least centuries, has been the predominant Psychological theory, the principle of all individual behavior is personal survival.  On that basis, as Hobbes influentially draws out, the existence of others, and a Species-drive, can only be conceived as radically transcendent to, if not antagonistic to, one.  But, within the past two centuries, that principle has been challenged in two ways, though not yet effectively enough to supplant in the popular imagination.  First, the Will to Power and Evolution, in themselves, entail more than mere survival, i. e. growth, in some respect.  Second, Darwinism, especially, suggests that individual behavior can, in fact, be a manifestation of a Species-drive, as it more patently is in Reproductive processes.  On that basis, immanent in even the most mundane bit of personal behavior can be, contrary to traditional Psychology, the promotion of a Cosmopolity that, millennia after the origin of the Species, is now becoming a concrete reality.

Wednesday, November 22, 2017

Species, Family, Harmony

The best available evidence suggests that all members of the human species have common ancestors.  It also suggests that the species first spread out globally from the site of its origin, and in recent centuries has been coalescing.  Thus, the species can be classified as a Family, and that this Family is governed by some principle or principles of organization, so that Family is the fundamental mode of human social organization.  On that basis, paticular families are all branches of the general Family, and a Polis is a modification of the fundamental principles of organization.  So, whether this Family is conceived as evolved from apes, or as postlapsarian, Harmony can be attributed to it without recourse to supernatural premises, and without a pre-established limitation of bestness.

Tuesday, November 21, 2017

Pre-Established Harmony and Internetwork

For some, the concept of human interconnectivity is Metaphysical, such as Leibniz' thesis of Pre-Established Harmony.  But, the essence of the latter is the principle of Predetermination, which Leibniz buttresses with the Best of All Possible Worlds thesis to explain the existence of suffering--a condition that is unsurpassable by human agency, because of the irreality of any such agency.  In contrast, fundamental human interconnectivity is, with no such mystification, as easily accounted for by the underlying unity of the species as is the commonality of blood types, genetic material, etc.  Furthermore, that plain fact is not constrained by the modal limitation of Leibniz' concatenation, thus leaving open the possibility of betterment.  Among the means to such betterment are improvements in the means of production, of communication, and of transportation, as well as in modes of social organization.  The aim of Political Philosophy is to devise the latter, and, unhindered by restrictions such as Leibniz' Theological commitments, a malleable human Internetwork can be recognized as the raw material of such a project.

Monday, November 20, 2017

Society, Internetwork, Interindependence

The previously described model of Society, developed from Leibniz' and Whitehead's systems, can be characterized as an Internetwork.  This Internetwork is a Hylomorphic concept, the Matter of which is its individual nodes, the Form of which is their malleable concatenation.  It can be characterized as interindependent, rather than interdependent, to emphasize that each node, i. e. each member of society, is fundamentally active, in addition to fundamentally sentient, which is emphasized by Leibniz and Whitehead.  This Internetwork thus fills the lacuna in Plato's model--the gap between writ small and writ large, between the internal and the external dimensions of the experience of a citizen, between the World-Soul and the Person-Soul--all one and the same lacuna.

Sunday, November 19, 2017

Experience, Atomism, Holism

Foundations of Atomist systems are usually experiences isolated from other experiences, e. g. a Sense-Datum, a Thought, etc.  In contrast, Whitehead's variation of Leibniz' system shows how those apparent Atoms are abstracted from Holist concantenation.  For, rather, each new experience is one's modification of the hitherto entire universe, which includes both one's own past actions and those of everybody else.  On that basis, human  society is a Network of interdependent, or, better, inter-independent, since active members.  A Person and/or a Person-Soul can then be defined in terms of one's ongoing history of actions, and a Polis can be defined as a type of organization of the Network.  The two intersect in one's perspective of the Network, which is a Concrescence, to borrow Whitehead's term, of all the influences hitherto.  Accordingly, the Person-Soul is both a Part of the Whole and independent of the rest of it.  So, an Atomist Atom of Experience is abstracted from the social Network of which it is originally a component.   Likewise, Leibniz detaches the cognitive phase of a novel experience from its function as a prelude to the modification of the cognized given, leaving him with an image of the universe, which, as thus inert, he can relegate to Epiphenomenality.

Saturday, November 18, 2017

Holism and Network

Thanks to Voltaire, the best-known example of Leibniz' compromising a Philosophical vision with Theological commitments is his application of Modal Logic to the existence of suffering, i. e. his Best of All Possible Worlds principle.  A more detailed example of that compromise is his Monadology, in which he subordinates a Holist concept of human society to Atomist Psychology.  That is, in order to preserve the separability of the Person-Soul from the Species, which is fundamental to the Theology of the Salvation of the Person-Soul, he relegates his vision of human society--a network of Perspectives--to mere Epiphenomenality.  So, it is unclear whether he would be pleased by or chagrined by the actualization of that vision a few centuries later, i. e. the World Wide Web.  Likewise, by the actualization of an Atomist antithesis in the guise of Capitalist Egoism.

Friday, November 17, 2017

Person, Polis, Internalization

Applying Leibniz' concept of Monadic Perception to Plato's writ small-writ large relation: a Person-Soul is an internalization of a unique perspective on the Polis.  Leibniz himself cannot conceive Appetition this way, since his Theological orientation requires a concept of the Person-Soul that is independent of the rest of the World.  But absent that orientation, a Person can be conceived as in interaction with each other member of a Polis, with behavior a Concrescence, to borrow from Whitehead, of all interactions. One important consequence of this model is that personal Happiness or Unhappiness is a reflection of a general social condition that is internalized, a concept of Psychology that is unrecognizable in an Atomist society, such as the contemporary U. S.  Nevertheless, it explains the uniqueness of a Person in a way that Individual, which is a generic concept, cannot.  Now, it is unclear if Plato would accept such a scheme; regardless it offers a derivation of Person-Soul from Polis-Soul in his Holism.

Thursday, November 16, 2017

Happiness, Organicism, Egoism

While Moore's well-recognized argument against Utilitarianism is that it commits a Naturalistic Fallacy, unexplored is the challenge that his Organicism poses to it.  For, the principle that a Whole is greater than the sum of its Parts surpasses the Utilitarian Calculus, the maximum of which is a mere sum.  It also exposes a deficiency in Egoism--the increment of Happiness that is unattainable outside of an harmonious social whole.  Likewise, Plato's strongest response to Glaucon's Ring of Gyges example in the Republic is that getting away with stealing is less happy than a maximum personal satisfaction that is in harmony with the rest of the Polis, i. e. that the Just person is happier than the Unjust person.  Such an argument also remains relevant against American Individualism.

Wednesday, November 15, 2017

Happiness, Justice, Harmony

The motor of the Republic is the question 'Is a just person happy?'.  Plato's response is not merely affirmative, but, more resoundlingly, that only a just person is happy.  The basis of that response is the thesis that Justice and Happiness are one and the same: Harmony.  In the Republic, that thesis is grounded in the Idea of the Good, a more concrete version of which is likely the concept of a World-Soul, which he presents in the Timaeus. Now, left unexplained in such Holism is the possibility of unhappiness, but implicit in the Republic is that it is a Political problem, as opposed to a Psychological problem in an Atomist system.

Tuesday, November 14, 2017

Philosopher, King, Legislation

While the best-known portion of Republic VII is the complicated figurative scene at its outset, later Plato presents a simple prosaic statement of purpose.  At 519-20, he asserts that the Philosopher has a civic duty to apply a "vision of the good", via "law", to "harmonizing" the Polis, i. e. to become a Philosopher-King.  So, he goes beyond even Marx, in defining Philosophizing as not merely interpreting or even changing the world, but ruling it.  However, at this juncture, Plato is himself still a Philosopher but not a King, offering definitions, even if Practical.  So, it is in the Laws, when he himself begins to Legislate, that, on the basis of his vision of the Good, he rules as well.

Monday, November 13, 2017

Good, World-Soul, Organic Unity

One similarity between Plato and Moore is that the former offers no definition of 'Good', while the latter asserts that it is indefinable.  A second is the former's concept of a World-Soul, and the latter's of Organic Unity.  Finally, a third is the lack of connection between, on the one hand Good and World-Soul, and on the other, Good and Organic Unity.  So, unexplored are, on the one hand, if the Idea of the Good is that of the World-Soul, and, on the other, if the indefininability of the Good is that of the distinction between the sum of the Parts and their Whole.  Not similar is their respective concepts of Nature, so that if Plato conceives the World-Soul as 'Natural' it would serve as no indication of whether or not the distinction between the sum of the Parts and the Whole is for Moore likewise 'Natural', with the implication that the Good is indeed 'Natural', contrary to another of his prominent principles.

Sunday, November 12, 2017

Shadows, Sun, Evil

While for many, the main function of Sense-Experience is Cognition, and, hence, is a topic in Epistemology, for others, it is also a factor in behavior, and, hence, a topic in Psychology and Ethics.  Now, when considered in its entirety, as well as in its general context, the scenario at the beginning of book VII of the Republic is plainly a representation of a corrupt Polis--Sophists manipulating Citizenry by pandering to their prejudices--as relevant today as ever.  So, if shadows do indeed represent Sense-Experience, as the medium of manipulation, it is qua behavioral, not qua cognitive.  Accordingly, the structural significance of a shadow, as opposed to that of mere copies such as an echo or a reflection, is derived from the meaning of the Sun in the passage.  That is, if the Sun is the Idea of Good, and a shadow is the result of a blocking of the Sun, then a shadow represents Evil, an interpretation that coheres with the classification of Sense-Experience as Psychological and Ethical, but not Epistemological.

Saturday, November 11, 2017

Sense-Experience and Shadows

Plato's likening, in book VII of the Republic, of Sense-Experience to shadows, is less than a sound basis for the prototype of a repudiation of Empiricism that it has been taken by many to be over the centuries.  For, to begin with, a shadow is not like Sense-Experience; it is a Sense-Experience.  Second, unlike a hallucination, an after-image, or a Secondary Quality, a shadow does not inhere in the percipient.  Finally, unlike an echo or a reflection, a shadow is no mere copy of an original.  Instead, the cognitive flaw that is the focus of passage is that a shadow is taken to be a self-subsistent entity.  But, that is an error of interpretation, and, hence, an intellectual error.  So, regardless of Plato's intention, what the passage illustrates is a misuse of Sense-Experience, not its Ontological inferiority.

Friday, November 10, 2017

Platonism and Esotericism

If, as some assert, there is an esoteric Platonism that remains veiled in the Republic, it can only be the system developed in the Timaeus, beginning with the principle of a World-Soul.  On that basis, a Polis-Soul is part of the World-Soul, and a Person-Soul is part of the Polis-Soul.  But, if the Whole is prior to the Part, Harmony is pre-established, and, so, any inquiry into the nature of Justice must begin by explaining how 'Injustice' is even possible.  Now, there seems to be two general approachs to such an explanation.  First, 'Injustice' is an irreal product of a partial, i. e. incomplete, cognition.  Second, the Parts of a Whole have the capacity for limited scope of free exercise, on the basis of which real uncoordination between Parts can arise.  Accordingly, the role of the Philosopher in the first case is to educate, e. g. via illuminating dialogue, and, in the second, to guide the Polis on the basis of a vision of the Whole.  Now, which of these, if either, might be Platonist Esotericism is unclear.  But less unclear is that those who classify it as an Inegalitarianism, coincidentally similar to their own, lack a full grasp of the scope of the issue.

Thursday, November 9, 2017

Platonic Irony, Language, Thought

The term 'Socratic Irony' is dubious in two respects.  First, the passages from which it originates usually involve a fictional Socrates, and, so, 'Platonic Irony' would be more accurate.  Second, Socrates' professions of ignorance in these passages, may, contrary to the standard interpretation of them, in fact be true, as an expression of his rigorous standards of Knowledge, and, hence, are not ironic.  Now, better evidenced, though more complicated, alternative examples of Platonic Irony are those in which he asserts the inadequacy of Language to Thought.  The first level of Irony in these passages is that he is using Language to deprecate Language.  But, then, a second level emerges--such assertions cannot be the content of mere Thought, since the possibility of Language exceeds Thought.  In other words, the second level of Irony is that such assertions entail, inversely, the subordination of Thought to Language, a thesis explored notably by Derrida.

Wednesday, November 8, 2017

Political Philosophy and Harmony

The primary aim of a Political Philosophy is to define the best Polity, which, even if not actual, serves to evaluate systems that are.  Accordingly, what Plato presents in the Republic is an analysis of what many agree constitutes the best Polity--a condition of universal Harmony.  On his analysis, the fundamental feature of that condition is a one-to-one correspondence between what is liked and what is needed, mediated by his observation that, anticipating Aristotle, personal Happiness consists in the exercise of one's natural abilities.  So, universal Harmony obtains when the Division of Labor that is needed is commensurate with the available talents.  That Plato presents that model patently in the text refutes the interpretation of some that the Republic is not to be taken at face value, since, rather, his true doctrine is esoteric, and just happens to coincide with their self-serving political agenda.  Advocates of that interpretation seem to not understand what the primary aim of Political Philosophy is, instead attributing to Plato a smaller-minded ulterior ambition.

Tuesday, November 7, 2017

Platonism, Beauty, Justice

Some have characterized Plato's Just Polis as a Kallipolis--a beautiful city.  But, regardless of whether or not Plato himself is among them, the characterization is problematic.  For, it suggests a kinship between Justice and Beauty, most likely that each is a kind of Hylomorphic Harmony.  But, Beauty is specifically a Harmony of some Sense-Experience, so to abstract from that dimension of it is to falsify it.  Beauty is a thorny problem for Platonism in general, since that Sensibility is abstracted from in the Intelligible Form of Beauty.  So, the concept of a Kallipolis complicates, not clarifies, the as is convoluted Republic.  More instructive is the formulation that Justice is Harmonious, constituted by the commensuration between needed Division of Labor and the natural abilities of the Citizenry.

Monday, November 6, 2017

Justice and Law

Strongly confirming the contention that Platonism is fundamentally Political Philosophy is the plain fact that by far his two longest works are the Republic and the Laws.  Now, he asserts that while the model of the former might be ideal, that of the latter is inferior but more practicable.  That inferiority can be gleaned from a contrast of Reason and Judgment--the former privileges the Universal over the Particular, while the latter aims to strike a balance between them. Thus, a Law can be Unjust to a Particular in some cases, but its generality is more wieldy than the particularity of Justice.  In any case, the thesis that Platonism is fundamentally Epistemology, Metaphysics, or Theology needs to explain the textual evidence that suggests otherwise.

Sunday, November 5, 2017

The Good, the Dead, the Actual

Perhaps the defining moment of Plato's oeuvre is in book VII, of the Republic, when the escapee from the cave returns.  This signifies that the function in Platonism of the world of Forms is Political, not Ontological, i. e. that its status as a 'better' world befits it as a source of influencing the actual world, rather than as a permanent residence.  Accordingly, even though in the Phaedo, Socrates seems to be asserting that humans are better off dead, those words may just as likely be designed to console his grieving followers.  Instead, the reason for his refusing the exile option may be the simplest one--that he is too old for such a change.  Likewise, comparisons between Socrates and Christ, e. g. Kierkegaard's, tend, in their zeal for afterworldliness, to overlook the mundane fact of the vast age difference at the time of their deaths.  Platonism is fundamentally Political Philosophy, not Theology.

Saturday, November 4, 2017

Platonism and Dialogue

With the banishment of Plato's Political writings to the Political Science Department, Platonism is typically presented in contemporary American academic Philosophy as fundamentally Epistemology, the central thesis of which being that Knowledge is Justified True Belief.  On that basis, Dialogue is an inessential style of presentation.  However, with the Republic, etc. included, the arc of Platonism is from the execution of the wisest man, to the Philosopher-King.  In that context, Epistemology functions to clarify the concept of Wisdom, and Dialogue is a continuation of the Apology, except with the wisest man now the prosecutor rather than the defendant.  And, even as himself an academic, Political Virtue remains for Plato a, if not the, focus of his concept of Philosophy, as is also the case with his star pupil.

Friday, November 3, 2017

Dialectic and Dialogic

As has been previously discussed, Plato and Marx share Political Materialism and property Communalism. But, a primary difference between them is not as absolute as it might seem.  What Marx rejects about Plato's Classism is the thesis that variations in ability are immutable, not that given the predominant Means of Production in a period, Economic hierarchy is unavoidable.  Likewise not absolutely opposed is Dialectical Materialism and Plato's Dialogic.  For, what the former is antithetical to is the Dialectical Idealism of Hegel and Kant, whereas, as the aporetic dialogues indicate, the pattern of that Dialogic is not as contrived and schematic as it is sometimes taken to be.  Accordingly, as an alternative to both Dialectical Materialism and Dialectical Idealism, attributable to Plato might be the thesis that it is concrete Language that is inherently Dialectical.  For, in his system, Dialectics is a property of neither Matter nor Ideas, the former being inert, the latter being changeless.

Thursday, November 2, 2017

Polis and Need

As Plato enumerates the needs to the meeting of which a Polis is a means, he implicitly defines a Polis as an organization of labor.  That definition contrasts sharply with more recent alternatives such as: a means to stop humans from killing each other, part of the path towards the Salvation of a Person-Soul, and a medium for the pursuit of personal happiness.  The second might be especially astonishing to Plato, a grotesque extrapolation of the thesis, in which he occasionally dabbles, of a Soul-Body separation. So, regardless of the influence of Plato on Medievalists, via Augustine, his closest kin among his successors might be one of their staunchest opponents, Marx, for whom, regardless of its Classism, Plato's invention is the prototype of a Polis the Base of which is Economic relations.

Wednesday, November 1, 2017

Species and Mother of Invention

Over the centuries, the passage from Republic, 369C: "Let us create a city from the beginning. . . .Its real creator, as it appears, will be our needs" has been modalized as "Necessity is the mother of our invention", trivialized as "Necessity is the mother of invention", and, more recently, appropriated from for the name of a group of Dadaist musicians.  Accordingly, lost has been the uniqueness of the passage in the history of Political Philosophy.  For, while the foundation of the typical Modern contribution to the genre has been the Happiness-seeking individual person, Plato begins by positing the biological needs of the collective: food, shelter, clothing, etc.  Thus, at the beginning of Political Philosophy, but hardly repeated since, not even later in the Republic, the Species briefly appears as the progenitor of the enterprise.