Good, World-Soul, Organic Unity

One similarity between Plato and Moore is that the former offers no definition of 'Good', while the latter asserts that it is indefinable.  A second is the former's concept of a World-Soul, and the latter's of Organic Unity.  Finally, a third is the lack of connection between, on the one hand Good and World-Soul, and on the other, Good and Organic Unity.  So, unexplored are, on the one hand, if the Idea of the Good is that of the World-Soul, and, on the other, if the indefininability of the Good is that of the distinction between the sum of the Parts and their Whole.  Not similar is their respective concepts of Nature, so that if Plato conceives the World-Soul as 'Natural' it would serve as no indication of whether or not the distinction between the sum of the Parts and the Whole is for Moore likewise 'Natural', with the implication that the Good is indeed 'Natural', contrary to another of his prominent principles.