Platonic Irony, Language, Thought

The term 'Socratic Irony' is dubious in two respects.  First, the passages from which it originates usually involve a fictional Socrates, and, so, 'Platonic Irony' would be more accurate.  Second, Socrates' professions of ignorance in these passages, may, contrary to the standard interpretation of them, in fact be true, as an expression of his rigorous standards of Knowledge, and, hence, are not ironic.  Now, better evidenced, though more complicated, alternative examples of Platonic Irony are those in which he asserts the inadequacy of Language to Thought.  The first level of Irony in these passages is that he is using Language to deprecate Language.  But, then, a second level emerges--such assertions cannot be the content of mere Thought, since the possibility of Language exceeds Thought.  In other words, the second level of Irony is that such assertions entail, inversely, the subordination of Thought to Language, a thesis explored notably by Derrida.