Bergson, Praxis, Morality

Bergson affirms the priority of Intuition over Intellect, and he defines Intellect as a mode of Consciousness conditioned by practical need. Hence, his critique of Intellect is a re-affirmation of the traditional priority of Contemplation over Praxis. However, by segregating Intuition from practical activity, he undermines the potential efficacy of his doctrine. To begin with, by treating the Free Will vs. Determinism debate as a de jure and not a de facto question, he eliminates, from the outset, any possibility of recognizing that some behavior is, in fact, free, and some is, in fact, conditioned. Hence, he preempts the possibility of distinguishing, within the flux of Duration, repetitive data patterns. Therefore, Bergsonian Intuition lacks the capacity to recognize, let alone influence, the conditioned behavior that is typically involved in practical interests. Consequently, his Moral doctrine offers no program for the cultivation of creative conduct, e. g. by equating Intuition and Attention, and promoting attentive behavior. In the absence of any concrete application of Intuition to conduct, his Highest Good is as much a contemplative state as is Aristotle's.