Will, Good, Virtue

While Spinoza's hypothetical 'free' man forms no concept of 'good', it expressedly possesses Virtue, so any characterization of his rational automaton as 'amoral' is inappropriate. Since he conceives 'virtue' as equivalent to 'active behavior', a virtuous person forms no concept of 'good' for the same reason that a healthy person has no need of medicine, i. e. 'X is good' may adequately represent the utility of some thing, but it is inadequate knowledge of Virtue. This subordination of the Good to Virtue aligns Spinoza with Aristotle against Plato, and helps illuminate Nietzsche's 'master' morality as an Ethics of Virtue, not as 'Subjectivism' or 'Immoralism'. Furthermore, the identification of Virtue and Activity grounds Ethics in the very performance of an action. For example, here, the fundamental locus of evaluation is the exercise of Will, i. e. in terms of quantity of Volition, or, equivalently, degree of Evolvement, and not, as is more prominently the case, an abstract idea, an intention, the consequences of action, a feeling, etc.