Naturalism and Human Artifice

Whether or not Spinoza conceives Thought to be inherently Mathematical, his attribution of it to Nature is a direct contrast with Descartes' concept of Thought as Super-Natural.  More generally, the attribution is a cardinal premise of the aspect of his doctrine that has been overshadowed by his Pantheism--what can be classified as Monistic Naturalism.  The under-emphasis of the latter is due to Spinoza's own focus on the God aspect of his principle, to the relative neglect of its Nature and Substance aspects, which together constitute Monistic Naturalism.  Now, as his counter to Descartes signifies, the immediate aim of Monistic Naturalism is the denial of any Super-Nature.  But, over the subsequent centuries, perhaps unanticipated by Spinoza, a second non-Natural realm has emerged--the world of Human artifice and its products, often characterized as 'unnatural', or 'artificial'.  Such characterizations perhaps reflect a Theological legacy--a distinction between God-made Nature and the disobedient Human appropriation of it.  Nevertheless, in a Monistic Naturalism, regardless of their value, all such activity and its products is Natural.  So, one way to forfend such developments from within Spinoza's doctrine is to emphasize that Modes are intra-Natural, as is all their creative activity.