Meaning and Preception

Regardless of how anybody else understands it, a certain patch of green is a mere phenomenon unless one interprets it as a signal for them to move their car forward.  Furthermore, that interpretation is personal, i. e. it incorporates the know-how of the driver, which is, at least in part, constituted by the driver's memories of past experiences.  Hence, such interpretation is Meaning-conferring, and is absolutely unique, i. e. the resulting Meaning is incommensurate with that conferred on the signal by any other driver, by the installers of the light, the jurisprudential system, etc.  Likewise, the Meaning of any verbal signal, e. g. a recipe, travel directions, etc., is peculiar to the one following it.  Now, the term 'Preception' has been introduced here to characterize the awareness of a verbal sequence as a formulation for one to enact, and, furthermore, it has been previously argued here that every Utterance is fundamentally a Signal.  Thus, the primary Meaning of an Utterance is its enactment, with the Preception of it the source of that Meaning.  In their examinations of rule-following, Wittgenstein and Searle each encounter Preception, without appreciating its function in Semantics.