Monism, Dualism, Binaryism

'Monism' traditionally holds that existence consists in one Substance, with its primary alternative, 'Pluralism', positing a multiplicity of Substances, e. g. 'Dualism' is a special case of Pluralism. However, insofar as 'substance' connotes stasis, 'Principle' might more appropriately characterize the basis or bases of existence conceived as dynamic. Hence, in Spinoza's Monism, while he classifies his dynamic God as 'Substance', 'Principle' might be a more appropriate term for it. In any case, his categorization of God as Substance is distinguished from that of Thought and Extension, and possibly others, as 'Attributes' of that Substance. One problem with these categorizations is that Spinoza does not sufficiently explain the Substance-Attribute distinction, given that they are concomitant. In other words, he does not explain why his system is not Pluralistic, consisting of the Principles Thought, Extension, and possibly others, with respect to which 'God' is no more than nominal, i. e. is no more than a name for their combination. In contrast, the system here consists in two fundamental Principles--the Material Principle and the Formal Principle--the infinite varieties of combination of which constitute all existents. Since 'Dualism' prominently denotes systems consisting in two non-interacting Principles, this 'Formaterial' System can be classified as 'Binaryism'.