Will, Freedom, Invention

For both Spinoza and Kant, Freedom is a cardinal principle, fundamentally consisting, in each case , in the achievement of self-control, via the supervention of Reason on external influences. The result, for Spinoza, is the transformation of passive behavior to active versions of the same behavior, whereas, for Kant, it is debatable whether or not Reason accomplishes anything positive beyond that supervention. Neither ideal seems derived from examples of human Inventiveness, despite the more robust expressions of Freedom evinced by creative processes. For, to invent, as introducing novelty into a situation, entails at least some independence from antecedent conditions. Furthermore, it issues in mastery not only over external elements, but over the physiological processes that are involved in that mastery, as well, e. g. the invention of the wheel involved not only mastery over wood, but over the physiological processes entailed in the transformation of tree bark into the first wheel. Here, Will is the ground of such novel physiological processes, so it is the ground of a more robust concept of Freedom than that of Spinoza or of Kant.