Judgment, Language, Private Knowledge

At B 97 of the 1st Critique, Kant uses the word "say" to introduce an expression that he classifies as a 'judgment', the significance of which is that it is evidence, in an otherwise indeterminate exposition, that he conceives judgments to be utterances, in which case, they serve a fundamentally social function.  It follows that insofar as judgments are the modes of expression of Knowledge, Knowledge is fundamentally social, which accords with the concept of the essential sociality of Rational beings that becomes explicit in the 2nd Critique.  But, it is implicit in the 1st Critique, as well.  For, the a priori transcends the a posteriori, e. g. personal differences.  Accordingly, the 'I think' is not only the ground of the unity of Knowledge, but, as anonymous, it is the ground of its sociality, as well.  So, the linguistic character of judgment underscores that for Kant, there is no private Knowledge, as there is in systems that recognize the possibility of intuitive Knowledge.