Judgments and A Priori Knowledge

The possibility, previously proposed here, that, for Kant, judgments are utterances, would seem to conflict with his affirmation of the existence of a priori Knowledge.  For, if judgments are both utterances and the fundamental mode of expression of Knowledge, it would seem to follow that all knowledge is a posteriori, i. e. because utterances are a posteriori.  However, that conclusion depends on what Kant means by 'a priori Knowledge'--1. 'knowledge of truths that are independent of empirical experience', or 2. 'knowledge possessed pre-natally'.  Now, there is little evidence that he joins Plato in subscribing to #2, and even if his position is that humans are pre-programmed with certain 'pure' concepts, the latter are not to be confused with the knowledge that is the product of a process involving them.  On the other hand, there is no incompatibility between a truth and the utterance of it, which is the distinction entailed in the contrast between interpretation #1 and the thesis that all judgments are utterances.  So, that Kant asserts the existence of a priori Knowledge is not necessarily an argument against the possibility that he affirms the latter, as well.